Handout on Book II of Plato\'s Republic PDF

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Summary of book 2 of Plato's republic with quotes and outlines of Glaucon's arguments....

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Handout on Book II of Plato’s Republic Given campus closings, and so that we don’t fall behind schedule, I decided to make a detailed handout for you with the main topics covered in Book II of Plato’s Republic. In this handout, I will try to do two main things: I will give you the context story or narrative and, most importantly, the arguments put forth by the main characters. The story goes as follows: In Book I of the Republic, Plato narrates how Socrates had gone to the festivities at the Pareus, which is a Greek port near Athens. On his way back, Socrates is approached by a servant of his old fried Cephalous. The servant asks Socrates to come and visit Cephalous, who is preoccupied with making amends before his death for any injustices in his life. Socrates asks Cephalous what he understands by justice and injustice—that is, how would you know whether you committed just or unjust acts without knowing what justice and injustice are? Cephalous excuses himself from the conversation because he must take care of other things and his son Polemarchus takes over the discussion. The main argument in Book I, which Socrates refutes, is that justice is whatever benefits the stronger. Thus, if you are a powerful person and can get away with taking advantage of others without being punished, you are on the right to do so. There is no need to go into the details of this argument and its refutation because in Book II, Glaucon, who is Plato’s brother, is dissatisfied with Socrates’ response to the argument. Glaucon then reformulates the original argument put forth by Polemarchus. Before looking at the main elements of the argument, it is important to remind ourselves that Glaucon and Adeimantus —Socrates’ main interlocutors in Book II—are Plato’s younger brothers and thus, they are portrayed in a good light throughout the dialogue. This is important to understand the intent of Glaucon’s and Adeimantus’ arguments. They do not endorse the arguments they present, but they complain that no one has been able to refute these common-sense views. The common-sense views Glaucon and Adeimantus present argue that it is better to seem just while being unjust than being just while seeming unjust. Throughout Book II, we thus see how Glaucon and Adeimantus are eager to hear Socrates refute these common-sense views so that they have clear reasons for why they should prefer being just rather than seeming just. So much for an introduction of the main discussion. Let me give you a general outline of the main topics covered in Book II and then I will present Glaucon’s arguments. 1. Glaucon presents the common-sense view that it is better to seem just than to be just.

2. Adeimantus presents a follow up to Glaucon’s arguments and asks Socrates to give them reasons for why it is better to pursue justice rather than injustice. 3. Socrates introduces an analogy between justice in the city and justice in the individual person. The reason for the analogy is that by searching for justice in the bigger thing (the city) we will be able to find justice in the smaller thing (the individual). 4. Socrates and Adeimantus formulate what the purpose of a city is and begin designing the main aspects that would make for a perfectly just city. It is important to keep in mind the topic of justice in the city because it will continue later in the semester when we read Book IV of the republic. 5. Lastly, Socrates and Adeimantus discuss the nature and education of the leaders in the city. Again, this discussion will continue in Book IV. From these topics, let’s focus our attention only on Glaucon’s arguments. We will comeback to the other topics later in the semester. Glaucon begins the discussion introducing a distinction between three kinds of goods because, ostensibly, people pursue justice because it is a good of some kind. The question then is what kind of good do people pursue when they pursue justice? Glaucon’s distinction goes as follows: 

There are goods that people seek for their own sake. That is, we don’t seek them because we expect them to bring about some consequence, but just for themselves. o These would be things like happiness, love, and enjoyment.

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There are goods that people seek for their own sake and for their consequences. That is, it is good to have them, but they also bring about other good things with them. o These would be things like studying, health, and art.

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There are goods that people seek not for their own sake, but for the sake of the consequences that come from them. o These are things like money-making, medical treatment, and exercise.

Again, the main question is on which of these categories should we place justice? Here, Plato is implicitly asking us to consider which one of these categories we would consider best and on which one we would place justice. Socrates’ answers are that the best of these categories is the second: things that we pursue both for their own sake and for the sake of their consequences. Socrates also places justice in this category. The reasoning is that justice is something we should

cultivate because it is good itself and because it brings about good things. Notice that Socrates is not saying that one should pursue justice only for the good things it brings, but because it is good itself. Glaucon’s response to Socrates, an the just of his argument, is that it is common-opinion that no one seeks justice for itself, but only because of the consequences it brings. Thus, the common-opinion Glaucon presents would place justice in the third category. Notice that the third category includes things that we would rather not do, but only do because we need what comes from them. Thus, for example, I would rather not have to go to the doctor when I need to get a vaccination because I am afraid of needles, but I do it only because I know that it will be good for me in the long term. Similarly, Glaucon argues, no one wants to put themselves through the burden of having to do just things, they only do so because of the things that come from it. In other words, no one wants to be just, people only want to seem just to benefit from the consequences. Here is the just of Glaucon’s argument: “‘Well, it doesn’t seem that way to most people,’ he said [the narrator is Socrates] ‘but to belong to the burdensome kind that ought to be pursued for the sake of the wages and reputation that come from opinion, but ought to be avoided itself on its own account as being something difficult’” (p. 50) If you remember our discussion regarding arguments, we said that an argument consists of premises and conclusion, and that the premises provide support for accepting the conclusion, the conclusion being what someone tries to convince us about. The passage I just quoted from Glaucon is his conclusion and the argument by which he will support this conclusion comes immediately after. He gives the following three premises, and he will defend each of these in detail: “‘So, I’m going to do it this way, if that seems good to you too: I’ll revive Thrasymachus’s argument, and I’ll say first what sort of thing people claim justice is and where they say comes from, and second that everyone who pursues it pursues it unwillingly as something necessary but not good, and third that they do it fittingly since the life of someone who’s unjust is much better than that of someone who’s just—as they say, since it doesn’t seem that way to me at all Socrates… (p. 50) Notice that in the last sentence, Glaucon states that this is a view “they” or common people hold, but that “it doesn’t seem that way to me at all.” Again, this means that Glaucon doesn’t endorse

the views he is presenting but wants Socrates to refute these common-sense views so that Glaucon can have reasons to pursue justice for its own sake, rather than for the sake of something else. (If we were in class, I would be asking you whether you have any questions at this point. Do you have any questions? If so, save them for Monday!) So, what are the premises of Glaucon’s argument as he introduces them in the passage above? (Can you spot them before continuing reading? Try!) They are three premises: (A) What justice is and where it comes from. (B) People pursue justice unwillingly as something necessary, but not good. (C) The life of someone who is unjust is better than the life of someone who is just. Therefore, and this is what the argument tries to convince us about, people avoid justice for its own sake and only pursue justice for its consequences. Notice that if we reformulate the conclusion, we would end up with something like this: people don’t want to be just, but they only want to appear to be just. Now, Glaucon supports each of these premises in different ways. Let’s go through each of them. In support of the first premise, Glaucon provides a two-part argument. Notice that the premise aims to i) tell us where justice comes from and to ii) tell us what justice is. The first part of the argument that supports the first premise comes in the following passage: “People claim that doing injustice is by its nature good and suffering injustice is bad, but that suffering injustice crosses over father into bad than doing injustice does into good [i.e., suffering injustice is worse than profiting from doing injustice], so that when people both do injustice to and suffer it from each other and get a taste of both, it seems profitable to the one’s who don’t have the power to avoid the latter [i.e., to avoid suffering injustice] make a contract with each other neither to suffer injustice nor to suffer it.” (pp. 50-51) Where does justice come from in this passage? Glaucon’s point is that justice only comes about because people prefer not to suffer injustice over the advantages that committing injustices might bring. Since people don’t like suffering injustice, they then agree not to commit injustice to others. People thus make a contract not to commit injustice only because they don’t want to suffer injustice. What does this imply? It implies that if people could avoid suffering injustice, they would pursue injustice. Again, the point of this argument is to show that people don’t pursue

justice for its own sake, but only for the sake of something else—in this case, for the sake of avoiding suffering injustice. Let me give you a quick example. If I steal $20 from Juan, I benefit from committing an injustice. I benefit because I now have more than I used to have in my pocket. Let’s say that I now have $40. On this state of affairs, I make myself vulnerable to suffer the same injustice from Mary. So, Mary now steals what I have in my pocket, which is $40. Thus, I both committed an injustice and suffered an injustice. Was my profit greater than my loss in this state of affairs? No! I lost even the $20 I had to begin with. So, to avoid this situation, I gather Juan and Mary and ask them to make an agreement not to do injustice to one another. In this way, I avoid suffering injustice, even if I am also prevented from committing injustice. This is where justice comes from, according to Glaucon. So, what we call justice is the agreement Juan, Mary, and Jorge made not to commit injustice so that we also avoid suffering injustice. Again, Glaucon’s main point is that we don’t join the agreement because we want justice, but only because we don’t want to suffer injustice. This example already helps us see what, in Glaucon’s argument, is justice. Namely, according to Glaucon’s common-sense view, justice is an agreement not to do injustice that we join to avoid suffering injustice. He puts it as follows: “And from then on they [people] begin to set up laws and agreements among themselves and to name what’s commanded by the law both lawful and just, and so this is the origin and being of justice, being in the middle between what is best, if one could do injustice and not pay a penalty, and what is worst, if one were powerless to take revenge when suffering injustice. What’s just, being at a mean between these two things, is something to be content with not as something good, but as something honored out of weakness at doing injustice, since someone with the power to do it and who was truly a man would never make a contract with anyone either to do nor to suffer injustice.” (p. 51) Glaucon’s argument is, to say the least, impressive. Think about it. When we, in the present, consider what counts as just or unjust, we appeal to the law. The law, which is an agreement not to do injustice so that one would not suffer injustice, is what we consider just. I am interested in what you all think about this. Are you convinced by Glaucon’s argument? Do you do just things only because you don’t want other people to do injustice to you—such that if you were sure that they won’t do the same to you, you wouldn’t treat them justly? This is Glaucon’s main question.

So far, Glaucon has only presented his supporting argument for premise (A). Now, premise (B) says that people pursue justice unwillingly as something necessary, but not good. In support of this premise, Glaucon tells a story. This story is called “The Ring of Gyges.” You can find an animated version of the story here (but please only watch the first two minutes of it): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qjGp6TWqe4 The story of the ring of Gyges is an imaginary one or, as we call them in philosophy, a “thought experiment” that is meant to test a proposition. The proposition Glaucon defends with the story is that people do justice unwillingly and not as something good. What would you do if you had a ring with the power to make you invisible? In other words, take away the bad consequences that come from being caught committing an injustice, and ask yourself if you would prefer to do justice. Would you cheat in an exam if you knew you wouldn’t get caught? If the answer is “yes,” then you are proving Glaucon’s point. That is, you don’t pursue justice because it is good, you do it unwillingly and only because you don’t want to get caught and suffer the consequences. This is what Glaucon concludes from the thought experiment. As he writes: “And surely someone could claim this is a great proof that no one is just willingly, but only when forced to be, on the grounds that it is not for his private good… Because every man assumes that injustice is much more profitable to him privately than justice, and the one saying the things involved in this sort of argument will claim that he’s assuming the truth, because if anyone got hold of such freedom and was never willing to do injustice or lay a hand on things belonging to others, he’d seem to be utterly miserable to those who observed it and utterly senseless as well.” (p. 52) What is Glaucon saying here? Let’s imagine that I give you a pop quiz on Plato’s reading when we comeback on Monday and that you and your classmates are unprepared. Now suppose that somehow, you and your classmates are able to cheat on the quiz without being caught by, let’s say, me! Would you do it? If your answer is “yes,” then you are proving Glaucon’s point. If your answer is “no,” then you would seen “miserable” and “senseless” to everyone else since you had the chance not to affect your grade in the class by failing the quiz and you didn’t take it. Glaucon’s general point in his second premise is that we don’t really want to do justice, we do justice only because we want to avoid the consequences of being caught. Remove the consequences and it doesn’t make sense to pursue justice for its own sake.

Lastly, the third premise in Glaucon’s argument says the following: (C) The life of someone who is unjust is better than the life of someone who is just. This is my favorite premise, especially because of the way in which Glaucon supports it. Glaucon asks Socrates to consider the purely unjust person and the purely just person. Now, for the purely unjust person to be the most unjust, let’s take away the consequences that come from injustice, namely, a bad reputation and punishment. So, our purely unjust person will have a good reputation, that is, a reputation for justice, even if she is in fact the most unjust. We do this so that the most unjust person wouldn’t act justly to avoid punishment, because remember, we want this to be the most unjust person. On the other side, let’s have the purely just person have a reputation for injustice. In this way, she won’t act justly only for the reputation, but because she is a purely just person. The point of Glaucon’s experiment is to take away how the just and unjust persons seem to others and to let them just be completely just and unjust. Glaucon puts it as follows: “So one must take away the seeming, for if he’s going to seem to be just there’ll be honors and presents for him as one seeming that way. Then it would be unclear whether he would be that way for the sake of what’s just or for the sake of the present’s and honors.” (p. 53) Since we don’t want the purely just person to be just only because of honors and rewards, let’s take away the reputation and see if her life is better than that of the purely unjust person. Similarly, since we don’t want the purely unjust person to act justly only to avoid punishment, let’s take away the reputation of injustice and see if her life is better than that of the purely just person. Who do you think will have a better life? In the experiment, the purely unjust person will have a reputation for justice and the purely just person will have a reputation for injustice. This means that the purely unjust person will receive honors and rewards, and the purely just person will have a bad reputation and will suffer all kinds of punishments. Who do you think will live a happier life? According to Glaucon, the happier person will be the unjust one, and the unhappy person will be the just one. He puts it very graphically as follows: “They’ll [people will] say this: that situated the way he is, the just person will be beaten with whips, stretched on the back, bound by chains, have both eyes burned out, and as an end after suffering every evil he’ll be hacked in pieces, and know that one ought to wish not to be but to seem just.” (p. 53)

To put it succinctly: the just person will suffer for seeming unjust and the unjust person will be honored for seeming just. The conclusion Glaucon derives from this is that it is better to seem just than to be just. Or that being unjust while appearing to be just is better than being just while appearing to be unjust. What do you think? Are you convinced by Glaucon’s argument that it is better to seem just than to be just? Glaucon’s argument seems like a stretch, but I think his point is a good one. Let me give you an example of how I think one can apply this argument. This argument makes sense in cases in which everyone acts unjustly and so the “just” thing to do is to act unjustly. If one acts justly in a situation in which everyone is unjust, who do you think will seem “unjust”? Here is an example from my country. The first time the current president of Mexico, let’s call him Andres, ran for the presidency was in 2006. He ran again in 2012, and only until 2018 did he win the elections. Among a corrupted and unpunished political class, Andres was the only uncorrupted politician. The political class thus spread a reputation that he was a “threat to Mexico” and even began an impeachment process when he was still the major of Mexico City. This defamatory campaign led to his losing the presidential elections in 2006 and one of the corrupted politicians became the president of Mexico. Who fared better in Andres’ story? The good guy or the bad guy? Glaucon’s point is that many times bad people fare better than good people. Thus, Glaucon’s premise (C) says that the life of someone who is unjust is better than the life of someone who is just. Let’s now do a recap of Glaucon’s overall argument. Glaucon argues that: (A) We only pursue justice to avoid injustice. (B) People pursue justice only to avoid punishment, not because it is good. (C) The life of the unjust person is better than the life of the just person. Conclusion: people don’t pursue justice for its own sake, they pursue justice only for its consequences. Or, in other words, people would prefer to seem just than bein...