Essay 1- A Moral Distinction between \'Killing\' and \'Letting Die\' PDF

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Ibrahim 1 Omar Ibrahim Prof. Sandeep Sreekumar PHI 3051: Moral Problems of Life and Death March 24, 2021 Essay 1: A Moral Distinction between ‘Killing’ and ‘Letting Die’ The conceptual distinction between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ can be considered quite hairsplitting and even inconsequential to the larger moral discussion being had in the field of bioethics; yet it plays a major role in forming and guiding our moral intuitions in ordinary life. The subject of this ongoing debate has to do with if and how moral philosophers discern between these two notions, the situations in which they arise, and how we ascertain to what degree either of these can be morally impermissible or permissible. ‘Killing’ is often conceived of as a performative action that has a direct, causal relation to the death of another person; whereas ‘letting die’ involves the refrainment from or inaction in the event of a life-or-death situation which will have an indirect, yet causal relation the death of another person. While it could be that this is just another case example of moral philosophers arguing semantics, there does seem to be an incongruity between these two concepts that are context-specific in how they arise. Even if that fine line between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ can be easily dismissed, it is a crucial distinction that ought to be made in order to correct for any misguided moral intuitions. According to James Rachels’ in his “Killing and Letting Die”, there is indeed a fundamental moral distinction between the performative and action of ‘killing’ and the more passive inaction of ‘letting die’. He outright rejects the Equivalence Thesis, or the idea that there is a broad, moral equivalence between ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ in all individual cases, as an incompatible set of contradictory beliefs if they are willing to concede the moral permissibility of

Ibrahim 2 passive euthanasia, which is more demonstrably inhumane than active euthanasia, than yet also hold that ‘letting die’ is just as immoral as ‘killing’. Rachels goes even further and suggests that our moral assessments should follow a case-by-case basis, instead of making sweeping statements and generalizing ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ in situations that are not as clear-cut and don’t translate quite well from textbook examples to real-world scenarios. This is very much prevalent in the medical field where there are far more ethical dilemmas, greater liability, and much less room for human error. In order to firmly grasp these principles in both a metaphysical sense and accurately gage their morality, the practical reality of these ideas must be confronted and dealt with. Rachels’ points out the obvious flaw in reasoning that a standalone case of murder – a man killing his wife in a fit of jealous rage – is much less morally justifiable than the case of a physician administering an overdose of morphine in a strictly regulated, humane manner with the consent of the patient. As such, the actions taking place in these two situations are incomparable and should not be held to such an unreasonable moral standard as to say that they are coequal in moral wrongness. Proponents of the Equivalence Thesis would suggest that in both instances, the moral actor is morally blameworthy because their action or inaction has a causal relation to the harm being done, whether it is directly or indirectly. Their argument of parallel examples signifies this idea that all cases are alike and as such, ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ are equally evil in the fact that in both cases, harm is done to the victim. Detractors would argue that there will always be instances whereby violating the right to life in an effort to quell human suffering is superlative to that of the right to life, and so it is the rational choice to make in that particular case. In short, the alleviation of unnecessary, prolonged suffering outweighs any disregard for the moral rule. Another popular argument is that of the parity of reasons, or the idea that the ethics of a

Ibrahim 3 particular course of action should be solely based on the intent behind it, and whether or not the moral agent kills another person or let’s them die the victim and their immediate family is harmed in any case, and so there is no distinguishable moral difference between the two, excluding intent. Rachel suggests otherwise and puts forward the idea that in cases of euthanasia where this moral dilemma often arises, it becomes morally important to make this key distinction between killing and letting die. If not for the abstract principle of the thing, the perhaps for its immediate, real-world implications. It is because of these varying circumstances and the facts of each case that such moral distinctions ought to be made in order to avoid falling into this rabbit hole of thinking that all ethical quandaries are black-and-white, and by extension so is this literalist approach to the moral rule against ‘killing’, with no exceptions given. This discussion being had on the morality of ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ can also be reframed as a logical proof to better illustrate whether or not this distinction exists, and if so to what extent. By expressing this moral problem as an equation, perhaps its solution can be as well. Person, x; the action/inaction that is taking place, y or ~y; and the harm being done to said person, z. If a person, x, performs an action/inaction, y/~y respectively, that has a direct and causal relation to the harm being done to another person, z, then they could be said to be morally blameworthy for that event, i.e., x + y  z. However, if a person, x, refrains from performing a lifesaving action, ~y, the end result is harm being done, z, i.e., x + ~y  z. In both cases, there are person(s), x and harm, y, is being done to person, z. The only variable that changes in this particular sequence of events is the action or inaction taking place, y and ~y, that could exclude any harm from being done. And so, it seems to be the case that this interruption in the causal chain of events which of this equation in itself can be considered evidentiary of this distinction.

Ibrahim 4 The deeper moral question remains: Is there a moral duty to save those in need of saving, in the absence of any moral cost to ourselves? Still further, what does it mean to ‘save’ someone from harm? Does the physician have a moral duty to resuscitate or extend the suffering of a patient due to their Hippocratic Oath to ‘do no harm’ or is their duty merely to lessen human suffering however which way they can? Differentiating between the notions of ‘killing’ and ‘letting die’ is not only important, but pragmatically useful in the event of day-to-day medical emergencies, overseen by an extensive, and arguably overly complex, judicial system and its legalese. To summarize, the distinction between killing and letting die is morally important. Both in the broad sense as a general moral principle, as well as in special circumstances e.g., euthanasia where this distinction must be elucidated. Either we accept the premise that there is a practical, morally important difference between killing and letting die, or we throw caution to the wind and uphold this inviolable moral rule against killing and permitting unnecessary human suffering to continue when it can almost certainly be alleviated.

Ibrahim 5 References Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition, ed. Lawrence Becker and Charlotte Becker (New York: Routledge, 2001), vol. 2, pp. 947-50 Woollard, Fiona and Frances Howard-Snyder, "Doing vs. Allowing Harm", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = . EasyChair:1518, Travis Rodgers, “The Equivalence Thesis and the (In)Significance of Violating Negative Rights”, EasyChair Preprint No. 1518, (EasyChair, 2019) Asscher J. The moral distinction between killing and letting die in medical cases. Bioethics. 2008 Jun;22(5):278-85. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2008.00616. x. PMID: 18447863. McLachlan HV. The ethics of killing and letting die: active and passive euthanasia. Journal of Medical Ethics 2008;34:636-638....