(1L) Criminal Law Outline PDF

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Criminal Law outline (entire course)...

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Criminal Law Outline 1) Introduction to Criminal Justice a) One cannot bargain away the fundamental aspects of one’s personhood, like one’s life—Dudley & Stephens (drawing lots to determine who should be murdered is still murder) b) Theories of punishment are essentially: i) Retributivist—Michael Moore (moral failings are sufficient to punish) (1) Contractarian—Herbert Morris (offenders violate the social contract of self-restraint and gain an advantage that must be equalized through punishment); Jeffrie Murphy (offenders violate the “gentleman’s club” of society, and punishment is payment of the debt); John Hampton (disagrees with contractarian theory’s concept of advantage through offense) ii) Utilitarian—John Mackie (retributivist justifications of repayment, annulment, and fair play do not follow logically); Jeremy Bentham (offenders make a cost/benefit analysis that should be taken into account for deterrence purposes); James Q. Wilson (cost-benefit analysis not likely and if it occurs, not accurate); Michael Vitiello (rehabilitation more socially useful than incarceration) c) Primary objectives of the criminal justice include: i) Deterrence: (1) Robinson & Darley argue that deterrence only works if the criminal (a) knows the rule (b) perceives the cost of the violation as greater than the perceived benefit (c) is able and willing to bring this knowledge to bear on his conduct (2) Two ways of increasing deterrence (Robinson & Darley): (a) Increasing the risk of conviction (more difficult to implement) (b) Increasing severity of punishment ii) Incapacitation—John J. DiIulio (Preventative incarceration is useful for punishment and moral disapproval, teaching lessons to felons, drug treatment and education, and keeping felons off the streets); Donahue & Seligman (selective incapacitation is problematic because criminal behavior concentrated over a short period of one’s life, and because ethics) iii) Rehabilitation—Michael Vitiello 2) Elements of a Crime a) Illegality i) Conduct must be prohibited by a statute; there are no common law crimes— Mochan (common law crime of offending public morals found, overturned) ii) The specific conduct alleged must be prohibited by the statute in question— McBoyle (National Motor Vehicle Theft Act did not cover airplane theft) iii) Statutes may not be vague, either on their faces or as applied, or risk violating Due Process—Morales (Gang Congregation Ordinance vague on its face for providing for too much police discretion and little notice to potential offenders). b) Actus Reus

i) A culpable mind must be accompanied by culpable acts—we do not punish for culpable thoughts—Blackstone; James Fitzjames Stephen; Dworkin & Blumenfeld (administerability concerns); Glanville Williams (administerability); Abraham Goldstein ii) A crime must be actually committed through a free and voluntary act taken on by the defendant—Martin (act of being drunk in public compelled by police officers not criminal); Low (Martin not controlling for bringing drugs into a jail even though not voluntary); MPC 2.01 (Requirement of a Voluntary Act; Omission as a Basis of Liability; Possession as an Act) iii) Omissions will only constitute crimes in certain enumerated situations when one has violated a positive legal duty—Jones (manslaughter of a baby by omission not criminal where did not rest on a legal duty); Beardsley (manslaughter by omission not criminal where there was no legal duty between extramarital couple); Carroll (child neglect by omission tenable over stepmother); Miranda (manslaughter by omission not tenable over boyfriend of mother who beat child to death); Barber (failure to continue providing lifesustaining care when ineffective not manslaughter); MPC 2.01 (1) Good Samaritanism is not legally required—Kleinig (we should require “reasonable” good Samaritanism); Bentham (we should require life-saving when it is safe); John Stuart Mill (one should be required to save another’s life); Lord Macaulay (it is too difficult to distinguish between harmproducing omissions and omissions which should not be legally proscribed) c) Mens Rea i) Moral culpability is required unless a statue explicitly erases the mens rea requirement—Staples (conviction based on lack of a mens rea requirement untenable without express elimination of the requirement); MPC § 2.02 (General Requirements of Culpability) (1) Where a statute does not explicitly state a mens rea, the statute will be read to require purpose, knowledge, or recklessness—Sault Ste. Marie; MPC § 2.02(3) ii) Mens rea may be one of four types, in ascending order: (1) Negligence is when someone should be aware of a risk, but is not aware of the risk, that one’s conduct will or could bring about illegal consequences, and is a gross deviation from the standard of a reasonable person—MPC § 2.02(2)(d) (a) Civil negligence will ordinarily not be sufficient for criminal negligence unless expressly stated in the statute—Santillanes (punishment for civil negligence in cutting a child’s neck not sufficient to convict) (2) Recklessness is consciously disregarding the risk that one’s conduct will bring about illegal consequences and is a gross deviation from the standard of a law-abiding person—MPC § 2.02(c) (a) A recklessness “plus” requirement is a slightly heightened standard that requires that one consciously disregard a risk with an extreme indifference to life.

(3) Knowledge is the existence of an awareness that the conduct is illegal or will bring about illegal consequences—MPC § 2.02(b) (a) Knowledge may not always require actual knowledge but an awareness of the high probability that a fact is true—Jewell (knowing commission of drug trafficking could be established absent positive knowledge that drugs were in the car); MPC § 2.02(7); Glanville Williams (willful blindness can only be ascertained when it is clear that the defendant knew but made sure not to “find out”) (b) Where one does not have knowledge that conduct is illegal but should, implied notice can be the basis of a conviction—Freed (defendant should have had notice of illegality of handling grenades) (c) A requirement of “willfulness” is considered to be a requirement of knowledge unless a contrary intent appears—MPC § 2.02(8) (4) Purpose can be described as an intent to bring about the consequences that occurred or that are made illegal by law—MPC § 2.02(a) iii) A mens rea requirement will often be read to apply to all elements of a crime, unless specifically stated or logically untenable—X-Citement Video (knowledge of transporting child porn required knowledge of the child porn, not just the transportation); MPC § 2.02(4) iv) Mistake of fact may be a defense to a crime if the mistake negatives the mens rea or if the law provides that such a mistake may constitute a defense— Prince (mistake of fact as to victim’s age not a defense to taking a girl without consent because the bad act was really the taking without consent of her father); MPC § 2.04 (1) Mistake of fact is not a defense if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the facts been as he believed them to be—MPC § 2.04; Mauricio (mistake of fact did not mitigate defendant’s provocation defense to murder) v) Mistake of law is only a defense to crime if the mistake was based on an official statement of the law, and not merely a misunderstanding of the law— Marrero (mistake of firearm law not a defense); Weiss (mistake of law a defense where defendant believed he was making a citizen’s arrest with authority of law); MPC § 2.02(8); MPC § 2.04(3); Oliver Wendell Holmes (mistake of law goes against the basic idea of lawmaking); Dan Kahan (a defense of reasonable mistake of law would punish unjustified ignorance but provide an incentive for people to understand the law) vi) When a lower mens rea is required, a higher mens rea will be sufficient to satisfy the mens rea requirement—MPC § 2.02(5) vii) A “violation” which is an offense not contained in the code or otherwise a technical violation does not require culpability unless stated in the statute— MPC § 2.05 (1) When liability is imposed on an offense absent and explicitly removes a mens rea requirement, that offense is a violation, which cannot be punishable by more than a civil penalty such as a fine or forfeiture—MPC § 2.05(2); MPC § 1.04(5) (Class of Crimes; Violations)

(2) Most states have refrained from imposing the MPC’s restrictions on public welfare/regulatory offenses’ mens rea requirements. d) Causation e) A defendant may not be found guilty of a crime he was not the proximate cause of —Stewart (defendant’s stabbing was not proximate cause of victim’s death, so not guilty); Stamp (defendant’s robbery proximately caused victim’s heart attack, so guilty); Lane (defendant held guilty for hitting victim over the head and killing him even though victim’s intoxication contributed to his injury); MPC § 2.03 i) Proximate cause may be analyzed using a foreseeability test, or by using a “zone of danger” test—Acosta (defendant created a zone of danger where it was possible a helicopter crash might occur); Arzon (defendant’s conduct setting fires likely to have caused the injury that occurred); Kibbe (defendants left victim in a zone of danger where it was possible he would be hit by a car) ii) If the victim takes a supervening act that contributes to his injury, defendant may be guilty if defendant put the victim to a “terrible choice”—Stephenson (victim’s self-poisoning did not relieve defendant of liability for battering and raping her and thus causing her death); Preslar (defendant not guilty where victim slept outside not out of necessity); Valade (defendant guilty where decedent jumped out of window following rape); Kern (defendants guilty for chasing decedent into traffic); Root (defendant not guilty where decedent engaged in drag race) 3) Homicide a) Homicide encompasses the purposeful, knowledgeable, reckless, or negligent killing of another human being—MPC § 210.1 b) Intentional Killing i) Murder is the purposeful or knowledgeable killing of someone, or the reckless killing of someone under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to life—MPC § 210.2 (1) Recklessness “plus” can be presumed if the actor is engaged in or fleeing from certain extremely violent felonies, such as robbery, rape, burglary, or kidnapping—MPC § 210.2 (2) Recklessness “plus” is often invoked in particularly bad car accident cases and other cases where recklessness seems particularly culpable—Burden; Fleming (crazy drunk car crash case sufficient for second degree murder); Pears (drunk driver who ignore multiple warnings could be convicted of murder); Watson (drunk driver who drove to the bar sufficiently culpable for murder); Dunfield (voluntary intoxication did not preclude finding of murder when defendant recklessly killed a woman while raping her) (3) Consider what the baseline is for the “degree of risk” in recklessness; multiple choices: (a) Likelihood of what actually happened occurring (b) Quantity of harm likely to result from any injury caused by defendant (c) Increase of harm from the baseline in the circumstance (4) Consider whether the awareness of risk required for recklessness is objective or subjective—Oliver Wendell Holmes (subjective should be punished the same as objective awareness); Stephen Garvey (subjective

awareness should be required because it would be unfair to punish inadvertent risk creation); Samuel Pillsbury (culpability for failure to recognize a risk depends on moral worthiness of the actor’s failure); Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan (subjective awareness would not be administerable); Glanville Williams (it would be impossible to deter mistake-making) ii) Murder is often split up into “degrees,” with a higher degree requiring premeditation, and a lower degree representing crimes of passion—Burden (conscious failure to feed a child sufficient for second degree murder) (1) Premeditation is subject to conflicting views: (a) Premeditation is any “conscious purpose to bring about death”, no matter how short the time frame (i.e. “no time is too short for a wicked man to premeditate”)—Carroll (premeditation found in only a few minutes between arguing with his wife and killing her); Young (premeditation found in only a few seconds between argument and shooting friends); O’Searo; Forrest (mercy killing of dying father showed evidence of premeditation) (b) Premeditation requires some amount of time or removal from whatever situation sparked the desire to kill, or at least some evidence of planning activity—Guthrie (premeditation not found when defendant stabbed co-worker); Bullock (the impulsive killer is not guilty of first degree murder) iii) Several mitigating circumstances may exist that can commute a finding of murder down to a finding of manslaughter (either as a partial excuse or a partial justification) (1) Provocation is a common law mitigating circumstance in which there is a legal basis for provocation and a blameworthy victim—Mauricio; Stephen J. Morse (provocation more sympathetic to perpetrators than victims); Emily L. Miller (women disproportionately affected by provocation doctrine) (a) Abusive words will typically not be seen as sufficient provocation— Girouard (b) There are several recognized provocations from common law, but this list has expanded and contracted somewhat as society changes, and courts have moved somewhat to a reasonableness determination— Maher (reasonableness more appropriate to assess defendant’s provocation from learning his wife had cheated on him) (i) Extreme assault or battery of defendant—Pittman (grandson not entitled to provocation defense because grandfather had the legal right to paddle him) (ii) Mutual combat (iii) Defendant’s illegal arrest (iv)Injury or serious abuse of a close relative—Nesler (mother entitled to provocation defense in killing of man who sexually abused her son)

(v) Sudden discovery of a spouse’s adultery (often construed very narrowly)—Maher; Simonovich (no provocation defense where adultery not “caught in the act”); Dennis (no provocation defense where adultery witnessed was not actually intercourse); Turner (no provocation defense where couple not married) (vi)Unwelcome homosexual advances (no longer accepted) (c) If the defendant was subject to “cooling time,” the provocation defense may not be available—Bordeaux (no provocation defense where defendant killed victim many hours after finding out he had raped defendant’s mother); Gounagias (no provocation defense where two weeks had passed from defendant’s forced sodomy); LeClair (no provocation defense where long-suspected infidelity confirmed due to prior cooling time); Berry (provocation defense allowed where defendant lied in wait, increasing his anger); McClain (no provocation defense where abused wife had not been abused for several years) (d) Provocation mitigation only applies to death of the provoker, not to innocent bystanders—Scriva (no provocation defense where angry father stabbed bystander); Spurlin (no provocation defense where father killed wife and then son as well); Stewart (provocation defense could be available to similar facts as Spurlin) (e) Provocation is not available if the defendant provoked the provocation —Johnson (no provocation defense where defendant taunted his provoker) (2) Extreme emotional disturbance is a mitigating circumstance under the MPC—MPC § 210.3; Nouse (women are disproportionately impacted by EED defense) (a) Extreme emotional disturbance is determined by two factors: (i) Defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance (subjective)—MPC § 210.3 (ii) A reasonable explanation or excuse existed for the extreme emotional disturbance (objective)—MPC § 210.3; Cassassa (no EED defense where defendant’s interpretation of the facts finding the victim in love with him were objectively unreasonable); Walker (no EED defense where anger came from an argument over a marijuana deal); Zhang (no EED defense where anger came from cultural expectations about prostitution) 1. The reasonableness standard will generally judge from a general “reasonable person” standard, and will not take the defendant’s idiosyncracies into account, but it will take the circumstances into account to analyze a reasonable person’s interpretation of the relevant facts—Camplin (boy who killed sexual abuser judged by reasonable man standard); Smith (appropriate standard takes all circumstances into account) (b) Cooling time may not necessarily negate an extreme emotional disturbance defense—White (EED defense allowed where wife drove over ex-husband even though there was cooling time); Eliot (EED

defense allowed where defendant feared his brother for years); Klimas (no EED defense where conflict had gone on for nine months) c) Unintentional Killing i) Types of unintentional killing include: (1) Manslaughter, which is a killing committed recklessly, or a crime that would be murder but for some mitigating influence.—MPC § 210.3; see provocation and extreme emotional disturbance, above; Bateman (recklessness is distinguished from negligence by a disregard for life and safety of others); Dellinger (a) Manslaughter is sometimes broken up into: (i) Voluntary manslaughter (a crime that would be murder but for mitigating circumstances) (ii) Involuntary manslaughter (reckless killing absent intent, sometimes called reckless manslaughter)—Welansky (willful and wanton lack of safety provisions in nightclub sufficient to establish involuntary manslaughter); Barnett (ordinary negligence insufficient to establish involuntary manslaughter); Hall (defendant’s skiing created a substantial and unjustifiable risk to others); Taylor (hitting woman on head and leaving her to die sufficient to establish manslaughter); Prindle (killing someone in a police chase in a snowplow only establishes recklessness) (b) Ignorance as to the danger of certain acts may sometimes constitute a defense to recklessness where an act is purely accidental—Hall; Williams (ignorance no defense); Everhart (low IQ sufficient to constitute a defense to accidental smothering of a baby); Patterson (low IQ not sufficient to constitute a defense to withholding water from child); Walker (religious treatment not a defense to lack of medicine given to a child); Malone (mistake as to where the bullets were not a defense to shooting friend in Russian Roulette game) (2) Negligent homicide, which is a killing committed negligently—MPC § 210.4; Williams (ignorance of medical condition of child sufficient to establish negligent homicide); Pierce (reasonable person would not douse someone with kerosene) (a) Contributory negligence will not be a defense to negligent homicide— Dickerson (negligent homicide established where decedent’s car was parked in the middle of the highway with lights off) d) Felony Murder i) If the defendant kills someone in furtherance of a felony, he may be convicted of murder despite having no intent to murder—MPC § 210.2 (allowing murder to be found with only recklessness plus in certain enumerated felonies)—Stamp (defendant convicted where decedent had a heart attack following a burglary); Washington; Aaron (overturning felony murder rule in Michigan); Dillon (refusing to overturn felony murder even though statute substantially similar to the one in Aaron); Guyora Binder (felon aggravates culpability for negligently-caused deaths); T.B. Macaulay (felony murder rule overly harsh); George B. Fletcher (felony murder inconsistent with

proportionality); James Tomkovicz (no evidence of deterrence exists); Scott and Sundby (felony murder either presumes or eliminates malice) ii) Some limitations on the felony murder rule (that vary) include: (1) “Inherently dangerous felony” requirement—Serné (defendant could be convicted if the felony of arson was dangerously likely to cause death); Phillips (practicing medicine without a license not a felony inherently dangerous to life); Henderson (false imprisonment not a dangerous felony); Howard (felonious eluding a police officer not an inherently dangerous felony); Burroughs (practicing medicine without a license is a felony dangerous to life because statute included language to that effect); Hines (possessing a firearm as a convicted felon is a dangerous felony); Ford (possessing a firearm as a convicted fel...