Class 20 Civil Procedure Case Briefs PDF

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Joinder of Claims & Parties Case Briefs...

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Marissa Meyer (4/1/19) Class 20 Civil Procedure Case Briefs Temple v. Synthes Corp. United States Supreme Court 498 U.S. 5, reh’g denied, 498 U.S. 1092 (1990) 

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Rule of Law o It is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit because joint tortfeasors are merely permissive parties. Facts o Temple (plaintiff), a Mississippi resident, underwent surgery in a Louisiana hospital, during which the doctor implanted a plate and screw device in his spine. o The device was manufactured by Synthes, (defendant). o One of the device's screws broke off inside Temple's back after surgery. o Temple filed suit against Synthes in federal district court and against the hospital and doctor who performed the surgery in a Louisiana state court. o Synthes moved to dismiss Temple's federal claim, arguing that Temple had failed to join the doctor and hospital as necessary parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19. o The district court, citing judicial economy, ordered Temple to join the doctor and hospital within 20 days. o When Temple failed to do so, the court dismissed the suit. o Temple appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed. o The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue o Whether joint tortfeasors are necessary and indispensable parties such that failure to join joint tortfeasors requires dismissal of the federal claim. Holding and Reasoning (Per curiam) o No. It is not necessary for all joint tortfeasors to be named as defendants in a single lawsuit. o Joint tortfeasors are not necessary and indispensable parties but merely permissive parties. o The Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(a) explicitly state that "a tortfeasor with the usual 'joint-and-several' liability is merely a permissive party to an action against another with like liability." o Because the threshold requirements of Rule 19(a) are not satisfied, joint tortfeasors are merely permissive parties and therefore the public interest considerations of Rule 19(b) need not be considered. o As a result the matter is reversed and remanded.

Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc. United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 2 F.R.D. 238 (Minn. 1942) 

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Rule of Law o Impleader of a third party who is or may be liable is appropriate even if an independent action for monetary recovery could not be brought against the third party by the original defendant at that time. Facts o Jeub (plaintiff) got food poisoning due to eating ham at one of B/G Foods, Inc.’s (B/G) (defendant) restaurants. o Jeub brought suit, and B/G obtained an order to make Swift and Company (Swift) a third party defendant. o Swift was the manufacturer of the ham. o Swift filed a motion to vacate the order on the grounds that Jeub had not amended the complaint to name Swift as a party and that B/G was unable at the time—because it had not suffered any loss—to bring an action against Swift. o Swift thus argued that no relief could be granted against it. Issue o Is impleader of a third party defendant appropriate even if an independent action for monetary recovery could not be brought against it by the original defendant at that time? Holding and Reasoning (Nordbye, J.) o Yes. Impleader of a third party who is or may be liable is appropriate even if an independent action for monetary recovery could not be brought against the third party by the original defendant at that time. o Indeed, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for impleader, is not restricted to presently enforceable rights. o Its purpose is to provide for efficient resolution of legal claims in one proceeding if possible. o In the present case, there is no good reason not to allow impleader of Swift. o Certainly Swift may be liable to one or both of the parties for the harm caused by the ham in question. o Bringing Swift in as a third party defendant thus would resolve the legal dispute in an efficient manner, and would not prejudice any party. o This is precisely the situation for which Rule 14 was created. o Swift’s motion to vacate the impleader order is denied.

Smuck v. Hobson United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 

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Rule of Law o Intervention is appropriate when the moving party has an interest in the outcome of the case, that outcome may impair the party’s ability to protect its interests if it does not intervene, and the party is not otherwise adequately represented in the case. Facts o Parents (plaintiffs) of black and poor students brought a class action discrimination suit against the District of Columbia School District Board of Education (Board) (defendant). o The plaintiffs won in the district court. o The Board voted not to appeal the judgment and ordered Dr. Carl Hansen, the superintendent, not to appeal. o However, Hansen and Carl Smuck, a dissenting member of the Board, filed notices of appeal and motions to intervene. o In addition, twenty parents (parents) who disagreed with the district court’s decision also filed motions to intervene. o Subsequently, Hansen left his position as superintendent. o This court held the appeals in abeyance and remanded the motions to intervene to the district court. o The district court granted the motions to intervene. Issue o Are parents entitled to intervene in a suit against their children’s school when the school’s Board of Education chooses not to move forward with the case? Holding and Reasoning (Bazelon, C.J.) o Yes. Under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, intervention is appropriate when (1) the moving party has an interest in the outcome of the case, (2) that outcome may impair the party’s ability to protect its interests if it does not intervene, and (3) the party is not otherwise adequately represented in the case. o The first prong of this test should be read as a prerequisite to the other two prongs, and not an otherwise determining factor. o In the present case, the court determines that Hansen’s and Smuck’s motions to intervene are denied, but the parents’ motion is granted. o Because Hansen left his position as superintendent, he no longer has an interest sufficient to warrant intervention. o Similarly, Smuck, while still a member of the Board, has no interest either. o The party to the case with the opportunity to appeal was the Board, and the Board voted as a collective unit not to appeal.

o Smuck was able to—and did—take part in that vote, but outside of that participation, he may not intervene as an individual because he has no interest outside of his position on the Board. o The parents, on the other hand, (1) do have a sufficient interest in the case to reach the other two prongs of the intervention test. o The parents’ interest in the case is seeking to protect their children’s welfare; this is clearly an important interest and is sufficient to meet the prerequisite. o (2) Further, if not allowed to intervene, the parents’ ability to protect their children’s welfare in this matter would obviously be harmed. o (3) Finally, the parents were not adequately represented by the Board’s decision not to appeal. o The Board represents all parents within the school district; these particular parents, however, represent the specific interests of their children, which do not always—and certainly in this case do not—coincide with the interests of all of the other students in the district. o Accordingly, the parents’ interests were not adequately represented by the Board. o As a result of the foregoing, the parents’ motions to intervene are granted. o The district court is therefore reversed in part and affirmed in part.

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