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Printz v. United States United States Supreme Court 521 U.S. 898 (1997)

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Rule of Law Congress may not compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs.

Facts Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act) in 1993 as an amendment to its Gun Control Act of 1968. The Brady Act was a federal gun-control provision that required the United States attorney general to implement a nationwide handgun background check system. While moving towards a national system, in the interim, state and local officials were required to conduct background checks of prospective firearm purchasers. Under the Brady Act, sellers of firearms would report sales to their county Chief Law Enforcement Officers (CLEOs). The CLEOs would then conduct background checks and confirm the lawfulness of the sales. Printz and Mack (plaintiffs) were CLEOs in Montana and Arizona, respectively. Printz brought suit in federal district court against the United States government alleging that the Brady Act was an unconstitutional exercise of Congressional power because it compelled state officers to participate in federal service. The district court held that the provision of the Brady Act requiring CLEOs to perform background checks was unconstitutional, but held that this provision could be separated from the rest of the act, leaving a constitutional, voluntary background check system in place. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that none of the Brady Act’s interim provisions were constitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Issue May Congress compel state officials to participate in the administration of federal programs?

Holding and Reasoning (Scalia, J.) No. Congress may not compel state CLEOs to administer federal programs. Firstly, no clear evidence exists that historical Congresses believed they had the power to compel state executives into federal service. Secondly, the Constitution creates a system of dual sovereignty whereby the states and the federal government are independent entities with different governmental functions. Thus, the Constitution’s structure suggests that it is inappropriate for the federal government to violate states’ status as separate entities by compelling their officials to perform federal roles. Additionally, the Constitution clearly states the execution of the laws is the responsibility of the President. The Brady Act transfers this responsibility to thousands of CLEOs, who are not subject to Presidential control or oversight. Hence, empowering each CLEO to make background check decisions would reduce the power of the executive branch and strain the constitutional separation of powers. Finally, the present case is governed by New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), which held Congress may not require states to legislate according to federal standards because doing so constitutes a commandeering of traditional state policy making functions. Thus the provision of the Brady Act allowing the federal government to directly control state officers conflicts with the New Yorkdecision and is unconstitutional. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed. Concurrence (O’Connor, J.) The provisions in the Brady Act compelling state officials to carry out federal objectives are unconstitutional. However, state and local officials might choose to volunteer under the Brady Act to carry out its provisions in an effort to improve gun control. Additionally, the background check provisions in the Brady Act are only required in the interim until the attorney general successfully implements a nationwide, federally-administered system. This could encourage state and local officials to voluntarily comply with the Brady Act, despite this decision. Concurrence (Thomas, J.) Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power only to regulate commerce among the several states, a power that does not extend to regulating wholly intrastate, point-of-sale transactions. Under United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), Congress does not have the authority to regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms. Congress lacks both the underlying power to make firearm regulations under the Second Amendment, as well as the ability to compel state officers to enforce such regulations under the Tenth Amendment. Dissent (Stevens, J.) When Congress exercises powers delegated to it by the Constitution, it may impose obligations to act on state and local officials, and even ordinary citizens. There are no constitutional restrictions in this area explicitly placed on Congress’s ability to regulate firearms. Nothing in the Tenth Amendment grants the ability to state and local officials to ignore a command from Congress given

pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 enumerated powers. Additionally, the framers envisioned a system in which the national government has the power to make demands on local officials and individual citizens. The framers’ goal of empowering the national government does not mean that states must surrender their sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment; the national government is simply authorized to act for the benefit of the union as a whole. Finally, the New York decision is not controlling in the present case. New York dealt with the issue of whether state legislators—as opposed to state executive officials—may be enlisted to implement federal policy. Dissent (Souter, J.) The text of Federalist No. 27, written by Alexander Hamilton states that, because the new Constitution would authorize the national government to bind individuals directly through national law, it could “employ the ordinary magistry of each [state] in execution of its laws.” The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and state officer oath requirements of the Constitution combine to stand for the proposition that state governments are incorporated into the national government, and that state officials, because of their oath, are also incorporated into national government service. This and other provisions from the Federalist Papers suggest that Congress, when acting pursuant to its constitutional powers, may require state government or state officials to act in furtherance of those constitutional powers.

Dissent (Breyer, J.) Other nations have successfully implemented a system whereby local authorities are commissioned to carry out regulations created by a national, federal body. The success of other nations with this model could be instructive in upholding the constitutionality of a similar model in the United States.

Reno v. Condon United States Supreme Court 528 U.S. 141 (2000)

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Rule of Law Congress may regulate states’ activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or

regulations and does not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.

Facts In 1994, Congress passed the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA) to regulate the disclosure of personal information retained by state Departments of Motor Vehicles (DMVs). Congress passed this legislation because states routinely obtained significant personal information from individuals in connection with those individuals obtaining driver’s licenses and then sold that information to private entities at a profit for the state. The private entities could also further resell this information. The DPPA was designed to prohibit the selling or reselling of individuals’ personal information by DMVs or private entities without obtaining the individual’s consent. South Carolina and its Attorney General, Condon (plaintiff), brought suit against the United States government and its Attorney General, Reno (defendant), in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, alleging that the DPPA violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments of the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment for Condon, and the court of appeals affirmed. Reno appealed to the United States Supreme Court.

Issue May Congress use its Commerce Clause powers to regulate a state’s use of its citizens’ personal information?

Holding and Reasoning (Rehnquist, C.J.) Yes. Personal information collected from individuals by DMVs is an article of commerce. The information is sold interstate to various private entities both within and outside South Carolina. Thus, Congress may regulate the information because of its constitutional authority to regulate interstate commerce. However, to be constitutional, Congress’s regulations must not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment as demonstrated by the Court’s decisions in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The present case is controlled more by its decision in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988), than New York or Printz, as Congress was merely seeking to regulate state activity and not the states’ regulations of private actors or the actions of state officials. Congress has the power under the Constitution to regulate state activity. This case does not present the same concerns about Congress commandeering states’ legislative processes or state officials’ actions as in New York or Printz. Finally, South Carolina’s argument that Congress cannot regulate state activity without making general regulations applicable to

private entities is rejected. The DPPA is generally applicable to both states and private entities, making resolution of that issue unnecessary. The DPPA is constitutional because Congress attempts to regulate state activity through a generally applicable measure, and the decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

Katzenbach v. Morgan United States Supreme Court 384 U.S. 641 (1966) 4: 08

Rule of Law Congress may pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law.

Facts In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Section 4(e) of the Act provided that no person that successfully completed the sixth grade in a public or private school accredited by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, where the language of education was something other than English, could be denied the right to vote in an election because of his inability to read or write English. The election laws of the State of New York, however, required all voters to have the ability to read and write English as a requisite to voting. Morgan and other registered voters in New York City (plaintiffs) brought suit against Katzenbach (defendant), the United States government official tasked with enforcing §4(e). The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of §4(e) in federal district court on the grounds that it prohibited enforcement of New York’s election laws requiring an ability to read and write English as a condition of voting. A three-judge panel of the district court held that §4(e) was unconstitutional, and Katzenbach appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.

Issue May Congress pass legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment even when the legislation conflicts with state law?

Holding and Reasoning (Brennan, J.) Yes. The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment included §5 to grant Congress with broad power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, Congress may pass legislation under its powers in §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment

provided that the legislation is (1) an enactment to enforce a provision of the Equal Protection Clause; (2) plainly adapted to that end; and (3) consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Under this analysis, §4(e) can be regarded as an enactment to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. Congress specifically stated that the reason it enacted the provision was to prevent unequal treatment under the law of the Puerto Rican community in New York. Additionally, §4(e) was plainly adapted for that purpose: the practical effect of §4(e) is to ensure that Puerto Rican voters who did not speak English in New York are not disenfranchised in the voting process. This effect is within the letter and spirit of the Constitution as the Constitution highly values civil rights and equal treatment under the laws. Finally, Congress exercised its prerogative to weigh these concerns when enacting such legislation and found §4(e) to be an appropriate measure to promote the Equal Protection Clause. Deference is given to Congress’s judgment as §4(e) is an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court's judgment is reversed.

Dissent (Harlan, J.) Congress’s enactment of Section 4(e) violates the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches and violates the federal and state boundaries of political authority. Franchise is a matter of state concern subject only to the overriding requirements of various federal constitutional provisions dealing with franchise. Hence, New York has constitutional authority to regulate its franchise requirements. Moreover, in Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state literary qualification. Finally, Congress may take remedial measures to redress and prevent state violations of federal constitutional standards. However, it is for the Court to decide—not Congress—whether the condition with which Congress has sought to deal is truly an infringement of the Constitution. If it were otherwise, Congress would be able to qualify the Court’s constitutional decisions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as other constitutional provisions, by resorting to the Necessary and Proper Clause.

City of Boerne v. Flores United States Supreme Court 521 U.S. 507 (1997) Rule of Law In exercising its remedial and preventive power to enforce a constitutional right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may enact only legislation that utilizes congruent and proportional means for to achieving that legislative purpose.

Facts In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an express attempt to overturn the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, Oregon’s prohibition on peyote use in Native American religious practice was upheld because the Oregon state law was one of general applicability. The RFRA prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s free exercise of religion, even if the burden is derived from a law of general applicability. A person’s free exercise of religion can only be substantially burdened if the government can show that its actions were necessary to achieve a compelling government interest and were the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Archbishop Flores (plaintiff) brought suit against the City of Boerne (defendant) under the RFRA after the City of Boerne denied his church’s application for a building permit to make necessary expansions to its current building. The city denied the church’s permit pursuant to a city ordinance that prevented expansions and alterations of structures designated as historic landmarks or existing within historic districts. The church’s permit was denied because the City’s Historic Landmark Commission determined the church was located in a historic district. Archbishop Flores sought relief under the RFRA in the District Court for the Western District of Texas. The district court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue In exercising its remedial and preventive power to enforce a constitutional right under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, may Congress enact only legislation that utilizes congruent and proportional means for achieving that legislative purpose?

Holding and Reasoning (Kennedy, J.) Yes. Congress has broad, but not unlimited, enforcement powers. Specifically, Congress’s powers under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment are strictly remedial and not plenary. Accordingly, Congress has the power to enforce laws to prevent the violation of a constitutional right, but it does not have the power to define the substance of that constitutional right. There must be congruence and proportionality between the means Congress uses and the preventive or remedial ends it hopes to achieve. Without this congruence and proportionality, Congress's actions may cross the line into unacceptable substantive legislation. This interpretation of Congress’s powers is supported by the legislative history surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the RFRA is outside the scope of Congress’s remedial enforcement powers, because it is

overly broad in its scope and reach in relation to the desired ends of promoting religious freedom. The RFRA would impose a much more significant burden on states in terms of litigation costs and difficulty of proof than was appropriate in relation to the proposed federal interest. Relying on prior jurisprudence, the RFRA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.

Concurrence (Stevens, J.) The RFRA is a “law respecting the establishment of religion” as prohibited by the First Amendment to the Constitution. If the historical building had been owned by an atheist, that person would not have been able to challenge the denial of a building permit based on the RFRA. Thus, the RFRA unconstitutionally promoted the establishment of religion and should be struck down. Concurrence (Scalia, J.) The dissent’s argument that historical materials suggest that Smith should be overturned as an improper interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause is incorrect. Not all zoning laws such as those in this case need to be struck down as improper restraints on the free exercise of religion as suggested by the dissent. The dissent does not properly support its position with sufficient historical evidence. Dissent (O’Connor, J.) Smith was wrongly decided. Instead of deciding the present case, the parties should reexamine Smith, which improperly restricts the free exercise of religion. Only after achieving a new understanding of the Free Exercise Clause can the Court properly analyze the constitutionality of the RFRA. Dissent (Souter, J.) Smith has little value as precedent and should not be followed in the present case. The case should be set for reargument where a plenary reexamination can be conducted of the Free Exercise Clause issue. Until this occurs, a proper decision regarding the constitutionality of the RFRA cannot be made.

Shelby County v. Holder United States Supreme Court 570 U.S. 529 (2013)4:46 Rule of Law

A federal law that departs from the fundamental principles of federalism must be justified by current needs.

Facts In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act. Prior to the enactment of this statute, several states maintained test or devices, such as literacy and knowledge tests, good moral-character requirements, and vouchers requirements for registered voters. In several states, white citizens were registered to vote at a rate approximately 50 percent higher than African American citizens, as a percentage of total eligible voters in each classification. Because of these conditions, Congress determined that racial discrimination in voting restrictions was entrenched and pervasive. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibited any standard, practice, or procedure imposed or applied to deny or limit the right to vote on account of race or color. In the states with the most severe restrictions, Congress required any changes in voting procedures be preapproved by either the Attorney General or a court of three judges in Washington, D.C., under § 5 of the act. These states were determined through a formula set forth in § 4(b). Both § 4(b) and § 5 were temporary and were set to expire after five years. Congress reaut...