C.L. Stevenson\'s Emotivism PDF

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Emotivism is a meta-ethical perspective that asserts that ethical sentences do not express propositions but rather emotional attitudes toward the subject. As a result, it is referred to as the hurrah/boo theory informally. In the twentieth century, the growth of analytic philosophy and logical posit...

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C.L. Stevenson's Emotivism Emotivism is a meta-ethical perspective that asserts that ethical sentences do not express propositions but rather emotional attitudes toward the subject. As a result, it is referred to as the hurrah/boo theory informally. In the twentieth century, the growth of analytic philosophy and logical positivism had an impact on them. Emotivism rose to prominence in the early twentieth century, but it had its origins hundreds of years earlier. Berkeley wrote in 1710 that language, in general, can serve to both inspire feelings and communicate ideas, and that this is true even today. David Hume, writing decades later, advocated ideas that were similar to those advanced by Stevenson later in his career. Non-cognitivism, also known as expressivism, is a school of thought developed by philosopher David Hume in his 1751 book An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Emotivism is defined as the belief that morality is not determined by facts but rather by "sensation." It is in opposition to other forms of non-cognitivism as well as to all forms of cognitivism, and it is the most radical of the three. It was not until the 1950s that emotivism made a comeback, this time in the form of R. M. Hare's universal prescriptivism. Emotivism, The belief in metaethics that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact but rather as expressions of the speaker's or writer's feelings rather than as statements of fact. When we say, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money," we are not expressing any fact other than the one stated by "You stole that money," according to the emotivist. It appears, however, that we expressed our disapproval of something in a particularly abhorrent manner, because when we say that something is wrong, we are expressing our feelings of disapproval toward it. In his book Language, Truth, and Logic (1936), A. J. Ayer articulated the concept of emotivism, which was further developed by Charles Stevenson in his book Ethics and Language (1939). (1945). Rather than beliefs, emotivists believed that moral judgments express and arouse emotions rather than beliefs. The act of stating whether something is right or wrong was thus envisioned as being similar to the expressions "Boo!" and "Hooray!" Emotivism provided an excellent explanation for the apparent necessity of the connection between moral judgement and motivation. If people believe it is wrong to lie, and their judgement reflects their hostility, it should come as no surprise that we can infer that they are unwilling to lie as a result of their judgement. Emotivism, on the other hand, did a poor job of explaining the critical role played by rational argument in moral practise. Given the implication that moral judgments defy categorical evaluation in terms of truth and falsehood, it suggested that rational argument about morals might be at best inappropriate and at worst impossible. Ayer offered an alternative account in his book Language, Truth, and Logic, which is available online. He argued that moral judgments are neither logical truths nor statements of fact. Instead, they are merely emotional expressions of one's approval or disapproval of a particular action or person, respectively. They cannot be true or false when used as expressions of approval or disapproval, any more than a tone of reverence (indicating approval) or a tone of abhorrence (indicating disapproval) can be true or false when used as expressions of disapproval. The American philosopher Charles Stevenson (1908–79), in his book Ethics and Language, elaborated on this

point of view in greater detail (1945). Moral philosophers (and philosophers in other fields, as evidenced by the titles of the books published during this period) were now paying more attention to language and the various ways in which it could be used. Stevenson distinguished between the factual information that a sentence may convey and the emotional impact that the sentence is intended to have. Moral judgments are important, he argued, because of the emotional impact they have on people. It is not enough to say something is wrong simply to express one's disapproval of it, as Ayer suggested. It is also necessary to explain why something is wrong. One is also encouraging those to whom he speaks to adopt his or her own point of view. This is why people bother to argue about their moral beliefs, whereas they may simply agree to disagree on matters of taste when it comes to matters of taste. While it is important to people that others share their views on moral issues such as abortion, euthanasia, and human rights, it is not important to them whether or not others prefer to drink their tea with a squeeze of lemon. The emotivists were immediately accused of being subjectivists, which they vigorously denied. In one sense of the term subjectivist, the emotivists would be able to vigorously deny this accusation. For example, they did not believe that those who say "Stealing is wrong" are making a statement of fact about their own feelings or attitudes toward stealing, as had been the case with other subjectivists in the past. Moore's open-question argument has the potential to disprove this viewpoint, which is more properly known as subjective naturalism because it holds that the truth of moral judgments is dependent on a natural, albeit subjective, fact about the world. "I understand that I have a positive reaction to this, but is it a good thing?" it makes sense to ask. The emotivists, on the other hand, held that moral judgments are essentially devoid of any statement of fact. In spite of the open-question argument, the emotivists were unable to be defeated because they agreed that no definition of "good" in terms of facts, whether natural or unnatural, could capture the emotive element of its meaning. However, this response falls short of confronting the real concerns that underlie the charge of subjectivism: the concern that there are no possible standards of right and wrong other than one's own subjective feelings about right and wrong. In this sense, the emotivists were in fact subjectivists in their thinking. Emotional statements were made by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards in their 1923 book on language, The Meaning of Meaning, and by W. H. F. Barnes and A. DuncanJones in separate works on ethics published in 1934, both of which were considered influential at the time. Ayer's later works, particularly those of Stevenson, are the most comprehensive and widely discussed defences of the theory to date. Stevenson's work has been interpreted as both an extension of Ayer's ideas and as a representation of one of "two broad types of ethical emotivism," according to Stevenson. A famous essay by Robert Louis Stevenson in 1937 titled "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" suggested that any ethical theory should explain three things: that intelligent disagreement can occur over moral questions, that moral terms like good are "magnetic" in their ability to motivate action, and that the

scientific method is insufficient for verifying moral claims. His own theory was fully developed in his 1944 book, Ethics and Language, which was published by Random House. As Ayer points out, ethical sentences express the speaker's feelings, but they also contain an imperative component intended to change the listener's feelings, and this component is of greater significance, according to him. The terms values and attitudes are interchangeable, and where Ayer spoke of disagreements of fact or rational disputes over the application of certain values to a particular case, Stevenson speaks of differences in belief; the concepts are the same, but the terminology is different. Stevenson interprets ethical statements according to two patterns of analysis: first, he looks at the statement as a statement of values, and then he looks at it as a statement of attitudes. In accordance with his first pattern of analysis, an ethical statement consists of two parts: a declaration of the speaker's attitude and an imperative to mirror that attitude, as in "This is good" means "I approve of this; do the same." As a result, Stevenson's translation of an ethical sentence remains a noncognitive translation because the propositional portion of the sentence is followed by an imperative portion that is not. Despite the fact that imperatives cannot be proven, they can still be supported in order for the listener to understand that they are not completely arbitrary. If one is told to close a door, one may inquire "Why?" and be given a response such as "It's too draughty," or "The noise is distracting," among other things. … There is no way these arguments can be considered "proofs" except in a dangerously broad sense, nor can they be shown to be demonstrative or inductively related to an imperative; however, they are clearly supportive of an imperative. They "back it up," "establish it," or "base it on concrete references to fact" in order to support their claims. They are intended to assist the listener in comprehending the ramifications of the action they are being instructed to take on their own initiative. Once they have gained an understanding of the command's ramifications, they can determine whether or not obeying the command will result in desirable outcomes. The imperative is used to influence the attitudes or actions of those who hear it. This is followed by a description of the situation or new situation that the imperative seeks to bring about; if the facts reveal that the new situation will satisfy a preponderance of the hearers' desires, the hearer will no longer hesitate to obey the imperative. A more general statement is that reasons support imperatives by altering certain beliefs, which in turn may alter an unwillingness to obey. This pattern of analysis is applied to statements about types of actions, rather than statements about specific actions, in Stevenson's second pattern of analysis. For the purposes of this pattern, the phrase "This is good" has the meaning of "This possesses the qualities or relationships [X], "Y," "Z," and so on," except that the word "good" has an additional laudatory meaning, which allows it to express the speaker's approval while also tending to elicit the approval of the listener. In second-pattern analysis, rather than judging a specific action directly, the speaker evaluates it in terms of a general principle that has been established. For example, when someone says "Murder is wrong," they may be referring to the fact that "Murder decreases overall happiness." This is a second-pattern statement that leads to a first-pattern

statement: "I disapprove of anything that decreases overall happiness." "Please do the same." As a starting point, Stevenson looked at "observations of ethical discussions in everyday life," which he defined as "observations of ethical discussions in everyday life." What exactly do people do when they use moral language? This was the question that laid the groundwork for all of the significant developments in contemporary moral philosophy. Stevenson must be commended on his decision to use it as a point of departure for his work. The following three characteristics of moral discourse, according to him, must be taken into consideration by any interpretation of ethical terms that is consistent with conventional usage. I The fact that genuine agreements and disagreements can occur within it is one of its strongest characteristics. (2) The fact that moral terms have a sort of "magnetism," as opposed to other kinds of terms. What he had in mind here was the dynamic nature of moral language, which we have already discussed in this context. As he put it, "A person who recognises X to be 'good' must acquire an ipso facto stronger tendency to act in its favour than he otherwise would have had" when he used the term "magnetism." In terms of ethics, this refers to the fact that the scientific, or empirical, method of verification is not sufficient. The ethical naturalist's response that "good" is "a confused huddle" of objects was effectively rejected by Moore when he explained this feature. Aiming to provide a clarification of the meaning of ethical terms that would allow for full recognition of each of these three characteristics, Stevenson's moral philosophy was an attempt to do so. There is a difference of opinion on attitudes and beliefs. The possibility of genuine agreement and disagreement within moral discourse was the first characteristic of moral discourse that Stevenson wished to explain in detail. This was accomplished through the establishment of a distinction between beliefs and attitudes. We took note of Ayer's belief that men never really disagree about value, but only about fact; that if we cannot demonstrate to our opponent in a moral argument that he is mistaken on some matter of fact, we should abandon our attempt to persuade him of our position. Despite the fact that he does not fundamentally disagree with Ayer's point of view, Stevenson believes that the situation is somewhat more complicated than Ayer's terse statement makes it appear to be. When it comes to moral argument, according to Stevenson, there are two types of agreement or disagreement. The difference between the two is in belief, and the difference between the two is in attitude. A "complete picture" of "the varied functions of ethical language," which is "in touch with practise," can only be drawn by distinguishing between them and recognising their presence in the same sentence. The distinction is easily discernible. One of the reasons given by Pope Paul VI in his highly controversial encyclical Humanae Vitae (1968) for his refusal to declare the use of contraceptives licit was the concern that, if this was done, governments would

be free to apply to the solution of community problems the same means that were previously recognised as licit for married couples in the solution of a family problem. Presumably, this will result in mandatory sterilisation. He assumes that, if this outcome occurs, it will result in a "lowering of morality" on the part of society. We can agree to disagree with the Pope on either or both of the following points: I His belief that declaring the use of contraceptives legal would have such an adverse effect may not be one with which we agree. The fact that he is completely opposed to mandatory sterilisation may not be something with which we agree. Stevenson asserted that whenever a moral judgement is expressed, it is possible to draw the following type of distinction: between right and wrong. I what is stated or assumed to be the factual state of affairs under consideration, and (ii) the positive or negative evaluation that is placed on that factual state of affairs are the two components of a judgement. The importance of emphasising that Stevenson made moral judgments in order to express-rather than to report-attitudes is critical when discussing agreement and disagreement in attitude. According to him, the former, rather than the latter, corresponded to his own theory of "This is good." He then compared two simple "working models" of the analysis of "This is good." I "I approve of this; please do so as well" and (1) "I approve of this and I want you to do so as well" were the statements (where the last clause is taken to have simply descriptive, not any imperative, force). For the following reason, if moral disagreements are to be genuine, the former method of analysis must be employed. It appears that they are in disagreement when A says "This is good" and B says "It is not" because one is saying "Approve of this!" and the other is saying "Don't!" On the surface, this appears to be a disagreement between them: one is saying "Approve of this!" and the other is saying "Don't!" On the other hand, according to the second analysis, there is no necessary disagreement between them: one is saying "I want you to prove this to me," and the other is saying "I don't," and each of them could acknowledge both of these statements to be true without being in conflict with themselves. Naturally, it is common for people who hold similar beliefs to hold similar attitudes, and vice versa. A great deal of moral argument is concerned with securing agreement in belief regarding the facts of a particular situation. To return to our previous example, opponents of the Pope have spent a significant amount of time arguing that he is incorrect about the likely consequences of his decision to make contraceptives licit. However, even though it is unavoidable that two disputants may agree on a common object of moral judgement while remaining divided on their attitudes toward that object, we can never be completely certain that further discussion will not reveal that one of them holds relevant factual beliefs that the other does not. When it comes to contraception, for example, those who do not sympathise with the Pope's opposition to compulsory sterilisation while agreeing with him that it would have been a likely consequence of allowing contraception could very well be found to differ significantly from the Pope in their beliefs about what is involved in, or a consequence of, compulsory sterilisation if a more thorough investigation were

carried out. Stevenson never denied that, in practise, certain beliefs and attitudes are so closely linked that, more often than not, if you can get someone to accept the beliefs, you can also get him to adopt the attitudes, and vice versa. But he never said that this was always the case. However, he insisted that the relationship between agreement or disagreement in belief and attitude is "always factual, never logical." It is always logically possible that the beliefs in question should be adopted while the attitudes in question are rejected, or vice versa. Every attitude in moral judgement is, without a doubt, accompanied by some belief about the object of the attitude; however, the beliefs that accompany opposed attitudes, or the attitudes that accompany opposed beliefs, do not have to be incompatible. Because it is possible that both types of disagreement occur simultaneously, or that neither should occur, the logical possibilities are all open to interpretation. If there is a genuine logical distinction between disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude, it follows that, whenever a moral disagreement occurs, the disagreement in belief (if any) can (logically) always be stated without any reference to the attitudes in question. Is this, however, the case? For example, consider the following passage from the Pope's encyclical, which we have already mentioned: "It is also to be feared that the man, becoming accustomed to the employment of anticonceptive practises, may eventually lose respect for the woman and, no longer caring for her physical and psychological equilibrium, may come to the point of considering her as a mere instrument of selfish enjoyment and no longer his respected and beloved companion." This purports to be a straightforward expression of belief about one possible consequence of allowing the use of contraceptives; however, words like "respect," "equilibrium," "mere instrument," and "selfish enjoyment" are clearly laden with attitude. The Pope's assertions about the validity of the Bible are based on factual beliefs that those who disagree with him (i.e., those who differ from him not only in attitude but also in belief) deny, according to Stevenson's interpretation of the passage. Is it possible to accomplish this? Allow us to explain. According to the research, "it is likely that the man will have sexual relations with the woman on a more frequent basis than she desires." These are the Pope's factual beliefs, which those who disagree with him categorically deny. However, it is important to remember that there are at least two ways in which people can disagree about the facts: I they can make two factual statements, with the only difference between them being that one is the assertion of X and the other is the denial of X; and (ii) they can be unable to accept any common statement of fact (X) which one wishes to assert and the other wishes to deny; and After being confronted with our rewriting of the Pope's belief, his defenders may well respond, "You haven't adequately stated his belief," and perhaps add, "If only you understood what he is sa...