2020 Salazar Remedial LAW Review I Digests PDF

Title 2020 Salazar Remedial LAW Review I Digests
Course College of Law
Institution Arellano University
Pages 19
File Size 1.1 MB
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ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAWREVIEWER I DO NOT CLAIM TO OWN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING. NO OTHER MATERIAL CAN REPLACE THE BIBLES OF LAW WHICH HAVE BEEN TESTED AND PRESCRIBED BY THE PROFESSOR. ANY ANSWER PRESENT IN THIS REVIEWER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION. THE READER HAS BEEN WARNED AND MAY PROCEED ACCOR...


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RE: REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I 2020 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

REVIEWER I DO NOT CLAIM TO OWN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING. NO OTHER MATERIAL CAN REPLACE THE BIBLES OF LAW WHICH HAVE BEEN TESTED AND PRESCRIBED BY THE PROFESSOR. ANY ANSWER PRESENT IN THIS REVIEWER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION. THE READER HAS BEEN WARNED AND MAY PROCEED ACCORDINGLY.

CASE LIST 20200922 RULE 1 - 7 1. Tan, Jr. vs. CA, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002 2. Sebastian v. Morales, G.R. No. 141116. February 17, 2003 3. Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Co., Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010 4. Saint Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010 5. Gipa, et al. vs. Southern Luzon Institute, G.R. No. 177425, June 18, 2014 6. Sps. Oco vs. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006 7. Relucio vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, January 16, 2002 8. China Banking Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. 153267, June 23, 2005 9. Aquino, et al. vs. Quiazon, et al., G.R. No. 201248, March 11, 2015 10. Marilag vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 201892, July 22, 2015 11. Association of Flood Victims vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203775, August 5, 2014 12. Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 193753, September 26, 2012 13. Divinagracia vs. Parilla, et al., G.R. No. 196750, March 11, 2015 14. Benguet Exploration, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. 117434, February 9, 2001 15. Bough vs. Cantiveros, G.R. No. 13300, September 29, 1919 16. Zuniga-Santos vs. Santos-Gran, G.R. No. 197380, October 8, 2014 17. First Sarmiento Property Holdings vs. PBCom, G.R. No. 202836, June 19, 2018 18. Roldan vs. Sps. Barrios, G.R. No. 214803, April 23, 2018 19. Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968 20. Figueroa vs. People, G.R. No. 147406, July 14, 2008 21. Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982 22. Frianela vs. Banayad, Jr., G.R. No. 169700, July 30, 2009 23. Duero vs. CA, G.R. No. 131282, January 4, 2002

24. Manchester Dev. Corp. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-75919, May 7, 1987 25. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. vs. Asuncion, G.R. Nos. 79937-38, February 13, 1989 26. United Overseas Bank vs. Ros, et al., G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007 27. Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc. vs. RTC Negros Occidental, G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008 28. Pantranco North Express, Inc. vs. Standard Insurance Co., Inc., G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005 29. Iniego vs. Purganan, G.R. No. 166876, March 24, 2006 30. Briones vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 204444, January 14, 2015 31. Ley Construction vs. Sedano, G.R. No. 222711, August 23, 2017

CASES PROPER 1. Tan, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002 Generally, rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect upon pending actions or proceedings. There are, however, exceptions to the rule: 1. The statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions are excepted from its operation; 2. To apply the new rules to pending proceedings would impair vested rights FACTS: On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale over parcel of land in Davao City in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement where Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory. Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. ISSUE: WHETHER THE APPLICATION OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RETROACTIVELY WAS ERRONEOUS? HELD: YES. If the old rule has been applied on the finality of judgment, the subject property was redeemed within the 120-day period of redemption. The appellate court applied the new 1997 rules retroactively and under the given facts of the case, the Court deemed that it is erroneous. *See Stated Doctrine* The case falls squarely within the second exception. Application of Rule 39, Sec. 1 would amount to an injustice to the petitioners. The new rule states that: Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an equitable mortgage.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Tan. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

E.Я.RE: DIGESTS ON REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. ARRANGED BY ELLIS LAGASCA. Νεχ ποσσυμ τεχυμ ωιωερε νεχ σινε τε.

The old rule that was applied by the RTC was Rule 51, Sec. 10-11 which briefly states that the date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of its entry and the motion for execution may only be filed in the proper court after its entry. The decision, according to the case at bar, became final on March 13, 1996 and the respondentspouses filed the questioned motions on March 21, 1996, well within the redemption period and appeal period given to petitioners. 2. Sebastian v. Morales, G.R. No. 141116, February 17, 2003 Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes. The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR secretary. That a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satisfy the requirements for the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does not necessarily mean that one is the same as the other, for that matter; If every error committed by the trial court or quasi-judicial agency were to be the proper subject of a review by certiorari, then trial would never end and the dockets of the dockets of appellate courts would be clogged beyond measur e. The “errors” which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari are thoseof the Court of Appeals, and not directly those of the trial court orthe quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, or officer which rendered the decision in the first instance. FACTS: Private respondents Leonila Sarenas, Josephine Sarenas-Dayrit, Evangeline Sarenas, Estrelita Sarenas Tan, Cecilio Marcos Sarenas, Manuel Gil Sarenas, Daisy Rita Sarenas and Joy Sarenas are heirs of late Guillermo Sarenas, who died intestate on June 27, 1986.

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RE: REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I 2020 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

During his lifetime, Guillermo owned three agricultural lots situated in Cabanatuan City. He was also the owner of an agricultural land in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. This property was tenanted by Manuel Valentin and Wenceslao Peneyra. The tenants tilling the first three lots mentioned had already been issued emancipation patents pursuant to P.D. no. 27. On July 14, 1993, private respondents filed an application with the Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga for the retention of over five hectares of the Guillermo landholdings. Among the lots they sought to retain under R.A. No. 6657 (CARL) were the ones covered by TCT Nos. NT-8608 and 8609 (the last two among the first three agraricultural lots) DAR granted private respondents’ application but on June 16, 1997, petitioner Sebastian moved for reconsideration of the order given by DAR. The DAR Regional Director found that the order was violative of R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 6. Therefore the order was hereby set aside, granting the heirs of Guillermo the right to retain only 2.8032 hectares of the land covered. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the DAR Secretary for lack of merit. On February 22, 1999, the petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with the CA. On March 9, 1999, the CA, without considering the merits, dismissed the case after finding that the petitioners pursued the wrong mode of appeal. The proper petition would be a petition for review pursuant to Rule 43, Sec. 1 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. CA also ruled that the petitioners failed to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the assailed order of June 18, 1998 as required by Rule 46, hence it had no other recourse but to dismiss the same. ISSUE: WHETHER THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 SINCE IT WAS A WRONG MODE OF APPEAL? HELD: YES. Under Rule 1, Sec. 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, liberal construction of the rules is

the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicalities. Though the Rules cannot be ignored, since strict observance is indispensable to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

that matter. A petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. It is basic remedial law that the two remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive, and antithetical.

Litigation is not a game of technicalities but every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure so that issues may be properly presented and justly resolved.

In insisting upon filing Rule 65 instead of Rule 43, the petitioner ignored R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 61 which states that it is Rule 43 that governs the procedure for judicial review of decisions, orders or resolutions of the DAR Secretary.

Rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant from injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to show any compelling reason for not resorting to the proper remedy. First, in instituting CA-G.R. SP No. 51288, petitioners categorically invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to have the questioned orders of the DAR Secretary declared null and void for having been issued and promulgated with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Note that it is precisely the office of an action for certiorari under Rule 65 to correct errors of jurisdiction. Second, after the appellate court dismissed their petition on the ground that the proper remedy was a petition for review, petitioners continued to insist in their motion for reconsideration that under Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657, a petition for certiorari is both adequate and proper in CA-G.R. SP No. 51288. It was only as an afterthought that they asked the appellate court to treat their special civil action for certiorari as a petition for review, after a belated and grudging admission that their reliance on Section 54 of R.A. No. 6657 was an honest mistake or excusable error. However, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should pro forma satistfy the requirements of the contents of a petition for review under Rule 43 does not necessarily mean that one is the same as the other. Or that one may be treated as the other, for

Furthermore, in the present case, the petitioner failed to show any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the DAR Secretary, which is a ground under Rule 65. Verily, the petition must fail. 3. Asia United Bank vs. Goodland Co., Inc., G.R. No. 188051, November 22, 2010 There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court." Forum shopping can be committed three ways, according to recent jurisprudence: 1. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (litis pendentia); 2. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res judicata); 3. filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers (res judicata / litis pendentia) FACTS: Respondent Goodland Company Inc. executed a Third Party Real Estate Mortgage (REM) over two parcels of land located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna, in favor of petitioner Asia United Bank (AUB). This mortgage secured the obligation amounting to PHP 250,000,000 of Radiomarine Network, Inc. (RMNI) doing business as Smartnet Philippines, to AUB. The REM was registered on

E.Я.RE: DIGESTS ON REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I. READ AT YOUR OWN RISK. ARRANGED BY ELLIS LAGASCA. Νεχ ποσσυμ τεχυμ ωιωερε νεχ σινε τε.

March 8, 2001 in the Registry of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. Respondent then filed a complaint in the RTC of Biñan, Laguna, for the annulment of the REM on the ground that the same was falsified and done in contravention of the parties’ verbal agreement. While the same was pending, RMNI defaulted in the payment of its obligation to AUB, prompting AUB to exercise the right to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage. It filed its application for extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135. The mortgaged properties were sold in public auction to the petitioner as the highest bidder. Before petitioner could consolidate its title, respondent filed a complaint to annul the foreclosure sale and to enjoin the consolidation in favor of AUB (injunction). Respondent alleged the falsified nature of the REM as basis for the injunction. A few days later, petitioner consolidated its ownership over the parcels of land. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss for the injunction case, stating that the two cases filed by the respondent both relied on the alleged falsification of the real estate mortgage as the basis for the reliefs. The RTC dismissed the injunction case with prejudice, on the grounds of forum shopping/litis pendentia. Since both were founded upon the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, and both raise the same issues, the judgment of one might necessarily bar another or result in res judicata. Respondent appealed the aforesaid decision to the CA, and the CA reversed the trial court’s ruling, and ruled for the respondents. The CA ruled that the two cases that Goodland filed were asking for different reliefs—the annulment case sought the nullification of the REM, while the injunction asked for the nullification of the foreclosure proceedings, and to enjoin the consolidation of title in favor of the petitioners. ISSUE: WHETHER THE SUCCESSIVE FILING OF ANNULMENT AND INJUNCTION CASE CONSTITUTED FORUM SHOPPING?

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RE: REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW I 2020 ARELLANO UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

HELD: YES. *See Stated Doctrine* Common in the types of forum shopping is the identity of cause of action in the different cases filed, which is defined under Rule 2, Sec. 2 as “the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another.” The cause of action in the annulment case is the alleged nullity of the REM because of its spurious nature, which is allegedly violative of Goodland’s right to the mortgaged property. It serves as the basis for the nullification of the REM. The injunction case involves the same cause of action as it also invokes the nullity of the REM as the basis of the prayer for nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure and for injunction against consolidation of title.

The nature of an ex parte petition for issuance of the possessory writ under Act No. 3135 has been described as a non-litigious proceeding and summary in nature. As an ex parte proceeding, it is brought for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to or consent by any person adversely interested. 4. Saint Louis University vs. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010

Cobarrubias to file a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and Employment. When circulation and mediation again failed, the parties submitted the issues between them for voluntary arbitration before Voluntary Arbitrator (VA) Daniel T. Fariñas.

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must bemade strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.

Cobarrubias argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave issue in a prior case between the parties, CA-G.R. SP No. 90596, ruling that the forced leave for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a five-year period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the same five-year period.

What is involved in the case at bar is the third mode of committing forum shopping, as there is still forum shopping even if the reliefs prayed for in the two cases be different, so long as both cases raise substantially the same issues.

While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

SLU, for its part, countered that CA decision cannot be considered in deciding the present case since it is presently on appeal with this Court and, thus, is not yet final.

A party cannot, by varying the form of an action, or adopting a different method of presenting his case, escape the operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.

FACTS: Respondent Evangeline C. Cobarrubias is an associate professor of the petitioner’s College of Human Sciences. She is an active member of the Union of Faculty and Employees of Saint Louis University (UFESLU). The 2001-2006 and 2006-2011 Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs) between SLU and UFESLU contain the following common provision on forced leave: Section 7.7. For teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation, the following provisions shall apply:

The RTC decision dismissing the complaint is now reinstated. OTHER DOCTRINES: After the consolidation of titles in the buyer’s name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, entitlement to a writ of possession becomes amatter of right. Under Rule 138, Section26 of the Rules of Court, for a substitution of attorney to beeffectual, the follow...


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