UGEC 2690 Lecture 8 - HK & TAIWAN PDF

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UGEC 2690 Spring, 2018 HK & TAIWAN Required reading: 1. <How China Lost Taiwan> by Nick Frisch, New York Times, Jan 27, 2016 2. <The charts that show how Trump’s ‘One China’ statements could jeopardize Taiwan’s economy>, by ...

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UGEC 2690 Spring, 2018 HK & TAIWAN Required reading: 1. by Nick Frisch, New York Times, Jan 27, 2016 2. , by Josh Horwitz, Dec 15, 2016

** HK/TAIWAN 1. Beijing has recently lumped “HK independence” with “Taiwan independence”. While the HK model of one country, two systems has completely collapsed for Taiwan, the influence has reciprocated: HK has apparently subconsciously copied Taiwan's localism drive for a "HK First" if not HK independence campaign. 2. Tsai Ing-wen's presidential victory was also a morale booster for HK's democracy fight. With blood-thicker-than-water politics remaining popular with Chinese people in general, Taiwan is now not just a popular tourist but also an EMIGRATION destination for Hongkongers. 3. It is understood that thousands of missile warheads in Fujian are still stationed and directed at Taiwan, which has hinted that once attacked, they would probably fire back at HK as it would be an easier, and more international target. -----------------------------------** CROSS-STRAIT (兩岸) Beijing has been issuing intermittent warnings to Taipei, telling it to behave or face possible war. Since Tsai Ing-wen's Democratic Progressive Party (DPP 民進黨) presidential and legislative victory in 2016, Beijing has been keeping a wary eye over Taiwan, which experienced a "localism" drive (playing the identity card) more than a decade ago. Taiwan now also undergoes an anti-Mainlandisation trend, which aims to ward off chiefly mainland economic impact. With the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist 國民黨) government now in opposition in Taipei, Beijing would be more alert to any Taiwan independence sentiments. The brief but overwhelming "Sunflower Movement" featuring students storming into the parliament was triggered by bilateral trade deals which were seen by the protesters as favouring the China side and "betraying" Taiwan, amounting to an "economic takeover". Money ties have been boosted by the signing of ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 兩岸經濟合作架構協 定), the most important bilateral pact since 1949. Two-way trade now amounts to be some US$100 billion-plus a year.

- Back in 2010, Beijing would appear angry over a new round of US ARMS SALES to Taiwan. The arms involved were however chiefly defensive in nature. US then president Barack Obama was performing “a balancing act” with Beijing. - In the same year, ex-president Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) extended an OLIVE BRANCH to Taiwan, especially to the then DPP. Hu’s speech marked the 30th anniversary of “A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan”, issued by Beijing on January 1, 1979. In his speech, Hu said to help stabilize cross-Strait relations, both sides should have political talks and could “explore setting up a mutually trusted military and security mechanism”. - Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping (習近平) , though tipped a tougher hardliner, is still expected to toe the status quo (維持視狀) line. With the departure of Ma Ying Jeou (馬英九), Beijing is likely to adopt a wait-and-see attitude over the Taiwan issue for a long time to come. In the shorter run, however, Beijing seems obviously keen to overpower Taiwan at least economically. -----------------------------------** REGIONAL/INTERNATIONAL: The U.S. and Japan jointly declared, in 2005, that they have a “common strategic objective” in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. This was in response to China's then-upcoming passage of its anti-secession (反分離) law aimed at Taiwan. Beijing calls it anti-secession, Taiwan calls it annexation (吞併). The Taiwan question may seem the BIGGEST THORN in Sino-American ties. While it remains unclear whether Trump would still want to “contain” (圍堵) China, or if he still needs Beijing’s cooperation in world issues, including anti-terror and North Korea fights, China will hold “One China” as its bottom line in all fronts. And Sino-Japanese relationship remains less than warm. While Japan has called China its key national defence target, the on-going dispute over the Diaoyu/SenkakuIslands have certainly made things worse. The U.S. has its largest military deployment in Japan in the whole of Asia. -------------------------------------------------** HISTORICAL: 1. One-China Vs. Self-determination for Taiwan: Beijing wants reunification, Taiwan says no. Ma Ying-jeou had maintained a “3 No policy" - No reunification, No independence, No war. (不 統不獨不武) via-a-vis Beijing and a general policy of befriending China and Japan but "being close" with the U.S. (和中、友日，親美)。Tsai Ing-wen has managed to retain this status quo. 2. China-Taiwan relations have been marked by war of words for decades, with Beijing wielding the threat of military action on and off. For Beijing, Taiwan is not only a political “face and blood” issue, but also a factor in its power-core struggles. 3. Beijing's biggest success of “reining in” Taiwan has been on the diplomatic front, now with

only a tiny handful of small countries in the international community recognizing Taiwan as the Republic of China. 4. Chiang Kai-sek (蔣介石) had conducted an autocratic type of ruling in Taiwan, some called it “white terror”. His son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) bettered the situation. Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) showed tendency towards Taiwan independence and Chen Shui-bian(陳水扁) had once taken an even harder line on the issue. 5. Taiwan's political mentality has shifted from “invade and retake the mainland” (反攻大陸) in the early days, to now “defend Taiwan” (保衛台灣). Commercially though there's been rampant cross-Strait integration since 1979. 6. Deng Xiaoping's “One Country, Two System” concept was first brought up for Taiwan, but which gets little welcome there -- in part due to the failure of the HK model. While HK has no choice on the two-system, Taiwanese see no reason to acknowledge “what's already ours” to become “what you bestow on us”. 7. Historically Taiwan was not quite “always a part of China” as Beijing claims. Historical records show that the majority of inhabitants on the island had been of Malayan, Polynesian-type of origin until the 19th century. Taiwan also came under a 50-year Japanese rule in the last century. Today, while feeling “Chinese” culturally, most Taiwanese’ political identity is one of Taiwan. Public opinion polls over the years have been consistent, with the majority of Taiwanese wanting to keep the status quo - de facto independence, a quasi state. --------------------------------------------------

** WHAT NEXT: 1. It is not at all likely that Beijing can go it alone when dealing with Taiwan, ignoring Japanese and US interests in the region. 2. A cross-Strait war is thus not expected any time soon, as it would prove too big a price to pay for Beijing – from ideological warfare to economic, diplomatic and military costs. Pragmatism/Machiavellianism should again apply. All parties concerned seem to be adopting a policy of strategic ambiguity. And Jiang Zemin's previous so-called 8-point policy on Taiwan actually stated “Chinese do not attack Chinese”. 3. Similar scenarios elsewhere: - England Vs Scotland - Canada Vs Quebec - Russia Vs Chechyna (車臣)....