1000C - Study Questions - Exam 1 (Descartes\' Dualism, Early Materialism) PDF

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Dr. Vadim Batitsky. Study guide for the tests that he gives throughout the semester. ...

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PHILOSOPHY 1000C Exam #1 STUDY QUESTIONS Philosophy: the study of theories of knowledge Validity: The premise and conclusion happen to be true (logical relation) (WEAK) Soundness: The premises are valid and true. (TRUTH). I. Descartes’ arguments for dualism What is dualism? Concept that reality as a whole is: physical material vs mental (spiritual)

What is the dualist’s conception of the mind and mental objects (states)? Nonphysical substance that thinks, wills, understands, senses and feels. Does not take up space and have no location. Only you can experience your mental state. CANT BE BOTH PHYSICAL AND MENTAL

What are rigid designators? Proper names designate the same object in every possible world

What is special about identity statements “x = y” when both x and y are rigid designators? not only is true in the actual world, but also is true in every possible world (necessarily true or opposite necessarily false)

How do such identity statements differ from those in which at least one of x, y is not a rigid designator (but is a description instead)? is not necessarily true. Different possibilities for descriptions in possible worlds.

What are the definitions of each of the three notions of possibility: epistemic, logical, physical? Can you give at least one example of each of these three notions?

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Epistemic: it concerned what is possible relative to what you know. You have no knowledge to rule out an answer. (Is an unknown number even or odd) “for all I know” possibility Logical: To say that something (a thing, event, processes – call it X) is logically possible is to say that X does not involve any logical contradictions. (only possibility that will help make Descartes argument work) Logically impossible: statements contradict. (Headless professor vs square circle) Physical: To say that something (a thing, event, processes – call it X) is physically possible is to say that (the existence or the occurrence of) X does not conflict with any laws of science. (life on other planets vs headless professor)

Does epistemic possibility of X guarantee the logical possibility of X? If not, can you give an example of a statement whose truth is epistemically possible, but not logically possible? The epistemic possibility of X does not guarantee the logical possibility of X. (An unknown number can be odd or even but it can’t be both).

What is Descartes’ Argument from Disembodied Existence? (i) If I (Descartes) can “clearly and distinctly understand” (imagine or conceive) my mind and my body as being distinct, then it is possible that they are distinct. (ii) If it is possible that mind ≠ body, then mind ≠ body. (iii) I can “clearly and distinctly understand” my mind and my body as being distinct. __________________________________________________ Therefore, my mind and my body are distinct as a matter of fact.

What is the logical fact about identity statements involving rigid designators? What notion of possibility is presupposed by this logical fact? What role does this logical fact play in Descartes’ Argument from Disembodied Existence? Necessarily True or Necessarily false If x = y, then it is necessary that x = y. (6) If it is possible that mind ≠ body, then mind ≠ body.

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The logical fact (6) will allow him to conclude that the mind and the body are distinct as a matter of fact (or, as he puts it, “in reality”).

If we agree that Descartes conceives (understands, thinks about) the mind and the body in completely different terms, does this guarantee the logical possibility of “mind ≠ body”? If not, why not? (Would the example of ‘heat versus motion’ in Handout 2 be relevant?) That such understanding establishes only the epistemic possibility of the mind being distinct from the body. Epistemic possibility does not guarantee logical possibility.

Would a materialist agree that so-called “out of body” experiences amount to imagining existence without the body? If not, why not? No, Materialist believe that mind and body are the same, so if the body is unconscious so is the mind.

What is Leibniz Law? How is Leibniz Law used in Descartes’ Divisibility Argument? A Logical Law of Identity Relation. If x=y, then x and y have the same properties Leibniz Law: The Mind lacks the property that all materials have.

What are the two premises of Divisibility Argument? 1. All material entities are divisible. 2. Minds are not divisible Therefore, Mind ≠ Body

What is the Modularity of Mind Hypothesis (MOMH)? What kind of evidence do we have for MOMH? Which premise of Descartes Divisibility Argument is challenged by MOMH? How does MOMH challenge Descartes’ reliance on introspection in Divisibility Argument? The mind consists of a number of specialized and independent modules that preform specific tasks.

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Evidence: someone suffers from brain damage, they have lost some specific mental capacity, while retaining all other mental capacities to their normal level 2nd premise is challenged ! Introspection is not reliable, the person has no knowledge of loss of a module.

What is Descartes’ Argument from Introspection? Does Descartes use Leibniz Law in this argument? If so, how? Descartes implies that it does not even make sense to speak of the mind as divisible into parts. While he could make sense of speaking about 1/3rd of his body, it would be utterly nonsensical to speak of 1/3rd of the mind. Descartes: 1. Mental States are knowable through introspection 2. States of the body are not knowable through introspection Therefore, by Leibniz Law: Mind ≠ Body

How does Paul Churchland object to Argument from Introspection? It needs to be tested scientifically to be proven correct

How can we object to Argument from Introspection by using our discussion (in Handout 3) of the limitations and unreliability of introspection as the source of knowledge about the mind? If people can’t notice/know that they've lost some important mental capacity then introspection is not reliable.

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II. Materialism: Initial Considerations What is Materialism? Everything in the world is part of the physical world. Created from atoms.

How does Thomas Hobbes describe the nature of mental states (such as perceptions, thoughts, etc.)? Does Hobbes’ description of the mind make him a materialist? We can give an account of the mental features of human persons in purely physical terms, w/o any need to appeal to non-material substance. The brain is the reason the mind exists.

What is the so-called Leibniz Mill objection to the materialist conception of the mind? Does Leibniz Mill objection claim that materialism is impossible in practice (because we can never get complete knowledge about physical, material processes in the body)? Or does this objection claim that materialism is impossible in principle (because even complete knowledge about the physical world, including the body, would not explain mental states)? How does the mind exist in the material world ? it’s just science This objection claim that materialism is impossible in principle: materialists are wrong to suppose that thinking is the sort of thing that physical systems and their properties could instantiate.

How can materialists respond to the claim that materialism does not and cannot explain the mind? Specifically, would the materialist agree that his approach to the mind is less likely to lead to a successful explanation of the mind than the dualist’s approach to the mind as an “immaterial thinking substance”? If not, why not?

Why is explaining how a non-physical thing could think and have sensations any less difficult to understand. Dualists struggle to explain why the mind thinks.

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