Voluntary Intoxication Essay Question PDF

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Essay on Voluntary Intoxication...

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DPP v Majewski is the leading authority on Voluntary Intoxication. The rule in which it sets out however represents an uneasy imbalance that favours public policy over fundamental principles of Criminal Law. However, recent attempts at reform have only served to further complicate the law and consequently highlighting Majewski harsh but practical application.

Voluntary Intoxication is the voluntary consumption of alcohol or drugs. It is not a criminal defence in the traditional sense. The rule set out in Majewski sets out that Voluntary Intoxication may provide a partial defence to a Defendant lacking MR for a crime of specific intent but is no defence to a crime of basic intention regardless of whether D had MR or not. Generally, a Specific Intent offence is defined as an offence that requires the defendant had the necessary intent with the potential that D’s intoxication may amount to a negation of the MR. Basic Intent offences involve recklessness. Voluntary Intoxication will never negate MR as the act of voluntary intoxication itself will constitute the required MR. On the basis that, as described by Lord Edmund-Davies, by voluntarily consuming alcohol or illegal drugs, D is taking the risk of potentially losing awareness and further committing a crime, which is a form of recklessness. By doing this it is possible to foresee that they may commit a crime (R v Kingston).

The Majewski rule underpins two policy considerations. Firstly, society must be protected from violence committed by an intoxicated person as they would if it was committed by a sober person. And that it is morally justifiable to hold such intoxicated persons responsible for criminal behaviour, as they chose to become intoxicated themselves. English criminal requires both the physical act and the consideration of D's state of mind. The latter of which becoming problematic in the context of voluntary intoxication. As it can prevent the formation of MR. A balance must be struck. Between the “strictly logically” approach which seeks to uphold fundamental principles of Criminal Law by requiring intoxication always being considered and it is discharging criminal liability if it prevents the formation of MR. And the “absolutist” approach that would facilitate an intoxicated person avoiding culpability when a sober person would not. Consequently, failing to both deter the behaviour and protect the public (Law Commission).

A desirable balance has not been achieved. Firstly, what constitutes a crime of specific intent and basic intent is uncertain. In Majewski, Lord Simon distinguished the two on the basis that the MR of a specific intent crime requires proof of a purposive element whilst Lord Elwyn-Jones stated that specific intent crimes are those crimes that cannot be committed recklessly. Caldwell referred to the wording of the charge. If the charge only required intention, then it was a specific intent crime. The use of a lesser MR or not at all constituted basic intent. In R v Heard it was held that crimes of specific intent are those where the offence requires proof of purpose or consequence, an ulterior MR. It highlights the terms 'specific intent' and 'basic intent' might not be suitable for every offence. There is no logical test for distinguishing between the distinction and policy dictates the decision.

Majewski also undoubtedly compromises fundamental principles of Criminal Law in favour of the advancement of Public Policy objectives. The competing interests of protecting and deterring the public from dangerous behaviour have resulted in the legal principles that impose guilt and criminal liability being compromised. For example, s76(5) of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 for self-defence mistaken belief cannot be the result of voluntary intoxication. Thus creating an assumption of guilt that contravenes the principle that both MR and AR are required to establish guilt for a crime (Haughton v Smith). Majewski dictates that D is presumed reckless if he voluntarily becomes intoxicated. The Majewski rule also leads to the MR being formed before both intoxication and the AR. Despite the criminal law principle dictating that AR and MR must coincide to establish guilt.

Despite the evident issues attempts at reform have done nothing but further complicate the law. R v Heard setting out the requirement of an ulterior MR is arguably less straightforward than Majewski. It complicates the categorisation of offences by essentially allowing an offence that contains no element of intent to be one of Specific intention by way of the existence of an ulterior MR. It limits the use of Voluntary Intoxication by requiring ulterior MR.

Taj expanded the scope of Majewski to the detriment of Defendants. By holding that voluntary intoxication provides the MR for crimes of basic intent where D was not intoxicated but instead was suffering from the ‘immediate and proximate consequences’ of intoxication when committing the crime. The lack of clarity as to what exactly constitutes ‘proximate’ may lead to further usurping of principle that the MR and AR must coincide for guilt to be established as Majewski required the prosecution to prove MR if D was not intoxicated at the time of the basic intent crime. Child also highlighted that the Law Commission’s recommendations for reform fail to address the courts inability to distinguish specific and basic intent offences objectively. Its attempt to replicate the distinction with a focus on individual external elements rather than offences will ultimately not remedy the uncertainty....