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The Compatibilist Approach The Best Method for Solving Free Will This essay argues that the compatibilist approach is the best method to solve the problem of free will. Firstly, I will provide an exposition of compatibilism about free will. Secondly, I will consider two key objections to the compatibilist approach through the evaluation of the could have done otherwise principle and the perceived threat of recent advancements in neuroscience. Next, I will provide a resolution to these critical objections and outline how the views of Daniel Dennett and Adina Roskies overcome these objections. Finally, I will analyse the compatibilist approach to free will and provide concluding remarks to summarize the conclusions elicited within the essay.

For coherence and clarity within this essay, it is essential to define the following key terms: compatibilism, free will, moral responsibility, and determinism. Compatibilism is the view that free will and determinism are compatible (Roskies, 2006). Free will is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, and it refers to an agent’s power to control his or her actions (O’Connor, T. & Franklin, C., 2019). Moreover, moral responsibility relates to discerning whether an agent deserves praise, blame, reward, or punishment for an act (Roskies, 2006). We often explore cognitive and control demands as sufficient conditions for determining moral responsibility. Consider a scenario in which a toddler, unbeknownst to his mother, places plastic toys in the oven while it is preheating. A short while later, the kitchen is full of smoke, and a small fire has erupted from the oven. There is reason to believe the toddler is not morally responsible for the fire, given that he lacks the reasoning capacity to meet the cognitive demand

condition necessary to be morally responsible. The reason for this is that the toddler’s brain has not reached a stage in development where he is capable of understanding the consequences of such actions. Finally, determinism is the state in which the universe is solely a function of physical law and the beginning conditions of the universe. As such, compatibilists assert that free will can be present in situations for reasons independent of metaphysics.

The first objection to the compatibilist approach to free will is the could have done otherwise (CDO) principle. Thomas Nagel of Oxford University discusses this principle. Nagel asserts that an agent has free will if he or she can act differently than he or she did concerning the specific conditions of a situation (Nagel, 1987). An example of CDO is a woman shopping at a supermarket. The woman can either purchase classic chocolate ice cream or mint. The woman buys the classic chocolate and leaves the store. In this scenario, regarding CDO, the woman has free will if given the same circumstances she could have chosen the mint ice cream instead of the classic chocolate. Given that the compatibilist approach accepts both free will and determinism, CDO challenges compatibilism. If determinism is true, it would not be possible for an agent to have done otherwise. Concerning the ice cream example, in the presence of determinism, the woman could not have chosen the mint ice cream.

The second perceived threat to the compatibilist approach is the development of further scientific research in the field of neuroscience. Ninety to ninety-five percent of people believe that people have free will and that our universe is not deterministic (Roskies, 2006). Neuroscience asserts that at a high-level, the operations of our brains are defined by laws that we can use to predict future behavior based on past activity (Roskies, 2006). Commonly this

evidence of a biological mechanism is perceived as proving that the universe is deterministic. From the above premises, a common conclusion is that neuroscience undermines human freedom. In summary, the above perception challenges compatibilism, as it reasons that the universe is deterministic and so people cannot be free.

The first objection to the compatibilist approach, the could have done otherwise (CDO) principle, can be overcome using the work of Daniel Dennett. Dennett argued that we are interested in free will because of its connection to moral responsibility, but that free will does not require CDO (Dennett, 1984). When people look to assign moral responsibility, they typically do not appeal to the metaphysical CDO principle discussed by philosophers. Metaphysical CDO refers to the logical possibility (Dennett, 1984). Instead, people explore local fatalism, which is a specific circumstance in the relevant past that ensured the agent would not have done otherwise regardless of what he or she wanted or attempted to do (Dennett, 1984). To elaborate on local fatalism, consider a boy who has fallen off his bicycle and scraped up his knees. Nearby a man in his car hears the boy crying out for help. The locks on the car doors have completely seized up. The man has nothing to smash one of his windows. Regardless of whether the man wants to help the injured boy, he is unable to do so. Given the circumstances, the man cannot exit the car. Therefore, the CDO objection is overcome by dismissing the principle when assigning moral responsibility and exploring free will.

The second objection to compatibilism, the interpretation of scientific evidence on neuroscience, can be overcome using the work of Adina Roskies. Roskies argues that the perception that neuroscience undermines free will is misguided (Roskies, 2006). Roskies

explains that neuroscience outlines a mechanistic style of human decision-making. While this contradicts people’s intuition that human decision-making is not mechanistic, it merely proves that our intuitive idea of decision-making is incorrect (Roskies, 2006). Roskies states that neuroscience may reconcile a scientifically informed view of the brain with cognitive demands and responsibility to better understand responsibility (Roskies, 2006). To overcome objections stemming from misguided interpretations of studies in the field of neuroscience, one requires a better understanding of the results. So long as conscious decisions are in the brain, what people think or try to do can impact what happens. Discoveries in neuroscience do not refute this concept.

Overall, there is reason to believe that the compatibilist approach is the best method for solving the problem of free will. The works of Dennett and Roskies overcome critical objections to the approach. Firstly, Dennett provides reason to dismiss metaphysical CDO when considering free will. Local fatalism is not equivalent to CDO but is the concept commonly applied when looking to assign moral responsibility for actions. Moreover, studies in the field of neuroscience merely shed light on the functions of the human brain. While the evidence is contrary to our intuition regarding human decision-making, it does not refute the idea of free will.

In summary, free will is the unrestrained ability of an agent to do what he or she wants. Given the work of Dennett and Roskies, it is plausible to conclude that the principle of determinism does not require that agents lack free will. Determinism does not entail that no agent ever does what her or she chooses to do. Therefore, compatibilism is justified. References

Roskies, A. (2006). Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 10(9), 419–423. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2006.07.011 Dennett, D. C. (1984). I Could not have Done Otherwise--So What? The Journal of Philosophy, 81(10), 553. doi: 10.2307/2026255 O’Connor, T. & Franklin, C. “Free Will”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entires/freewill/ Thomas, N. (1987). What does it all Mean? New York, NY: Oxford University Press Inc....