Criminal LAW - Coincidence OF Actus REUS AND MENS REA PDF

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CRIMINAL LAW COINCIDENCE OF ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA Both actus reus and the mens rea must coincide for there to be criminal liability. In some cases a literal interpretation of this rule would manifestly lead to injustice, and the courts have developed ways of finding a coincidence of actus reus and...

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CRIMINAL LAW

COINCIDENCE OF ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA

Both actus reus and the mens rea must coincide for there to be criminal liability. In some cases a literal interpretation of this rule would manifestly lead to injustice, and the courts have developed ways of finding a coincidence of actus reus and mens rea when the events take place over a period of time and constitute a course of events. Continuing Acts One way is to say that an actus reus is some circumstance involving a continuing act and a later mens rea can therefore coincide. Authority: Fagan vs. Metropolitan Police Commissioner (1969). D accidentally drove his car on a policeman’s foot (no mens rea at that time) and when he realised, he refused to remove it immediately. The court held that the actus reus of the assault was a continuing act in progress all the time the car was on the policeman’s foot, so the subsequent mens rea could coincide with the actus reus at a later stage. Authority: Kaitamaki (1984). D was charged with rape. His defence was that when he penetrated the woman he thought she was consenting. When he realised that she objected he did not withdraw. The Privy Council held that the actus reus of rape was a continuing act, and when he realised that she did not consent (and he therefore formed necessary mens rea) the actus reus was still in progress and there could therefore be coincidence. One Transaction The second way the courts have dealt with the problem is to consider a continuing series of acts to be “one transaction” for the purposes of the criminal law. If actus reus and mens rea are both present at some time during this transaction, then there is liability. Authority: Thabo Meli vs. R. (1954). D’s had attempted to kill their victim by beating him over the head. They threw the body over a cliff. He died from the fall and exposure, and not from the beating. The Privy Council held that this was all one series of acts following through a pre-conceived plan of action and therefore could not be seen as separate acts at all. Actus reus and the mens rea were present during the transaction and therefore D’s were guilty of murder. Authority: Church (1996). The same reasoning was applied here even where there was no pre-conceived plan and D, having killed (or so he thought) unexpectedly, disposed of the “body” in a panic and thereby caused death. Authority: Le Brun (1991). D committed an initial assault and then unintentionally killed what he believed to be a corpse in trying to cover up his crime. The Court of Appeal confined and applied the reasoning in Church.

This kind of reasoning should be recognized for what it is: a way to avoid a logical but unjust result....