Assess de Gaulle’s relationship with and influence on the EEC in the 1960s- grade 1st hons PDF

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Assignment cover sheet Name: Adrian Wood Student no. 120404506 Course and year of study: Arts 1 Module code: ES003 Course coordinator: Katherine McGarry Essay title: Assess de Gaulle’s relationship with and influence on the EEC in the 1960s. Due date: 11/12/20 Word count: 1768

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Assess de Gaulle’s relationship with and influence on the EEC in the 1960s.

There is little doubt in most historian’s minds that Charles de Gaulle’s dealings within the EEC during his time as French Prime Minister had significant implications for the community. However what is debated between historians is the interpretation of his European policy.1 Some see his relationship with the EEC to be that of a selfish one, that de Gaulle acted with only the best interests of France in mind and not for the good of the EEC.2 Evidence can certainly be seen to support this in his dealings regarding Common agricultural policy as well as the Fouchet proposals and his veto of british entry to the community. However others see de Gaulle as ‘a hard headed realist’ who’s relationship with the EEC was crucial in preventing its premature downfall, as he recognized the fragility of the structures in place and influenced proceedings accordingly .3 It is without doubt that de Gaulles belief in how the EEC should operate was contrary to the supranationalist and federalist intentions of the other 5 countries within the community.4 De Gaulle was an advocate for close cooperation between European powers provided national interests of the countries in question were paramount. However he was a staunch opposer of any ideas of an influential common governing body for Europe.5 This belief would act as the fulcrum for his actions and therefore dictate his influence on the EEC during the 1960’s. This essay will serve to assess the influence of de Gaulle's main relations with the ECC, namely his veto of British entry, the empty chair crisis and the CAP negotiations, while also looking briefly at the 1 P.Ludlow, 2009. From words to actions: reinterpreting de Gaulle's European policy. In: C. Nuenlist, A. Locher and G. Martin, ed., Globalizing de Gaulle : International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958–1969, 1st ed. Washington DC: Lexington books.,p.64 2 D.Troitiño, 2008. de Gaulle and the European Communities. Socio-economic and institutional environment: harmonisation in the EU countries of Baltic Sea Rim: a collection of research articles dedicated to the 10th Anniversary of the Institute for European Studies., 4,p4 3 Ludlow, “de Gaulle European policy”,p.64 4 Troitiño, “de Gaulle”, p.1 5 ibid

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fouchet proposals.

Blocking british entry.

It may seem upon first glance that de Gaulle would have welcomed British entry to the EEC with open arms, after all the UK opposed supranationalism just as much as de Gaulle, one would think that he would have found a perfect partner to push his nationalist ideals with.6 This however was not the case and there were a number of reasons for de Gaulle's veto of expansion. Firstly, the UK was seen as a threat to France's dominance within the EC. While there is some historical debate on the matter, it seems clear that de Gaulle saw his relationship with the EEC as an ‘instrument to empower France’.7 If de Gaulle did not use his influence to shut Britain out, French interests were in danger of being overshadowed. De Gaulle was also suspicious of the UKs close links with the USA, he felt if the UK joined in 1963, it would allow the Americans to infiltrate the European market through Britains promotion of a free trade agreement with the US and Canada through the UK established ‘EFTA’.8 Had de Gaulle not prevented British accession this could have led to the EEC becoming overly reliant on the American imports, causing France to lose the European market.9 Looming large behind all de Gaulles decisions was the issue of the CAP . Primary economic activities were of utmost importance to France at the time and the french relied on the heavy subsidies awarded by the CAP in order to compete in the modern global market. Had the british been allowed into Europe they may have interfered with CAP negotiations as the CAP was

6 ibid.,p.145 7 ibid 8 Ludlow, “de Gaulle European policy”,p.64 9 Troitiño, “de Gaulle” ,p.146 3

contrary to British agricultural policy. The UK favoured a more import based trade policy as this ensured them lower prices and boosted their industrial based economy.10The CAP had not yet been finalised and until it was fully ratified de Gaulle felt it necessary to keep Britain excluded from the community for the time being. Regardless of what de Gaulles underlying intentions were in 1963 and 1967, the decision to veto British entry had a pronounced effect on the EEC, had Britain entered the European economy could have become reliant on the USA and the CAP may never have been realized, a policy that is still central in the EU, making up 62% of the budget in 2020.11 The blocking of british entry however had an adverse effect on de Gaulles relationship with the rest of the community, who all were in favour of expansion.12

Influences on the empty chair crisis.

For a period of 6 months beginning on the first of July 1965, de Gaulles relationship with the EEC was deadlocked in what became known as the empty chair crisis. In order to look at how this stagnant relationship came to be it is important to analyse what influenced de Gaulles decision to enact a French boycott of community meetings within those 6 months. There were a few main issues that caused the boycott, these being the proposals to allow majority voting within council,the proposal to allow the european assembly greater powers and the other member state’s reluctance to approve the CAP.13 The reasoning for de Gaulles discontentment with the 10 ibid.,p147 11 gov.ie 12 Ludlow, “de Gaulle European policy”,p.65 13 N.Ludlow ,1999. Challenging French Leadership in Europe: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the Outbreak of the Empty Chair Crisis of 1965–1966. Contemporary European History, 8(2),p.223

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proposal of increased powers to the european assembly and the use of majority voting is quite straightforward. It relates back to his selfish approach to european policy, a majority vote on an issue which was against the interest of the french would force the french to accept the wishes of the rest of the community.14 As a result of this defiance, de Gaulle saw no other option than to adopt a policy of non cooperation and leave the French seat empty. This had a major influence on proceedings within the EEC as no decisions could be reached within the community without a unanimous decision, and, as de Gualle was well aware, the vote could not be unanimous without the french involved.15 This crisis left the community with no choice but to find a compromise, this was realized in the form of the Luxembourg compromise which De gualle’s France agreed to in 1966. Crucially for de Gualle, this compromise allowed european leaders to keep their power of veto if national interests were at stake. This compromise caused stagnation in european decision making for over 2 decades as it led to most decisions being elongated due to the fact a compromise must be sought in order to prevent a veto of the decision altogether.16 The effects of the influence of de Gaulle's compromise were felt during negotiations up until 1986 when it was finally removed.

The issue of the CAP

The empty chair crisis and the CAP negotiations in the lead up to it also display the cracks that 14 Troitiño, “de Gaulle”,p.148 15 ibid 16 ibid 5

were appearing in de Gaulles alliances within the community. Germany and Italy for example were previously at the mercy of French threats of leaving the community, with both making heavy sacrifices in order to quell french threats of leaving the community.17As the Italian ambassador to Paris put it following the treaty of Rome, “Europe cannot organise without France and, to get her in, prices must be paid which may seem exorbitant”.18

However the clearer it became that France was heavily reliant on the EEC , the more de Gaulle’s influence on proceedings was eroded.19 The inequality of the CAP among the community was widely recognised however it was originally accepted as a necessary sacrifice in the name of Europe.20 However the CAP benefited the French to such an extent that it became obvious that without the subsidies provided by the EEC, French agriculture would be in crisis. In fact from the period of 1958 to 1963 the value French agricultural exports within Europe had risen 350%.21 For this reason among others the other member states were confident that de Gaulle was too reliant on the EEC to leave it. Due to this belief that de Gaulle was bluffing in regards to a French exit from the EEC, the other members began pushing their agendas and refusing to allow de Gaulle’s blackmail tactics to influence proceedings.22 During negotiations in the lead up to the empty chair crisis, the commission proposed that national CAP contributions be based upon a fixed key, this would increase France's bill while also allowing other states to import cheaper goods from the world market.23 Ge Gaulle’s efforts to sway negotiations in France's favour were this time met with defiance from the Germans, Dutch and Italians, with the Italian foreign 17 Ludlow, “de Gaulle European policy” p.70 18 ibid 19 Ludlow, “empty chair crisis”,p.238-239 20 Ludlow, “empty chair crisis”,p.237 21 ibid.,p.238 22 Troitiño, de Gaulle, p 150 23 Ludlow, “empty chair crisis”,p.245 6

minister lashing out at the CAPs import levies as ‘nothing less than a tax on poorer agricultural systems’.24 It was clear de Gaulle;s relationship with the other members of the community had begun to turn sour. Ultimately however,this change in attitude towards the CAP did little to prevent the de Gaulle and the French pushing it through as the empty chair crisis served to reinforce this relationship built on the fear of French non cooperation. 25The CAP was later accepted not under de Gaulle, his successor Pompidou, almost 11 years after it first appeared in the treaty of Rome in 1958. However it was accepted only due to the groundwork under de Gaulles influence. His legacy still remains as the CAP continues to dominate EU politics today with the largest proportion of the budget being spent on the CAP.26

Conclusions

It must be noted that although de Gaulle had huge success in influencing important decisions during his relationship with the EEC, he was not always successful in doing so, as can be seen with his attempts to model and transform the EC framework to his own liking through the Fouchet proposals in the early 60’s.27 Had this passed it would likely have seen the end of any supranationalist hopes held by other members of the community and, as put by Christen Fouchet himself, ‘political Europe would never have been born.’ 28 However all de Gaulle achieved through these proposals was a strong anti french feeling among the other 5 in the community.

24 ibid 25 Troitiño, de Gaulle, p 150 26 ibid 27 A.Teasdale, 2016. The Fouchet Plan: de Gaulle's Intergovernmental Design for Europe. LEQS Paper, 117.

28 Teasdale,”The Fouchet Plan”,p.54 7

This failure of de Gaulle to develop a controlling relationship with the EEC resulted in his tactical stalling of any significant attempts of resuming political integration and enlargement29 This tactical stalling is evident in all of the above points illustrated in this essay.

Perspective of de Gaulle's relationship with and influence on the EEC will certainly dictate one’s assessment of them. From the perspective of France, de Guelle was somewhat of a miracle worker for French agriculture through the battle for the CAP, he also retained the power of veto which protected French domestic interests despite constant opposition throughout the decade. However from the perspective of the EEC de Gaulle had devastating impacts on the progression of integration and often the other members' interests were left disregarded due to his french centered policies. Overall however, it certainly cannot be denied that when de Gaulle departed the European scene in 1969, he left a legacy as an influential character in the EEC’s history.

Bibliography Agriculture.gov.ie. 2020. DAFM - Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). [online] Available at:...