1-Actus-reus - Summary Criminal Law PDF

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Whole of Actus Reus. Includes all the cases as well. Regarding the conduct element of a crime. ...

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1 – Actus Reus GENERAL Definitions  AR: The conduct element of the offence  MR: The mental element of the offence (intention, recklessness, negligence) Law  Both AR and MR to be fulfilled to be guilty Three components of AR 1. Proof that D did a particular act 2. Proof that the act caused a particular result 3. Proof that the act/result occurred in certain circumstances Conduct crimes vs Result Crimes  Conduct crimes: Only need proof that the D did the act (1) o Eg. Possession of prohibited drugs  Result Crimes: Requires (1) and (2) o Eg. Murder requires proof that D’s act caused the death of the victim

VOLUNTARINESS Voluntary act requirement  General rule: proof of a voluntary act is required for actus reus  Exceptions (there are so many that G. Williams argued the rule does not exist o 1) Omissions (later) o 2) Crimes that only proof of state of affairs  D is guilty for being in a particular situation  E.g possession of drugs/weapons, being drunk while in charge of a vehicle  Larsonneur (1933) o 3) Actions of another  Doctrine of innocent agency  If A causes B (who is insane or a child) to cause harm to another, A is criminally responsible for the consequences of B’s act  more in Complicity Larsonneur [1933]  Summary o D was convicted of the offence of being found in the UK contrary to the Aliens order 1920. D was supposed to leave the UK by a certain date, which she did and went to the Irish free state but was forcibly returned to the UK against her will.  Process

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o Successful conviction as offence was a strict liability offence (no mens rea needed) o Even though actus reus happened to D, D is still guilty Learning points o Situational liability, D need not even fulfill the AR and MR but was still charged

Hill v Baxter [1958]  Summary: o D drives across a road junction, ignoring the ‘halt’ sign and collided with a motorcar. D claimed he had a “blackout”, and became unconscious due to being overcome by a sudden illness.  Process o Initially, justices believed D that he was not conscious of what he was doing  not capable of forming an intention as to his manner of driving  dismissed D’s charges o Appeal  justices agreed that there the burden of proof also rested on the D to show proof of the epileptic fit, but was no evidence showing D was not fully responsible for his actions  Appeal Allowed. o *Argued that the mens rea not important as regardless if D had a guilty mind or not, dangerous driving was absolutely prohibited (strict liability offence  only actus reus matters  thus the defence must show that unconsciousness led to lack of AR)  Learning points o Lord Goddard: “Circumstances are such that the accused could not really be said to be driving at all; …a stroke or an epileptic fit”  Automatism involves more than a denial of mens rea, it is also a denial of actus reus o Lord Devlin: 2 types of mental irresponsibility  1) involuntary act not due to disease of mind temporary unconsciousness that is accidental  safe to acquit the D via defence of automatism  2) Involuntary act due to a recurrent disease of the mind  chance that it happens again  defence of insanity  acquittal is given in illogical form of the verdict “guilty but insane” Bratty v AG for N Ireland [1963]  Summary o D charged with murdering a girl by strangulation. D claimed to be unconscious of what he was doing at the time, based on evidence that he suffered from psychomotor epilepsy.  Process o Initially went with defence of insanity  rejected o Appeal to instead use defence of automatism  Appeal refused by the CA in N. Irelend

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o Conclusion: If the only cause alleged for the unconsciousness is a defect of reason from disease of the mind (insanity)  there can be no room for alternative defence of automatism as no pathological evidence Learning points o Lord Denning: “the requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential… in every criminal case” + “No act is punishable if it is done involuntarily” o Application of the M’Naghten rules in Criminal Court (Test for criminal insanity)  To establish defence of insanity within these rules, must prove:  1) A defect of reason from a disease of the mind  2) As a consequence of such a defect  ignorance of the nature/quality of the wrongful act OR If aware of nature/quality of the act  so deranged that was unaware of the wrongfulness of the act o Automatism (Lord Denning)  An act done by the muscles without any control by the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action, lack of consciousness”  Does NOT include  Not remembering it afterwards (as at the time of action was conscious)  Cannot control my impulse to do it (as he knew what he was doing)  Simply because it is unintentional or consequences were unforeseen

AG’s Reference (no 2 of 1992)  Summary o D was driving a heavy good lorry and crashed into a stationary van, killing 2 people. D produced medical evidence showing that he had a condition of ‘driving without awareness’ hence amounted to automatism  Process o Initially D was acquitted by the jury o AG Appealed  Appeal allowed  Learning points o Issue  Whether ‘driving without awareness’ could validate a defense of automatism o Law: 2 factors to be considered  1) Per Judicial precedent, Automatism = COMPLETE loss of voluntary control  2) Difference between insane automatism and non-insane automatism  If involuntary due to internal causes (insanity)  brought within the M’Naghten Rules  verdict of ‘not guilty due to insanity’ (changed since Hill v Baxter)

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If involuntary from external causes  D should be acquitted

o Application  Lord Taylor:  Medical evidence pointed to large unawareness, but not total unawareness  Hence, although the involuntariness in this case was arguably from external factors (motorway conditions as a trigger), per R v Burgess (1991 – case of sleepwalking - considered an internal cause), there should be ‘proper evidential foundation for the defense of automatism  lacking in this case as no complete loss of control

OMISSIONS Introduction  Generally standard legal doctrine stipulates that there should be positive action for actus reus  Omissions are usually not included as AR – Why? 1) Value of autonomy in society – prohibition of omissions is far more intrusive upon autonomy than prohibition of specific acts 2) Slippery slope  how much omissions to prohibit to prevent harm to others (cannot omit donations now also?) 3) Individuals will give greater priority to their own lives and those of the people around them. We limit the extent to which strangers take precedence over our own interests and presumption against omissions liability recognises this Should there be criminal liability for Omissions? 1. Social responsibility view

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a. YES: Ashworth: There should be a ‘duty of easy rescue’ (in The scope of criminal liability for omissions (1989)) i. When rescuing someone would have little danger to yourself  duty will arise e.g. in cases of child neglect ii. Duty to take reasonable steps towards law enforcement iii. Corroborated by French Criminal Code which penalizes someone who voluntarily neglects to give assistance to someone in peril or prevent a serious crime iv. *Sympathy for those fearful of personal danger  public should not be asked to do unreasonable things b. YES: Ashworth: Statutes that appear only to include acts should be extended to Omissions in breach of duty, as courts sometimes do and sometimes don’t interpret active verbs to include omissions i. *Heavily criticized by Williams: Failing aptly worded legislation, we still should maintain the rule that statutory words are to be given their ordinary meaning unless the context indicates a different intention  Policy decisions on whether to include Omissions should be left to legislature c. YES: No difference between Omission and an Act i. Both Omission and act results in the same result. Even if it can be argued that Omissions lead to less culpability, it does not make them any less worthy of criminalization ii. Ashworth: There is no fundamental moral distinction between failing to perform an act with foreseen bad consequences and performing the act with identical bad foreseen consequences d. YES: Social good outweighs principle of autonomy i. Utilitarian mindset  greater social welfare from criminalizing omissions outweigh potential negatives from “infringing” freedom ii. Ashworth: “Value of one citizen’s life is generally greater than the value of another citizen’s temporary freedom’ iii. Besides, principle of autonomy is not absolute (e.g. we must wear out seatbelts) iv. *Potential improvement: to craft Omissions liability such that while it may hinder negative liberty (freedom wrt the number of options open), it stays clear of hindering positive liberty (possession of power and resources to fulfil one’s own personal potential and goals) 2. Conventional View (orthodox, traditional view) a. NO: Syncing Omissions and actions in statutes would reduce ambiguity in court interpretation i. Glanville: Syncing omissions and Actions in statutes would remove the complexity inherent in every case that results in varying interpretations. ii. More seriously, the statute’s words, however poorly worded, should be taken for its literal meaning, and should not be tweaked by the judiciary, as that role belongs to Parliament and it’s legislation

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b. NO: Principle of freedom i. By not criminalizing omissions, the government gives public members the autonomy they deserve to lead what they believe to be a life with high standard of living. ii. Ashworth “one aim of the law is to maximise individual liberty, so as to allow each individual to pursue a conception of the good life with as few constraints as possible” iii. Williams criticises Ashworth’s proposal of a duty to assist law enforcement because “it would turn us all by force into subsidiary policemen and tell-tales” c. NO: Actions and omissions are fundamentally different i. Glanville: A doctor letting a patient die as opposed to a murder sinking a knife into the same person may both lead to the same result if omissions is criminally liable, but they are both fundamentally different ii. In Airedale NHS Trust v Bland , HOL deemed it legal for the omission of life-sustaining treatment to a patient who was in a vegetative state, and that there was no breach of any duty of care. d. NO: To do so would be unpractical and breach many legal principles i. The social responsibility view is too wide. It is unpractical to criminalise anybody who stands witness to a crime and does not take any reasonable steps to counter it, as it would simply criminalise an excess amount of people ii. Law enforcement are already busy dealing with active conduct, trying to regulate omissions “would exceed the bounds of possibility” (Williams) iii. This is in breach with the principle of minimal criminalisation, which seeks to preserve the severity of criminal liability by minimising the parameters to commit an offence. Exceptions where omission is sufficient for actus reus 1. Statutory duty a. Companies Act 2006 criminalizing the failure to file annual returns 2. Duties of law enforcement a. Police officers are under a duty to assist public members in danger  failure to do that constitutes an offence (e.g. in R v Dytham (1979) when a PO failed to protect a citizen who was being kicked to death) 3. Contractual duty a. Contractual duty to help/ do something  under a duty under criminal law (e.g. Pittwood) 4. Duties imposed by a special relationship with the victim a. Special = greater-than-general legal duty to the victim b. Decisive factor in these cases is whether the D is responsible for V’s welfare (less importance on the exact label of the relationship)  Stone and Dobinson (1977)

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5. Duties imposed by a relationship to the harm / Creation of danger a. Where unless D intervenes, his earlier (positive) act will bring about a criminally prohibited harm  Miller (1983) b. R v Evans (2009) 6. Duties imposed by the assumption of responsibility a. Usually professional responsibility (e.g. doctor) b. Ashworth: Assumption of responsibility can derive from an explicit statement or agreement, or it can be inferred from a settled relationship of mutual interdependence c. Stone and Dobinson (1997) 7. Continuing act doctrine a. Not strictly omissions liability b. Extends the time frame of an AR if one omits to remedy it, such that is coincides with the requisite MR + suggests that omission to remedy implies MR  R v Fagan (1969) c. Lord Diplock: Dangerous departure from the maxim " actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea." The maxim has always been understood to mean that actus reus and mens rea should be contemporaneous. If applied generally, it could condemn an accused for an act that he committed without mens rea whereas the crime for which he was convicted required it. R v Stone and Dobinson [1977]  Summary o Ds’ (a man and his mistress) were charged with manslaughter by negligence of the man’s sister, V. Sister came to live in their house and started becoming infirm and anxious about her weight  several health complications. Ds’ made ineffectual attempts to seek medical help  V eventually died  Process o Initially convicted, then appealed against conviction on grounds that there was no 1) legal duty of care + 2) recklessness was insufficiently proved o Appeal dismissed  Learning points o Lord Geoffrey LJ  1) Legal duty of care: Whether V was a lodger or not in the property, she was blood related to D, thus sibling relationship + assumed duty of care for the mistress as Ds assisted in the provision of V’s basic needs, and did not place her in the care of others  implicit that they accepted legal duty of care  2) Grossly negligent  no effort made to call ambulance / inform social services or police  Omission likely cause of death as had the V received medical attention 3 weeks prior, per medical reports  good chance of recovery o *Contention

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Should have included defence for diminished mental capacity? Man was partially deaf, almost blind with a low IQ

R v Miller [1983]  Summary o D was charged with arson. D fell asleep, dropping his lit cigarette on the mattress. Upon waking up, he moved to another room to sleep without taking any actions to extinguish the fire.  Process o Initially convicted o Appeal dismissed (conviction upheld)  Learning points o Based on definition of arson in CDA, it is a “result-crime”  means crime is complete only when conduct of D has caused property belonging to another to be destroyed/damaged o Issue  Whether the AR of arson is present when a D accidentally starts a fire and thereafter, intending to destroy or damage property belonging to another or being reckless (Caldwell recklessness applies) as to whether any such property would be destroyed or damaged, fails to take any steps to extinguish the fire or prevent damage to such property by the fire. o Law  The D’s physical act must have started the fire which spread and damaged property o Application  Since it’s a result crime, there is a considerable period  both passive and active actions in this case lead to the fire, and the state of mind throughout this entire period is considered.  *AR: Since the D started the fire in the mattress, later upon being aware of it presenting a risk of damaging the house, because under a duty to take some action to put it out  but D did not  AR “to take measures that lie within one’s one power to counteract a danger that one has oneself created” Fagan v MPC [1969]  Summary o D was charged with assault. D was stopped by V, a police officer, and was signaled to park his car. In doing so, D accidentally drove over V’s foot and allowed it to remain there despite initial protestation by V.  Process o D was charged initially o Appeal dismissed  Learning points o Issue  Whether subsequent inception of MR capable of converting original unintentional act into an assault

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o Law  MR can be superimposed on the AR and vice versa only in a continuing act  If an act is completed no future mens rea can be applied to the act o Application  Lord Parker CJ (majority)  Where assault involves battery, it does not matter whether the injury is inflicted by the body of the offender or though some other medium controlled by the action of the offender  Mere omission =/= assault. Thus, important that D’s act did not end simply after driving over the foot  Refusal to remove the car = continuation of the act, hence MR (where D kept the car there deliberately) did correspond with AT  Lord Bridge (dissents)  There was no act done by D after driving over the foot that can constitute assault  was a simple omission that cannot result in an offence.as it lacks AR R v Pittwood (1902)  Summary o D was employed as a gatekeeper on a railway line  failed to perform his duties by not closing the gate when required  accident that led to collision of a train and a cart  a man (V) died. o D was successfully charged with manslaughter  required under his contract of employment to ensure the gate was shut  omission was in breach of contractual duty.  Learning points o Although the contractual duty was owed to the third party (employer), not V, per Ashworth: “a contractual duty per se is a sufficient basis for criminal liability for an omission, no matter to whom it is owed”

Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993]  Summary o Bland was a 17-year old injured via football  persistent vegetative state  no hoped of any improvement. Consultant, with support of the parents sought a declaration from the court permitting the discontinuation of all life-sustaining treatment  Process o HOL (Lord Goff) held that turning of life support would not be murder  and can be categorised as an omission  not a breach of duty by the doctor, because he is not obliged to continue in a hopeless case. o Lord Browne-Wilkinson: Turning off life support has the mens rea for murder, but no actus reus as there is no positive act  omission

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is not in breach of duty because the treatment is no longer in the best interest of the patient  ending dury of care Learning points (Lord Goff) o Principle of the sanctity of human life  recognized in art 2 of the ECHR  Not absolute  some lawful circumstances to take another’s life (e.g. via self-defence or lawful execution) o Principle of self-determination  Respect given to wishes of Patient, who must be an adult of sound mind  if P refuses treatment through which his life is prolonged, the Doctor has to give effect to his wishes, even if doctor does not consider it to be in the best interests of the patient  principle of sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination o Omission vs positive act  Omission = Doctor deciding not to provide treatment to Patient that might prolong his life based on P’s consent  no breach of duty to his patient  Positive act = Doctor administering a lethal drug to actively bring the patient’s life to an end (even if doctor is merely trying to end patient’s suffering)  *An interloper (a person being involved in a situation they are not wanted in) who maliciously switches off life support is not considered an omission, as the doctor is simply allowing his patient to die of his pre-existing condition, but the interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging the patient’s life.

R v Evans [2009]  Summary o A woman (D) who failed to summon help for her 16-year old sister (V) who collapsed after taking heroin supplied by D  charged with manslaughter (In appeal, conviction upheld)  Learning points o D contributed to the harm to V by creating the dangerous situation via supplying the drugs  “When a person has created or contributed to the creation of a state of affairs which he knows or ought reasonably to know, has become life threatening, a consequent duty on him to act by taking reasonable steps to save the other’s life will normally arise”  D breached that duty o Criticism  Over-widens criminal li...