Criminal Law Outline PDF

Preview

Summary

Download Criminal Law Outline PDF

Description

Criminal Law Outline I. Introduction: a. US criminal law is statutory b. The P is always the state. The D is usually a person, sometimes a company. i. Victims are not on the table. But often today, prosecutors talk to the victim, but victims have no veto power. c. What is a CRIME? i. Community condemnation is what makes the difference, you’ve been found guilty of a crime. ii. MPC § 1.02 d. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt i. The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires the prosecutor to persuade the factfinder “beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.” e. Owens v. State (Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1992) i. Facts: 1. The Defendant Owens was convicted of driving while intoxicated after he was found unconscious in a vehicle with its motor running. ii. Issue: 1. Is the Defendant’s conviction based on legally sufficient evidence? iii. Rule: 1. “[A] conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” iv. Holding: 1. Here, the Defendant was passed out behind the wheel of a vehicle with its motor running. Either he drove to the spot where he was found or he had just gotten into the vehicle, started it up, and passed out before he could drive. The latter proposition, however, is not a reasonable hypothesis. 2. The presence of beer cans in the car leads one to conclude that he had been drinking in the car, and it is not reasonable for a person to leave his house, get in the car, start the engine, drink beer, and then pass out. Further, the car only contained three beers, which probably were not enough to induce unconsciousness, so the drinking is more likely to be at its end rather than the beginning. 3. Affirmed. Yes, DUI. f. Jury Nullification i. When jurors simply feel compassion for the accused, the jury may ignore the facts and the judge’s instructions on the law and acquit the defendant. 1. The Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause bars the government from re-prosecuting a defendant after a jury acquittal. g. State v. Ragland (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1986) i. Facts: 1. Defendant Ragland was convicted by jury of, among other things, armed robbery and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon. The trial judge instructed the jury that it “must” convict of the possession charge if it found that the Defendant possessed a weapon during the robbery. ii. Issue: 1. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury that it must convict of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon if it finds that the defendant possessed a weapon during the robbery? 2. Whether the judge’s use of the word “must” deprived the Defendant of the jury’s nullification power, an essential attribute of his constitutional right to a jury trial. iii. Rule: 1. The jury’s right to acquit despite overwhelming evidence of guilt is not a right of the accused but rather a power of the jury.

1

Holding: 1. The conviction for possession was reversed and a new trial ordered on other grounds not recounted in the opinion. A jury may acquit a defendant despite overwhelming proof of guilt. This practice, commonly referred to as jury nullification, is certainly a power the jury has. Theories of Punishment Retributivism (backward looking theory) i. Claims that punishment is justified because people deserve it. ii. It is always wrong to punish the innocent. 50 people v. 1 person. It is always right to punish the guilty. iii. The moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to punish him. iv. Deterrence plays no part in justifying punishment. Utilitarian (forward looking theory) i. Believes that justification lies in the useful purposes that punishment serves. ii. Deterrence iii. 50 people v. 1 person – save 50 people. MPC – almost utilitarian, not retributivist. The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (Queen’s Bench Division, 1884) i. Facts: 1. The Defendants, Thomas Dudley (Mr. Dudley) and Edwin Stephens (Mr. Stephens) (Defendants) and two other gentlemen, Mr. Brooks and the victim, Richard Parker (Mr. Parker), were stranded on a boat for several days. When it appeared that the whole party would likely die of thirst and starvation, the Defendants decided to sacrifice Mr. Parker for the good of the rest. ii. Should Dudley and Stephens have been punished for their conduct? Retributive or utilitarian? People v. Du (Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 1991) i. Facts: 1. The Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter following the shooting of fifteen year old Latasha Harlins (Harlins) after an altercation in a convenience store owned by the Defendant’s family. The gun that the Defendant used to shoot Harlins with had previously been altered without the Defendant’s knowledge. Further, the Defendant had decided to work that particular shift at the convenience store in order to allow her son to work at another store that the family owned. The Defendant made this decision because her son had previously been the victim of threats by local gang members. ii. Issue: 1. Can the objectives of sentencing be achieved through conviction of the Defendant to ten years of incarceration? iii. Rule: 1. In imposing a sentence, a judge must first consider the objectives of sentencing a defendant, including: (1) to protect society; (2) to punish the defendant for committing a crime; (3) to encourage the defendant to lead a law-abiding life; (4) to deter others; (5) to isolate the defendant so she cannot commit other crimes; (6) to secure restitution for the victim and (7) to seek uniformity in sentencing. iv. Holding: 1. Probation is a more appropriate form of sentence than incarceration in this case. 2. The Defendant does not need to be incarcerated in order to protect society. 3. Society does not need the Defendant to be incarcerated in order to be protected. 4. State prison is not needed in order to encourage the Defendant to lead a law-abiding life. 5. State prison is not needed in order to isolate the Defendant so that she cannot commit other crimes. United States v. Gementera (US Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 2004) i. Facts: iv.

II. a.

b.

c. d.

e.

f.

2

1. Gementera (D) was a convict with a previous criminal record. His present crime was stealing mail. The judge sentenced him in the lower bracket of the Sentence Reform Act. He was released under supervision, one part of the condition being 100 hours of community service, including eight hours of standing before a post office on one day, with a sign which said, “I stole mail. This is my punishment.” He appealed it as a violation of the Sentencing Reform Act. ii. Issue: 1. Is making a convict wear a sign in public stating his crime a reasonable way to achieve the legally required goal of rehabilitation, so that it is a proper sentence under the Sentencing Reform Act? iii. Rule: 1. Making a convict wear a sign specifying his crime in a public place is related in a reasonable way to the objective of rehabilitation as stated in the statute, and so is proper under the Sentencing Reform Act. iv. Holding: 1. Yes. Making a convict wear a sign specifying his crime in a public place is related in a reasonable way to the objective of rehabilitation as stated in the statute, and so is proper under the Sentencing Reform Act. 2. Even if the signboard requirement was not very refined in its operation, it was accompanied by other useful conditions like lecturing at a high school and writing apologies. Taken all together, these might be understood to be tools tailored to the offender, which would promote Gementera’s rehabilitation as a useful and acceptable member of society. Thus the condition is related in a reasonable manner to the aim of rehabilitation. 3. The verdict is affirmed. v. Dissent: 1. (Hawkins, J.) This condition is one which induces humiliation rather than deterrence or rehabilitation. Producing a shameful condition in another person is lowering them in society’s esteem and robbing them of human dignity. This is not a judicial role. III. Actus Reus a. Actus expressing the voluntary physical movement in the sense of conduct and reus expressing the fact that this conduct results in a certain proscribed harm. b. The physical component of a crime. In murder, the death of a human being is the actus reus. c. A voluntary act (or omission in certain circumstances) d. Martin v. State (Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944) i. Facts: 1. Appellant convicted of being drunk on a public highway. Officers arrested him at his home and took him onto the highway, where he allegedly committed the proscribed acts: manifested a drunken condition by using loud and profane languge. ii. Issue: 1. Does the statute require voluntary appearance? 2. Statute: Code 1940, Title 14, Section 120: “Any person who, while intoxicated or drunk, appears in any public place where one or more persons are present, and manifests a drunken condition by boisterous or indecent conduct, or loud and profane discourse, shall, on conviction, be fined.” iii. Rule: 1. An accusation of drunkenness in a designated public place cannot be established by proof that the accused, while in an intoxicated condition, was involuntarily and forcibly carried to that place by the arresting officer. iv. Holding: 1. Conviction of appellant was erroneous. Reversed and rendered. v. Notes:

3

1. Influenced by the MPC § 2.01(1), many modern criminal codes expressly provide that, issues of “omission” aside, a person is not guilty of an offense unless his conduct includes a voluntary act. e. State v. Utter (Court of Appeals of Washington, 1971) i. Facts: 1. The Defendant Utter stabbed and killed his son. Son was heard to say “Dad, don’t” and “Dad stabbed me.” He claims to have no recollection of the murder, as it was committed after the Defendant had consumed alcohol and allegedly killed by a “conditioned response.” At trial, the Defendant sought to introduce evidence of “conditioned response,” which his expert defined as an act done automatically in response to a certain stimulus. The trial court ruled that this was no defense and instructed the jury to disregard the evidence. The jury convicted the Defendant of manslaughter. ii. Issue: 1. Did the trial court properly instruct the jury to disregard evidence regarding the defendant’s “conditioned response” defense? a. Conditioned response, as defined by Dr. Jarvis, a psychiatrist and the defendant’s expert witness, is “an act or a pattern of activity occurring so rapidly, so uniformly as to be automatic in response to a certain stimulus.” iii. Rule: 1. An “act” committed during unconsciousness is not voluntary, and therefore one cannot be held criminally culpable for said act. However, voluntarily induced unconsciousness, such as by drugs or alcohol, is not a complete defense. 2. An “act” committed while one is unconscious is in reality no act at all. 3. When the state of unconsciousness is voluntarily induced through the use and consumption of alcohol and drugs, then that state of unconsciousness does not attain the stature of a complete defense. iv. Holding: 1. Yes. Homicide is defined as “the killing of a human being by the act. IV. Acts and Omissions a. People v. Beardsley (Supreme Court of Michigan, 1907) i. Facts: 1. The Defendant was a married man. While his wife was out of town, he arranged to spend time with Ms. Burns, with whom he had been previously acquainted. The two spent the weekend together drinking liquor in the Defendant’s apartment. When they ran out of liquor, a young man from the Columbia Hotel brought more. The young man appeared on Monday afternoon to see if they wanted anything, and Ms. Burns sent him to the drugstore to get camphor and morphine. Ms. Burns concealed the morphine from the Defendant, but the Defendant and the young man noticed her putting something in her mouth. The Defendant knocked the box out of her hand and crushed several of the tablets. Nevertheless, she probably took about three to four grains of morphine. The young man then left, but the Defendant called him about an hour later and asked him to take Ms. Burns to the basement apartment so that his wife would not see her. By this time, she was in a stupor and did not respond when spoken to. The Defendant was too intoxicated to help at this time. Ms. Burns died later that day, and the Defendant was charged with manslaughter for failing to render aid to her. ii. Issue: 1. When, if ever, does a person have a duty to act such that failure to act is a breach of duty, which may result in criminal culpability? iii. Rule: 1. A person owes no legal obligation to another unless such person is within his custody or care as a dependent person.

4

2. 5 situations in which failure to act may constitute a breach of a legal duty: a. Where a statute imposes a duty b. Where one stands in a certain status relationship to another c. Where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another d. Where one has voluntarily assumed the care of another and so secluded the helpless person as to prevent others from rendering aid. e. Where a person creates a risk of harm to another. iv. Holding: 1. The Defendant owed no such duty to the alleged victim here. Ms. Burns was over 30 years of age, and her conduct indicates that she had plenty of experience with carousing with men and consuming alcohol and drugs. Hence, while the defendant may have had a moral duty to protect Ms. Burns, the law imposes no such duty on him. v. Notes: 1. Kitty Genovese a. Genovese was stabbed in the back by Moseley as she got out of her car in front of her apartment building in Queens, New York. She cried out for help, a cry that was heard and ignored by as many as thirty-eight of her apartment neighbors. Despite Kitty’s cries, her assailant stabbed her again, fled, and then returned and finally killed her when nobody came to her aid. b. Barber v. Superior Court (California Court of Appeal, Second District, 1983) i. Facts: 1. The deceased, Mr. Herbert, underwent surgery following a heart attack and suffered severe brain damage. He was subsequently placed on life support equipment and determined to be in a comatose state. Herbert’s family, after being told that there was virtually no chance of recovery, requested that he be taken off of life support. The two physicians discontinued treatment by removing the life support equipment and were subsequently charged with murder and conspiracy to commit murder. After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate dismissed the charges. However the superior court set aside the order and reinstated the complaint. The physicians petitioned the court of appeals for review of the decision of the superior court to dismiss the complaint. ii. Issue: 1. Is a physician under a duty to continue treatment of a comatose patient once such treatment has proven to be ineffective such that he/she can be held liable for murder? iii. Rule: 1. Historically, death defined in terms of cessation of heart and respiratory function. Now only cessation of all brain function. 2. A physician’s failure to continue treatment of a comatose patient at the request of the patient’s family is not an unlawful failure to perform a legal duty and therefore is not punishable under the penal code. iv. Holding: 1. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, to be distinguished from those killings which society has deemed justifiable. This court deems the cessation of life support as an omission of further treatment as opposed to an affirmative act and there is no criminal liability for an omission where no legal duty is owed. c. Two types of offenses: i. Result Crimes: 1. The law punishes because of an unwanted outcome, such as the death of another person (criminal homicide) or the destruction of a dwelling house (arson). 2. The law is not punishing a person for this thoughts or even for his voluntary acts or omissions, but rather is punishing for the harm resulting from his acts or omissions. 3. Because result if a crime, not simply a tort, outcome is called social harm.

5

4. Social Harm: loss suffered from a murder or other violent crime is experienced not only by the immediate victim, but also by society. a. An intangible harm: community’s loss of a sense of security. ii. Conduct Crimes: 1. The law prohibits specific behavior, such as DUI or solicitation to commit murder. 2. There may be no social harm in conduct crimes. 3. The reason why a legislature may prohibit drunk driving is precisely to avoid the harm that can result from such conduct if it is not deterred or terminated. 4. But conduct crimes may sometimes involve social harm. 5. Social Harm: “negation, endangering, or destruction of an individual, group, or state interest, which is deemed socially valuable.” a. Endangerment of a socially valuable interest = social harm occurs. b. Ex: A solicits to kill V; C drives on a public highway in an intoxicated condition. iii. Attendant Circumstances 1. This element constitutes a part of the actus reus of an offense. 2. Statute: “it is an offense to drive an automobile in an intoxicated condition.” 3. The words “in an intoxicated condition” represent an attendant circumstance: the actus reus of the offense does not occur unless the actor drives her car (conduct) while intoxicated (the circumstance that must be present at the time of her conduct). V. MENS REA a. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie (USDC, E.D. New York 1993) i. “Mens rea”: a guilty mind;a guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent ii. To look in the wrongdoer’s mind to determine both the propriety and the grading of punishment. iii. Criminal Law’s mantra: “An act does not make [the doer of it] guilty, unless the mind be guilty; that is, unless the intent be criminal.” iv. Elemental meaning of mens rea: the mental state the defendant must have had with regard to the “social harm” elements set out in he definition of the offense. 1. In this definition, a D is not guilty of an offense, even if she has a culpable frame of mind, if she lacks the mental state specified in the definition of the crime. 2. Purpose v. Knowledge v. Reckless v. Negligent. b. Regina v. Cunningham (Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957) i. Facts: 1. Appellant went to the cellar of a building and stole the gas meter. Appellant was charged with larceny. He plead guilty and was sentenced to 6 months in prison. As a consequence of this act by Appellant, a woman that lived in the house was endangered from the exposure to gas leaking after Appellant took the gas meter. The prosecution alleged that Appellant was guilty of a felony for malicious administering gas to an individual. ii. Issue: 1. The appellant’s act was clearly unlawful, but real question for the jury was whether it was also malicious and constituted the crime of felony for malicious administering of gas to an I. iii. Rule: 1. Malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of “wickedness,” but as requiring either: a. An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done, OR b. Recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (ex: the accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done, and yet has gone on to the risk of it.) 2. It may be correct that the D acted “wickedly,” but jury ought to find that D had acted “maliciously” in causing the gas to be taken by Mrs. Wade so as thereby to endanger her life. iv. Holding: 1. Allow the appeal and quash the conviction.

6

c. People v. Cooley (Illinois Appellate Court, 1989) (INTENT) transferred intent i. Facts: 1. The victim attended a party with friends. During the evening his group was approached by about 20 boys who thought that someone in the victim’s group had said something derogatory. The group denied saying anything and left shortly thereafter. While walking to their car, the victim and a friend, Marty Carroll, were approached by a group of people who mentioned something about them being the guys from the party. A person, later determined to be the Defendant, emerged from the group and demanded a beer from the victim’s six-pack. When the victim refused, the Defendant tried to strike Marty in the face with a wine bottle. Marty ducked, and D hit Sean and Sean sustained broken upper and lower jaws and four brok...