Borodino Strategy - Lecture notes 3 PDF

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Victor Barinov...

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Borodino Strategy Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov is rightly ranked among the cohort of the Saviors of the Fatherland. It is not great, for by no means in all the wars that Russia fought was about saving the state. The great Suvorov did not lose a single battle, but his student Kutuzov was put in a row with Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy, Minin and Pozharsky with Zhukov and Stalin. Kutuzov really turned the tide of the unhappy and deadly for the fate of the country, the campaign of 1812. Not one or several battles - from the point of view of the then military science, they were not victorious at all - but their entire strategy. The goals of the war are determined by the goals of politics The war between Russia and France in 1812 was not inevitable. From a political point of view, Napoleon achieved his goals after Tilsit and Erfurt, tying Russia to the system of the continental blockade of England. No matter what they say about the craftiness of the Russian authorities, allegedly encouraging smuggling, St. Petersburg and London were officially at war. In it Russian sailors perished and Russian ships were captured by the British. Napoleon faced the same problem as all other unifiers of Europe. For as soon as the European contradictions were resolved by the creation of a powerful center of power, and the motley conglomerate was taking shape in a semblance of an empire, it immediately peered at Russia for expansion at its expense. The contradictions between France and Russia were not insoluble so much that the policy demanded continuation of the war. Actually, after Erfurt, Petersburg had enough promising concerns with the pacification of Sweden through the conquest of Finland and the conquest of the Straits through the pacification of Turkey. What she thoughtfully did, practically abandoning active European politics. But it was precisely this independence of Russia that caused the alarm of the European establishment. Of course, the interests of the French and Jewish bourgeoisie, which had just seized control of the country, were behind the French expansion into Europe. However, at that time she had practically no interests in Russia, because she did not represent either a sales market with extreme poverty of the population, or a market for capital with an almost absent industry. So the economic reasons for Napoleonic aggression can also be ruled out. Civilizational ones remain ... The signing of the Peace of Tilsit by Alexander I and Napoleon Source: pinterest.ru War of Civilizations Kutuzov, as you know, was not only a military leader, but also a diplomat of high standard. Less well known is that he was also an outstanding strategic intelligence officer, and therefore an analyst. In this capacity, he was tested in his youth, from the time he served as an aide-de-camp for the Governor-General of Revel, Prince of Holstein-Beck. And the participation of the almighty Count Shuvalov in his fate speaks volumes. So, alternating military service with diplomatic and often political, by 1812 Kutuzov was fully ripe for understanding the true nature of Napoleon's war with Russia as a civilizational war. Russia had to submit simply because it was different. The attitude of the Eastern Roman Empire was approximately the same in barbarian Europe. And when she was gone, the European states that grew out of barbarian kingdoms were more sympathetic to the hostile Ottoman Empire with a center in Constantinople than to Russia, which had never encountered them. The circle of participants in the struggle for the center of civilization, the Mediterranean, was defined over the centuries, and no one expected new participants. As the centuries-old history shows, as soon as the approach of Russia to the Straits and Constantinople was outlined, the European community invariably took the side of Turkey. And made, in modern terms, any effort, including the military, to "throw back" Russia. So the war of 1812 had a distinct, at least for Kutuzov, term - the Straits. Paris in no way weakened - perhaps slightly draped - the support

of the Ottoman Empire in its war with the Russians in 1806-1811. And with the "division of the world" between St. Petersburg and Paris achieved, it would seem, in Tilsit-Erfurt, the latter had no intention of releasing Russia into the Mediterranean. The Straits were also a sore spot for England. The Turks control them - this is normal. Russians are a threat to British interests. A century later, in the most difficult year of 1915, England and France unsuccessfully tried to seize the straits promised to Russia, if only they did not fall to the ally. For Kutuzov as a strategist, it was necessary to take into account the British factor. From his point of view, Russia had two strongest rivals, one of which reigns on the continent, and the other rules over the seas. Therefore, Kutuzov was more than clearly aware that London was on the way with Petersburg only as long as the latter would fight Napoleon in Europe. And it doesn't even matter for whose interests and with whom in alliance. If only Russia did not fight for its own national interests. Kutuzov as a military strategist Kutuzov was the first of the then active military to comprehend the war not only as a continuation of politics by other means, but in his headquarters Clausewitz picked up this idea - but also as a sequence of military operations aimed at achieving one strategic goal. In this sense, he was perhaps the best military strategist in history. Moreover, the brilliant commander Napoleon, until the very end of his career, relied on victorious general battles. Kutuzov, in his understanding of strategy, has risen one step higher: the enemy's army can be just as successfully destroyed not in one battle, the outcome of which is not guaranteed due to "inevitable accidents in battle", but in a series of operations. Not everyone has to be militant: the suppression of the logistics of the enemy army is as guaranteed to lead to its degradation as a whole series of victorious battles. For the army, as Napoleon's phrase says, "like a snake - moves on its belly." Battle of Berezina. Source: ug.tsargrad.tv This, by the way, is the fundamental difference between the very good plan, which was developed for the capture of Napoleon and the destruction of his army by the headquarters military under Emperor Alexander, and the one that Kutuzov implemented. The plan - let's call it imperial - was quite feasible: to encircle the French on the Berezina with three armies from the north, from the south and from the east, and then celebrate Victoria, delighting in treating the captured French emperor with wine. Kutuzov's plan took into account the very "ravines" that are not visible on smooth staff paper. For example, the worst training and ability of the Russian army to maneuver on the battlefield. Operational superiority of the French generals. Finally, the personal qualities of their military leaders. Kutuzov could have predicted that Admiral Chichagov would be easy to deceive, which was demonstrated by Marshal Oudinot with the crossings on the Berezina. That General Wittgenstein, fearing to lose the crazy glory of the "savior of St. Petersburg", would desperately hesitate to engage in battle with Marshal Viktor, which is why he would be late for the battle for the crossing. All the time the French were fleeing from Russia, Kutuzov no longer relied on the art and training of his generals (for which they hated him), but on a solid suppression of the supply of the French army and the constant, simple, but irresistible threat to overtake the retreating along side roads. The fact that Kutuzov knew how to surround the enemy's armies is beyond doubt. He demonstrated this more than once, as soon as he received the powers of the commander-in-chief. For example, in the battle of Krems - Durenstein in 1805, where the corps of Marshal Mortier was only destroyed for a little. (General Dokhturov let down, who failed to complete the maneuver to encircle the French in time.) Another textbook example is the battle at Slobodzeya, where the complete encirclement of the enemy predetermined the attack of a separate corps on the Turkish base camp on the opposite side of the Danube. The Battle of Slobodzeya Source: pinterest.ru Kutuzov took the army in Tsarevo-Zaymishche, letting her

know that he was about to go over to the expected counteroffensive. But ... ordered to retreat. For the terrain did not allow maneuvering and did not give a chance to lure the enemy into a trap. He chose a position with Borodin. The field in front of the Semyonovsky ravine is something like an amphitheater, surrounded by heights. There Kutuzov ordered to arrange powerful batteries on the redoubts. And as soon as Napoleon, would have ferried most of his troops across Kolocha to this "amphitheater", which was shot from three sides, the Russian troops of the right flank, thrown in the opposite direction across the river, would have entered into action. It is no coincidence that even a faint glimpse of the planned operation - a raid of the Cossacks and light cavalry through Kolocha to the rear of the French - caused Napoleon's great alarm. Alas, in the then hierarchical system of the Russian army, the commander-in-chief did not command the troops directly. And that is why he could do little to oppose the "initiative" of the generals who were eager to fight. As a result, the battle had to continue the retreat: Borodino - Moscow - Krasnaya Pakhra - Tarutin Maloyaroslavets ... Kutuzov endured and defiantly ignored the criticism of his generals, which often reached dirty. Yes, but how he retreated! Unlike Barclay de Tolly, who also stood for the abandonment of Moscow, but offered to retreat further east, to Nizhny Novgorod, Kutuzov ordered to go “nowhere” - to Ryazan. To defend Kalmykia? Once again he was not understood, and he then ordered to make a flank march to Krasnaya Pakhra and close the south from the French. Hanging at the same time on their backs, so that Napoleon would not try to move with such force in his rear to Petersburg. Napoleon in Moscow. Source: pikabu.ru They retreated from Krasnaya Pakhra again. The result is a strategic separation of the French vanguard, which controlled the Russian army, from the main forces remaining in Moscow. And in the end - the defeat of this vanguard. Even from Maloyaroslavets, the positions around which were insurmountable for the French, they again retreated - to the Linen Plants. And again, Kutuzov was not understood by anyone. Except ... Napoleon. Who understood everything and stopped trying to bypass the Russian army in a quest for the not devastated south. Kutuzov was retreating even at Krasnoye, when Napoleon's exhausted army was moving towards him! And why was it necessary to lay down their soldiers, when Without that, the stretched corps of the French army passed through the Russians occupying the heights, as if through a line, shot by artillery? And again Kutuzov's thought was understood only by Napoleon: he stomped on the spot, not undertaking attacks, and moved back, waving his hand at the beaten Beauharnais, Davout and Ney - the best commanders of the French army ... Kutuzov as a strategist of the world bridge". Either at the direction of the Masonic lodge, or by their own cowardice. He really did not hide that he wanted to release Napoleon, depriving him of the army. For the final victory over him will bring real victory to the power that already owns the seas; and then her dominion will become unbearable. And he said this ... to the English representative in the Russian army, General Wilson. Probably, with Kutuzov, the Russian troops would not have marched in Paris, and the bistros there would have been called differently. Napoleon is released to Europe. There he recruits a new army - long and hard. Whether he controls Austria and Prussia as before, or whether they have raised liberation uprisings, it does not matter at all. The main thing is that they are very busy with each other and do not think about an attack on Russia. But Napoleon is alive and active, and therefore Britain is busy with him. And she, too, has no time for Russian affairs. How long this tampering will continue in Europe - God knows. And Russia? And for Russia, with its victorious army, which has acquired invaluable combat and military-strategic experience, all paths are open! To ensure national interests. To the Straits. To the Balkans. To Persia, which was desperately at war with her, and the road to other

warm seas. And just for decades of rest and peace, while the Europeans are busy sorting out relations at the highest level of military art....