Banat v. Comelec, G.R. No. 179271 PDF

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BANAT v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 CARPIO, J.: FACTS: The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? (2) Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional. HELD: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. 2) The high court ruled that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the

Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

JUSMAG Philippines, petitioner vs. NLRC and Florencio Sacramento G. R. No. 108813 December 15, 1994 PUNO, J.: FACTS Private respondent Florencio Sacramento worked as Security Assistance Support Personnel (SASP) at JUSMAG-Philippines from December 18, 1969 until April 27, 1992 when he was terminated due to the abolition of his position. He filed a complaint on DOLE contesting his dismissal as illegal and asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG-Philippines, in answer, filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from suit as an agency of the United States Government. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of JUSMAG and dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction of which respondent appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, herein public respondent. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s ruling stating inter alia that JUSMAG-Philippines has lost its right not to be sued when it hired private respondent’s services. JUSMAG then elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending primarily that the complaint is a suit against the United States which had not given its consent to be sued. ISSUE The immunity from suit of the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the Republic of the Philippines (JUSMAG-Philippines). HELD The Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled that when JUSMAG took the services of private respondent, it was performing a governmental function on behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement dated March 21, 1947. Hence, the suit is, in effect, against the United States Government and considering that the latter did not consented to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper since the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities (jure imperii) of which petitioner is exercising when it engaged respondent’s services in the case at bar....