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5. Epistemological scepticism raises a challenge to the assumption that we are able to obtain knowledge. What are the main arguments for epistemological scepticism? What are the most significant consequences of epistemological scepticism? Is it possible to meet the challenge raised by epistemolog...

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PHIL30016 2019 5. Epistemological scepticism raises a challenge to the assumption that we are

able to obtain knowledge. What are the main arguments for epistemological scepticism? What are the most significant consequences of epistemological scepticism? Is it possible to meet the challenge raised by epistemological scepticism?

Epistemological scepticism is less so a specific theory or school of thought, than a general attitude of doubt. Scepticism covers a wide range of different positions. Some forms of scepticism question our ability to be justified in believing certain things whilst others doubt our ability to know certain things, or even to have any knowledge about anything at all. In this essay, I will be concerning myself mainly with the form of scepticism dealing with the Problem of the External World. Simply, the problem of the external world is the question of whether we can have any knowledge of the world around us at all (Stroud, 1984), including that of its existence, and that of the nature of external objects. The sceptics would conclude that we can’t know anything about the external world (Stroud, 1984). In what follows, I will summarize the main arguments that the sceptics have put forth to support the above conclusion – specifically the arguments stemming from Descartes’ Meditations and the arguments put forth by Sextus Empiricus. I will then examine two responses to this problem: namely, Moore’s ‘Proof of an external world’ and Schiffer’s ‘Contextual Solutions to Scepticism’. I will use these responses to show why I believe it is possible to meet the challenges raised by scepticism. An important sceptical viewpoint is that of Pyrrhonism (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism). They propose a set of ten arguments, called ‘Modes’ targeted at the contradictions in the way the objects are perceived through sense experience. I will look at several modes: the first is that the same things are perceived differently between human beings and other animal species owing to the fact that there are differences in their sense organs. Even among human beings, the same objects impress upon us in different ways. This is easily shown to be true through use of a simple case: a person who is totally colour-blind will not perceive, say, a painting in the same way as a person who is not colour-blind. Furthermore, each of our senses— touch, smell, taste, sight and hearing— also respond differently to the same thing. A perfume may smell sweet, but taste bitter. Our circumstances, disposition, locations or distances from an object all change how we view it. It may be possible to attempt to resolve these contradictions by trying to create a criterion with which to judge how to accurately interpret the objects we sense. However, by doing this, we invite the problem of how we would set up and justify an

PHIL30016 2019 acceptable criterion, and we fall into a trilemma: we could adopt a criterion through unjustified assumption (which is, as previously stated, unjustified), appeal to another criterion (which brings up the problem of infinite regress), or we try to justify the criterion by appealing to itself, which is just circular reasoning. Thus, it isn’t possible to set up a viable criterion, leading to the conclusion that the way an object appears to be (to us) may not be what, in reality, the object really is. As a result of this, Sextus argues that we should suspend judgement on our beliefs of the essential nature of an object. Since we can agree that justified true belief is a vital part of knowledge (whether it is knowledge or not remains a separate matter), by arguing that our beliefs should be withheld, Pyrrhonism inadvertently denies that we can have knowledge about external objects. Major arguments for scepticism are brought up by Descartes’ ‘ Meditations’ . Descartes presents us with an extremely sceptical view of the existence of the external world. He first calls into question everyday sense experience, stating that his senses have deceived him occasionally, and that one should never trust completely something that has deceived him once (Descartes, 1984). He then proceeds to take his doubts even further by questioning if he is actually in a dream. Further still, he proposes a scenario in which an evil and extremely cunning demon (Descartes, 1984) has trapped him in an illusion. The modern day equivalent of the evil demon thought experiment is the brain in the vat (BIV). Sceptics argue that we wouldn’t know whether we are in such a situation or not. We aren’t able to tell if the world around us is real, or a simulation. There is really no way for us to prove that we are a BIV in the case that we really are a BIV. Thus, the existence of the external world is uncertain. Descartes and many others argue that certainty is a requirement for knowledge. We can therefore conclude that, since we are uncertain of the external world, we can have no knowledge of it. Another argument is that for us to know something, we are infallible about it. Given that we are not infallible about world around us, we cannot have knowledge about it. The significant consequences of scepticism is that all empirical knowledge is rendered impossible. After all, if we cannot have knowledge of the existence of the external world, then we can’t have knowledge of the existence of the objects in it, nor their true natures (as concluded from pyrrhonism). We cannot say we know that we have hands. Nor can I claim to know that I am sitting on a chair right now. Scientific pursuit is also made worthless. If we cannot know anything about the external world, it becomes useless trying to search for explanations (Stone, 2000). Still, this wouldn’t have much of an effect on our everyday lives, as scepticism does not deny us the knowledge of how things appear to be (Stone, 2000). I believe it is possible to meet the challenges posed by scepticism. In fact, many philosophers have provided a response to scepticism. I will provide an account of two such responses: ‘Proof of an external world’ by G. E. Moore, and briefly, ‘Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism’ by S. Schiffer. In Proof of an

PHIL30016 2019 external world, Moore argues from a common sense standpoint. He proves that two human hands exist by holding up one hand, saying ‘Here is one hand’, and doing the same with the other (Moore, 1999). He thus proves ipso facto that external objects exist. Moore claims that his proof is absolutely rigorous, and conforms to how we often conclusively prove things in everyday life. An example of this is: say a husband comes home and creates a lot of noise. His wife tells him he should quieten down, as their baby is asleep. To prove this, she walks the husband to the baby’s room, points at the baby, and says ‘there is the baby sleeping in his cot’. An obvious objection to Moore’s argument is that he misses the point entirely, even that he is ‘begging the question’. He in no way answers how it is that he knows that what he is holding up is actually a hand. He proves that his hand exists by appealing to its existence. Moore’s response to that is by claiming that we can know things such as these (there is a hand) even without having any proof for them, and that for sceptics to claim otherwise is unreasonable. Another response to scepticism is the ‘Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism’ by S. Schiffler. He argues that we can know things in certain contexts, and not know them in others. For example, in an everyday context, it is possible to know that, say, there is a cup on the desk, or that we have hands. However, in the context of scepticism, we cannot say we know those propositions. It treats knowledge as context sensitive. The context in which ‘know’ something determines the standard to which that knowledge is determined.

In conclusion, epistemological scepticism is a broad term which denotes a variety of viewpoints and positions. The main argument of scepticism of the external world is that we cannot have any knowledge of the outside world. I believe that the challenges of scepticism can be met.

PHIL30016 2019

Bibliography

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PHIL30016 2019 Ariew, R., Cottingham, J., & Sorell, T. (1998). Descartes' meditations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Landesman, C. (1999). Moore’s Proof of an External World and the Problem of Skepticism. Journal Of Philosophical Research, 24, 21-36. doi: 10.5840/jpr_1999_14

Moser, P. (1986). STROUD, BARRY [1984]: The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Clarendon Press. xiv + 277 pp. The British Journal For The Philosophy Of Science, 37(2), 235-238. doi: 10.1093/bjps/37.2.235

Schiffer, S. (1996). XIII—Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism. Proceedings Of The Aristotelian Society, 96(1), 317-334. doi: 10.1093/aristotelian/96.1.317

Sexto EmpDrico., & Bury, R. (2007). Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Stone, J. (2000). Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge. Philosophy And Phenomenological Research, 60(3), 527. doi: 10.2307/2653812...