'Slovak, not Brussels Social Democracy'. Europeanization/De-Europeanization and the Ideological Development of Smer-SD Before 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia PDF

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ARTICLES 37 ‘Slovak, not Brussels Social Democracy’. Europeanization/De-Europeanization and the Ideological Development of Smer-SD Before 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia* JuraJ M arušiak** Abstract This paper is focused on the evolution of the ideology of Smer - Social Democracy (Smer-SD) p...

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‘Slovak, not Brussels Social Democracy’. Europeanization/De-Europeanization and the Ideological Development of Smer-SD Before 2020 Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia* JuraJ M arušiak** Abstract This paper is focused on the evolution of the ideology of Smer - Social Democracy (Smer-SD) party and its positions on European integration before the political elections in Slovakia in February 2020. As the ‘social-democratization’ of Smer-SD was the result of party’s Europeanization, the article explores the dimensions of de-Europeanization in the politics of this party in 2017–2020. Since 2006, Smer-SD has occupied a dominant position among political parties in Slovakia. However, a substantive decline in the electoral support of the party took place after 2016. Smer-SD faced a significant political challenge during the political crisis after the assassination of the journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in February 2018. The result was the resignation of Prime Minister Robert Fico. The appointment of party vice chairman Peter Pellegrini as Prime Minister created a new situation within the party, as for the first time the positions of Prime Minister and head of the party were separated. The political crisis in 2018 revealed the presence of internal conflicts within the party and the weakening of the authority of its chairman, Robert Fico. The establishment of two centres of power within the party resulted in competition between Fico and Pellegrini and, finally, in June 2020, a split, as Pellegrini announced the founding of a new political party. Keywords: Slovakia; parliamentary elections 2020; Smer-SD; social democracy; Europeanization; de-Europeanization DOI: 10.5817/PC2021-1-37

* The article was prepared within the framework of VEGA project ‘The Image of the “Other” in Post1989 Slovak Politics’ (VEGA 2/0046/19). ** Senior research fellow, Institute of Political Science, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Dúbravská Str. 9, 841 04 Bratislava, Slovak Republic, e-mail: [email protected], ORCID: 0000-0003-3972-8165.

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CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE / POLITOLOGICK Ý ČASOPIS 1/2021

1. Introduction The Smer - Social Democracy (Smer - sociálna demokracia, Smer-SD) political party has been operating in Slovakia since 1999, initially under the name Smer (Direction). After more than two decades of existence, due to the low degree of consolidation of the party system, Smer-SD became one of the longest-running parliamentary parties in the Slovak Republic, characterized by a high degree of organizational and personal stability as well as stable electoral support. The February 2020 parliamentary elections interrupted its 12year tenure as a  governing party. It had participated in governments since 2006, with a short two-year break in 2010–2012. From 2012 to 2016 it was able to form a government independently, and in 2006–2010 and 2016–2020 it was the dominant part of the governing coalition. Smer-SD won the parliamentary elections four times in a row (2006, 2010, 2012 and 2016), a  feat which, after 1989, only the Movement for Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) led by Vladimír Mečiar (1992, 1994, 1998 and 2002) had accomplished in Slovak politics. However, HZDS managed to form a government only twice, and for the third time participated in the activities of the government as a junior coalition partner (2006–2010). Therefore, Smer-SD can be described as the most successful political party in contemporary Slovakia, and its leader Robert Fico as the most successful prime minister. He became prime minister three times, although in 2018 he was forced to end his third term prematurely. At that time, Smer-SD faced a significant political challenge during the political crisis that ensued after the assassination of the journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnírová in February 2018. The appointment of the party’s vice chairman Peter Pellegrini as Prime Minister created a new situation within the party, as the positions of prime minister and head of the party were separated. The political crisis in 2018 revealed the presence of internal conflicts within the party and the weakening of the authority of its chairman Robert Fico. However, he continued to hold a decisive position within the party and thus retained influence over the government. Therefore, the period of 2006–2020 can be described as the ‘era of Smer-SD’, or the ‘era of Fico’ in Slovakia. The election results for Smer-SD in February 2020, which did not win first place in the parliamentary elections for the first time since 2006, were the result of a process of a longterm trend of weakening in the party. After the early elections in March 2012, Smer-SD gained a majority of seats in the parliament (83 of 150, i.e. 55.3 percent) (see Table 1). Such electoral success allowing Smer-SD to establish a one-party government took place for the first time in Slovakia since the political changes in 1989. After the 2016 elections, the party needed coalition partners to take over the government. The party suffered defeat in the 2014 presidential election, when its candidate Fico lost to Andrej Kiska, and in 2019, when opposition-backed candidate Zuzana Čaputová won the election over the Smer-SD candidate, Maroš Šefčovič. Finally, the weakening position of Smer-SD was confirmed by regional elections in 2017 and municipal elections in 2018, when the party lost many positions, especially in larger cities (see Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2017, 2018). The aim of this article is to identify the main trends in the development of Smer-SD in the period of 2017–2020, in the context of the parliamentary elections held on 29 Febru-

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Table 1: Dynamics of electoral support for Smer-SD (national elections) Share of valid votes (%)

Number of valid votes

Assigned seats (150 total)

Rank

G (government) O (opposition)

2002

13.46

387,100

25

3

O

2006

29.14

671,185

50

1

G

2010

34.79

880,111

62

1

O

2012

44.41

1,134,280

83

1

G

2016

28.28

737,481

49

1

G

2020

18.29

527,172

38

2

O

Year of elections

Source: ‘Elections to the Parliament’, Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (2002–2020).

ary 2020. I will focus to the question, how and why did the ideology of Smer-SD change in the pre-2020 electoral period and to what extent were ideological changes accompanied by changes in the party’s approach to European integration? In this context, I would like to discuss the misalignment between the party’s proclaimed social democratic orientation and the significant conservative orientation of its political practices. Analysis of the programmatic and ideological development of Smer-SD represents the main contribution of the article, since relatively little attention is paid to this issue at present and most publications on the topic come from the early to mid-2000s (Haughton, 2007; Haughton & Rybář, 2009; Karabová, 2017; Marušiak 2005, 2006; Polačková, 2016).

2. Institutional Europeanization and de-Europeanization of Smer-SD The lack of clear ideological and programmatic definition (and self-definition) has accompanied the party’s activities since its creation. In 1999, Smer defined itself as a non-ideological and pragmatic party (Mesežnikov & Gyárfášová, 2008, p. 10). It profiled its identity situationally as a force distancing itself from the rival camps of supporters and opponents of former Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar (Cabada, Hloušek, & Jurek, 2014, p. 95). The party was established by the former deputy chairman of the post-communist Party of Democratic Left (Strana demokratickej ľavice, SDĽ) Robert Fico; however, some of its founding members were former collaborators of HZDS (such as Monika Beňová and Fedor Flašík). Therefore, some authors point out that Smer is a mixture of both parties (Szabó & Tátrai, 2016). From this perspective, Smer can be defined in the first years of its existence (before the 2002 elections) as an anti-establishment reform party. Its members presented themselves as challengers to the establishment parties and emphasized the divide between society and the political establishment. Smer proclaimed its commitment to the model of liberal democracy and market economy. Although the party displayed certain inclinations to social conservatism, it didn’t support the populist right’s values such as illiberal democracy or ethnocentrism, nor the anti-capitalism of the radical left (Hanley & Sikk, 2014). Peter

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CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE / POLITOLOGICK Ý ČASOPIS 1/2021

Učeň (2004) characterized Smer in a similar way, calling it ‘centrist-populist’ due to its strong anti-establishment appeal. After the 2002 election, the process of ‘mainstreaming’ Smer began (Učeň, 2012, p. 39). In 2004–2005 it merged with minor centre-left parties. Two of them – SDĽ and Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (Sociálnodemokratická strana Slovenska, SDSS)  – were members of the Socialist International. Subsequently, the party changed its name to Smer - Social Democracy. Smer-SD joined both the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES). However, the party agenda was still focused on the protection of national identity and ‘national interests’, as the aim of its leadership was to appeal to the former voters of HZDS and Slovak National Party (Slovenská národná strana, SNS). Several authors emphasize that in this period Smer-SD weakened or even completely abandoned its populist appeals (Bakke & Sitter, 2005; Učeň, 2012; Spáč & Havlík, 2016). According to Kessel, Smer could be described as a populist or anti-establishment reform party only before the 2002 and 2006 elections (Kessel, 2015, p. 65), and no longer by 2010 (Engler, Pytlas, & Deegan-Krause, 2019, pp. 8–9). On the other hand, some expressions of anti-minority attitudes and disdain for the media and opposition constitute evidence cited by other experts who stress the continued presence of elements of populism in the Smer-SD agenda in the later period, or even equate it with the opinions of the leader of populist right Freedom Party of Austria, Norbert Hofer, or US President Donald Trump, who, according to Pavel Baboš, are ‘opposing the principles of liberal democracy’ (Brusis, 2018, p. 42; Baboš, 2018, p. 54). This ‘social-democratization’ or ‘mainstreaming’ of Smer-SD was closely connected with the Europeanization processes, which for political parties means reacting to the processes of European integration (Ladrech, 2002; Havlík & Valterová, 2007, p. 79). According to Ladrech, Europeanization affects not only internal organizational changes in parties, the forms of party competition, and relations between political parties and the government and relations beyond the level of the party system, but can also include changes in party programming (Ladrech, 2002, p. 396). Among these changes is the entry of national parties into European party structures (Dančák, Fiala, &  Hloušek, 2005, p.  14). These changes can have institutional as well as values dimensions. The decision of the Smer-SD party leadership to adopt a social democratic orientation was related to Slovakia’s accession to the EU (Leška, 2015, pp. 46–47). According to Haughton and Rybář (2009, p. 546), this brought Smer a triple victory: ‘PES was actively looking for new partners in the new member states, Smer was keen to obtain a badge of approval, and some Smer politicians were interested in political careers in the EU’. As Europeanization in the context of Central and Eastern European (CEE) states involves the introduction of liberal values, rejecting or questioning them could be considered an element of de-Europeanization, or even counter-Europeanization (Ágh, 2015; Castaldo & Pinna, 2018). According to Castaldo and Pinna (2018), ‘de-Europeanization represents a process of disengagement combined with the intentional decision to reverse the impact of Europeanization’. If Europeanization is understood as a  set of beliefs (or ‘rules for action’) which aims for solutions on the level of EU governance structures, de-Europeanization is a similar set of beliefs which emphasizes more narrowly defined ‘national’ interests and consequently aims for solutions at the level of the nation state.

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De-Europeanization could be conducted on the levels of single decisions, substantively connected multiple decisions (policies), or identities (Hellmann, 2006, pp. 163, 165). Some authors consider de-Europeanization a reversal of the process of Europeanization (Zimny, 2007, pp.  128–130), but de-Europeanization in some particular areas doesn’t need to be juxtaposed to Europeanization in other fields of social life. For example, Yilmaz (2015) points out the simultaneous introduction of Europeanizing reforms by Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan in Turkey and adoption of the restrictive abortion law in 2012. Ágh (2015) and Domaradzki (2019) stress that there could be simultaneous processes of formal Europeanization and genuine de-Europeanization. In this context, Domaradzki (2019, pp. 166, 168) distinguishes between two levels of de-Europeanization – departure from European values and institutional and procedural de-Europeanization. Therefore, the de-Europeanization can be understood as ‘the loss or weakening of the EU/ Europe as a normative/political context and as a reference point in domestic settings and national public debates’ (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 5). It denotes the ‘distancing of domestic contexts from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations (Aydın-Düzgit & Kaliber, 2016, p. 5), and, conversely, prioritization of sovereigntist approaches to solving political problems (Cichocki, 2009). From this perspective, we will analyze the level of Europeanization / de-Europeanization in the political agenda of Smer-SD, with particular stress on its programme and ideology in the period between the political crisis of February and March 2018 in Slovakia and the parliamentary elections in February 2020. The Europeanization of Smer-SD regarding shared values with its partners from PES was problematic. After the elections in 2006, the party adopted an accommodating strategy towards the national populist HZDS and radical right SNS, and formed a coalition with them (Hynčica, 2007; Pytlas, 2009). This step provoked the first conflict in 2006 with PES. European social democrats, following the declaration ‘for a modern, pluralist and tolerant Europe’ adopted by the PES Congress in 2001, unequivocally rejected cooperation with ‘any political party which incites or attempts to stir up racial or ethnic prejudices and racial hatred’. Therefore, the PES Presidency announced a suspension of Smer-SD’s membership in this umbrella organization of the European Social Democrats (PES, 2006). Smer-SD returned to the PES fold as a provisional member in February 2008 and achieved a full membership at the 8th Congress of PES in December 2009 (PES, 2009). In such a context, Ladrech pointed out that Smer-SD was an example of ‘shallow Europeanization’ (Ladrech, 2009, p. 12). The emancipation agenda in relation to marginalized groups of the population has long been part of the agenda of the PES and the Socialist International, whereas Smer-SD continued to be cautious towards it. For example, in 2013, Fico claimed that minorities in Slovakia were characterized by making demands and minimal cultivation of civic virtues. He declared: ‘We did not primarily establish our independent state for minorities (…) but especially for the Slovak state-building nation’ (Webnoviny, 2013). As a result of the refugee crisis in 2015, relations between Smer-SD and PES repeatedly deteriorated. Smer-SD, actively from its position as the governing party, but also during the election campaign at that time, opposed mandatory quotas for the redistribution of refugees between individual EU member states, although in the past this topic was not of interest to Smer-SD at all (Štefančík, 2010, p.  20). As Malová states, the stance was

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CZECH JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE / POLITOLOGICK Ý ČASOPIS 1/2021

based on the consensus that prevailed among the Slovak public on this issue, as up to 63 percent of citizens considered refugees to be a security risk for Slovakia (Malová, 2017b, p. 9). Anti-immigrant sentiments became one of the main topics of Smer-SD’s electoral campaign, supplementing the hitherto social-democratic key phrase ‘We work for people’ with the national-populist ‘We protect Slovakia’, which even became the dominant message (Marušiak, 2016). After the marginalization of the Hungarian Coalition Party, which lost its representation in the National Council of the Slovak Republic in 2010, and the formation of a coalition with the participation of the Slovak-Hungarian Most-Híd (Bridge) Party in 2016, the topic of Slovak-Hungarian relations became secondary in the Smer-SD agenda. At the same time, the anti-minority agenda remained present in its rhetoric, both in relation to the potential emergence of a  Muslim community in Slovakia and in relation to the Roma minority. Since 2015–2016, Smer-SD has replaced its nation state-based populism with the notion of the ‘opposition between self and other not in narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms’, present as well in the agenda of Fidesz (in Hungary) and Law and Justice (in Poland), which Rogers Brubaker calls ‘civilizationism’ (Brubaker, 2017, p. 1193). In the case of Smer-SD, this ideology was grounded in defending Christian traditions, protecting the safety of the citizens, and in the secular character of the state. Fico saw the immigration of Muslim refugees to Slovakia as a potential security risk, referring to the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris. He warned against the creation of a sizable Islamic community in Slovakia (Androvičová, 2015, p. 329; Kazharski, 2017, p. 15). The promise to prevent an influx of immigrants and establishment of compact ghettoes remained one of the crucial mobilization agenda items of Smer-SD before the 2016 elections. These statements raised doubts in the PES about the social democratic nature of the party, and some PES members suggested that its membership should be suspended. Such negative reactions were caused, for example, by Slovakia’s decision to bring a case before the EU Court of Justice in Luxembourg against the legally binding quota as approved by the interior ministers of the EU member states. Gianni Pittella, head of the Socialists and Democrats faction in the European Parliament, justified the proposal to initiate the procedure of suspending Smer-SD membership in the PES by its ‘persistent reluctance to take responsibility and show solidarity in the refugee crisis’, which he said was contrary to the values and beliefs of the PES. On the other hand, Smer-SD had the ...