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Shreeya  Pandey       PROBLEM  QUESTIONS   Offer  &  Acceptance:  B&H  v  Hackstars   Issue   Whether  B&H’s  advertisement  amounted  to  an  of...

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Shreeya'Pandey'' '

PROBLEM(QUESTIONS(

Offer(&(Acceptance:'B&H'v'Hackstars' Issue( Whether'B&H’s'advertisement'amounted'to'an'offer'which'led'to'Hackstar’s'reply'being'an' acceptance'of'this'offer?' ' Relevant(Law( 'An'advertisement'can'be'construed'as'an'offer'or'an'invitation'to'treat'(Grainger).'Invitation'to'treat' is'an'invitation'to'negotiate'rather'than'an'offer'(Gibson).'An'offer'is'a'statement'made'by'an'offeror' that'he/she'is'willing'to'enter'on'particular'terms.'It'is'only'effective'when'all'terms'are'included'and' is'communicated'to'the'offeree.'It'cannot'be'accepted'unless'the'offeree'is'aware'of'the'existence'of' the'offer'and'its'terms'(Carbolic).'The'distinction'between'an'offer'and'an'invitation'to'treat' depends'objectively'upon'the'intention'of'parties'(Gibson).' Application( An'advertisement'is'normally'considered'an'invite'to'treat'(Grainger).'B&H'published'an' advertisement'requiring'the'supply'of'hardware/software.'While'the'advertisement'did'contain'the' line'that'B&H'that'they'had'“already'obtained'the'necessary'finance'to'proceed”,'the'advertisement' still'lacked'complete'terms'such'as'price,'a'necessary'condition'for'it'to'be'an'offer'(Carbolic).' Additionally,'were'it'to'be'found'an'offer,'the'reply'from'Hackstars'would'classify'as'a'counterOoffer' as'it'makes'offer'that'modifies'the'original'terms'of'the'advertisement'(Stevenson'Jacques'v' Mclean).' Conclusion( Ultimately,'it'is'most'likely'that'B&H’s'advertisement'would'be'determined'to'be'an'invitation'to' treat.'Additionally'the'response'of'Hackstar'would'be'construed'as'a'new'counterOoffer'which'B&H' can'accept'or'reject'(Gibson).'As'such,'B&H'is'under'no'obligation'to'accept'the'offer'in'response'to' their'original'invitation'to'treat'and'are'not'legally'bound'to'proceed'in'business'with'Hackstars.'' '

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Certainty:'Gina'v'Beck'Barrow'Merchant'Bank'Ltd' Issue( Whether'clauses'7'and'9'in'the'employment'contract'are'uncertain,'leading'to'an'incomplete' contract?' Relevant((Law(&(Application(( ' In'Upper'Hunter'County'District'Council'v'Australian'Chilling'and'Freezing'Co'Ltd'(1968),'Barwick'CJ.' stipulates'that'unless'the'language'employed'is'so'vague'that'its'definite'meaning'is'indecipherable' to'the'courts'then'the'contract'should'be'upheld.'In'Meehan'v'Jones'(1982)'Mason'J.'deals'with'the' problem'of'specifying'the'terms'of'refinancing'an'agreement,'and'states'that'whilst'drafting'an' explicit'clause'would'avoid'the'problem'of'uncertainty,'“such'a'clause,'by'reason'of'its'greater' precision,'may'be'too'inflexible'in'its'operation”,'thus'the'court'may'view'the'lack'of'specificity'as'a' necessary'condition'to'the'operation'of'the'contract.' ' Firstly'I'will'address'clause'7'which'may'be'considered'uncertain'due'to'its'lack'of'specificity'in' regards'to'salary'conditions.'The'clause'sets'out'an'approximation'of'a'starting'salary'rate'(between' $135'000'and'$150'000p.a.)'and'then'sets'a'condition'for'review'under'every'six'months,'with'the' first'review'on'14'January'2005.'No'details'of'this'review'process'have'been'supplied,'which'raise' questions'about'uncertainty'in'application'of'the'contract.'In'this'case'I'would'argue'that'it'is' unlikely'that'the'courts'would'find'the'lack'of'detail'sufficient'to'void'the'contract,'with'the'inferred' meaning'that'the'review'would'involve'both'parties.'Furthermore'should'there'be'disagreement'in' this'review'the'contract'provides'specified'methods'of'arbitration'to'resolve'any'conflict'in'clause' 11.' ' Secondly,'there'may'be'issue'regarding'uncertainty'in'the'phrase'“satisfactory'terms'and'conditions”' in'regards'to'Gina’s'parking'in'clause'9.'In'Meehan'v'Jones'(1982)'Gibbs'CJ.'found'that'whilst'opinion' of'what'may'be'satisfactory'may'differ'that'did'not'make'the'contract'sufficiently'uncertain'as'to' make'it'void.'I'believe'that'in'this'case'the'same'rule'would'apply,'and'following'Mason'judgment'in' the'same'case'that'the'terms'of'what'is'satisfactory'would'be'defined'by'Gina,'as'long'as'they'were' not'unreasonable.'' ' Conclusion( Given'this,'and'in'light'of'the'courts'desire'to'avoid'“being'the'destroyer'of'bargains”'(Hillas'&'Co'Ltd' v'Arcos'Ltd'(1932)),'I'would'advise'BB'that'based'on'the'information'supplied'there'are'no'grounds' for'withdrawal'from'the'contract.' '

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Shreeya'Pandey'' '

Consideration:(Meena(v(Fanfare( (A)

Advise M whether F is liable to pay her the promised increase in salary from 10th Nov 2004 to date;

As per Beaton for the promisee to enforce the promisor’s promise, the promisor must have provided sufficient consideration for the promise. This is something valuable in the eyes of the law, exchanged for a promise (Aust Woollen), which confers a benefit on the promisor F, or a detriment on the promisee M (Currie). Here, the consideration provided by M is the detriment suffered by turning down a better-paid job and the benefit F receives from keeping M on in this busy period. If the court also found this, then M could enforce Fs promise. However, Ms act could also be seen as the performance of an existing contractual duty, which is not sufficient consideration, unless that duty is exceeded (Stilk). Here Ms act to remain employed was an ECD as she was bound by contract for another 2 years. However, Williams says that performance of an ECD is sufficient consideration when the promisor gets an added benefit by the promisees continued performance. Here, that benefit is avoidance of a “difficult position” and could therefore be sufficient consideration and M could enforce this promise. Yet, if Ms act was not held to be so, M may try to estop F from enforcing his strict legal right to deny that his statement was promissory if it is found unconscionable to do so. To do this, F must have induced in M, a clear and unequivocal assumption, M must have reasonably relied on this assumption to her detriment and it must be unconscionable for F to retract this assumption (Je Maintindre, Waltons). Here, F promised that he would pay M the increased salary and M, like any other reasonable person in her shoes, trusted and relied on the statement made by her employer and turned down the other job offer. This was definitely to her detriment, as this salary was needed to support her family and it was therefore unconscionable for F to retract the statement. (B) Advise M whether F is liable to pay her the back pay from 1st October 2004. F cannot be held liable for backpay. This is because M's work for F is now past consideration by M (Casey's Patents). M may feel that F has a moral duty to pay her but has no legal duty because past consideration is not adequate in the eyes of the law.

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Intention:'Jane'v'Hans' Issue' Whether'the'agreement'between'Hans'and'Jane'had'an'intent'to'create'a'legal'relation?' Relevant(Law(&(Application' ' An'agreement'can'only'be'enforceable'if'the'parties'intended'by'that'agreement'to'create'legal' relations.' Whether'or'not'the'parties'intended'to'create'a'legal'relationship'is'tested'objectively' (ermogenous).'''Where'agreements'are'categorised'as'domestic'or'social'agreements,'the'law' presumes'that'the'parties'did'not'intend'to'create'legal'relations'(Todd'v'Nicol).' This'principle'was'primarily'established'in'Balfour'v'Balfour'[1919]'where'it'was'held'that'a'husband' (D)'who'promised'to'pay'his'wife'(P)'an'allowance'was'not'in'breach'of'contract'when'he'failed'to'do' so'because'at'the'time'of'the'agreement'there'was'no'intention'for'it'to'be'legally'binding.'Atkin'LJ' stated'that'“it'would'be'of'the'worst'possible'example'to'hold'that'agreements'such'as'this'resulted' in'legal'obligations'which'could'be'enforced'in'the'courts”.'' This'presumption'was'reinforced'in'Jones'v'Padavatton'and'Wakeling'v'Ripley,but'in'these'cases,'it' was'determined'that'this'presumption'did'not'always'negate'intention,'which'could'still'be' established'by'looking'at'the'merits'of'each'case.''Instead,'the'principle'adopted'by'Riches'v'Hogben' held'that'among'other'factors,'the'court'should'consider'the'language'used;'the'context'in'which' the'statements'were'made,'the'circumstances'and'consequences'of'the'agreement'as'well'as'the' conduct'of'both'parties'in'determining'whether'a'legal'relation'could'exist.''' In'application'to'the'present'case,'the'objective'test'suggests'the'August'promise'lacks'legal' intention:'they'were'in'a'close'relationship,'the'consequences'of'her'conduct'were'not'too'great,' and'there'appears'to'be'no'commercial'interests'at'stake.'Like'in'Padavatton,'J'moved'houses'and' gave'up'a'wellOpaid'job'at'the'request'of'H,'in'return'for'maintenance'and'no'legal'relation'was' found.'Here,'it'appears'that'J'did'these'acts'in'“natural'love'and'affection”'for'H'and'not'just'for'the' maintenance.'Based'on'this'it'is'likely'that'the'promise'will'not'be'enforced,'if'J'cannot'prove' otherwise.'She'may'argue'that'the'gravity'of'the'consequences'of'her'conduct'for'the'promise'was' so'great'as'to'warrant'the'existence'of'legal'intention,'as'in'Todd.'However,'it'is'unlikely'that'this' promise'will'be'enforced.'' Even''after'the'termination'of'their'romantic'relationship,'Hans’'relation'to'Jane'could'clearly'be' considered'a'personal'relationship'as'Hans'still'viewed'Jan'as'a'friend.'In'this'context,'a'presumption' of'no'legal'relation'would'normally'be'assumed,'but'in'analysing'the'case,'we'can'see'a'number'of' factors'that'could'negate'this'presumption.'Primarily,'Hans’'intention'becomes'clear'through'his' statement'of'“I'will'be'transferring'$5000/month'...for'the'next'18'months”'and'is'reinforced'by'the' notice'of'agreement'supplied'with'the'first'payment.'This,'combined'with'the'circumstances' surrounding'the'agreement'in'which'Jane'left'her'job'and'cared'for'Han,'highlights'how'substantial' and'serious'this'agreement'was.'' ( (

Shreeya'Pandey'' ' Conclusion( In'light'of'the'circumstances'surrounding'the'agreement'and'the'conduct'of'both'parties,'it'is'highly' likely'that'the'courts'would'negate'the'presumption'of'no'intention,'and'instead'would'treat'this' agreement'as'an'enforceable'promise.' '

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Exclusion(clauses(+(Incoporation(by(notice(&(receipt:(Jason'&'Mel'v' Fitness'Fetish'Gym' Issue( ( Whether'the'exclusion'clause'is'incorporated'into'the'contract?'' ' Relevant(Law( ( A'person'is'likely'to'be'bound'the'terms'in'a'written'document'(not'signed'by'him'or'her)'if' reasonable'notice'of'the'existence'of'the'terms'has'been'given,'and'this'notice'was'given'before'or' upon'contract'formation.''Reasonable'steps'must'be'taken'to'give'notice'of'the'existence'of'the' term'(Curtis'v'Chemical'Cleaning'and'Dyeing).' Application( ( In'this'scenario,'Jason'was'shown'the'sign'prior'to'purchasing'his'membership'during'the'tour'with' Freda.'In'this'instance,'the'sign'in'the'gym'“clearly'read”'the'exclusion'and'Jason'has'confirmed' seeing'the'sign.'Despite'the'argument'that'he'was'distracted,'this'is'not'a'sufficient'argument'as'the' gym'can'never'ensure'the'full'attention'of'its'member.'Instead'it'took'the'reasonably'required'steps' to'ensure'he'saw'the'sign'was'seen'by'making'it'clearly'readable,'its'explicit'language'and'by' including'the'location'of'the'sign'as'part'of'the'tour.'' ' It'is'debatable'whether'Mel'was'made'aware'of'this'sign'but'as'she'was'on'her'2nd'visit'to'the'gym' when'she'paid'the'entry'fee,'it'is'reasonable'to'assume'that'she'would’ve'seen'the'sign'prior'to'that' visit.''' ( Conclusion( ' While'Jason'was'distracted,'he'was'nonetheless'made'aware'of'the'notice'by'its'prominent'presence' in'the'weights'room.'As'such,'it'is'highly'likely'that'the'exclusion'clause'on'the'sign'would'be' incorporated'into'the'contract.'In'Mel’s'case,'it'is'also'probable'that'the'exclusion'clause'was' noticed'and'thereby'incorporated.' ( Issue( ( If'the'sign'is'incorporated,'does'the'exclusion'clause'on'the'sign'prevent'Jason'&'Mel'from'being' able'to'claim'damages'for'their'injuries'suffered'at'the'gym?' ( Relevant(Law' An'exclusion'clause'this'is'a'condition'that'excludes'a'right'of'a'party'to'the'contract,'from'a'right'the' party'would'otherwise'have'had'(L’Estrange'v'Graucob).'Exclusion'clauses'will'be'construed' according'to'their'natural'and'ordinary'meaning'(Darlington'Futures'v'Delco'Australia)'and'any' exclusion'from'negligently'must'be'sufficiently'stated'(Davis'v'Pearce'Parking).'

Shreeya'Pandey'' ' Application' ' Both'Jason'and'Mel'suffered'injuries'while'at'the'gym'but'in'varying'circumstances.'Jason'was' injured'as'a'result'of'faulty'equipment,'thereby'making'it'a'negligent'action.'In'this'situation,'it'can' be'seen'that'the'gym'providing'safe'equipment'would'be'an'implied'term'of'the'contract'since'the' implication'of'this'particular'term'is'necessary'for'the'reasonable'or'effective'operation'of'the' contract'in'the'circumstances'of'this'case'(Byrne&v&Australian&Airlines&Ltd).'The'operation'of'the' exclusion'makes'no'mention'of'negligence'and'therefore'will'most'likely'not'be'covered'under'this' clause.' ' However,'Mel'was'injured'by'the'actions'of'another'gym'member'when'they'dropped'a'weight'on' her'foot.'The'exclusion'clauses'explicitly'mentions'that'any'injury'“howsoever'caused”'will'be' excluded'and'an'ordinary'meaning'of'this'statement'would'seem'to'include'through'the'actions'of' other'gym'members.' ' Conclusion( If'both'Jason'and'Mel'are'found'to'have'the'exclusion'clause'incorporated'into'their'contract,'then' the'most'likely'result'will'be'Jason'would'not'be'covered'under'this'clause'for'his'injuries,'while'Mel' would,'thereby'excluding'the'gym'from'liability'in'her'situation.' Question(2(I(Issue ( Were'the'terms'on'the'receipt'excluding'liability'for'theft'or'damage'incorporated'into'the'contract' by'notice?' Relevant(Law(&(Application( If'there'is'no'signature,'the'usual'way'a'term'can'be'incorporated'is'by'giving'the'other'party'notice' of'the'term.'The'party'must'do'everything'reasonably'necessary'to'bring'term'to'the'attention'of'a' reasonable'person'for'the'other'to'be'bound'by'it'(Thornton).'Here,'as'in'Causer,'the'defendant' attempted'to'incorporate'a'term'into'a'contract'of'sale'through'a'receipt,'although'they'did'not' bring'the'term'to'the'attention'of'the'plaintiff,'(M'in'this'case).'Causer'(Herring)'says'that'for'M'to' be'bound'by'the'exclusion'clause'on'the'receipt,'F'must'show'that'it'was'not'just'a'receipt,'but'was' intended'to'make'him'aware'of'special'conditions'and'of'Fs'intention'to'modify'the'effect'of'the' ordinary'contract.'Clearly'this'was'not'done'in'this'case'as'M'was'not'informed'until'significantly' after'the'sale,'on'his'second'visit.'Therefore'the'term'will'likely'not'be'incorporated'so'M'will'likely' have'a'claim'for'breach'of'contract.' Conclusion( No'incoporation'–'damages'claimed.' '

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Parole(Evidence(Rule(+(PreIcontractual(statements:(Frida'&' Arundhati'v'Inter'Galactic'(PAST'PAPER'QUESTION)' Issue( The'issue'is'whether'any'of'the'preOcontractual'statements'can'be'incorporated'into'the'contract?' Relevant(Law(&(Application( A'collateral'contract'can'exist'when'any'statement'made,'while'not'a'term'of'the'main'contract,'was' clearly'intended'to'have'some'commercial'significance.' In'this'scenario,'it'is'clear'that'Frida'relied'on'the'statements'made'during'the'phonecall.'However'it' is'unlikely'that'he'representative'intended'these'statements'to'be'legally'binding,'instead'it'was'a' mere'representation'as'to'what'they'believed'to'be'the'most'likely'outcome.'Additionally,'these' statements'would'be'inconsistent'with'the'terms'of'the'website,'thereby'ruling'out'the'possibility'of' a'collateral'contract.' Conclusion( It'is'highly'unlikely'that'the'preOcontractual'statements'would'be'taken'as'terms'to'form'a'collateral' contract,'since'they'were'only'representations'and'were'inconsistent'with'the'main'agreement.' Frida'may'have'a'case'for'promissory'estoppels,'but'in'this'scenario,'there'are'no'terms'that'could' be'incorporated'from'the'preOcontractual'statements.'

Issue( The'issue'is'whether'or'not'any'preOcontractual'statements'that'are'found'to'be'terms'would'be' excluded'under'the'parole'evidence'rule?' Relevant(Law(&(Application( If'preOcontractual'statements'are'considered'terms'then'the'courts'must'consider'the'parole' evidence'rule.'The'parole'evidence'rules'states'that'when'a'contract'is'reduced'into'writing'and'the' contract'appears'to'be'entirely'or'wholly'written,'it'is'presumed'that'the'writing'contains'all'the' terms'of'the'condition.'Under'these'circumstances,'any'prior'negotiations'or'alternative'terms'are' unable'to'be'incorporated'into'the'contract.' In'this'scenario,'the'terms'of'the'contract'were'posted'online'under'the'‘terms'and'conditions’' where'Frida'filled'in'her'details'and'clicked'accept.'By'use'of'her'signature,'Frida'incorporated'these' terms'into'her'contract'and'thus'is'bound'by'them'(L’estrange).' Additionally'there'was'an'entirety'clause'on'the'website'which'is'generally'considered'sufficient'to' confirm'that'the'contract'was'wholly'written'(Assoc.'Newspapers'ltd'v'Banks).'If'this'entirety'clause' is'accepted,'which'is'highly'likely,'then'any'evidence'of'alternative'terms'is'unadmissible'(Codelfa,' Mason'J).' (

Shreeya'Pandey'' ' ( Conclusion( Because'of'this'entirety'clause'and'the'parole'evidence'rule,'the'website'terms'and'conditions' would'most'likely'be'found'to'be'the'wholly'written'contracts,'thereby'making'it'the'only'source'of' terms'for'the'contract.' ' '

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Repudation,(Time/Delay,(Affirmation(&(R.O.T:'Lou'v'Bob' Issue( Whether'Bob'has'repudidated'the'contract'by'anticipatory'breach'giving'Lou'right'of'termination?' Relevant(Law(&(Application( Repudiation'may'be'found'in'conduct'whih'indicates'that'a'party'will'not'perfrom'the'contract' according'to'its'terms'(Carr).'Repudiation'can'occur'through'expressed'or'implied'terms'based'on' words'or'conduct'when'a'party'is'unable'or'unwilling'to'carry'out'their'contractual'obligations.' Express'repudiation'is'when'their'inability'to'perform'is'clearly'stated'(Hochester).' Bob'repudiated'the'contract'when'he'told'his'solicitors'to'inform'Lous'solicitors'of'his'inability'to' perform'his'obligation'of'the'contract'to'allow'Lou'to'move'in'to'the'vacant'premises'on'time,'as' agreed'(Carr).' In'this'case,'Bob'has'expressly'stated'through'words'to'Lou'through'his'solicitors'that'the'tenant'will' not'vacate'the'premise'before'2nd'of'sep'meaning'an'anticipatory'breach'of'time'stipulation'has' occurred'on'Bobs'half'(Carr).'It'has'been'expressly'stated'in'the'contract'that'time'is'of'the'essence,' therefore'at'common'law'this'is'an'essential'term'of'the'contract'(foran).'Once'Bob,'the'promisor,' has'repudiated'the'contract,'Lou,'the'innocent'party'may'elect'to'terminate'the'contract'by' accepting'the'repudiation.'This'will'prevent'Bob'from'retracting'the'repudiation.'Since'time'is'of'the' essence'and'this'is'an'essential'term,'this'gives'Lou'immediate'right'of'termination'(Foran).' However,'he'does'the'option'of'affirming'the'contract'and'in'doing'so'he'gives'up'his'right'of' termination,'keeping'the'contract'on'foot.' Conclusion( Lou'can'immediately'terminate'the'contract'on'the'26th'of'August'by'accepting'the'repudiation'or' choose'to'continue'with'the'contract.

(a) Can Lou terminate the contract after 2 September if after the telephone call of 26 August he merely waits for the agreed settlement date to pass, and does not attempt to tender the balance of purchase price to Bob on 2 September? the'delay'may'constitute'affirmation'of'the'contract'and'would'therefore'terminate'Lou’s'ROT'on' the'2nd'of'September'–'he'loses'the'right'to'repudiate'therefore'loses'ROT.'–'he'would'get'it'on'the' 2nd'September.'' O'if'Lou'doesn’t'attempt'to'tender'the'balance'of'purchase'price'to'Bob'on'the'2nd'that'may' constitute'a'breach'of'the'contract'by'repudiation'by'conduct'and'give'Bob'the'right'to'terminate.'' >'the'other'side'would'be'able'to'argue'that'he'was'not'ready'and'willing'to'perform'so'then'he' would'be'in'breach'because'they'both'need'to'be'ready'and'willing'to'complete'the'contract.''

(b) Would your advice be different in 2(a) above, if at the time of the telep...