Assess Fianna Fail’s external (including Anglo-Irish) policies in the 1930s- grade 1st hons PDF

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Name:Adrian Wood Student no. 120404506 Course and year of study: Arts, 1 Module code HI1002 Deadline: 08/01/21 Essay title: Assess Fianna Fáil’s external (including Anglo-Irish) policies in the 1930s Word count: 2,150

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Assess Fianna Fáil’s external (including Anglo-Irish) policies in the 1930s

Fianna Fáil, during the 1930’s took foreign affairs extremely seriously. Recognising the importance of the matter, Eamon de Valera swooped to appoint the role of minister of external affairs to none other than himself in 1932. The main aims of the FF policy at the time involved establishing the Irish Free State on the world stage, further breaking down ties with Britain and ultimately dismantling the treaty in the hopes of establishing a fully fledged Republic. These policies were carried out through a number of mediums. These mediums included involvement in the League of Nations, the withholdment of land annuities, and a series of constitutional amendments that eventually amounted to the 1937 constitution. Many of FF’s actions in regards to external relations throughout the 1930’s could be seen as damaging, especially in relation to the Economic War. In order to assess the policies of the government at this time, it is important to remember the groundwork that allowed de Valera to execute his policies was paved by the Cumman na nGaedheal government that went before him. In many instances de Valera reaped the reWards of what W.T Cosgrave had sown. However, ultimately by the end of the 1930’s the Fianna Fáil government could say that they had achieved the majority of what they had set out to do, in relation to foreign policy.

FF and the League of Nations Prior to being in government, the League of Nations was of little importance to Fianna Fáil. One could even go so far as to say Fianna Fáil were apathetic to the League. Sean Lemass was, in 1931, quoted saying that the League was of no advantage to Ireland, stating it ‘was wrapped in utter futility’.1 A few however, de Valera included, recognised the potential of the League. Ireland's permanent delegate at Geneva was Sean Lester who felt the League was a wonderful 1Stephen Barcroft, “Irish Foreign Policy at the League of Nations 1929-1936.” Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, (1979) p20

platform for publicity. His views however were met with indifference from Fianna Fáil, he often wrote that he had received ‘no kind of instructions from government’ when it came to arising issues in the league.2 The first interest shown in the League by de Valera came in 1932 when the League council presidency rotated and it was Ireland's turn to hold office. De Valera took on the position and went on to become well regarded as a spokesman for smaller states.3 De Valera’s most admirable policy in regards to the League was most certainly his critical views on the League's effectiveness in carrying out its responsibilities.4 His views were that the League lacked authority, which was highlighted in 1934 after Italy's worrying intentions in Ethiopia were brought before the league.5 The League showed complete inaction in disciplining Italy which threw the League's effectiveness into doubt. Countries such as Britain and France feared sanctioning Italy would alienate them, leaving them unlikely to join the Allies in the event of a War in Europe.6 In early 1935 de Valera admitted to the Dáil that the League of Nations would be of no use unless it could fulfil its obligations in enacting sactions .7 Surprisingly however, in September of 1935, the British committed themselves to the League and the obligations that came with it. Following Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935, the League was obligated to take measures to stop Italy’s advance. De Valera controversially supported the British initiative immediately. Opposition parties in Ireland felt this was a failure of Fianna Fáil, that the support for British leadership could have been used as an effective bargaining chip in negotiations to end the Economic War.8 This opposition however had little impact on Fianna Fáil's policy of sanctioning those who violated international law, and their renewed confidence in the League's effectiveness.9 When the League of Nations (obligations) bill was debated in the Dáil in 2Barcroft,’ireland at league of nations’, p.21 3 Patrick Keatinge, “Ireland and the League of Nations.” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, vol. 59, no. 234 (1970) p142 4 Barcroft,’Ireland at League of Nations’, p.22 5 Keating ‘Ireland and League’,p.142 6 ibid,pp.142,143 7 ibid,p.142 8 Ibid, p.143 9 Ibid

November of 1935, Fianna Fáil succeeded in passing the bill. Fianna Fail’s confidence in the League of Nations however, was short lived as following the leaking of the Hoare-Laval plan in December. It was clear that Britain and France were, as initially thought, more willing to appease Italy then uphold the obligations of the League.10 What remaining confidence Fianna Fáil held in the League consequently disappeared. De Valera, when speaking to the Dáil on the 18th of June of that year, admitted that ‘the League does not command our confidence’ and ‘unless reformed, is not of advantage to us’.11 With the League in the 1930’s proving itself to be ineffective, it is argued that de Valera's insistence in fulfilling Ireland's obligations to what CnaG TD, Deputy Kent described as ‘the greatest farce of all time’ was a failure of Fianna Fáil.12 It also could be seen that the League perhaps failed Fianna Fáil. After all Fianna Fáil had acted in accordance with the obligations their League membership entailed, something that can perhaps not be said for Britain, France, or other League members.

The Economic War. After the realisation that Ireland's League obligations amounted to very little after 1936, Fianna Fáil began turning their attention to resolving the Economic War, further severing ties with the UK and building up a position of neutrality.13 The Economic War began in 1932 after Fianna Fáil came to power in the Irish free state. It was sparked by Fianna Fáil's decision to withhold the payment of land annuities to Britain on the 1st of July. The land annuities were payments made by Irish tenant farmers to repay the loans they received under the five land acts passed by the British government between 1870 and 1909. Annually they amounted to around 3 million pounds. Which, when compared with Ireland’s GDP of 150 million may have seemed quite marginal but it was nonetheless a financial burden on the Irish economy.14 Although withholding these monies may have seemed, to the British government, as a violation of the Anglo Irish financial agreements made in 1923 and 1926. However in actual fact, the British had no legal rights to the annuities. The agreements, although made, were never ratified by the Dáil at the 10 Barcroft,’Ireland at League of Nations’, p.27 11 Francis M. Carroll, "Ireland Among the Nations of the Earth: Ireland’s Foreign Relations from 1923 to 1949" in

Études irlandaises, no. 41-1 (2016), p42 ; and Keating ‘Ireland and League’,p.144 12 Barcroft,’ireland at league of nations’, p.20 13 Keating ‘Ireland and League’,p.145 14 Kevin O'Rourke, “Burn Everything British but Their Coal: The Anglo-Irish Economic War of the 1930s.” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 51, no. 2, (1991) p358

time, rendering them void and not legally binding.15 Fianna Fáils bold step caused a complete breakdown in anglo Irish trade relations as the British retaliated by imposing emergency tariffs on Irish Agricultural exports, primarily cattle.16 The British hoped this may lead to unrest among the farming community and resentment for the Fianna Fáil government, resulting in their demise and consequently the return of the more cooperative CnaG.17 Despite the former coming true, no such eventuality occurred in regards to the latter and Fianna Fáil instead responded by imposing duties of their own on British goods. These emergency duties, combined with Fianna Fáil’s protectionist trade policy, resulted in tariff levels rising to 45% by 1936. By 1937 almost 2,000 articles were subject to these import duties.18 The short term implications of this War were devastating. In 1932 alone, the value of Irish agricultural exports fell from around 34 million pounds (1931) to just 15 million in that year.19 This snowballed with the cattle industry worst hit as the value of exports collapsed 55% between 1930 and 1935.20 The income of farmers (particularly larger cattle farmers who owned 50% of the land at the time) were dealt a massive blow and agrarian protests ensued in 1933 and 1934.21 This near destruction of Irish agricultural exports could most definitely be assessed as a failure during the years leading up to the CoalCattle Pact in 1935. The Pact certainly eased the burden on Irish cattle farmers but the Economic War had not ended as the dispute over the land annuities remained.22 Despite the impact the War had on Irish agriculture in the 1930s, it ultimately ended in success for Fianna Fáil. In 1938 de Valera successfully negotiated a deal which highly favoured the Irish government. It involved paying a lump 10 million pound sum to cancel the payments, this was a mere 10% of what the british calculated the actual value of the disputed payments to be.23 In addition the Fianna Fáil succeeded in reattaining the treaty ports, which proved to be vital in allowing Ireland to declare 15 Drisceoil, Donal Ó. “WHEN DEV DEFAULTED: THE LAND ANNUITIES DISPUTE, 1926-38.” History Ireland, vol. 19, no. 3, (2011) p. 44 16 O'Rourke,’burn everything but coal’, p. 358 17 ibid, p.358 18 ibid,p358 19 Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An economic history of Ireland since independence (1st ed., London, 2013), pp 52 20 Bielenberg and Ryan,’Economic History of Ireland’,p.52 21 Drisceoil,’WHEN DEV DEFAULTED’,p.45 22 Bielenberg and Ryan,’Economic History of Ireland’,p.51 23 Drisceoil,’WHEN DEV DEFAULTED’,p.45

neutrality in world War 2.24 Despite the initial short term implications of the trade War, the solution ultimately led to a vital victory for the Fianna Fáil government in regards to external relations.

Breaking ties with the British De Valera was openly critical of his predecessor's Cosgrave’s government for failing to go far enough in severing ties with the Empire. In reality however, it was the CnaG government that set the stage for de Valera to easily dismantle the Treaty and convert Ireland into a republic in all but name. In fact he is reported to have admitted privately that Cosgrave’s government ‘did a magnificent job’.25 When taking over in 1932 de Valera retained Joseph Walsh as secretary for external affairs, a sign surely that the job done in that area by the previous government was not as poor as he publicly stated.26 The strength of the Balfour declaration and the statute of Westminster gave Fianna Fáil legal right to completely remodel the constitution and remove any aspect they saw fit.27 This must be kept in mind in our assessment of Fianna Fáils policy as without doing so one may be at risk of blowing their achievements out of proportion. In 1932 he began exercising the rights of the Dominion in accordance with the Statute of Westminster by passing the ‘removal of the oath act’ in 1932. He then followed this up by diminishing the role of Governor General by appointing Domhnall O’Buachalla, a local butcher and ex Irish volunteer as the King's representative.28 Fianna Fáil were aided in their mission to break away from Britain following King Edward VIII’s abdication. The Dáil accepted his abdication and failed to accept his successor. De Valera then swiftly introduced a Constitutional Amendment Act which removed all mention of the King from the constitution.29 These actions, among others, were major successes for Fianna Fáils foreign policy, albeit not particularly impressive when you consider they were only successful largely due to Statute negotiated by 24 O'Rourke,’burn everything but coal’, p. 358 25 Carroll,’Ireland’s foreign relations’,p.45 26 ibid,p.41 27 Luke McDonagh, "Losing Ireland, losing the Empire: Dominion status and the Irish Constitutions of 1922 and 1937" in International Journal of Constitutional Law, no. 4 (2019), p.1205

28 Carroll,’Ireland’s foreign relations’,p.45 29 ibid

Cosgrave’s government. By 1937 de Valera felt a new constitution was needed. Bunreacht na hEireann, the new constitution, would continue the destruction of the Treaty and ultimately officially sever any illusion there was that Ireland would still answer to Westminster. Under this constitution the Irish Free State now became known as Éire, the Head of State would be the President and there was no mention of the Commonwealth or the King of England within. This technically meant Éire was now a Republic, however the constitution stopped short of this due to the unresolved issue of partition.30 Article 2 claimed jurisdiction over ‘the whole island of Ireland’, however there was no mention of the 6 Ulster counties within Bunreacht na hEireann as they remained a part of Britain.31 Despite this slight shortfall, the 1937 constitution certainly represented a changed relationship with Britain and, from Fianna Fail’s point of view, represented a successful outcome of their foreign policy. By the end of the 1930’s Ireland was now effectively independent of Britain and Fianna Fáil had succeeded in dismantling the treaty. The Final nail in the Anglo-Irish coffin was Fianna Fáil's decision in 1939 to remain neutral during WW2, A decision that in the eyes of Joseph P Walsh, gave ‘the people more faith in what the government has achieved for independence’.32

Conclusion Throughout the 1930’s there was a clear direction to Eamon de Valera and Fianna Fáils external policy. The aim was to cement Ireland's position as an independent nation through the systematic dismantling of the treaty, establishing a protectionist trade policy and actively engaging in global politics in the League of Nations. Did they succeed? In most areas it can be concluded that the ultimate outcome of their external policy was successful and achieved the aims set out. Although many Historians downplay the importance of the League of Nations to Ireland at the time, It must be noted that at the time the League was seen as vital in elevating global opinions of Ireland amongst the nations of the world.33 De Valera, as chair of the council in 1932 and of the assembly in 1938, certainly improved not only his own, but Ireland's reputation in the eyes of her fellow 30 McDonagh,’losing Ireland’, p.1207 31 ibid 32 Carroll,’Ireland’s foreign relations’,p.47 33 ibid,p.41

nations.34 Although critics may point to the Economic War as a failure due to its devastating impact on the economy, as an external political matter it resulted in success, allowing Ireland to remain neutral in 1939. Finally Fianna Fáils policies in regards to gaining independence were certainly successful, although made far more manageable due to the achievements of the previous government. To conclude it can be said Fianna Fáil’s external policies were to a large extent successful, as they should have been given the ideal roadmap provided by the government before them.

Bibliography 34 Keating ‘Ireland and League’,p.142

Barcroft, Stephen. “Irish Foreign Policy at the League of Nations 1929-1936.” Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, (1979) pp. 19–29. Bielenberg, Andy, Andy Bielenberg and Raymond Ryan, An economic history of Ireland since independence (1st ed., London, 2013) Carroll, Francis M., "Ireland Among the Nations of the Earth: Ireland’s Foreign Relations from 1923 to 1949" in Études irlandaises, no. 41-1 (2016), pp 35-52 Drisceoil, Donal Ó. “WHEN DEV DEFAULTED: THE LAND ANNUITIES DISPUTE, 192638.” History Ireland, vol. 19, no. 3, (2011) pp. 42–45. Kennedy, Michael. “'Nobody Knows and Ever Shall Know from Me That I Have Written It': Joseph Walshe, Éamon De Valera and the Execution of Irish Foreign Policy, 1932-8.” Irish Studies in International Affairs, vol. 14, (2003) pp. 165–183. Keatinge, Patrick. “Ireland and the League of Nations.” Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, vol. 59, no. 234 (1970) pp. 133–147. McDonagh, Luke, "Losing Ireland, losing the Empire: Dominion status and the Irish Constitutions of 1922 and 1937" in International Journal of Constitutional Law, no. 4, (2019), pp 1192-1212 O'Rourke, Kevin. “Burn Everything British but Their Coal: The Anglo-Irish Economic War of the 1930s.” The Journal of Economic History, vol. 51, no. 2, (1991) pp. 357–366....