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The Concentric Circles of South Africa’s Foreign Policy under Jacob Zuma

Chris Landsberg

India Quarterly 70(2) 153–172 © 2014 Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA) SAGE Publications Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC DOI: 10.1177/0974928414524652 http://iqq.sagepub.com

[email protected] Abstract South Africa’s foreign policy could be viewed as a set of concentric circles which define the Republic’s international priorities. In an attempt to bring coherence and predictability to them, the Zuma government has tried to learn from its predecessor, the Mbeki government (1999–2008), by putting emphasis on key international relations and concerns, and the idea was suggested that these different layers reinforced each other. According to stated policy, pursuit of the national interests lay at the heart of the Republic’s international strategies and came to be regarded as the new glue that holds it together, albeit it is four years into Zuma’s government and the ‘national interest’ remains poorly developed and in need of expansion and implementation. A set of wider foreign policy concentric circles informs foreign policy, championed as ‘Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced Cooperation’. This agenda was to be pursued under a series of sub-goals or sub-categories, for our purposes concentric circles, namely (a) closing the gap between domestic and foreign policy; (b) continued prioritisation of the African continent—the Mbeki government called it African Agenda, or Africa first policy; (c) strengthening South–South relations; (d) strategic relations with strategic formations for the North; (e) participating in the global system of governance and (f) strengthening political and economic relations. While these six pillars were clearly developed on paper, and self-standing, how they all relate to the epicentre of the national interest and overlap one another is not so clear. More serious effort is needed on the part of government to close this lacuna, and the idea of coherence between them should not be assumed if there is to be consistency between them and the stated annulus of national interest. Keywords Jacob Zuma foreign policy, concentric circles, national interest driven foreign policy, African advancement, South-South relations, strategic relations with the North, participate in global system of governance, strengthening political and economic relations

Introduction One way of looking at South Africa’s foreign policy is to view it as a set of concentric circles which define its priorities. Forging international relations with countries, regions and continental groups helps bring an element of coherence and predictability to a country’s foreign policy 1 and may be viewed as an

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annulus with a common centre. If two concentric circles have the same area, they are congruent, and so bring a degree of coherence to policy and processes in general, and foreign policy in particular. Concentric circles could also be viewed as a hierarchy from the inside out, or from the bottom up. The idea behind concentric circles is that a country’s foreign policy has a common centre, with different, but inter-related and reinforcing foci. These different layers reinforce each other as they coexist in a symbiotic relationship. Concentric circles thus have different radiuses, but common epicentres; it speaks to different dimensions but all linked to the same core or centre. Concentric circles are about alignment and dialectic relationship between different layers and thrusts of an issue. While concentric circles exist in a complex political and institutional relationship, they seek to bring coherence and congruence to a country’s foreign policy. All circles speak to the inner-most or core circle. As early as 1973, James Barber used the idea of the ‘concentric circle model’ to explain an external environment faced by the old South Africa foreign policy-makers (Barber 1973, 227). The inner circle represented southern Africa; the rest of Africa constituted the middle circle; and the wider international community formed the outer circle. Does South Africa’s foreign policy have a common centre, a congruent area? As we have marked the five-year point of South Africa’s new Jacob Zuma-led government in May 2014, it is time to map some of its policy trajectories, and unpack the policy courses of this administration; we will do so by applying the idea of concentric circles, making an assessment of its emerging foreign policy agenda or dominant diplomatic priorities. Having previously applied this idea to the Thabo Mbeki administration, one question we are interested in is whether there are signs of significant change from the concentric circles drawn by the Mbeki government, or is there continuity—more of the same? (Landsberg 2006).

The Concentric Circles of the Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy On paper at least, the emerging foreign policy of the Zuma government shows the idea of concentric circles underscoring both foreign and domestic policy, namely, domestic or national interests, an ‘African Agenda’, South–South cooperation, North–South dialogue, socio-economic and politico-security global governance and economic diplomacy (ibid.). The August 2009 Medium-term Strategic Framework to Guide Government’s Programme for the Electoral Mandate Period 2009–2014 reveals that it too is looking to champion the continent in its foreign policy, this time under the broad rubric of ‘Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced Cooperation’ (MTSF 2009). Echoing the Mbeki rhetoric, this agenda was to be pursued under a series of sub-goals or sub-categories (see Figure 1). After the articulation of the 2009 Mid-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), these areas were spelled out by the president and senior government officials in state of the nation addresses, budget vote speeches and at conferences.

From Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation: A National Interest Doctrine At the epicentre of South Africa’s foreign policy stands the idea of ‘the national interests’. All the different circles are thus supposed to reinforce the national interests. But do they? That is what we will India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 153–172

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Figure 1. Concentric Circles of the Zuma Administration Source: Author’s own graphic representation.

seek to understand in this article. In one of the first moves announced by Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, in line with the resolution adopted by the ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane, the name of the department responsible for the management and coordination of the Republic’s diplomacy and foreign policy changed from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to that of Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The idea was to signal government’s intention to introduce a new style and approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, namely: (a) that domestic considerations, ‘the national interest’, would henceforth be the main priority of South Africa’s foreign policy and (b) there would be emphasis on issues of collaborative non-hegemonic soft-balancing as opposed to dominant, hegemonic intentions and power-seeking realist approaches to relations with other states and international entities. In her first public address as new Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane confirmed the change in the name of the department, as well as spelling out the rationale behind it. The first concentric circle to deal with here, the epicentre, is that of the ‘national interest’ as the new guide that would drive South Africa’s foreign policy. In a major policy speech by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on 10 April 2013, Miss Maite Nkoana-Mashabane claimed that ‘we have established a national interest link between our domestic priorities and foreign policy’.2 Elsewhere, the Minister in charge of DIRCO vowed in her address to the Heads of Mission conference, ‘our government desires to give more clarity and focus on the role of the Department in meeting our domestic priorities through international partnerships and cooperation’.3 In 2009, DIRCO borrowed from the work of Joseph Frankel, who argued that the national interest of every country is ‘centred upon welfare of the nation and the preservation of the national way of life’ (DIRCO 29 September 2009, 6). In adapting this definition, DIRCO crafted their own conceptualisation, and India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 153–172

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asserted that ‘the national interest can be defined as those interests of the state, which can be categorised as core interests, which are inalienable, and whose attainment and protection is absolutely vital’ (29 September 2009, 6). Slightly more promising was the statement announcing a new International Relations ‘Outreach Programme’ by the Minister in an address at the University of Limpopo in October 2009, in which she provided the clearest enunciation yet of a national interest doctrine. Challenging the realist notion of power and domination, it focused on ‘cooperation and partnership’,4 but how would this materialise? According to the Minister, ‘national interests are by their very nature multi-faceted. In the main, national interests refer to a country’s goals and ambitions; they are about the state’s survival and security, extending to its pursuit of wealth, economic growth and power’.5 According to Nkoana-Mashabane, DIRCO attached great importance to ‘soft-power’ and ‘soft balancing’ notions in its conceptualisation of the national interest, for as the Minister explained, ‘by their very nature, national interests find resonance in, and are informed, by our domestic agenda’.6 Clear in her grasp of the concepts, she continued, We do attach great importance to our national interests in our foreign policy. But unlike realists we do not believe that the international system is characterised by anarchy and that states have to hide behind the cover of their sovereignty and focus narrowly on the pursuit of their national interests.7

In South Africa’s pursuit of the national interest, she proclaimed, will be a recognition that ‘states can work together around a common global agenda and shared values for a better world’8—basing her analysis on formulations of general interests, not primary or permanent interests. While these statements provide some understanding of the rationale behind South Africa’s national interest conceptualisation, less clear was how the ideals would be put into operation. The Minister had articulated a view of national interest which challenged the realist notion of power and domination, and instead spoke to cooperation and partnership. According to the Minister, ‘national interests are by their very nature multi-faceted. In the main, national interests refer to a country’s goals and ambitions; they are about the state’s survival, extending to its pursuit of wealth, economic growth and power’.9 Elsewhere, the Minister argued that, for us in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation we took on that promise by making sure that our mandate reflects all our domestic priorities of the creation of jobs, improvement of health, quality access and education to all, eradication of crime, and the upliftment of our rural communities.10

These views highlight government’s struggle to come up with a robust conception of the national interest that would inform all other aspects of foreign policy. DIRCO attached great currency to soft-power and soft-balancing notions in its conceptualisation of the national interest, and as the Minister explained, ‘by their very nature, national interests find resonance in, and are informed, by our domestic agenda. We do attach great importance to our national interests in our foreign policy.’11 ‘But unlike realists’, asserted the Minister, ‘we do not believe that the international system is characterised by anarchy and that states have to hide behind the cover of their sovereignty and focus narrowly on the pursuit of their national interest.’ In South Africa’s scheme of the national interests, ‘states can work together around a common global agenda and shared values for a better world’.12 On this score, the South Africans attempted to make their unique contribution to the debate about national India Quarterly, 70, 2 (2014): 153–172

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interests by making the case for a less power-obsessed notion of the concept, and to infuse into the debate the idea that non-hegemonic international relations could in fact help to advance the national interests of a country. The Minister stated that, ‘the name of the Department has been changed from Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation. This has been done to help clarify the mandate of the Department. The name should reflect the new focus that our government wishes to place on partnerships and cooperation for development.’13 In an address to DIRCO Heads of Missions Conference in August 2009, she expanded on this motivation when she asserted that, ‘the renaming was largely motivated by international trends which require states to put emphasis on cooperation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation’.14 In addition, ‘the globalised nature of the world necessitates that states continue to forge ways of cooperating better with each other’.15 Thus, for the South African government, cooperation and non-hegemonism are vital ingredients in the promotion of a state’s national interests. A further motivation behind the change in the name of the department was to help close the gap between domestic and foreign affairs and to assist in demystifying foreign policy by bringing it closer to the public. In the words of the Minister, one of the important areas of our work will be to make South Africans aware of the work that the Department is doing. In this regard we plan to enhance our public diplomacy initiatives and increase the level of our engagement with South Africans on foreign policy matters.16

The idea of national interests again figured prominently here. ‘For the department to get the support of the country’, she asserted, ‘our work needs to be known and understood by South Africans from all walks of life’.17 It is important to stress here that, while this move was an important signal to the outside world about South Africa’s intentions, it did not represent a departure from the Mandela and Mbeki years or their approaches to foreign affairs. In fact, both these previous administrations had long de-emphasised hegemonic approaches to international affairs and placed emphasis on cooperation and partnershipbuilding. In Africa in particular, South Africa has adopted a posture of partnership in a bid to reassure its neighbours about its good intentions, and announced that it sought to be a peaceful and reliable partner, not a bully bent on pursuing its own interest at their expense.

Pursuing African Advancement Let us now zero in on the second layer of the concentric circle under the Zuma administration’s emerging foreign policy, that of ‘continued prioritisation of the African continent’. In that policy speech of the Minister of 10 April 2013, the Minister repeated what has now become a familiar refrain in South Africa’s foreign policy: ‘Africa is at the centre of what we do in the world through our African Agenda commitments and programmes’.18 The ‘Africa prioritisation’ strategies are being pursued under two broad thematic areas: (a) Africa continental and (b) improving political and economic integration of SADC. Although the Zuma government has set out to pursue its Africa strategies under the label of ‘African advancement’, it is actually a policy that borrows heavily from the Mbeki government’s notion of the ‘African Agenda’ and in fact one that continued to use the very label ‘African Agenda’.19 In this

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regard, Nkoana-Mashabane stated that, ‘the consolidation of the African Agenda remains central to our foreign policy objectives’ and that the new government ‘will continue to work towards achieving a vision of Africa which is united, peaceful and prosperous’.20 It came as clarifying news when the government recently started to state in the open that it remained committed to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). For the first two years, and born out of sensitivities of the fraternal battles which played out during the battle at Polokwane, where Mbeki lost the African National Congress presidency in 2007 and was eventually ‘recalled from the Presidency’ in 2008, there was silence on this issue, and the government appeared ambivalent about NEPAD’s future. NEPAD was too closely associated with the persona of Mbeki. This was surprising because there was a real risk that the country, which was the lead state in the formation of NEPAD, was distancing itself from a plan for domestic political reasons, as opposed to sound foreign policy motivations. Government has come out and committed itself to the implementation of NEPAD, and to improving the regional climate for growth and development, as well as placing the development requirements of the continent on the global agenda. This seems to signify that, as had the Mbeki government, the new administration will use NEPAD, and its vehicles, the G8-Africa Action Plan, and the African Partnership Forum. Policy states that NEPAD remains the main frame of reference for intra-African relations and Africa’s partnership with international partners, such as, the EU–Africa Strategic Partnership, Forum for Africa–China Partnership (FOCAC), the G8, New Africa–Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The socio-economic development plan devised by Mbeki and some of his African partners continued to feature as a pole in this important concentric circle of ‘African advancement’. It is important to say something here about the future of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the implementation of which the government has come out in support. As Africa’s unique governance promotion tool, it was set up to advance democratic, corporate and economic governance of the continent. There are also questions around the future of the mechanism at home and the implementation of the action plan, creating challenges for this pole of the African concentric circle. During the Mbeki period, there were many tensions between government and civil society over the domestic APRM process and structures. As the new government committed itself to the future of the APRM, they persisted, with both civil society actors and government having to show some political maturity to restore the creditability of the instrument. The Zuma government has committed itself to supporting this paradigm of building a Union of African states and to continuing to work for the strengthening of the AU and its institutions, another key aspect of the ‘African advancement’ posture. Zuma and his Minister of International Relations and Cooperation distanced themselves from Ghadaffi’s USAF push and instead vowed that ‘South Africa will continue to advocate for a gradual and incremental approach, focusing on the regional organisations, as building blocks towards the Union Government.’21 South Africa’s approach is premised on the understanding ‘that the African Union is a union of independent and sovereign states’, and that the actions of the AU Agency ‘are contingent on the mandate of member states’.22 Policy indicated that it would, through continental and regional issues, work towards the entrenchment of democracy and respect for human rights on the African continent. Suffice it to point out here that the balance between an approach of human rights and justice versus one of peace, security and development has been difficult for this country to achieve during the course of the past 15 years. There Ind...