Colter Energy LP - Assignment 2 PDF

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Assignment 2...

Description

Canadian Pacific Railway – Regina Intermodal Yard

Memo To:

Kim Gillis, CEO

From:

Bisi Adeyoyin, OHS Officer

Date:

February 23, 2021

Re:

Summary of CNRL Tank Farm Roof Collapse and Recommendations

Background The purpose of this memo is to summarize the series of events that occur at CNRL Tank Farm Roof by focusing on the proximate and root cause of the incident, providing control measures in preventing the incident from occurring and recommendation on how Colter Energy can Proceed considering the incident. Incident The Incident occurred on April 24,2007 in one of CNRL’s tank (Tank 72-TK-1B). It was reported that the roof support structure of the tank fell off eastward as a result of wind. The component fell apart as the structure collapsed - cable failed as well as many bolts holding the component as a result. While these events were happening, most of the workers escaped through holes and manways of the tank wall. Contractors who were working at the west tank closer to where the incident happened hurriedly left what they were doing to assist in rescuing the insured employees – However an electrical consultant and scaffolder was pronounce death on the scene when CRNL Horizon emergency service arrived. Also, two other workers were seriously injured, and three others had minor injuries – they were first transported to Fort McMurray for treatment; the two seriously injured were further transported to Edmonton for more treatment.

Investigation on Casualties/Injured Contractors and Employee The Investigation was carried out by WHSC lead investigators and CNRL internal investigation team. After thorough investigation, they found out that 13 workers were inside tank 72-TK – 1B at the time of the incident (10 Chinese workers with SSEC Canada, one Chinese worker with TCC as an electric consultant and two Canadian workers with Iris NDT) The investigation team found out that all fatally injured were Chinese temporary foreign workers. The Electrical Consultant that died was Chinese and was on top of a welding machine

working on the east side of the tank wall. He was hit in the head and back by a portion of the falling steel and tossed onto the scaffolding outside the east wall of the tank. Whereas the scaffolder was trapped and crushed under a falling girder while standing on the tank floor, east of the tank center. One of the badly injured workers, Welder l was within the same welding machine that the Electrical Consultant was working on. He was trapped inside the welding machine and was rescued by CNRL staff and other contract workers. The other gravely injured worker, Welder 2, was inside another welding machine on the east wall that had been struck by falling steel and completely dislodged from the wall, falling to the tank floor. Welder 2 was rescued by his Chinese co-workers. A verbal Stop Work Order was confirmed in writing and issued after the incident had happened, April 27, 2007. The Stop Work Order prohibited access to the east and west tank farms. Proxima Proximate te and Roo Roott C Cause ause 1. Negligence on both CNRL and its contractor: One of CNRL contractors, SSEC Canada assembled the roof support structure of tank 72-TK-1B as a stand-alone structure. The erection of the shell was independent of the roof support structure and they were assembled concurrently, so the top of the shell and the outer ring were not supporting each other. This procedure was different from what was started in the TIW drawing for them to follow – neither CNRL nor SSEC Canada consulted with TIW with respect to what the assembly sequence should be followed for the construction of the roof structure. 2. TIW did not specify an erection sequence to follow to erect the tank they designed – they argued that it was not part of the contract they signed with CNRL. 3. Tenth Construction Company of Sinopec (TCC) did not undertake satisfactorily practical measures to protect the health and safety of the Electrical Consultant. The tank roof support structure that crushed onto the worker was a skeleton structure. The Electrical Consultant did not have a work permit as a temporary foreign worker and thus should not have been working at the work site. 4. No Engineering Procedures were followed - the report started that SSEC Canada did not provide written engineered erection procedures while assembling the root structure because CNRL did not require them to provide written engineered assembly procedures. 5. No Qualified/Professional Engineer - SSEC Canada chief engineer that developed the erection procedure for the roof support structures and specified the number, size and location of the guy wires was not a qualified professional engineer. The erection procedures for erecting the roof support structures had not been prepared and certified by a Professional Engineer as well. 6. Insufficient wires used as wind bracing on the partly assembled roof also contributed to its collapse. The bolted roof support structure on the tank did not have the necessary restraint to resist the lateral forces generated by the wind – the roof structure was bolted using ASTM A-307 without the use of wedges or washers. Because of the flexible bolted

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structure, any movement caused by the wind would provide means to loosen the nut on the bolts as well as intensify the twisting force on the guy wires. The report started that as the structure flopped, some of the support cables failed, many of the bolts that were holding the components together failed and then the components began to come apart. Control Measur Measures es

Administrative Control CNRL should employ administrative controls to integrate workplace policy, procedures, and practices that minimize the exposure of workers to such risk conditions. The below administrative procedures should be followed: 1. Administrative office/management should establish a Joint Health and Safety Committee (JHSC) that consist of both management representative and employee to discuss health and safety issues. 2. Management should ensure all employee/contractors are trained, competent and certified to perform any duties or work in designated areas – From the incident report, the worker who had been designated as the Confined Space Monitor was not competent. 3. Management should implement an emergency response plan (ERP) and ensure all workers understand how to carry out a emergency call during an alarming incident– the plan should outline specific procedures for handling sudden and unexpected situations. In this situation, they should come up with procedure to evacuate workers working in confined space in the case of an incident. They should ensure telephone or radio are in place to summon assistance. The report stated that SSEC Canada did not ensure that the designated worker had a suitable system for summoning assistance. Sadly, on the day of the incident the worker who had been designated as the Confined Space Monitor was not aware of the emergency response requirements and was not capable of raising an alarm or implementing an effective rescue. SSEC Canada did not ensure that the emergency response plan included procedures to evacuate the confined space immediately. 4. Management should ensure all temporary foreign workers employed directly with the company and as contractors have valid work permit to work in Canada.

Engineering Control Engineer control should be employed to modify equipment, materials and work processes that reduce workers’ exposure to hazards. The following Engineering procedures should be followed: The structural engineer should identify any questionable design aspect, including whether any updates were made that affected the roof support structure of tank 72-TK1B prior to it collapsing (This includes design and drawings, electrical and mechanical plans, calculations, any reports, etc.) 2. The Structural Engineer should verify that the erection of the roof support structure is stable during assembly – this will prevent the parts from falling off during windy conditions. 3. The engineer will need to assess the rotational and tensile capacity of connections that are not designed with safety in mind – Engineer should audit existing systems and instantly modify deficiencies. 1.

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4. The structural Engineer should remove the service wire rope used to support the roof

support structure in tank 72-TK-l B that had been distorted because of kinking where it had been attached around girders.

Personal Protective Equipement (PPE) Helmets, goggles, gloves should be mandatory for all workers on site and fall protection system in place for those working at height 6ft or more above a lower level. For an employee working on a scaffold, the height requirement for fall protection is 10 feet, and this protection should be provided by a built-in guardrail. Respirators, gloves and ear plugs should be provided for those working in confined spaces. Recommendation on ho how w CP R Rail ail can Proceed considering the Incident a att CNRL 1.

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Policies should be put in place to encourage employees to conduct daily safety audit on worksite. Physically observing the workplace and how work is performed within is a powerful step in identifying hazards. The inspection should not be limited to considering physical objects, such as machines, tools, equipment, and structures, but should also include observing processes, systems, and work procedures. Also, site supervisors should be talking with workers: Passive observation can miss many important aspects of how work is performed. Getting the perspective of the people conducting the work will reveal other insights. This can be done informally through discussions or through more formal means such as surveys or interviews. Once hazards have been identified, management should train staff/workers how to prioritize the risk - Risk assessment will be a helpful tool. Policies limiting the time workers spend in contact with a chemical hazard should be in place, like “no-go” zones that control workers’ activities in certain locations that are mapped with dangerous hazard sign Ensure that strategies are in place to enable appropriate communication of weather reports and anticipated weather events to operational personnel. Consider the integrity of the surrounding structures and environment before, during and after space. Safety training orientations to new and existing workers that address workplace hazard, emergency procedures, PPE training and Policies (e.g.how to report injuries and near misses) and job specific OHS skills. Focus should be on using local contractors instead of foreign contractors. Foreign contractors could import Third World construction practices while performing our work. Management should ensure all foreign workers and employee working on our properties have their valid work permit.

References

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Buildings. (2007, March 20). How to Avoid Progressive Collapse in Your Building . Retrieved from Buidlings: https://www.buildings.com/articles/35198/how-avoid-progressivecollapse-your-building CNRL. (2007). 2007 Fatality Report: Workers Crushed by Collapse of Tank Roof Support Structure. https://wcs.lms.athabascau.ca/file.php/267/readings/Incident%20Investigation %20Report.pdf. GlobalNews. (2016, 02 09). Companies’ lack of qualified engineers contributed to fatal Alberta 2007 collapse: OHS. Retrieved from GlobalNews: https://globalnews.ca/news/2506810/companies-lack-of-qualified-engineers-contributedto-fatal-alberta-2007-collapse-ohs/ NFCC. (2021, 03 18). Hazard Structural Defect or Further Collapse. Retrieved from WorkSafe: https://www.worksafe.vic.gov.au/safety-alerts/preventing-structural-collapse Stromme, M. H. (2010, 01 05). Clearing Up the Confusion Surrounding Fall Protection. Retrieved from EHSToday: https://www.ehstoday.com/construction/article/21904675/clearing-up-the-confusionsurrounding-fall-protection

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