How is killing more bad than allowing them to die essay PDF

Title How is killing more bad than allowing them to die essay
Course Bioethics
Institution University of Sydney
Pages 3
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How is killing a person worse than allowing them die?

When asked to answer such a question, “is killing worse than letting someone die?”, our judgment becomes unclear and we naturally rely on our common sense. The problem here is our instinct automatically leads us to the most appealing standpoint, the belief that killing will always be worse than letting someone die. Such philosophical debate has yet to end and is still open for discussion. To tackle this argument, one must have the moral distinction between killing and letting someone die. I want to propose that there is a difference between the two from a moral perspective and that both are not equivalent. I analysed this argument using the scenario presented by James Rachels (1975) who claims there is not a moral distinction between killing and letting one die and the contrasting response by Winston Nesbitt in Helga Kuhse’s article (1998). Nesbitt claims that the actor’s willingness to kill and other external factors are equally important. The willingness to kill strongly determines the outcome of the scenario. I used the original scenario and Nesbitt’s modified version to assert that the distinction between the two contributes to our moral reasoning. My perception is still the same, killing is morally worse than letting someone die. Rachels present a hypothetical example that has become historically famous, Smith and Jones killing their cousin. In this example, a large inheritance is at stake where both Smith and Jones will gain but only at the cost of their nephew’s death. In the first scenario, Smith drowns the child in the bath tub and then made it look like an accident. In the second scenario, Jones also had the motive to drown the child but notices that the child is already drowning. Jones observe and does nothing. All the factors are the same except Smith killed the child and Jones merely let the child die. To further Rachels argument, Jones cannot defend his conspiracy to murder based on the distinction of killing and letting someone die. There is no justification for his actions that can be considered sane in eyes of the society even if his defending statement is “After all, I didn’t do anything except just stand there and watch the child drown. I didn’t kill him: I only let him die” (Rachels, 1975). So according to Rachel’s claims, an act of killing is morally no worse than the act of letting die, both Jones and Smith are equally morally reprehensible. There is a crucial mistake which will be explained later. Rachel makes a very clear and persuasive argument for the scenarios and so even Nesbitt would have a difficult time to argue his point across. Nesbitt does not deny Rachel’s claims, he is aware that all the factors presented are equal and that there is no moral distinction between the two. However, he strongly believes that Rachels scenarios do not completely show that there is no existence of moral distinction between killing and letting die. He begins by stating that society judges the scenario this way because they are very similar. In this case, they both had identical motives behind their course of action and it can be agreed upon that both are guilty of the same moral offense. He insists that society’s judgment is clouded, we cannot look at the scenarios as if its black and white because there is more to it than just distinction between killing and letting die. Nesbitt attempts to skew society’s point of view by suggesting that we need to take consideration of the actors’ willingness to kill. The willingness to kill the child is the main reason society can agree that Jones’ action is morally just as bad as Smith’s. Nesbitt is trying to convey that when we are judging the act, the intention behind the actions is relevant. In the case Rachel provided, they had the same intentions. We should take into consideration the intentions of the actors before we make a moral decision. Both Smith and Jones have the same personal goal and willingness to kill the child, therefore it’s only natural for society to judge them the same.

To illustrate the point he trying to make, Nesbitt modified the original scenario by removing Jones willingness to kill the child. If the child tried to get out, Jones would not try to physically push the child’s head down to drown him. This leads to an expected new result where Jones will not kill. According to Nesbitt, the moral perceptions of the scenario has now changed and morally Smith is worse than Jones. The most important aspect in these scenarios is the willingness to kill. If the intention is not there then fundamentally, society will judge both Smith and Jones differently. In regards to the original scenario, Rachels briefly mentioned that “Jones observe and does nothing as the child drowns.” The crucial mistake is Rachel did not include the fact that Jones was prepared to push the child’s head down to drown if deemed to be necessary. As the scenario played out, Jones did not need to take further action because the desired outcome, the death of the child, has been met.

If we follow Rachels argument that there is no moral difference between killing and letting die, the moral dilemmas that society is confronted with on a daily basis are all questionable. Killing is an action which results in death which is the primary goal. Whereas, letting die is an inaction which results in death but is not the primary goal. In both these cases the primary goal the willingness to kill. In retrospect, an indepth analysis of the situations is necessary to see if it fits the killing and letting die distinction. In this case, a great example would be people in countries with high living standards are liable for the death of those in poorer countries suffering from malnutrition and other factors. This is basically saying that if you’re not a humanitarian, then you are indirectly killing people who are less fortunate than you. In comparison to Rachels hypothetical scenarios, the factors here do correspond with each other, but the end results of death produce a different judgement. The judgment here is not influenced by killing factor because the intention and goals are not there. Arguably everyone is a murderer because the failure to act resulted in the death of those in impoverished countries which equates letting die to killing. However, this argument is unacceptable as there is no willingness to kill by the people in high standards of living. The people in the countries with high living standards do not explicitly want those in less fortunate countries to die. In this paper, I have referred to the historically famous scenario Smith and Jones and discovered that there is no distinction between killing and letting die as argued by James Rachels. In response to Rachels, Winston Nesbitt in Helga Kuhse’s article showed that there is a moral distinction between the two and it is dependent on the willingness to kill. An additional supportive argument for Nesbitt’s modified scenario of Smith and Jones aided in emphasizing my point that killing will always be morally worse than letting die.

References

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J. Rachels, (1975) “Active and Passive Euthanasia”, New England Journal of Medicine, 292 (2) pp.78-80 H. Khuhse, (1998) “Why Killing is not always worse – and is sometimes better –than letting die”, Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 7, 371-374...


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