An evaluation of critical criminology in a modern context PDF

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An evaluation of critical criminology in a modern context...

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182742 Word countIs critical criminology wedded to outdated theorisation? An evaluation of critical criminology a modern context.

Introduction The 1970s and 1980s saw a rise of radical pressure groups, bohemianism and a changing social order. Academic studies sought to reflect the ‘experimental mood of the time’ (Carrington, 2002), and through new ways of thinking, combined with transgressing research opportunities, criminology redefined itself. It challenged previously accepted notions, questioned conventional ideas, and blurred other fields of academia, giving rise to more radical intellectual possibilities. It was in this era that critical criminology emerged as a political project to expose inequalities and injustices, whilst arguing the inefficiency of a repressive state approach. Although critical criminological theories are varied and each hold unique virtues, they share common notions that indicate crime as a form of capitalist structure. They each argue the law functions in the interests of the powerful and is shaped by political economy, specifically race, class and gender. ‘Today, a variety of interesting perspectives can be subsumed under this domain including, but not limited to, postmodernism, left realism, feminism and peace-making.’ (Ross, 2009) Critical criminological theorists reject state definitions of crime, instead turning to concepts of harm and human right violations. They blame the social structure of society as the cause of crime believing ‘crime is not something some people do, and others don’t. Crime is a matter of who can pin the label on whom, and underlying this socio-political process is the structure of social relations determined by the political economy.’ (Chambliss, 1975). In doing so, they oppose power hierarchies based on inequality, regardless of whether the imbalance is of class, political, social or cultural power. Therefore, they regard the criminal justice system as an ineffectual means to correct injustice, proposing that alternate methods are required to have any meaningful and lasting resolutions to crime. Critical criminological theories mainly strive to argue that instead of implementing notions of reform or change, the criminal justice system is a semiautonomous partner of the capitalist system of production, with the overall objective of maintaining that system’s dominant power structure.

182742 Word countHowever, critical criminology remains theoretically conservative. Its theories are wedded to outdated research and have failed to move forwards to accommodate notions of crime in a contemporary context. Their commitment to traditional values and ideas, with reluctance to welcoming change or opposition, hinder the validity of their teachings. This analysis will critically discuss the broad merits of critical criminology by evaluating specific critical theories and their implications. ‘Arguably, this ground has been eroded in a harsher social, political and academic climate of the 1990s, leaving a question mark over the future directions that critical criminologies might or could take in the twenty-first century.’ (Carrington, 2002) Each subheading within the analysis examines a dominant or an emerging theory of critical criminology, assessing the extent of its integrity, particularly within in a modern context. It will specifically focus on the theories of critical political economy, radical criminology, moral panic theory, labelling theory and feminist criminology, arguing their prevalence has diminished as society has moved forwards. It will then offer alternate suggestions for a new direction of crime, before concluding whether critical criminology holds any relevance in a modern context.

Critical political economy Developments Critical political economy accuses intellectual and institutional divisions as being crime catalysts. Marx and Engels’ work provided the prime model of critical political economy, describing crime as a form of ‘primitive rebellion’, in response to a polarised society between the bourgeoise and proletariat. However, their work was largely ignored, slamming its theoretical credibility. For example, it was contested that Marx’s theoretical work did not systematically address issues of crime or criminal justice, it merely offered a pioneering analysis of crime ‘very far from the economic determinism attributed to Marx, demonstrating the dialectal interplay of structure and action.’ (Reiner, 2016) Nevertheless, Bonger (1905) developed the first systematic Marxist analysis of crime, noting capitalism generates crime through egoism. He highlighted that egoism itself does not make people criminal, but more capable of committing crime, as when people are looking out for themselves ‘a great part of morality disappears.’ (Bonger, 1905) He argued modern markets stimulate excitement within its offenders and proposed the removal of moral

182742 Word countaccountability. More recently, structural political economy has often been reduced to a social psychology of deviance, a psychic strain between aspirations and achievement. Merton (1938) notes tendencies of deviance rooted in the strains of materialism. ‘Encouragement of common material aspirations through a mythology of meritocracy, against a structural reality of unequal opportunities, generates anomic pressures and deviant reactions.’ (Reiner, 2011) However, Merton’s work was criticised for being limited to cross-societal comparisons of deviance, failing to offer understandings of deviance within a society. Furthermore, inequality and deprivation do not generate deviance directly, but mediated through their cultural meanings. Current critical political economy purports to be a scientific enterprise ‘deploying mathematical models based on abstract and simplified axioms about human motivation and social organisation.’ (Reiner, 2011) Radical criminology The study of political economy as a basis for crime has not been limited. American radicalism has derived its criminological theories through these notions, to suggest that crime is not rising, control is. Chambliss (1975) suggests that as the divide between bourgeoisie and proletariat broadens, increasingly punitive measures are necessary to maintain social order. He suggests that political economy shapes trends of crime and penality, functioning to distract working-class from their control . ‘Crime is a matter of who can pin the label on whom and underlying this socio-political process is the structure of social relations determined by the political economy’ (Chambliss, 1975) Cavadino and Digan (2006) support this, noting social democracies are associated with less homicide, violence and serious crime as well as less punitive policies. Radical criminology argues crime is not the issue for academic focus, but instead, ‘its underlying causes in the political economy, way beyond the controls of codes, cops, courts and corrections.’ (Reiner, 2011) Taylor, Walton and Young in their book ‘The new criminology’ (1973) explore a fully social theory of deviance, formulated as ‘a political economy of criminal action and of the reaction it excites’. They stress the wider contexts in which acts of deviance and control are embedded, arguing without the holistic sensibility of political economy, it is impossible to explain crime and control. ‘The task is not merely to 'penetrate' these problems, not merely to question the stereotypes, not merely to act as carriers of 'alternative phenomenological realities'. The

182742 Word counttask is to create a society in which the facts of human diversity, whether personal, organic or social, are not subject to the power to criminalize.’ (Taylor et al, 1973). However, the New Criminology has been subject to extensive criticism for its idealistic and deterministic reach. (Burke, 2005) A fully social theory of deviance offers little practical impact, receiving criticisms of economic reductionism from mainstream criminology. It overlooks analyses of neocolonialism and patriarchy as structures of criminalisation and lacks empirical evidence to support its proposals. For example, it offers no explanation for low crime rates in capitalist societies and high crime rates in socialist societies. It has also been criticised by feminist criminologists such as Carlton (2013) for ignoring the patriarchal nature of the criminal justice system, as well as other groups such as victims. Traditional Marxists such as Hirst (1975) fear radical criminology in general has strayed too far away from traditional Marxist beliefs, whilst others argue it wrongly romanticises crime (Rock, 1988). During the 1970s, radical criminology paid substantial attention to white collar crime, looking at ‘crimes committed by state institutions and private business organizations or corporations.’ (Whyte, 2009) It sought to expose the elite for political wrongdoing, especially in its governmental and corporate forms. However, its concerns were devoted to an analysis of oppressive features of the capitalist system and remained ‘dominated by instrumental Marxism and pluralistic conflict perspectives.’ (Rothe et al, 2011) Their research on whitecollar crime was largely misfocused, side-tracked by the ‘broader social, political and economic power structures.’ (Rothe et al, 2011) However, Freidrichs et al (2011) argued the importance of employing a more expansive interpretation to examine the results of capitalist structures generally. He recognised ‘a need to reconsider the often-misleading labels under the umbrella of white-collar crime as more broadly encompassed by crimes of the powerful.’ Radical studies of white-collar crime can be condemned for ignoring the historical legacy and pattern of crimes of the powerful pre-dating capitalist structures but rewarded for recognising the capitalist conditions that facilitate behaviours of the powerful. Certainly, attention to structural power imbalances are necessary as a much-needed corrective to mainstream criminological positivist analyses of crime. ‘The maldistribution of power across the societal spectrum has always been a central point of departure for all the different strains for radical and critical criminological analysis.’ (DeKeserdy, 2014)

182742 Word countMoral panic theory Another theory deriving from critical political economy is that of moral panic theory. As an obvious outcome of constructionist framework, its thesis offers a curious approach to criminology. Coined by Cohen, in a ‘very brief and opportunistic piece of research’ (Horsley, 2017), the theory illustrates the responses of the media, community, police, legislators and action groups to minor social disruptions. Focussing on legislative elites and those in positions of power, it notes the systematic marginalization of deviance. Moral panic theory blames media outlets and political elites for over-dramatizing socio-cultural tensions by identifying a subject ripe for ‘folk devil’ status. ‘In response to exaggerated concerns, ‘folk devils’ are created, deviant stereotypes identifying the enemy, the source of threat, selfish, evil wrongdoers who are responsible for the trouble.’ (Goode, 1994) Emotive language, rumour and fiction are used to blow up selected occurrences indicating crime or deviance, usually of a minor nature. Fearing a collapse of dominant social values, the public turn to the state who are seen to ‘escalate’ their law enforcement efforts and ‘innovate’ new methods of social control.’ (Cohen, 1972:86-91). This ultimately urges the internalisation and expansion of social controls, meaning erosion of civil liberties can be easily justified and state oppression can be used to achieve behavioural regulation. In his analysis of the mods and rockers, Cohen noticed minor acts breaching social order displayed nothing more than small indiscretions shared among gatherings of that size and nature. ‘What would normally be regarded as minor disturbance among young people…touched off what can only be described as an orgy of sensationalism in the British media.’ (Goode, 1994) The media in the following days saw an outburst of disproportionate headlines such as ‘Day of Terror by Scooter Groups (Daily Telegraph), ‘Youngsters beat up town’ (Daily Express), ‘Wild Ones Invade Seaside’ (Daily Mirror), creating cynical public attitudes surrounding not only these groups of people specifically, but all young people. Its coverage provoked public fears feeding the politics of punitive social policy. He warned of the long term impact of this political tactic, noting ‘Sometimes the panic passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way society conceives itself.’ (Cohen 1972:9)

182742 Word count‘Acts are not, they become. So it is with crime. Crime does not exist. Crime is created. First there are acts. Then follows a long process of giving meaning to these acts.’ (Christie, 1998: 121) Moral panic theory was considered an academic breakthrough in the 1970s, a time of scholarly activism. Garland (2008), describes it as ‘a prerequisite for effective social theorisation’ and Cohen (2011) boasted of its prevalence noting over one hundred citations a year. Moral panic theory appealed to the radical intellectuals of the time in a move away from previous commitment to ideas surrounding the ontology of harm and aetiology of crime. It symbolised a shift from an early-scientific world, reliant on facts and positivism to a harsh criticism of state supremacy, media controversy and social control as an explanation for crime. Thompson (1998) went so far as to describe this criminological era as the ‘age of the moral panic’, noting an upward trend in its use. However, Jewkes (2015) suggests the theory rests on a social order that has largely changed since this time and that although it has received praise for decades, its overbearing prominence may be unwarranted. Perhaps criminology should ‘seek to move away from the idea of moral panics because its understanding of politics, social order and structural change may no longer reflect the ontological and ethical constitution of late modernity.’ (Horsley, 2017). Firstly, Critcher (2009) argues the original definition of ‘moral panic’ used ambiguous terminology leading to a loose and vague understanding of the theory. He argues that subsequent updates have failed to redefine its terms and wider theoretical debates within sociology and criminology need to be considered to provide conceptual clarity. Its extent has been compared to that of a ‘conspiracy theory’, being overgeneralized to cover any minor form of fear, or in some instances, no existing public fear at all. ‘Since the 1970s, sociologists have often applied the term ‘moral panic’ to such general fears’ (Jenkins, 1992) including inflated claims regarding child cruelty, serial homicide and even satanism. For example, in the United States, the late 80s saw a minor wave of ‘ritual abuse’ surrounding devil worship and cult practise, of which its foundations were firmly embedded within Christian fundamentalist teachings and religious right movements. The media neglected this deeply rooted element of satanism entirely, creating panic over an entirely separate problem. ‘The uncritical acceptance of the problem by the media led to widespread

182742 Word countdissemination of the charges, without recognition of the wider social and political connotations.’ (Jenkins, 1992). The blurring of boundaries between moral panic theory and conspiracy theory was also obvious in the United States surrounding, cannabis and other recreational drug use. ‘During the 1930s, scores of sensationalistic magazine articles, and thousands of local newspaper articles, were published on the horrors of marihuana use, dubbing the drug the ‘killer weed’ the ‘weed of madness, a ‘sex-crazing drug menace’, the ‘burning weed of hell’, a ‘gloomy monster of destruction.’’ (Goode 1993:194, 1994:197). Through ‘the press and other communications media’, the government created a national menace that had very little truth or objective reality. (Becker, 1963) Marijuana users and dealers therefore became a new class of outsiders, creating a crisis where no basis for it existed. These examples demonstrate a public belief that some concealed but prominent association is accountable for an unexplained occurrence, confusing the distinction between moral panic theory and conspiracy theory. For moral panic theory to hold validity and authenticity, its definition needs to be clarified and the scope of its application refined. Furthermore, its loose definition has caused inaccurate applications (Cornwell and Linders 2002) leading to scholarly testing of its academic precision. (Hier 2008) Moral panic theory can also be criticised for undermining its audiences by ‘assuming their gullibility to the underhand ideological machinations of nefarious elites.’ (Horsley, 2017) For example, moral panic theory in the context of the 2016 Brexit election assumes leave voters were fearful of immigration because they were influenced by sensationalist xenophobic propaganda that condemned the alien foreigner. Yet, this assumes a certain level of naivety within its audience, failing to acknowledge their capacity for critical reflection. ‘Although it’s probably inevitable prejudice plays some role in a national vote, turning it into a primary explanation perhaps struggles to accommodate a sense of reason and logic within an opposing worldview.’ (Horsley, 2017). The leave campaign may be guilty of portraying immigrants as ‘folk devil’ through fake news and political media narratives but it would be unwarranted to assume its voters were oblivious to this bias or that they were wholly influenced by the media alone. Furthermore, xenophobia and nationalism existed pre-Brexit, so to blame the result on a public fear created by the leave campaign would be unwarranted. ‘The EU referendum, of course, did not create racism. Rather, the campaign only drew on and fed into existing forms of racism.’ (Burnett, 2017).

182742 Word countInstead of using moral panic to ‘accommodate a sense of reason and logic in an opposing world view’ (Horsley, 2017), we should explore and fully comprehend our economic systems more broadly. Using moral panic theory as a valid criminological justification has a danger of diminishing real problems to mere ‘claims’ against the public, authorities or mass media. The main downfall of moral panic theory is that it largely rests on a conservative moral order. For example, basic understandings of ‘control’ and ‘repression’ come from a classical age of criminology, which society has moved forwards from. ‘Such notions of control and repression come from a different time, a ‘classical’ age.’ (Baudrillard, 2007) We have a changing media landscape that facilitates multiple influential sources, such as the rise of social media, allowing individuals to make judgements of their own. Even the political influence of elites can be overshadowed, challenged or disproved. ‘Moral panic thesis remains trapped within a language of power that no longer reflects the social structures and relations it is supposed to explain.’ (Horsley, 2017) Attempting to maintain viability of his theory in a modern era, Cohen (2011a [1972]) broadened the application of moral panic theory. It no longer requires moral entrepreneurs to belong to a dominant class and has broadened to include sub-cultures, intellectuals and minorities. Panics need not adjust the status quo and, instead of carrying negative implications, can now be supportive of a social diversity. However, these alterations make the scope of moral panic theory almost overbearing, showing very little commitment to its original concept. It instead resembles ‘an indiscriminate, all-purpose designation for a broad array of popular third-party influences on public concern.’ (Horsley, 2017). Cornwell and Linders (2002) add it has ‘stretched so far beyond the original limits’ that the term ‘has lost most of its conceptual ground’. Critcher (2008) suggests Cohen need not move away from his original notions to this extent since there are still situations in which elites attempt to control and regulate the ...