Asymmetrical Freedom by Susan Wolf - Reading Outline PDF

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Outline of Susan Wolf's paper titled Asymmetrical Freedom - Determinism, Moral Responsibility curriculum...

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In order to be morally responsible, 2 conditions must be satisfied: - 1. Must be free agent (actions under their own control) = “Condition of freedom” - Question of free will - 2. Must be a moral agent (moral claims apply to them) = “Condition of value” - Question of moral skepticism

Wolf is arguing that the condition of freedom (free will) depends on the condition of value (moral skepticism) - she says many people would believe the converse Agent’s actions are psychologically determined if they are determined by their interests (values, desires) & interests are determined by heredity or environment - If all actions are so determined, then psychological determinism is true Discusses common idea that free will & psychological determinism can’t coexist, but says: - Consider what an agent who did satisfy those conditions would have to be like - if their actions were not determined by their interests - act against what they believe in and care about - Examples of son in burning house, punch someone at the door, etc

These pieces of behavior wouldn’t be classified as actions at, but spasms that are out of the person’s control If they were considered actions they would be considered bizarre and insane If actions are determined by interests by interests are not determined by anything, it must be the case that he does not have to have those interests. If we require an agent to be psychologically undetermined, we cannot expect him to be a moral agent. - Because…. if we require that his actions not be determined by interests, then they cannot be determined by his moral interests. - & if we require that his interests not be determined by anything else, then they cannot be determined by his moral reasons. Imagining an agent who performs right actions would be to imagine an agent who is rightly determined, whose actions are determined by the right sorts of interests and whose interests are determined by the right sort of reasons. An agent not psychologically determined cannot perform actions that are right in this way. But he can never be wrong in not performing right actions. - The undetermined agent is so free as to be free from moral reasons - The satisfaction of the condition of freedom seems to rule out the satisfaction of the condition of value. (free will ruling out being a moral agent)

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This suggests that the condition of freedom was previously stated too strongly. - could have done otherwise if they tried Any conditional analysis of “he could have done otherwise” seems too weak to satisfy the condition of freedom. Yet if “he could have done otherwise” is not a conditional, it seems too strong to allow the satisfaction of the condition of value. - Thinking about morality and freedom differently.

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Saying there is an asymmetry in our institutions about freedom - Because when we think of condition of value, our intuition suggests that compatibilists are right - moral as long as actions are psychologically determined - But when we think about the condition of freedom, we think that incompatibilists are right intuitively because they suggest that an agent is free as long as actions are not psychologically determined. - Wolf suggests that the solution lies elsewhere, that both compatibilists and incompatibilists are wrong. What we need in order to be responsible beings, she argues: is a suitable combination of determination and indetermination. Not only could he have done otherwise if he tried, but could he have tried - Kleptomaniac could have done otherwise, but he could not have tried - Other examples: hypnosis -

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Rarely ask whether an agent is truly responsible if his being responsible would make him worthy of praise - Why might this be so? - 1. Acts of moral blame are more connected with punishment than acts of moral praise are connected with reward (= more likely to be more public, more examples at hand) - 2. (more important) we have stronger reasons for wanting acts of blame to be justified. If we blame/punish someone, we are likely to be causing him pain. But praising/rewarding adds to pleasures. To blame someone underserved is doing an injustice, but praising underservely is just a harmless mistake. - Believes this makes our intuitions about praise weaker and less developed than our intuitions about blame

When we ask whether an action is deserving of praise, we don’t require that he could have done otherwise. If an agent does the right thing for just the right reasons it seems absurd to ask whether he could have done the wrong. Language examples (says these are not exemptions from praiseworthiness but testimonies to it)

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“I cannot tell a lie” “he couldn’t hurt a fly” “i could resist” (gift) “no choice but to speak up [against injustice]” - It is not admirable if you can’t tell a lie because you stutter when you try When an agent does the right thing for the right reasons, the fact that, having the right reasons, he must do the right should surely not lessen the credit he deserves. For presumably the reason he cannot do otherwise is that his virtue is so sure or his moral commitment is so strong.

Must know not only whether his motives are determined, but how they are determined as well - Nurture example. Man develops generosity to get love of generous mother

Reason for developing generous nature need not be his reasons for retaining it when he grows up He can’t help having the experiences that make him independently create reasons for generosity. This would seem to still be under his control though because his character is determined on the basis of his reasons and his reasons are determined by what reasons there are. - Not under his control is the fact that generosity is a virtue and it is only because he realizes this that he remains generous Agent can be morally praiseworthy even though he is determined to perform the action he performs. But an agent cannot be morally blameworthy if he is determined to perform the action he does. Determination is compatible with responsibility for a good action but incompatible for responsibility for a bad action.

So, after all, the condition of freedom does demand a conditional analysis after all. - He could have done otherwise if there had been good and sufficient reason. Morally praiseworthy only if there are no good and sufficient reasons to do something else. An action is morally blameworthy only if there are good and sufficient reasons to do something else. - When an agent performs a good action, the condition of freedom is counterfactual - there was no good/sufficient reason to do otherwise - When an agent performs a bad action, the condition of freedom is not a counterfactual. Condition requires that the agent in this case could have done otherwise in the situation that he was in.

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Doesn’t blame the action because of his childhood Goal : True and the Good. freedom to find it. - Requires: that we have the abilities to direct and govern our actions by our most fundamental selves & that the world cooperate in such a way that our most fundamental selves have the opportunity to develop into the selves they ought to be We cannot know we have such freedom unless we know that there is a true and a good or that there are capacities for finding them. The condition of freedom cannot be stated in purely metaphysical terms. - Cannot be stated in terms that are value-free, misinterpreted so far as to be a purely metaphysical problem. This is why it’s seemed hopeless for so long

Because we can’t know which capacities and circumstances are necessary for freedom unless we know which capacities and circumstances will enable us to form the right value and right actions. Capacity to reason is not enough - we need a kind of sensibility and perception as well. Most of us have this. When the world cooperates, we are morally responsible. Right v taught explanations - says it’s not one or the other like some believe, they don’t necessarily compete, they are explanations are different kinds - Carson city question example - Explanations are not unrelated. If it wasn’t the capital, she wouldn't have been taught that. If she hadn’t been taught that, she wouldn’t have known.

And if the answer wasn’t right, she couldn’t have given that answer because she was taught it - wouldn’t have been taught incorrect information. Similarly, we can explain why a person acts justly in either of the following ways: - 1. Point out he was taught to act justly, positively reinforced for doing so - 2. Point out it is right to act justly, & why he knows this - These explanations are likely to be related. If it wasn’t right to act justly, they wouldn’t have been taught that it was and if they hadn’t been taught that they should act justly, they might not have discovered this on their own. - Explanations are compatible. One determined by the Good and one determined by the Past. To be morally free, must be capable of being determined by the Good. the good we need freedom to pursue. Need the freedom to have our actions determined by the Good and the freedom to be or to become the sorts of persons whose actions will continue to be so determined. So no standard incompatibilist views can be right. Like compatibilists, she is claiming that whether an agent is morally responsible depends on how that agent is determined. Her view differs from theirs in what she takes as the

satisfactory kind of determination to be (which is determination by reasons that an agent ought to have). 163 -

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Agent can be determined and responsible insofar as he performs actions that he ought to perform. If an agent performs a morally bad action, his actions can’t be determined in the appropriate way. So if they are ever going to be held responsible for a bad action, it must be the case that this action is not psychologically determined. psychological determinism is false. (some actions are, some aren’t & some actions are not determined by our interests, and some interests are not determined at all.

2 sorts of moral failure: - 1. Moral negligence - failure to recognize the existence of moral reasons they ought to have recognized - 2. Moral weakness: failure to act on the reasons that one knows one ought, for moral reasons, be acting on.

Explanation for why a responsible agent performs a morally bad action is kinda incomplete - Must be nothing that prevented him from performing a morally better one & nothing that made him perform the action that he did. Also might be praiseworthy actions for which the explanations are similarly incomplete

To have control over the moral quality of his actions, an agent must have certain requisite abilities - the abilities necessary to see and understand the reasons and interests he ought to see and understand with the abilities necessary to direct his actions in accordance with these reasons and interests. The freedom required for moral responsibility is the freedom to be good....