Facilities Management- CASE Study Resorts World Manila PDF

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CASE: RESORTS WORLD MANILA

On June 2, 2017, 38 people died and dozens injured at the Resorts World Manila (RWM) entertainment complex in Pasay, Metro Manila when a gunman caused a stampede and started a fire .The gunman arrived at the entertainment complex by taxi wearing plain clothes and a backpack and with no visible firearms. He took an elevator leading to the parking areas. He alighted at the second floor and proceeded to the parking area, where he wore a mask and ammunition vest and took out his rifle. The gunman entered the mall bypassing a metal detector and then brandishing an M14 assault rifle at the lone female security personnel who tried to stop him. The lone security guard panicked when she saw the suspect’s automatic rifle. The gunman set fire to casino tables and slot machine chairs. He left a bag of bullets on top of a burning casino table and explode on their own. The gunman moved to a storage area and steal casino chips. The Police Community Precinct received a call on the presence of armed men entering Resorts World Manila. At that time the RWM security personnel had no idea how many armed men where in the vicinity, as they vacated the two CCTV surveillance rooms inside the hotel-casino just a few minutes before the attack begun. The hotel security then transferred to their back-up CCTV room at the adjacent Remington Hotel. A mis-encounter occurred between a team of police officers and hotel security guard, who was wearing civilian clothes and was mistaken for a gunman. A quick gunfight between the police and the security guard ensued with the latter receiving a non-fatal shot on the right hip. The guests frantically ran for the exits in the sound of gunshots and smoke coming from the upper floors of buildings. The trapped victims assumed that there was more than one gunman and decided to stay in the rooms because they were afraid to be caught in the gunfire. The lone gunman committed suicide by setting himself on fire in one of the rooms on the fifth floor of the hotel guest rooms.

Question: Describe the lapses in security at the Resorts World Manila with regards to the following aspects and what should have been done that would had prevented the incident at the hotel-casino. 1. Access control - The Resorts World Manila access control is unsatisfactory, and the resort has failed to heed threat warnings and security enhancement requirements. Because the gunman's apparent ease of entry into the casino and shopping mall complex reveals several security flaws. A taxi dropped off the gunman at the designated drop-off location, which is the parking lot entrance. I don't understand why Resorts World Manila, like most casinos, is or was secured by a slew of CCTV cameras. And, like most casinos, these cameras are watched in real time by a team of people. So why did it take nearly an hour for police and establishment security to find the gunman, who appeared to be running up and down several floors? 2. Physical control

- Inadequate security at the casino-hotel entrance, taxi drop-off, and parking garage areas. Inadequate deployment of armed and unarmed security forces. - Inadequate rapid response force and emergency response procedure. - Inadequate active shooter protocols. - Ineffective guard shift management. - Inadequate guard team structure. - Guards were either not at their posts in the Hotel and Casino when the attack began, or they abandoned their posts. - There is no intelligence or data-driven access control. - Inadequate physical access control at the casino's entrance. - There are no procedures for determining who is a friend or foe. 3. Layer or security - True situational awareness was trumped by hysteria. Despite the Resorts World Manila's numerous flaws and failures, security was able to successfully evacuate over 12,000 guests through 13 exits during the chaos. And this has a significant impact, demonstrating that the guard force did have some cohesive emergency procedures in place at the hotel. Furthermore, despite lacking close quarters battle training, the armed RWM force engaged and wounded the attacking gunman, which greatly contributed to the eventual endgame of this scenario, messy as it was. In doing so, these security personnel displayed a level of bravery that should be recognized, but some of them lacked training due to the panic. 4. Physical control equipment and security - The Resorts World Manila's lack of security personnel at the casino-hotel entrance, taxi drop-off, and parking garage areas: These are two access points through which the gunman passed, and they were not manned by security. Improper placement of armed/unarmed security forces, RWM policy posted armed security guards outside the casino-hotel and prohibited them from entering the establishment. According to RWM Chief Operating Officer Stephen Reilly, the reason given was that having armed security inside the establishment "would escalate the situation." Because of the insufficient quick response force or emergency response procedures, the gunman had free reign of the facility for approximately 30-45 minutes even though there were 200 security personnel on premises for the entire resort, not just the Casino and Hotel. Improper active shooter protocols, RWM active shooter or counterterror response policy, according to Security Chief Gomez, was to notify the police and allow them to engage the hostile actor. Modern active shooter protocols require immediate and aggressive engagement of the hostile actor by security personnel closest to the attacker. The Poor guard shift management, there were few guards assigned to the 12:00-7:00 am casino shift. Poor guard shift management, with only a few guards assigned to the casino shift from 12:00 to 7:00 a.m. The lack of and poor guard team structure: The guard force did not use a "buddy system" in the event of an emergency or hostile act, forcing the guard force to deal with problem personnel one-onone, which was a significant disadvantage. Guards were not at their posts in the Hotel and Casino, or they had abandoned their posts when the attack began, according to COO Reilly, who narrated CCTV footage of the gunman's path through the hotel and casino, revealing at least five places where there should have been guards, but there were none. No intelligence data supported access control; despite being barred from all state-sponsored operations, the gunman was able to enter the facility. Poor physical access control at the casino entrance: The gunman refused to go through a metal detector and

easily pushed past a lone female guard at the interior casino entrance. There were no identification or friend or foe procedures in place: As police and RWM security maneuvered through the Maxims Hotel and Casino complex to clear it of hostile threats, police shot and wounded an armed RWM security guard, mistaking him for the or a gunman. 5. Personnel training and coordination - Panic was palpable. The security personnel did not do their job, which is to provide security for their clients; I believe they are incompetent for the job. It wasn't well-organized because the security guards were the first to panic. They are trained to sense the situation and know what is going on; it is natural for security to panic, but it is their responsibility to handle the situation properly. The security guards were terrified, but what did they do? They simply flee, unconcerned about the people inside the establishments. Security at Resorts World Manila has not been thoroughly vetted. When Resorts World Manila security finally engaged the gunman in the hotel stairwell, CCTV video clearly shows they had little, if any, knowledge of CQB from their numerous errors such as framing doorways, etc. The Resorts World Manila guard force manning the casino, reportedly contractors from the NC Lanting Security Specialist Agency, came from a sector widely criticized for being overworked in 12-hour shifts, poorly trained, underpaid, and lacking social security. As a result, the contract guard force is dissatisfied. They should hire well-trained individuals for the job because the safety of your customers is at stake. For them to be efficient and effective, they must be well-trained or have a background in some security-related work....