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BHAVMALHOTRA

MI DTERM ASSI GNMENT

LAWS1160T320 21

UNSW Law

Electronic Assignment Cover Sheet Student Declaration of Academic Integrity https://student.unsw.edu.au/plagiarism I declare that this assessment item is my own work, except where acknowledged, and has not been submitted for academic credit elsewhere, and acknowledge that the assessor of this item may, for the purpose of assessing this item:  Reproduce this assessment item and provide a copy to another member of the University; and/or,  Communicate a copy of this assessment item to a plagiarism checking service (which may then retain a copy of the assessment item on its database for the purpose of future plagiarism checking). I certify that I have read and understood the University rules in respect of Student Academic Misconduct. By the act of submitting this assignment to turnitin you are agreeing to the above Student Declaration of Academic Integrity.

Student name:

Bhav Malhotra

Student ID:

Z5267442

Course no:

LAWS1160

Course name:

Administrative Law

Lecturer name:

Claudia Mitchell

Class Days/times: Due date: No of words: Topic:

Monday Thurs (2pm3pm) 20/10/21 1961 “Merits Review” -Research Paper Administrative Law MidTerm

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“ Ther e p ut at i ono ft h eAATha ss u ffe r e df r o mal a c ko fi nd e pe n de n tpr o c e s si nt h ema k i n gof 1 a ppo i n t me n t s ”

Giving reasons, please explain whether you agree or disagree with Emeritus Professor Carney’s observation.

I.

Introduction

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) conducts independent merits review of administrative decisions made under the Commonwealth with underlying objectives of fairness, accessibility and making decisions that promote faith in the decision-making of the tribunal. Thus, to provide the community an assurance of integrity and legality2 when conducting merits review the AAT must have a reputation as an independent body. This paper explores that the AAT was successfully able to achieve adjudicative independence through the adoption of the judicial method, but its current appointment process has caused significant damage to its reputation as an institution that is independent to the executive branch. The framework for this discussion involves examining AAT using a judicial method when conducting merits review to convey an impression of impartiality. However, the shortcomings of the AAT’s the making of appointment poses a significant threat to the AAT’s reputation as 1I DFCa l l i na nRe vi e w:s e c t i on4oft heTr i buna l sAma l g a ma t i onAc t201 5( Ct h)( Re po r tt ot heAt t or ne y Ge ne r a l ,De c e mbe r2 018) ,[ 6. 261] .

2Brennan,SirGerard,"Foreword"[1991]UNSWLawJl1;(1991)14(1)UNSWLawJournalVI100.

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illuminated by modern trends in public administration, therefore demonstrating the veracity of Professor Carney’s observations and outlining an overhaul through the implementation of statutory scheme.

II.

JUDCIAL METHOD AND APPEARANCE OF INDEPDENCE

The appearance of impartiality in the AAT stems from the tribunal exercising an administrative function though a judicial method, giving AAT the jurisdiction to undertake de novo review of a range of Commonwealth decisions. An adversarial judicial model was championed under the stewardship of Brennan J3 illuminated through its decisions that highlighted that the tribunal operates “quasi judicially”4 and has a “duty to act judicially.”5 Furthermore, the tribunal signals its continued commitment to the judicial method by adopting to changes in the judicial model through embracing programs of judicial education 6 t i on a lJ u di c i a lCo l l e g e . Despite this the AAT exercises administrative power when by the Na

making the “correct or preferable decision”7 when undertaking merits review. Thus, the AAT utilises a judicial method to enact administrative decision-making serving as the foundation for the AAT’s reputation as an independent body. 3 Mat t he wGr o v e s ,‘ DoAdmi n i s t r a t i v eTr i bun a l sHa v et obeSa t i s fie doft h eCo mpe t e nc eofPa r t i e sBe f or e The m’( 20 13)20 ( 1)Ps y c hi a t r y ,Ps y c hol o gyan dLaw13 3, 134. 4 Si ng h( Mi gr at i on)20 17]AATA85016J une20 17) . 5 Sul l i v anvDe par t me ntofT r ans por t( 19 78)1ALD383 , 402( De a neJ ) .

6 ChiefJusticeMurrayGleeson,“Outcome,ProcessandtheRuleofLaw”(Speech,AustralianNationalUniversity, 20 08) .

7 Dr ak evMi n i s t e rf orI mmi gr at i onan dEt hni cAffai r s( 19 79)2ALD60, 68( Bo we nCJa ndDe a neJ ) .

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The primary benefit of adapting from the judicial model was respect for the AAT in its decision-making process, spurred on for Australia’s appreciation for the rule of law. By stylising the AAT’s decision-making process to that of the courts, the AAT was able to be viewed as an elite repository of power and gain respect for its decision-making allowing the tribunal to receive funding and have public support in its integrity.8 Furthermore, the AAT’s adherence to the judicial method enabled it to reap the rewards of an independent judiciary whilst exercising administrative power9 and thus engender adjudicative independence10. This means that the AAT has a focus on addressing individual grievances, expects impartiality in tribunal members decision making and is free from external interference or improper influence.11 Aspects of this independence is displayed through the formal procedures of the AAT such as reasons must be given for its decisions12, regard must be had to the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness13 and hearings must be conducted in public14 enabling the AAT to foster a reputation as a system that is independent to the executive branch. O’Connor J, a former President of the Tribunal, argued that “there has never been any doubt 8 I b i dn2.

9J us t i c eMi c ha e lKi r b y , ‘ Re t ur noft heNa t i v e ’( Spe e c h, Au s t r a l i a nNa t i on a lUni v e r s i t y ,199 6) . 10 POConn or ,“ Tr i bun a lI nd e pe nde nc e ”Aus t r a l i a nI ns t i t ut eofJ udi c i a lAdmi n i s t r a t i onMe l bo ur ne , ( 200 3) . 11 I b i d.

12 Admi ni s t r at i v eAppe al sT r i bun alAc t19 75( Ct h)s39( ‘ AATAc t ’ ) ;s e ea l s oGa r r yDo wne s ,‘ GoodDe c i s i on Ma ki n g ’( Spe e c h, Au s t r a l i a nPubl i cSe r v i c eCommi s s i onFor umofCommon we a l t hAg e nc i e sConf e r e nc e ,7 Ma r c h200 8) .

13 AATAct( n17)s43 ( 2) . 14 AATAc t( n17)s35.

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as to the AAT‟ s independence”, which she attributed to its judicial mould, the absence of any statutory restriction on its capacity to review policy and the separation of the Tribunal’s administration from the Attorney-General’s Department15. However, the adoption of the judicial model only covers one aspect of tribunal independence, and the AAT must have robust mechanisms to integrate institutional and adjudicative independence16 to promote public confidence and trust in the AAT’s decision-making17.

III.

CURRENT MECHANISMS OF TRIBUNAL APPOINTMENT

The mechanisms of appointment adopted by the AAT ties directly into determining whether

n i t i a lme mb e r s h i poft h e the AAT is institutionally independent from the executive.18 Thei

AATwa se n vi s a g e dt oc o mpr i s ep a ne l sofj ud g e s , pu bl i cs e r v a n t sa n dl a ype o pl ea pp oi nt e d

1 9 f ort h e i r‘ c h a r a c t e ra n de xpe r i e n c ei npr a c t i c a la ffa i r s . ’ Ont hes u r f a c et h eAATa c h i e v e st hi s

2 0 g oa la sc r i t e r i ac o ns i s t sof“ s pe c i a lkno wl e d g ea n d/ ore nr o l me nta sal e g a lpr a c t i t i o ne r ” a nd

t h eEOIt obe c o mea nAATme mbe rou t l i ne ss e l e c t i onba s e donc r i t e r i as uc ha si nt e gr i t y ,

15 De i r d r eO‟Conn or ,„ Effe c t i v eAdmi ni s t r a t i v eRe v i e w:AnAna l y s i sofTwot i e rRe vi e w‟ ( 19 93)1Aus t r al i a n J ou r nalofAdmi ni s t r at i v eLaw4,8. 16 Pa me l aOCon nor , “ Tr i buna lI nde pe nde nc e ”Aus t r a l i a nI ns t i t ut eofJ udi c i a lAdmi ni s t r a t i onMe l bou r ne , ( 2 003) . 17 AATAc t( n17)s2( A) . 18 I b i dn15. 19 Nar e l l eBe df or d," TheWi nne rTa k e sI tAl l :Le g a lCos t sAsAMe c ha ni s mOfCont r ol I nPubl i cLa w" [ 2 018]Bon dLawRe v i e w. 20 AATAc t( n17)s ( 7) .

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2 1 c o mmu ni c a t i o ns ki l l s ,r e a s o ni n ga n dr e s i l i e nc e . Ast hepr e s i de ntoft h eAATc a no nl yma k e

r e c o mme n da t i ont ot h eAt t o r ne y Ge n e r a la n da p poi nt me n t sa r eul t i ma t e l yma deb yt h e

2 2 Go v e r nor Ge n e r a l , t h e r ee x i s t sgr e a t a moun t sofd i s c r e t i onf ort h ee x e c ut i v eb r a n c ht o

i nflue n c ede c i s i on ma ki n gt hr o u ght hea pp oi n t me ntpr o c e s s .Thi sme a n st hepr oc e s si s

s hr ou de di ns e c r e c ya s“ i ti sdi ffic ul tt okno who wf a rg o v e r nme nt sr e f us et or e n e wne w

2 3 me mbe r sba s e dondi s s a t i s f a c t i onwi t ht he i rde c i s i on ma ki n g ” a nds o mee vi de n c es u g g e s t s

2 4 t h a tme mbe r sa r er e a p poi nt e do na n nu a ls t a t i s t i c s . Suc hame c ha ni s mi sr e fle c t i v eof“ ne w

ma na g e r i a l i s m”a n dt hei n c r e a s i n gl ybu r e a u c r a t i cn a t u r eo ft heAATwh e r ec o s t c u t t i n ga nd

2 5 e ffic i e n c yt h r ou ghme a s ur e me ntofp e r f or ma n c eme t r i c ss uc ha snu mbe ro fc a s e sh e a r d e

p r i or i t i s e do v e rr e a pp oi n t me nt sba s e dont heq ua l i t yofde c i s i o nma ki n g .Th e s epr o bl e ms

we r el i k e l ye xa c e r ba t e da f t e rt heAAT’ sa ma l g a ma t i o na sa p poi nt me nta r es u b j e c tt ot h e

2 6 a p pr o v a loft h eg o v e r n or g e ne r a l a sop pos e dt o6di ffe r e n tme mbe r sa sou t l i ne di nt h e2 000

2 7 ARTbi l l . Al t hou g ht h eAAT’ sa nn ua lr e p or to ut l i n e st h eu s eofe x t e r n a la s s e s s o r sf or

21 Dei r d r eO‟Conn or ,„ Effe c t i v eAdmi ni s t r a t i v eRe v i e w:AnAna l y s i sofTwot i e rRe vi e w‟ ( 19 93)1Aus t r al i a n J ou r nalofAdmi ni s t r at i v eLaw4,8. 22 I b i d. 23 I b i dn18. 24 Robi nCr e yk e ,‘ Thes pe c i a lpl a c eoft r i bun a l si nt h es y s t e mofj us t i c e :Ho wc a nt r i buna l sma keadi ffe r e nc e ? ’ 15( 3)( 2 004)Pub l i cLa wRe v i e w220 , 2245 . 25 I b i d. 26 Admi n i s t r a t i v eAppe a l sTr i buna lAc t19 75( Ct h)s8( 3 ) . 27 Cr e yk ea bo v en24 .

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2 8 me mbe re v a l ua t i ona swe l la si n t e r vi e wi n gc ur r e ntme mb e r sb ya ni nd e pe nd e ntpa ne l , t h e r e

i snor e v e l a t i o no ft hec r i t e r i af ora s s e s s me ntno ra n yf e e dba c kt ome a s u r et h ee ffe c t i v e ne s sof

2 9 t h ee v a l u a t i ons y s t e m.Mor e o v e r , t heAAT’ sa bi l i t yt or e a c hi t sno r ma t i v eg oa l s i sr e d uc e da s

3 0 d e c i s i o nma ki n gha st h ep ot e nt i a lt ob ei n flue nc e db yt heg o v e r nme ntoft h ed a y me a ni n g

3 1 s i mi l a rc a s e swi l ln otbet r e a t e di nas i mi l a rf a s h i o n a ndt h eAATl a c kst h eop e nn e s si n

p r oc e e di n g st oa ppo i n tme mbe r s .Fi n a l l y ,i ta l s or e duc e si t sa bi l i t yt oi nc r e a s et h eq ua l i t ya nd

3 2 c ons i s t e nc yi nde c i s i o nma ki n g ofg o v e r nme nta g e nc i e sa st h et r i bun a lwi l ln ota ppe a rt ob e

us , t h ec ur r e nta ppoi nt me nt i nde pe n de n the nc el os i n gr e s pe c tf ori t sde c i s i o nma ki n g .Th

p r oc e s si n s t i t u t e db yt heAATs u ffe r sf r o mal a c koft r a ns pa r e nc yno rha sl e gi s l a t i v e

3 3 r e qu i r e me nt st ob eapub l i c ,me r i t s b a s e d , c ompe t i t i v ep r oc e s sme a ni n gt h a tt he r ea r eno

r o bus tme c ha ni s mst oe ns u r ei ns t i t ut i ona li n de pe nde nc eo ft heAATf r o mt hee x e c ut i v ea r m.

IV.

DECLINING PUBLIC PERCEPTION

28 Se eAAT, “ Cor por a t ePl a n2019 202 0” :.

29 Gabr i e lFl e mi n g , ‘ Admi ni s t r a t i v eRe vi e wa ndt he“ Nor ma t i v e ”Goa l–I sAn ybo dyOutThe r e ? ’( 200 0)28 ( 1) Fe de r alLawRe v i e w61, 63( ‘ Nor ma t i v eGoa l ’ ) . 30 J a me sMor g a n,‘ Se c ur i n gt heAdmi n i s t r a t i v eAppe a l sTr i bu na l ’ si n de pe nde nc e :Te nu r ea ndme c ha ni s msof a pp oi nt me nt ’( 2018)43 ( 4)Al t e r nat i v eLa wJ ou r nal3 02,30 3( ‘ Se c ur i n gAAT’ si nd e pe nde nc e ’ ) . 31 Fl e mi n gn29 . 32 I bi d 33 Cr e yk ea bo v en24.

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As outlined by Brennan J a tribunal lacking institutional independence will appoint “nominees of convenience”34 demonstrated through the political interference in appointments by ‘stacking’ the tribunal with government contracts35. The removal of Terry Carney in September 2017 after his first decision on the illegality of the government’s robodebt scheme in March 2017 without reasons given for his removal was highly publicised36, hence damaging the AAT’s reputation. When comparing this to the appointment of Karen Synon as the deputy president of the AAT and head of its social services division whilst having no experience in social services law37 raises questions upon the robustness of the appointment making process and her extensive association with the Liberal Party further denigrates the reputation of the AAT.

Although there is no concrete evidence of determining whether the appointment and reappointment making process was conducted fairly or with independence to the executive the mere appearance of bias can be just as damaging to the AAT’s reputation as an actual

34 I bi dn2.

35 SeePaulKar p, ‘ “ Ful l ofLi be r a lMa t e s ” :La bo ra c c us e sCoa l i t i onof“ s t a c ki n g”t r i buna l ’ ,TheGuar di an ( onl i ne ,21Fe br ua r y201 9).

36 SeeDavidHardaker,“InChristianPorter’sworld,partymatesoverrideprocessormerit”,Crikey(online, Fe bur a r y202 1).

37

Se eDa v i dHa r da k e r ,“Fr omFr yde nbe r gc a mpa i gnt obi gbuc kst r i bun a lj ob— t hes we e tr e wa r dsofpa r t y s e r vi c e( onl i neFe b , 202 1)...