2:1 Essay: What is the \"separateness of persons\" objection to utilitarianism? Do you think it is successful? PDF

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"What is the "separateness of persons" objection to utilitarianism? Do you think it is successful? Give reasons for your answer."...

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What is the "separateness of persons" objection to utilitarianism? Do you think it is successful? Give reasons for your answer. This essay will outline Rawls’s “separateness of persons” objection to utilitarianism, which I will argue is supported by Williams’s stance that utilitarianism does not account for personal integrity. I will follow this with an objection from Pettit to conclude that although the examples used are extreme, they are successful in illustrating utilitarianism’s failure to account for individuality in moral decisions.

Utilitarianism is a consequentialist theory and as such, it is concerned with promoting values. Whilst honoring a value involves acting in accordance with and embodying it in one’s actions, promoting a value is to act in order to realize and maximize that value overall; it does not necessarily involve its embodiment in one’s actions. Promoting non-violence is not a refusal to act violently no matter the outcome, but a focus on reducing the total amount of violence. To achieve this, I might act violently myself. The “separateness of persons” objection attacks this particular feature of utilitarianism as a system of ethics that seeks to promote the total utility of a situation, or produce the greatest net amount of pleasure, without concern for the nature of the actions that produce it or the individuals involved.

John Rawls argued that utilitarianism does not respect the distinction between persons because it essentially aims at achieving universal happiness or pleasure, and in doing so, adds up everyone’s happiness impartially and “adopt[s] for society as a whole the principle of choice for one man”1. It ‘lumps’ everyone together, allowing one person’s rights to be violated if there are greater '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 1 'J.'Rawls,'A"Theory"of"Justice,'rev.'ed.,'Massachusetts,'Harvard'University'Press,'1999,'p.24.' ' ' 1

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aggregate benefits to be gained, when in fact each of us has a unique life to live that should factor into our ethical decision-making2. A thought experiment of an ‘organ lottery’ is used to support this criticism. If we imagine that seven terminally ill patients require transplants each year who could all be saved using one healthy donor, the government might decide to randomly select one out of 100 people to be killed for their organs each year. Utilitarianism would allow this course of action because it raises overall utility; the pleasure produced for the seven survivors and their family and friends outweighs the suffering produced by killing one donor. Yet, this is a scenario that doesn’t sit comfortably with most people because it treats them as interchangeable units valued only for their health3. One could argue that utilitarianism would consider the net effect of psychological stress resulting from the constant fear people would have of being chosen and therefore, a utilitarian could consider an ‘organ lottery’ to be morally impermissible. However, this utilitarian calculation still treats people only as indistinguishable bearers of pleasure and pain, not as individuals who should have to give their consent for such a system to be considered morally right; as such, it lends support to Rawls’s criticism.

Another aspect of the “separateness of persons” criticism is the argument that utilitarianism fails to respect the integrity of individuals. Bernard Williams outlines two cases where following utilitarian logic would force someone to act in a way that violates their intuitive moral feelings. The agent must do something disagreeable because if they do not, someone else will, with supposedly much worse consequences. Essentially, utilitarianism tells the agent '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 2 'E.'Ashford'and'T.'Mulgan,'"Contractualism",'The'Stanford'Encyclopedia'of'Philosophy'(Fall' 2012'Edition),'E.'N.'Zalta'(ed.),'URL'=' .' 3 'J.'Harris,'“The'Survival'Lottery.”'Philosophy,'vol.'50,'no.'191,'1975,'pp.'81–87.,' www.jstor.org/stable/3749647.' ' 2

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to ignore their intuitions and ‘bite the bullet’ by choosing to do the lesser evil. One of Williams’s examples concerns a soldier called Pedro who vows to shoot twenty innocent people unless Jim, a tourist, shoots one person. In this case, Pedro will let the remaining nineteen go free. To the utilitarian, it seems obvious that Jim should agree; refraining from the opportunity to alleviate a lot of potential suffering is worse than letting Pedro kill nineteen more people. However, this position does not consider the issue of personal responsibility. Jim might intuitively feel that it is worse for him to be personally accountable for one death, even if the alternative means the death of twenty people. Williams goes on to argue that utilitarianism has an unsatisfactory view of personal integrity, since it becomes clear that our deeply-held beliefs and attitudes “do not compute” in the “utilitarian calculus”4. It encourages us to renounce our principles for the ‘greater good’.

This is particularly well-illustrated in Williams’s second example. George, who is having difficulty finding a job due to poor health, is forced on utilitarian grounds to accept a job that goes against his moral principles. George’s lack of employment has put strain on his family, but he is offered a well-paid job in research for chemical and biological warfare, to which he is opposed. The chemist tells George that the research would still exist if he refuses the job, so he should take it in order to help his family rather than let it go to someone who has no reservations and would encourage the research enthusiastically5. Williams uses this example to argue that utilitarianism does not account for personal feelings in moral decisions, when they are actually crucial in our '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 4 'J.'Smart'&'B.'Williams'(1973).'A'critique'of'utilitarianism.'In'Utilitarianism:'For'and' Against'(pp.'75-150).'Cambridge:'Cambridge'University'Press.' doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840852.002'cited'in'C.'H.'Sommers'&'F.'T.'Sommers,'Vice"&"Virtue" in"Everyday"Life:"introductory"readings"in"ethics,'Wadsworth/Thomson,'2004,'p.99' 5 'Ibid.'' ' 3

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decision-making because they are closely linked with the idea that each of us is specially responsible for what we do, rather than for what others do. Unpleasant ‘gut’ instincts are not regarded as indications of right and wrong, because utilitarianism only promotes the universal view as the right view; it does not recognize the separateness of persons.

Williams concludes that deeply held principles should count for more than ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ in order to maintain personal integrity. Those influenced by J.S. Mill’s political philosophy might respond by arguing that the aim of utilitarianism is to make people’s personal ‘projects’ coincide with the greater good through education and public deliberation. In this sense, utilitarianism is a ‘solution’ to the separateness of persons rather than a conflicting notion. I would argue that the fact that utilitarianism tends to view personal attitudes and desires as something to be diminished and molded to the interests of the majority is the very reason why it does not account for the separateness of persons. Utilitarianism would suggest, for example, that a mother might have greater obligations to two orphans than to her own child because of the utilitarian principle to maximize happiness. To most, this would appear utterly counter-intuitive because there is no room for acknowledging the special claims of loved ones. We must be impartial in order to always maximize not our own happiness, but the happiness of all those concerned. Essentially, agents are required to become moralistic computers because utilitarianism does not appear to recognize that morality is at least partially individualistic.

Those such as Pettit have implied that the criticism of compromised personal integrity only applies to horrendous circumstances6. If someone of ordinary values were to condone torture, it would only be in situations with great '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 6 'P.'Singer'(ed.),'A"Companion"to"Ethics,'Jonh'Wiley'&'Sons,'2013,'p.234' ' 4

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potential gain, such as preventing tragedy or saving innocent lives. Therefore, he argues that the criticism does little damage because although it might be awful to torture, a non-consequentialist would have to defend the “equally unattractive” response of not doing so and allowing a terrorist attack to occur, for example. This simply reinforces the separateness of persons objection in showing us that utilitarianism does not take into account personal responsibility. It threatens individuals in these circumstances with “negative responsibility”7, suggesting that they are responsible for what somebody else has chosen to do because they could have prevented it. Many people would be uncomfortable with this because it would make them personally responsible for doing something bad, even if it is ‘less bad’. Constantly having to revise one’s principles in light of the greater good forces people to brush their feelings of what they can or cannot personally ‘live with’ aside, arguably causing them to lose their moral identity and integrity.

I would agree with Pettit in the sense that the examples used to support the objection are severe. Whilst they successfully highlight the way in which utilitarianism fails to respect the distinction between persons, I believe it is important to note that everyday decision-making does not tend to involve such horrific ultimatums. Utilitarianism is a relativistic moral theory and in normal circumstances, if an agent truly felt that being personally responsible for a certain deed would go against their most deeply-held beliefs and cause them great displeasure, utilitarian calculation offers sufficient free reign for the agent to decide how much weighting they should assign to this in their decision. Nevertheless, I would maintain that utilitarianism seems to allow and encourage '''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''''' 7 'J.'Smart'&'B.'Williams'(1973).'A'critique'of'utilitarianism.'In'Utilitarianism:'For'and' Against'(pp.'75-150).'Cambridge:'Cambridge'University'Press,'p.108' doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840852.002' ' 5

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a habit of contemplating or accepting the possibility that deeds such as condoning torture might be necessary. Solely promoting utility would make nothing unthinkable and individuals could not admit any constraints on their behavior, even when it concerns the rights of others.

This essay has shown that the separateness of persons criticism is a strong objection to utilitarianism. The theory’s core principle of maximizing utility doesn’t allow agents to be principled individuals, since utilitarian calculation is solely concerned with the pleasure or happiness produced and leaves no room for personal beliefs or feelings of responsibility.

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Bibliography

1. Ashford, E. and Mulgan, T. "Contractualism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .

2. Harris, J., “The Survival Lottery.” Philosophy, vol. 50, no. 191, 1975, www.jstor.org/stable/3749647.

3. Rawls, J., A Theory of Justice, rev. ed., Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1999

4. Singer, P., (ed.), A Companion to Ethics, Jonh Wiley & Sons, 2013

5. Smart, J. & Williams, B. (1973). A Critique of Utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism: For and Against (pp. 75-150). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.108 doi:10.1017/CBO9780511840852.002

6. Sommers, C. H., & Sommers, F. T., Vice & Virtue in Everyday Life: introductory readings in ethics, Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004

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