Answer to scenario on criminal law: liability for murder and property damage. PDF

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17003419 1. Davina’s liable for the murder of Anne. The mens rea, being malice aforethought, is described as the intention to cause death or serious harm (GBH). In this scenario, it is certain that any reasonable person could foresee that these actions could result in death of another – meeting the conditions which are laid out for murder. For example, in the case of R v Woolin [1999] AC 82 the defendant threw his 3-month-old baby at a wall whom died as a result. The first conviction given by the Court of Appeal was that he should be charged with murder due to the rejection of his defence of provocation. If Davina had set Anne’s flat on fire with the intention to cause death or serious bodily harm then she would be liable for direct intention, however, from the facts of the case she may have oblique intent. With the intention to frighten Anne, her actions injured the victim and surrounding properties with the possibility of suffering of others. If death was not her purpose but virtually certain (objectively) and she foresaw this fact then according to R v Woolin [1999] AC 82 where the House of Lords agreed with the Nedrick guidelines, she is liable. The actus reus of murder is the unlawful killing of a human being under the Queens peace which is satisfied because Davina’s actions of setting fire to Anne’s house is what lead to her death. As seen in the case or R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566 where the defendant attacked the victim by hitting him repeatedly with a chair and resulting in his death. There is a break in the chain of causation or ‘novus actus interveniens’ which could potential mean, that a new act has come into place and the first defendant may not be responsible. In the scenario, Dr George is an intervening act because he gave Anne the wrong blood for a transfusion. She then died because of this and not directly because of the fire – however it could be argued that from the description of ‘serious burns’, her injuries incurred from Davina’s actions alone were more than a minimal cause of death. A further point to be taken into consideration is that of medical negligence and the nature of Dr George’s act, as seen in the case of R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844, where the hospital’s treatment caused the victims death several weeks later. The case of Jordan [1956] 40 Cr App E 152 may be applied better to the scenario as the defendant was found not guilty for the victim’s death due to the actions of the hospital. For example, the stress and pressure of working in a hospital is what lead to Dr George’s mistake and it is for the courts to decide whether the victim would have died anyway from Davina’s actions alone. Therefore, Davina is the cause of Anne’s death. Factual causation requires the use of the ‘but for’ test; whether the actions of the defendant resulted in injury and proof that the consequence would not have happened but for the defendant’s conduct. This test comes from the case of R v Pagett [1983] 76 Cr App R 279 where the police acted in self-defence. ‘But for’ Davina causing a fire to spread rapidly in Anne’s home, Anne would not have died – satisfying this part of the test and leaving Davina liable. As seen in the case of R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 when the defendant put poison into his mother’s drink with the intention to murder her. However, medical evidence showed that her cause of death was a heart attack and therefore the defendant was liable for attempted murder. Legal causation requires proof that the accused conduct was a substantial and operating cause of the death, but not necessarily the only cause. A supporting case is R v Smith [1959 2 QB 35 where the stab wound was the main cause of death and therefore a murder conviction was upheld. Davina’s act would complete this test and it would be for the court to decide her conviction.

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2. A defence she could plead is diminished responsibility (Homicide Act 1957, Section 2). This is stated as an abnormality of the mind which must be proven with evidence from Doctor reports and also must be a recognised medical condition which substantially impairs the defendant’s ability to understand their act or omission. As seen in the case of R v Ahluwalia [1933] CA, 96 Cr App R (CA) where the defendant threw petrol in her husband’s bedroom and set it alight but due to her depressive state she was not convicted of murder. From the scenario a Doctor confirmed that by Davina having suffered brain damage as a child, this causes her to react aggressively to situations - especially under the stress of her boyfriend leaving her and by Anne’s comment. Without the brain damage Davina wouldn’t have reacted this way and therefore it is a more than trivial cause. This partial defence may reduce the conviction of murder to voluntary manslaughter. It is for the Jury to accept the medical evidence and for a balance of probabilities to be proven.

3. Davina’s liable for any damage to the flat caused by the fire. She’s also liable for the damage to the surrounding premises which were affecting by the fire. The actus reus is any damage caused to a property belonging to another, without lawful excuse (Loveless, J. 2016), which is evident from the scenario. The mens rea is intention or recklessness, as seen in the case of R v Cunningham (1957) 2 QB 396 where it was held that the defendant was malicious and reckless as he had foreseen that some harm would be incurred. Davina knew that the flat belonged to Anne and will therefore be liable to pay special damages of over £1000 and if costs exceed £5000 then she will receive a level 4 fine and possibly 3 months in prison.

17003419 Bibliography Loveless J, Complete Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, USA 2012) P670. R v Ahluwalia [1933] CA, 96 Cr App R (CA) R v Cheshire [1991] 1 WLR 844 R v Cunningham [1957] 2 QB 396 R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566 (HL) R v Jordan [1956] 40 Cr App E 152 R v Pagett [1983] 76 Cr App R 279 R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35 R v White [1910] 2 KB 124 R v Woolin [1999] AC 82 (HL)...