Balfour v balfour-Merrit v merrit PDF

Preview

Summary

fact of the cases and role of English court with regards to intention to create legal relation...

Description

Level:

4

Balfour v Balfour1 Balfour gave rise to the aim of establishing the principle of legal relations in contract law in 1919. Facts Mr. Balfour and his wife went to England for a holiday, and his wife became ill and needed medical care. They arranged that When the husband went back to Ceylon Mrs. Balfour would stay behind in England and that Mr. Balfour would pay her £ 30 a month before he returned. This understanding was generated when their relationship was perfect. The relation soured later, however, and the husband refused to make the payment. The wife was seeking to enforce the agreement. The parties eventually split and divorced themselves. This case was brought by the wife for the money her husband had agreed to pay her, but she had not done so. Procedural History An additional KB Div. judge, chaired by J Sargant, ruled that the husband was responsible for helping his wife and that the husband and the wife had a strong contract. The wife's agreement to this monthly transfer order was a valid assumption to constitute a necessary contract between the couple. Issue Was Mr. and Mrs. Balfour's contract true in nature? Held The arrangement was of a strictly social and domestic nature and was thus believed not to have been legally binding by the parties. Reasons Agreements made between a husband and a wife for the provision of capital are usually no contracts since the parties do not wish to engage in legal proceedings. Commonly, the parties to a marriage shall make provisions for personal or household expenses. L J Atkin said in a dispute between a husband and wife that domestic obligations were not under the jurisdiction of contract law. The primary argument made was that commitments are contracts. But are contracts legally enforceable if they are a promise? And if there might be something present to consider if it had happened between various parties. The Court of Appeal ruled unanimously that there was no enforceable agreement. The balfour law therefore made it very clear that a legal intention to enter into a contract is very important. Balfour law often moves around the idea of legal intention as a fundamental and, much of the time, the need to justify a contract.

Merrit v Merrit2 An agreement between a married couple is a binding that may occur. Merritt is one of the relevant cases for that. 1 [1919] 2 KB 571 2 [1970] 1 WLR 1211

Facts The Merritt couple married in 1941 and borrowed cash from the bank for them to build their home. Mr. Merritt owned the building, but the couple shared in the payment of their loan, and only in 1966 was a conjugal property made. Nevertheless, the pair wanted to split, and Ms. Merritt agreed to pay the house loan on an ongoing basis and Mr. Merritt offered to pass the property's sole ownership to Ms. Merritt after it had been paid in full. This arrangement was made in writing, but Mr Merritt declined to do so when the time came that the house was considered to have been passed to Ms Merritt. Issue The question was whether Mr. Merritt's promise was legally enforceable or not, even though the parties were legally married. Held The court's ruling was that it was possible to conclude from the circumstances between the parties that the promise was legally binding. Reasons The reasoning for the decision was that the decision had an objective basis. According to L Denning, it was from the circumstances that one had to ask if the party considered their contract legally binding. It was therefore submitted that honorable understanding is already absent in the relationship between the parties in the case. With this, it can be assumed that their arrangement was meant to be legally enforceable. It is important to understand the case of married couples agreeing because certain aspects of their cases and terms sometimes overlap with the fact that they are contractually bound because of their marriage.

Role of English courts and ITCLR In the formulation of contracts, the doctrines of consideration and ITCLR are two critical elements. Consideration can be described as the act or commitment to be made by the promisee when the offer is accepted, and this act or promise must be requested in the offer. ITCLR, as the word itself implies, is the parties' state of mind as to their ability to be bound by the terms of the agreement. In general, it is critical that these doctrines are all instruments used by the Court to assess the fairness of the contract, the enforceability of the terms of the contract, and the parties' liability under that contract. In both doctrines, however, there has been much criticism, particularly about their authenticity, usefulness, and effectiveness. Here we will discuss the role of English courts with regards to the intention to create legal relations. The concept, instead, remains an integral aspect of English law of contract. Let us break that up into two elements. The first shall lay down the general position of English law on doctrine, whereas the second shall examine both principal arguments which are sometimes made against the domestic presumption. It can then be inferred that any claim will not be advanced by unnecessary criticism of the doctrine.

"In Balfour3, L Atkin best exemplifies the common law response to the concept of ITCLR as it states 'agreements such as these are completely beyond the reach of contracts. The type of agreements between spouses is not governed by common law... The meaning that gets for them is the natural love and affection that in these cold courts counts for very little. Although it seems that, in this case, L Atkin was far more solicitous in policy than with the party’s intentions, this will not signify that the parties’ motive was entirely insignificant. Alternatively, the Balfour directive was eventually explicated as a presumption that the parties did not intend to create legal relations in 'domestic or social' agreements for instance Jones v Padavatton4. In view of the counter presumption in commercial agreements such as Esso5, this must be taken into account. Analysing the first presumption, illustrating that the practical value of the doctrine is not questioned by two of the most widely developed criticisms of the domestic assumption. First, the theory is also believed to be inadequate for a contemporary society where family law is primarily dominated by contract, the ordinary pre-nuptial agreement is a prime example. Nevertheless, this is contradicted by the reality that the parties do not have a specific intention in the majority of domestic agreements of creating legal relations in one way or another. Consequently, the negative assumption acts as an essential precaution against unknowing or less dominant parties in the negotiating phase being drawn into an expensive, challenging, and complicated system of litigation. An understanding of their consequential freedom from contract is, after all, an integral aspect of upholding the freedom of contract of the parties. Second, it is commonly asserted that the domestic assumption is greatly conflicting with the theory of consideration and therefore not any more fulfils any particular role in our contract formation law. This is a factually incorrect statement. Although it is obvious that a large correlation exists amongst doctrines, as both relate to the issue of whether the 'badge of lawfulness' should be given to an agreement, it is fairly obvious that consideration does not serve the role of policy of ITCLR referred to above. L Atkin made it clear in Balfour 6 that it is necessary to limit minor domestic cases that take up court time (the position of his domestic assumption), however the theory that consideration must be necessary but not sufficient must be considered Chappell v Nestle7 requires the capacity of examination to attain such consideration. Besides, any concern that this 'policy element' could contribute to critical domestic conflicts that avoid litigation system can be alleviated by reality that clear evidence to the contrary may contradict the domestic assumption. This proof covers the factors in which the agreement was made as in Merrit8, the dependency of either party, for instance, Parker9 , and the certainty of the agreement for instance Vaughan10. The orthodox and current position of English law is that the intention to create legal relation is sufficient for the creation of a legally enforceable contract, in addition to consideration, offer and acceptance, as confirmed in Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks & Spencer plc11.

3 ibid1 4 EWCA Civ 4, 1 WLR 328; All ER 616 5 [1976] QB 801 6 Ibid1 7 [1960] AC 97 8 ibid2 9 [1960] 1 WLR 286 10 [1953] 1 QB 762 11 [2001] EWCA (Civ) 274

In the end, it is obvious that the above critiques on the doctrine do not advance any persuasive claim that the English courts role with regards to ITCLR's is in desperate need of change or abolition.

Bibliography [ CITATION Bal19 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION Mer70 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION Bai68 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION Ess75 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION Cha59 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION Par60 \l 2057 ]

[ CITATION Vau10 \l 2057 ] Elliott & Quinns contract law twelfth edition pearson p48 J.C Smith, The Law of Contract, 3rd edition, Sweet & Maxwell H.Beale, A.Hartkamp, H.Kotz, D.Tallon, Contract Law Cases, Materials and Text on, Hart Publishing 2002 J.Beatson, Anson's Law of Contract, 28th edition, Oxford University Press Iolis Resource Book 2004/05 Elliott & Quinns contract law twelfth edition pearson p54...