gotlob Frege\'s aim and purpose in his paper “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”? PDF

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assignment on Gottlob Frege's aim and purpose in his paper “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”....

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Name - Chunauti gupta Roll no. - 473 Subject - Analytic philosophy Question - Explain the aim and purpose of Frege in his paper “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”? Answer - Gottlob Frege (1848) was a mathematician, logician and philosopher from the university of jena. His one of the prominent works is “The Thought – A logical enquiry”. Frege explores the cognitive phenomenon of taking something to be true. His central claim is that to take something as true is to enter into a relation with an abstract entity called a ‘Thought,’ which to Frege is a specific sort of meaning, expressible through sentences, which may be either true or false. In the midst of formulating this answer, Frege clarifies what he means by ‘true’, explains what he thinks are some basic properties of Thoughts, and engages in a discussion of the precise ontological status of Thoughts. Frege believes that the primary concern of logic is truth, as beauty and good is of aesthetics and ethics respectively. While the aim of all sciences is truth, logic deals with laws of truth. There can be two kinds of laws- moral laws and civil laws, those which ought to be followed (however, might not be) and those which are representation of what is (like- laws of nature). Laws of nature are the generalization of natural occurrences with which the occurrences are always in accordance. Rules for asserting, thinking, judging, inferring, follow from the laws of truth. Thus, Laws are Truth are not happening but what is. Frege asserts that laws of thought are like the laws of nature. But This should not get be confused with the laws of thought. As laws of thought are mental process and logic is not. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, Frege asserts “to prevent the blurring of the boundary between psychology and logic, I assign to logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not of assertion or thought.” Frege says that truth has a specific meaning and refers to the kind of truth that science is concerned with. "... an idea is not called true in itself but only with respect to an intention that it should correspond to something." Frege considers but rejects the possibility of truth as correspondence. The correspondence theory says that an assertion is true when it corresponds to reality .(for instance, the word 'table' has the table to which it refers to as its meaning). Frege says that correspondence is a relationship but truth does not refer to a relation between an idea (assertion=verbalization of a mental idea) and that which is real. For instance, if I do not know how A looks, then to show the

picture of A to me would not allow me to find out if the picture is true since I wouldn't have anything to compare and correspond it with. (2) If truth is correspondence of two things with each other, then we can only say that an idea represents the truth when it completely corresponds to the object or vice versa. But it is not possible to compare an idea with an object in reality and vice versa. Why not? Because reality is distinct from the ideas and ideas can never completely correspond and coincide with that which is real. There would always be inconsistencies between the idea and the object. (3) For those who say that it is possible to assert idea A to correspond to object A when they coincide in respect X, Frege responds that we would still come to impasse as we would have to do as we did before- compare an idea and object. Truth can't be correspondence of the sense of a sentence with something else due to the regress. Truth is concerned with thought, which is the sense of a sentence. We correspond an idea with an object in reality in a certain way by using an assertion- “My idea corresponds to the person A”. This assertion is a sentence and we are thus dealing with the truth of this sentence and not with the truth of the picture or of the idea. Frege answers "Is the sense of a sentence an idea?" A sentence is a series of sounds which makes sense. (This does not imply that every series of sounds which makes sense is a sentence.) Thus, when we ask whether a sentence is true, we are asking whether the sense it makes is true. Here, we are not saying that the sense is true provided it corresponds to anything, for it would still drop us into the vicious circle.The sense of a sentence is the thought behind it. This thought could be true or false. Thus, thought is a mental/immaterial entity which expresses itself through sentence. "Being true is not a material, perceptible property." Truth is not a sense-quality but property of being true connected with every property which characterizes an object. from this sphere of that for which the question of truth arises. Truth is not a quality that corresponds with a particular kind of sense-impression. So it is sharply distinguished from the qualities which we denote by the words " red "," bitter ", lilac-smelling etc. (a) For instance, when we say that 'Sun has risen'- the quality of having risen is not something which is inherent in the Sun itself but an assertion we make about the senseimpressions we receive; (b) Secondly, when I say that I do not see anything, this is not based on the sense-impressions i receive. With every property which actually exists in an object is connected a property of thought of red/truth. That is, the property of redness in an object has the property of being true connected to it. There are different kinds of sentences. Only sentences that make a statement can be true. Which kind has thought as its sense?

1. Imperative sentence: This is not a type about which the question of truth or falsity could arise. Therefore, it does not have thought as its sense. 2. Sentences expressing desires also do not have the question of truth arising about them. Therefore, they do not have thought as their sense. 3. Interrogative sentences: ∂ Word-questions: These need completion and thus are not considered to have thought as their sense. ∂ Sentence-questions met with an indicative answer of 'yes' or 'no': Saying 'yes' or 'no' indicates whether that which was asserted is true or false. These have thought as their sense. The process in which we make an assertion is as follows: 1. Apprehension of a thought: Thinking i.e. “is Aristotle theory true?’. 2. Recognition of truth of a thought: Judgment i.e. deciding it is true based on proof. 3. The manifestation of this thought: Assertion i.e. stating the result. Assertion can be made in different ways and the use of word 'true' does not necessarily imply that which is being asserted has been recognized as truth. There could be an assertion of a thought without the judgment of its truth. This explains why it is that nothing seems to be added to a thought by attributing to it the property of truth. There exists a doubt- Distinction is not made between the mental act of attributing truth to a thought (judgment) and of verbally expressing it (assertion). A thought is expressed verbally as a sentence. A sentence has a context of its utterance. "Seriousness" (lack of sarcasm/play) necessary for assertion. Assertive force is a key ingredient. On words which express sentiments like 'alas' or 'thank god!': One must also remember that the use of phrases like these are limited to humanities which are less scientific than exact sciences. The exact sciences are concerned only with the truth. These phrases do not affect the assertion and cannot be part of the scientific exposition we have taken up. Languages plays a major role when dealing with phrases that make up an assertion. In the initial stages of an inquiry, these can be given importance. However, they must be discarded as we move towards exact sciences where the language/nationality/particulars of the author do not matter and cannot be discerned from the writing. Frege points out that thought is not affected by the transformations in language used to express it like change of verb and others. Contents of a sentence often go beyond the thought. Frege claims that the words horse, steed, cart-horse, and mare can be used indifferently without changing the meaning of a statement. On the other hand, wording alone is often inadequate to express a thought. Finger-pointing, circumstances, may be necessary. Sentences starting with "I" have different senses depending on the context (i.e., who is saying them).

Issues surrounding the use of equivocal words like "I." Example of various people talking about A, who says "I have been wounded." If B later says, "A has been wounded," is this the same thought as that expressed by A? Proper names, For most people, "A has been wounded" (where A is a proper name) does not express a particular thought because they don't know who A is. If two parties assign the name A to the same person, then the thought is the same for both.The thought is what different ideas have in common.] If the name A is assigned to different people, the thoughts are different. If two parties assign A to the same person, but under different aspects that aren't connected with each other, the thoughts are different. Sense versus reference. The referent of a proper name can be "presented" (or appear) in different ways. For example, B knows A from childhood, but hasn't seen or heard from him in 30 years, while C is familiar with A now, but knows nothing of his childhood. To B and C "A has been wounded" has different senses. Their respective thoughts have the same truth value, but are distinct. Frege mentions: "... it must really be demanded that a single way in which whatever is referred to is presented be associated with every proper name" Yet there is a doubt. Is it at all the same thought which first that man expresses and now this one? which frege does not answer. Frege introduces the distinction between inner world and outer world at this point in the work. 1. He begins by saying that my sense-impressions, wishes and desires, feelings and creations of imaginations are accessible to me in a very different way from which others who receive its verbal expression through assertion access it. These are ideas excluding decisions. 2. Moreover, the objects of outer world like tree, desk and others are accessible in same way to every person. But can two people be in such a relation to one another? That is, when I express what I feel, are we sharing a thought? Are you receiving it in the same way I feel it? He asks what kind of being a thought is. Is it an idea? Ideas as belonging to inner world: Why don't ideas belong to outer world? ➔ Ideas are not objects of sense-perception. ➔ 'Ideas are had'. These ideas belong to the content of the person's consciousness. Ideas cannot exist independent of its bearer while the objects of the ideas like a tree do.

➔ Ideas are subject-dependent though objects are common: The idea I have of an object is very different from the idea you have of it. Though we might be seeing the same object, our ideas about it are distinct. Every idea has only one bearer. No two people can share one idea. Frege marks that if I refer to "that lime tree" and my reference is valid, it can't be my idea. If the tree is a hallucination, then "that lime tree is my idea" is neither true nor false because "that lime tree" refers to nothing. If an idea could be shared by more than one person, then the idea would have to exist independently. Is thought an idea? Frege answers like in The Pythagorean theorem (PT) can be grasped or recognized to be true by multiple people, so it is not the content of my consciousness, and I am not its bearer. If all thoughts were ideas, then the question of true and false could only apply within the content of my consciousness or his consciousness or your consciousness. There could be no objective truth but only subjective ones. Frege continues that there could be no science then either. If there would be, there it would be my science or your science, such that there would be no Truth but only subjective sciences of every person. Thus, for thought to be an idea is a dangerous condition. For those who agree that thoughts are indeed ideas, then for Frege to say that they are not ideas would not concern them at all because they would believe that it is his idea of thought. Thus ,thoughts are not the object of outer or inner world (ideas). Frege calls this the "third realm”. Thoughts share central qualities of both ideas and objects (of outer world). Like ideas, they are immaterial and like objects, they are not born by any particular individual's consciousness. But does this not assume that thoughts exist? That there are things apart from my own ideas which exist like tree, table and others? Let us assume that only my own ideas exist. 1. Either all that exists is my ideas or things apart from my ideas exist. 2. Ideas need a bearer, like experiences need experient. 3. Bearer of an idea cannot be an idea itself, because this would result in infinite regress (who is the bearer of this idea of I and so on?) 4. 'I' is the bearer of my ideas. 5. Then, 'I' is an idea too. (From 4 and 1) 6. 'I' is not my idea. (From 5 and 3) 7. Therefore, I exist independent of my ideas. (From 1 and 6) 8. Other ideas apart from my own exist. (Given) 9. Other idea-bearing individuals exist. (From 8 and 2) Therefore, I and the other individuals constitute the outer world. The other individuals and I also share thoughts of these things and of ideas. Thoughts are the common medium through which we share ideas and things. Let us assume that all I have is my inner world and that we do not even share

the objects of our perception. ➔ Excluding dreams and fictitious objects: Thoughts which have no would be individual ideas, for if they had been thoughts, then they would have been shared by others. My dream also is the privilege of my inner world, unshared by anyone else. ➔ If there is nothing belonging to the inner realm that we all could share, then we all would only have our individual inner lives. Before the sense-impression of a tree is formed, there is a bridge and play of visual nerves. Could the senseimpression in itself be said to have no outer counterpart and as a product of only my visual nerves? Because after all, we only receive the final product and not the object itself. ➔ If everything is an idea, then there can be no bearer of ideas, for this bearer himself would be an idea. Thus, the 'I' we talk about would in itself be an idea. But ideas are essentially borne and cannot exist without a bearer. So, if we say that there are only ideas with no bearers, then no ideas can exist either. But how can there then be experience without an experiencer? How can there be pain without there being one who is going through it? There can be two options about the 'I': 1. An idea of 'I' which is constructed in my mental awareness accompanies every judgment I make. That is, every time I make a judgment- 'Tree', 'Toy' and so on, an idea of 'I' accompanies it. But this would mean that there are infinite ideas of 'I'. However, it is not true that the 'I' I conceive infinitely regresses. 2. My mental awareness grasps something which is not idea- this is the nature of 'I'. This 'I' might have an idea corresponding to it. But I am not identical with this idea. In the same way, we can see each individual as being bearer of ideas without they themselves being ideas. I can have an idea about an individual but the idea is not the object itself. Thus, we can make a distinction between what is the object of my consciousness/idea (idea of the individual) and that which is the object of my thought (common thing/idea). Thought is the medium through which we carry the common properties of human kind like things- trees, plants etc and ideas- of his pain, her anger and so on. There will always be a probability of error in dealing with the outer world while we can be certain about that which we conceive in the inner. "I cannot doubt that I have a visual impression of green but it is not so certain that I see a lime-leaf [...] we find certainty in the inner world while doubt never altogether leaves us in our excursions into the outer world".

People do not bear thoughts like they bear ideas. Frege believes thoughts exist before people think them. Frege says, 'A particular mental capacity, the power of thought, must correspond to the apprehension of thought.' If it had been produced by a person, then it would have remained an idea. Being a common property of all, its existence and truth value is independent of the bearer of thought A thought is true and representative of the reality independent of the acknowldgment/apprehension of its truth by the bearer. A fact is a thought which is true. We recognize and acknowledge the truth of thought by calling it a fact. Frege goes on to say that the work of a scientist consists in discovering these true thoughts. Science does not invent truths but discovers them. The scientist discovers that a thing can be a wave and particle at the same time. This is a timeless truth- existing as a thought which has now been apprehended by science. Its timelessness stands testimony to its being a thought (not an idea or only a material thing). Thoughts require thinkers to apprehend them, but the thinker is the "bearer of the thinking but not of the thought". "... the thought does not belong to the contents of the thinker's consciousness yet something in his consciousness must be aimed at the thought" We commonly believe that sense perception is the only way we associate and receive the outer world. Sense impressions are necessary but not sufficient for disclosing the outer world. Why not? Because the sense-impressions each of us have are individual are part of our inner world. The object of the sense impressions might be the same but the sense-impressions themselves are not.." there must be a non-sensible which bridges the inner and outer world. If we only considered sense-impressions, we will end up with the inner world again. Thus,there is a distinction between the sensible and perceptible things on one hand and non-sensible and perceptible on the other. Thoughts, though nonsensible would be perceived and will be given in the inner world along with the sense impressions. In this way, it would become possible to share things and ideas. For Frege, thoughts must, by definition be true or false, period. A statement like "the tree has green leaves" is not a thought because it can be both true or false, depending on the season (or even the existence of the tree). He insists: "Only a sentence supplemented by a time-indication and complete in every respect expresses a thought." Thoughts aren't usually regarded as real (in the sense of having causal effects). How can a

timeless, unchangeable thing like a thought exert any causal effects in the world? How can a changeless thing cause a change? Frege's answer: "By being apprehended and taken to be true." As an event in time, apprehension annuls the timelessness. " If, for example, I grasp the thought which we express by the theorem of Pythagoras, the consequence may be that It recognise it to be true and, further, that I apply it, making a decision which brings about the acceleration of masses. [...] And so thought can have an indirect influence on the motion of masses. People also influence each other by communicating thoughts. Thoughts are by no means unreal, but behave differently than things. They require a thinker to exert any effects. Still, the thinker does not create them them but must take them as they are....