Essay Reponse Paper 2 - \'\' Why did the League of Nations fail to preserve collective security ? \'\' PDF

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Response paper 2 POLI 244-International Politics: State Behavior Conference section: 021 TA: Luc Franche Jack Farman Word count: 1073

Why did the League of Nations fail to preserve collective security?

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The devastating consequences of World War I marked a new era and a new approach to international relations. Indeed, this period characterized itself by an attempt to preserve global peace through the policy of collective security, which was to be made by an association called the League of Nations grouping the nonaggressive powers of the world 1. This policy failed however which eventually led to the outbreak of World War II. The failures of collective security involved the Manchurian crisis of 1931 and the Abyssinian crisis of 1935. Such events can be explained from a neoliberal institutional view, to then be criticized in order to evaluate the validity of this explanation, and to finally be responded in order to assess neoliberal institutional theory.

Japan’s rise in power following the victory against Russia in 1905, the colonization of North Korea in 1910, as well as its contribution to World War I supporting the allies, was still not recognized by the Western powers due to racial equality2. Japanese immigration was therefore banned in US territory, and Britain ended the bilateral treaty it had with Japan. The Manchurian failure of 1931 involved a Japanese invasion over Chinese territory, to which the League of Nations responded by sending a British committee to investigate under the Lytton report. The report did blame Japan for invading Manchuria, and voted for it to give back the land in question, but did not call for sanctions. As a consequence to this, Japan was excluded from the League of Nations3. The League of Nations as an institution therefore proved to be inefficient and weak, as it was unable to complete its objective as an institution, that is “making states work together”4. Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that although “there is no central government to enforce rules ”5, states will cooperate on a “conditional basis”6. The reason for the Japanese defection can

1 Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and David A. Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Ninth edition (Boston, Pearson, 2012), 112. 2 ibid, 119. 3 ibid, 119. 4 Joseph M. Grieco. International Organization, Vol. 42. No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 493. 5 ibid, 492. 6 ibid, 493.

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therefore be blamed on the domestic characteristics of Britain who disabled cooperation through its ending of the bilateral treaty, and due to conditional play, explains why Japan would not cooperate later on. Indeed, if a state refuses to collaborate with another state, the other states reaction will be to defect reciprocally in the future. Also, the fact that the report claiming the sanctions was written under a British committee is another issue, as states are “rational-unitary actors”7 and therefore focus on their individual benefits and not to those of other. The Abyssinian crisis of 1935 involved the Italian annexation over Ethiopian land, although Italy had signed the Kellogg-Briand pact in 1928, outlawing war. The League of Nations regrouping the fifty states, responded eight days after the Italian invasion, by imposing economic sanctions. These sanctions nevertheless did not prevent Mussolini’s invasion over Abyssinia8. Because rules cannot be enforced, “cheating”9 is the issue. Given that states are rational unitary actors that maximize their “well-being”10, and referring to Grieco’s writings, Italy did so, by defecting while the other states collaborated11. Wilson was therefore wrong in believing military force would be the reaction of non-aggressive states in cases of cheating12, as Britain responded by calling off the sanctions over Italy as it feared losing Italy as an ally against an uprising Germany13. Another reason for the failure to preserve collective security in this situation is the number of players involved in the League of Nations, this being because as Oye explains “cooperation becomes more difficult as the number of actors increases”14. Indeed a greater number of players involves a greater need of coordination, and in the case of the League of Nations was lacking as it only made decisions after the invasion.

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ibid, 492. Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and David A. Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Ninth edition (Boston, Pearson, 2012), 120. 9 Joseph M. Grieco. International Organization, Vol. 42. No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 497. 10 ibid, 498. 11 ibid, 493. 12 Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and David A. Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Ninth edition (Boston, Pearson, 2012), 113. 13 ibid, 120. 14 Kenneth A. Oye. Cooperation under anarchy (Princeton University Press, 1986),87.

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This explanation of the failures of collective security can however be criticized using realist arguments. To start off with, it seems that the League of Nations had no impact at all, and that the neoliberal assumption that institutions are created in order to make states work together was proved wrong. As a matter of fact, institutions only reflect the will of its greatest powers. In the case of the Abyssinian crisis, Britain made the final decision of removing sanctions. In the case of the Manchurian crisis, a British committee made the report on the situation , and made the decisions. The role of the League of Nations was therefore only an illusion and demonstrated that institutions, as Stein explains, cannot deal with cases of national security15. A second flaw involves the notion of cheating. The neoliberal view implies, that because there is no central authority, institutions are created in order to ameliorate cheating and therefore emphasizes the fact that cooperation cannot be enforced. It fails to understand however that on top of that, the issue in an anarchic system is also that no authority can prevent states from “using violence, or the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them”16. As the Abyssinian crisis demonstrated, Italy did indeed cheat by defecting but it also invaded the Ethiopian land although it had signed the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war. Once again, institutions are shown to be incapable of dealing with situations of high-politics such as national security. Finally, the neoliberal view argues that state action is conditioned by ambition, but the Abyssinian crisis demonstrated that the British fear of losing Italy as an ally against Nazi Germany shows that is was driven rather by what realists believe drive state action: “fear and survival”17.

These critiques however can be responded. Firstly, neoliberal institutionalism agrees that states are indeed the “major actors in world affairs”18, but although

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Reus-Smit Christian and Duncan Snidal. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford, 2012), 207. 16 Joseph M. Grieco. International Organization, Vol. 42. No. 3 (Summer, 1988), 498. 17 ibid, 498. 18 ibid, 492.

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institutions cannot create cooperation, they can “reinforce”19 it. The argument that institutions cannot deal with situations of national security does not stand, as the League did manage to be successful in preserving peace during the 1920’s through the creation of pacts and treaties. The Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 outlawed war, but was only cheated on when Italy invaded Abyssinia in 1935. This demonstrated that the role of institutions is to facilitate cooperation, but agrees that they cannot ensure it as they cannot enforce promises, and that therefore the major issue is cheating. Thirdly, the notion of state ambition refers to the fact that states cooperate, perhaps for survival reasons but also because by cooperating, they maximize their own interests, and can find a way to enforce laws through reciprocal strategies.

In conclusion, neoliberal institutionalism provides a satisfactory explanation as to why the League of Nations failed to preserve collective security. However, it fails to explain why Britain would cooperate with Italy for reasons of self-interest.

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ibid, 495.

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Bibliography: Nye, Joseph S. Jr., and David A. Welch. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Ninth edition (Boston, Pearson, 2012) Joseph M. Grieco. International Organization, Vol. 42. No. 3 (Summer, 1988) Reus-Smit Christian and Duncan Snidal. The Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford, 2012) Kenneth A. Oye. Cooperation under anarchy (Princeton University Press, 1986)

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