Brief INS v. Chadha PDF

Title Brief INS v. Chadha
Course Constitutional Law
Institution Florida International University
Pages 3
File Size 74.4 KB
File Type PDF
Total Downloads 20
Total Views 159

Summary

Brief...


Description

Leticia L Bermudez Benitez Brief INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

I.

Parties

Immigration and Naturalization Service-Petitioner Jagdish Rai Chadha et al- Respondents II.

Facts

Chadha, an individual born in Kenya and holder of a UK’s passport, had been lawfully admitted in the U.S. with a student non-immigrant visa. His visa had expired, and an immigration judge required him to show cause why he should not be deported. An immigration judge suspended the deportation pursuant 244 (c) (2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (hereinafter the Act). The report of the deportation suspension as stated in the law, was transmitted to Congress. Congress veto the judge’s decision and a Resolution opposing the granting of the permanent residence to Chadha and five more aliens was issued. After the veto, the immigration judge opened Chadha’s case and ordered deportation. Chadha appealed before the Board of Immigration challenging the constitutionality of the provision in § 244 (c) (2), which authorized the House of Representatives, by Resolution and unilaterally, to invalidate the decision of the immigration judge. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the appeal ruling that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an Act. Chadha appealed to the Court which

resolved that the provision in § 244 (c) (2) violated the doctrine of separation of powers and that it was severable of the Act. A petition for certiorari was filed and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. III.

Issue on appeal

Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, properly declared the unconstitutionality of the provision in §244 (c) (2) of the Immigration Nationality Act which authorized the House of Representative to veto the decision of the Executive Branch allowing the respondent a deportable alien to remain in the United States. IV.

Decision

Judgment issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was affirmed in favor of the respondent stating the unconstitutionality of §244 (c) (2) of the Immigration Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.S. § 1254(c)(2). V.

Reasoning of the court

Justice Burger wrote the opinion. In this case the majority considered whether the action of the House of Representative under the authority of §244 (c) (2) of the Immigration Nationality Act, violated Article I, § 1 & § 7, cl. 2 & cl. 3 of the Constitution. According to the Court’s reasoning “[the] fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient and useful in facilitating functions of the government standing alone will not safe it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives of democratic government”.

While it is true that not every action taken by the House of Representatives or the Senate are submitted to the bicameralism and the presentment clause, those whose purpose and effect are of a legislative nature must be governed by the mechanism provided by article I of the Constitution. In this case “the House took action that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relation of persons, including the Attorney General, Executive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative branch”. The Court held that “the legislative character of the one-House veto in this case is confirmed by the character of the Congressional action it supplants”. Even both houses acting together could require the Attorney General to deport an alien once the Attorney General exercising the legislative delegated authority had determined the alien should remain in the country. The Congressional veto provision was unconstitutional because violated the separation of powers as governance model. Justice Powell concurred and concluded that the House’s actions were adjudicatory on its face. It wasn’t enacted a general rule, rather than the resolution affected only six specific persons, and this type of determination traditionally is responsibility of the other branches. “Unlike the judiciary or an administrative agency, Congress is not bound by established substantive rules. Nor is it subject to the procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel and a hearing before an impartial tribunal”. In his dissenting opinion Justice White stated that “[The] Constitution does not directly authorize or prohibit the legislative veto, and that . . . [the] presentment and bicameralism requirements do not [answer] the constitution question [in this case]”. Justice Rehnquist joined by Justice White, issued a dissenting opinion expressing view that the provision in §244(c)(2) was not severable from the rest of the Act....


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