International Security - Lecture Notes Week 1-20 PDF

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Week 1 – Introduction: Strategic Security Studies and Security Studies Debates o Whether security is synonymous with survival (of who or what) or whether it is more than survival i., emancipation?  Emancipation: Freedom, nothing is holding you back, your shackles are broken o Whether security is a...

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Week 1 – Introduction: Strategic Security Studies and Security Studies 

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Debates o Whether security is synonymous with survival (of who or what) or whether it is more than survival i.e., emancipation?  Emancipation: Freedom, nothing is holding you back, your shackles are broken o Whether security is a material thing or a socially created phenomenon such as through language, ideas, and identities. o Security is essentially contested.’  There is no consensus of what it is that is threatened or how to achieve that. Overarching claim o Security is a paradox! o What security means to scholars, students, policymakers, and states cannot be separated from the historical and political contexts in which security is being discussed or debated.  Security is not only about survival but about hindrances that prevent people from doing what they want to do -> Security is beyond survival o ‘Security is a derivative concept – Ken Booth o No neutral definition is possible. ‘All definitions are theorydependent, and all definitions reflect normative commitments’ – Steve Smith  No definition of security is non-biased  Normative: when somenot what it is but what it is ought to be. o ‘Theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ – Robert Cox What is security? o A relatively simple question to answer in the 60s and 70s. Why?  Primary concern was with Communism and the USSR  Security was synonymous with ‘National Security’ or ‘National Interest’. Realism o Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes  State of nature  ‘The life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’  Anarchy: Human nature  Anarchy: no overarching authority  The Social Contract  Domestic analogy. The Leviathan has achieved peace domestically, but the international domain is still anarchic without an overarching authority.  War is a common feature of world politics.

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Week 2: Core Traditional Approaches 1. What do we mean when we talk about traditional approaches? Are they still relevant today? ○ Changes to produce greater cooperation i. Increasing cooperation by establishing institutions where they do not exist ○ Realization that international politics is not just a zero-sum game i. Zero-sum game refers to in a competition between 2 countries, if one country gains, the other country loses, but in actual fact, it is not as simple as that (not as simple as realists’ thinking) ○ Example of traditional approaches i. Realism: very factual approach, state-centric approach to IR, sees international state as anarchy 1. Offensive realism a. Don’t believe in cooperative ability of states 2. Defensive realism a. Importance on game theory or prisoner’s dilemma, vicious cycle, instead of getting attacked, i attack first. Pre-empt attacks, but ends up attacking. ii. Liberalism 1. Neo-liberal institutionalism iii. Marxism iv. Idealist internationalism 1. Since then (1950), this idea has taken a different meaning. (Jarvis article) 2. Centralising through international forces a. Through international organizations/institutions (collective institutional power) i. UN (even though this article was published pre UN - 1950) ii. WTO iii. IMF iv. NATO v. This approach sees doing this as a positive thing ○ Are they still relevant today? i. Given that state power may not be so hegemonic as it used to be, does realism still have the same traction?

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Liberalism can still stick around, despite realism going on the decline

2. Source of conflict: not evil, but tragedy? ○ Evil is not necessarily the right word to use ○ Offensive realist approach: aggression, territorial acquisition etc. is the impetus for this kind of behaviour. State’s interests are aggressive, offensive ○ Defensive variant: prisoner’s dilemma -> so more tragedy ○ Linking straight in to security dilemma 3. Should we think of states as rational actors? ○ States as units of the system (Waltz 1979; 1990). ○ The critics, according to Keohane (1986a:24), sought to move beyond the nation-state by challenging the "validity of the 'state as actor' model on which neorealism relies." ○ Although neorealists and neoliberals disagree on the relative importance of non-state actors, both treat states as the primary actors. 4. What is the security dilemma? ○ Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Striving to attain security from such attack, they are driven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the power of others. This, in turn, renders the others more insecure and compels them to prepare for the worst. Since none can ever feel entirely secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on. ___________________________________________________________________________

Week 3 - Theories and Causes of War Recap from last lecture ● There used to be international anarchy, but because there was a social contract, people came together to serve their own interests, and agreed to come together to escape the state of nature, allow the establishment of a government.

● Because there isn’t a global police/global government, the only person that can help you is you. And if you can’t help yourself, your survival is in jeopardy. ● Anarchy is inside of us, it is something psychological. Because we as humans are self-interested, greedy. ● We can’t continue with power politics because it’ll cause mass devastation. Instead, we need to engage in a more ideal realist politics. (According to Woodrow Wilson) ● Both offensive and defensive strands of realism sees the states as a black box, doesn’t care about what is inside the states but cares only about the material capability (no. of soldiers etc.), physical size of the states. ● Neoclassical realism corrects the previous point. Cares about internal structure of the state. What is warfare? ● War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless number of duels which make up a War, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves two wrestlers. Each strives by physical force to compel the others to submit to his will: each endeavours to throw his adversary, and thus render him incapable of further resistance (Carl Von Clausewitz). ○ Disarm the enemy so you can get your enemy to do what you want ○ Conquer/overpower your enemy ○ Put emphasis on “incapable of further resistance” ● War therefore is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will (CVC- On War). ○ At the heart of war lies violence ○ Even if you overpower someone, but if you cannot get the other person to fulfil your will, you didn’t win. You won the battle, but not the war. ● The aim of War is to disarm the enemy. Types of warfare ● By methods and approach: ○ Conventional warfare - Pitched battles. Clear frontlines and enemies and relatively matched opponents. Usually involving regular armies and weapons. ■ Usually, in conventional warfare, both sides of the war follow certain rules/regulations. General protocol of warfare: like how you treat prisoners, you can’t use cluster bombs cause it might harm civilians etc.

○ Unconventional warfare - Asymmetric opponents, and frontlines are usually indistinguishable and fluid. Could involve the use of irregular armies and weapons. ■ E.g.: Guerilla warfare, suicide attacks ■ You can’t distinguish the frontline. Frontline is not defined. Frontline could be anywhere (a church, a mosque, a classroom) ■ Thus, unconventional warfare is worse in terms of civilian danger. You can kill more people. Because it’s not clear. ● By actors and territory: ○ Interstate war: Between two or more sovereign states or nations. ■ Interstate: war going across boundaries ■ E.g.: WW2 ■ Usually conventional in nature but not all the time ○ Civil war: Within or between actors within national boundaries but could spill over into other countries. Usually there is at least one state actor involved. ■ A people’s war more than the military’s war ■ Battle of attrition: more long term. Civil war can go as long as 70 years Causes of warfare ● Evolutionary rationale behind the realist stress on egotistic competition and conflict between states ● Survival and ascendancy - ‘Survival of the fittest’ - Darwin ○ You have to show that you are the strongest in the system to survive, if you’re not strong enough, someone will overpower you and defeat you. ● Competition over resources and ● Reproduction, the ensuing quest for dominance, the security dilemma ○ People want glory, to show they are the most powerful ● And other prisoner’s dilemmas that emanate from the competition, ○ You don’t know the intentions of others, you don’t know if others will attack you. So you only know the nash-equilibrium, if you default. ○ The nash-equilibrium states that the best position you can be, is that you can’t trust the other person, you can only trust yourself. ○ What the realist is saying is that you can only trust yourself. So, if you don’t trust someone, go to war, be ready and attack. So that no one gets the better of you.

● Kinship, identity, and ideas ○ Identity conflict: main mobilising force of the Rwandan genocide ■ Identities mobilise people at different ends Power transition theory ● It is a theory about the nature of war, in relation to the power in international relations ● The theory was first published in 1958 by A.F.K. Organski, in his textbook, World Politics (1958) ● An even distribution of political, economic and military capabilities between contending groups of states is likely to increase the probability of war; peace is preserved best when there is an imbalance of national capabilities between disadvantaged and advantaged nations; the aggressor will come from a small group of dissatisfied strong countries; and it is the weaker, rather than the strongest power that is most likely to be the aggressor (Organski). ● The theory leads to the long cycle theory of war and seeks to explain trends between warring states in the past 500 years. The general trend is that a nation achieves hegemonic power and then is challenged by a great power. This leads to a war which, in the past, has created a transition between the two powers. ● Status quo states and revisionist states. ○ E.g. China now is a status quo states. ■ But may not always be a status quo state because they do accept some American framework (e.g. uses American liberal economy system) ■ China has the potential to be a revisionist state. So, it is best to defeat and go against China before it becomes a revisionist state. What is misperception? ● Perception: ○ The ability to see, hear, or become aware of something through the senses ○ The way in which something is regarded, understood, or interpreted. ○ States always perceive other states: perceive their intentions and capabilities. ○ In theory, humans are rational actors, and usually make very good cost-benefit analysis before entering into war. But in reality, humans are not always rational and often misperceive, which can lead to disaster.

● Misperception involves a discrepancy between the psychological environment of the decision makers and the operational environment of the ‘real world.’ ○ Psychological: It’s relative. You’re thinking of me against you. ● Decisions and actions may be determined by the former, but their effects or consequences are constrained by the latter. ● Misperception of capability - can they be always reliable? ● Misperception of intention(s) - How possible is it to gain enough information about your enemy? ○ Difficult to perceive the intentions of your enemy ○ Defensive/offensive weapons - you never know whether they’re building up arms to attack or to defend ■ E.g. when Pakistan was working on its nuclear weapons -> led to Iraqi invasion, who saw Pakistan as building weapons for mass destruction Primary and Secondary Misperceptions Primary: ● Misperception of capabilities ● Misperception of intention ● These are the primary concerns in any intelligence analysis Secondary ● Misperception of the perception of others: Others’ perceptions of our capabilities and intentions, and also their broader definition of the situation and the nature of the threats it poses to their vital interests. ● They also distort our cost-benefit calculus and can lead to serious miscalculations of the consequences of our own action. ● Misunderstanding of the nature of the decision-making process of others. ___________________________________________________________________________ Week 4 - Deterrence and Defence ● Recap from last lecture ○ Main concern is war and essentially ‘what is war’ ○ The only point when you win is when the other person can’t resist no more, when you have gotten the other person to obey your will ○ You can win the battle but not the war ■ E.g. Vietnam War -> US was so much more powerful than Vietnam, won many battles, was materially

superior but overall lost the war, didn’t fulfill their objective, lost reputation, public opinion etc. ○ Categorized war into: ■ conventional vs nonconventional war ■ Regular vs irregular war (e.g. guerrilla warfare, insurgency) ● Regular war usually corresponds to conventional war ■ International vs civil war ● Sovereignty used to distinguish between wars ● Consider boundaries where war takes place ● But can overlap ○ Domestic can spill into international and vice versa ● How does the last lecture connect to this one? ○ Deterrence and defence are connected in that the former addresses the various ways in which we can achieve the latter without always having to go to ‘war’ (destruction of life and property) ■ What deterrence tries to achieve is that you try to associate a particular reaction to a particular action, which discourages whoever is trying to carry out that particular action from going ahead. ■ Deterrence -> doesn’t mean always have to carry out the action but the action is available & there to be carried out ● History ○ The deterrence theory of punishment can be traced to the early works of classical philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1678) - the social contract - Cesare Beccaria (1738 1794) - commensurability of punishment to crime to achieve deterrence - and Jeremy Bentham (1748 - 1832) - ‘mankind [is governed by two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure’ (Bentham, 1789, p.125) ○ An object of punishment is ‘to induce a man to choose always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce a man to prefer the less’ (Bentham, 1789, 171). ■ Big brother concept: panopticon ● The idea that there is someone, omniscient agent, a ‘god’ watching your every move.

● Humans are always trying to maximise pleasure and minimise pain. We are always trying to do things that maximise benefits. When we are making decisions, we are always trying to make decisions that would result in us being better off than before making that decision. ● Pain and pleasure are two masters ● When there are two offenses, you opt for the ones that would induce lesser punishment ○ What is deterrence? ■ Deterrence comes from the word ‘deter’, which is a verb meaning to discourage (someone) from doing something by instilling doubt or fear of the consequences ■ In a broad sense, its proponents believe that people make their choices based on their calculations of the gains and consequences of such (in-)actions ■ Types of deterrence: ● Specific/individual: to deter only the individual offender from committing that crime in the future ○ E.g. when you commit a driving offense, you get demerit points (individual, only you are affected, only you are aware of that, other people don’t have to be aware) ● General: targets a general population, e.g. criminal system ○ The actual person that committed the crime might not be the actual target ○ Everyone knows that if you commit certain crime, you will go to jail. Everyone is aware that there are consequences ○ Three components of deterrence: ■ Severity, certainty, and celerity ● Certainty of punishment ○ Certainty of consequences = consistent ○ Everyone knows if you do certain things that are wrong, there are consequences they have to deal with. And this knowledge is consistent ● Severity of punishment ● Celerity - speed or swiftness - of the punishment ○ The consequence has to immediately follow the ‘crime’

○ Can’t accommodate according to your convenience ○ Deterrence theory in IR ■ The Cold War ● Deterrence theory in IR emerged during the Cold War. Concepts such as first- and second- strike capability, reciprocal fear of surprise attack were relevant during the period ○ Especially with developments of nuclear weapons ○ You never want to be caught off guard ○ How do you prevent being completely destroyed? ■ Deterrence ● Although deterrence does not require nuclear weapons, their existence makes it easier to grasp the basic ideas ○ Does not ALWAYS require ● Deterrence theory applies most easily, and perhaps applies only, when one side believes that the other is highly aggressive. USA vs USSR. ○ Deterrence works if you believe the other side is being hostile to you ○ More like a counter-attack policy ○ “If you do this, this would be the consequence” -> Works for an aggressive force ○ The Cost and Benefit of Deterrence ■ A state/actor wishing to implement a strategy of deterrence is most likely to succeed if: ● The costs of non-compliance (cnc) it can impose on another state/actor is greater than the benefits of non-compliance (BNC), i.e. CNC > BNC ● The benefits of compliance (BC) it can offer to another state/actor is greater than the costs of compliance (BC) ○ Three Waves of Deterrence Theory - Robert Jervis ■ First wave - Post WW2; Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, and Jacob Viner. Impact of the atomic bomb; applied game theory; not a systematized theory itself

■ Second wave - the chicken analogy: stand firm or retreat? Each side attempts to prevail by making the other side think it will stand firm. Rational actors. ● Most dominant wave of deterrence theory ● Tries to intimidate the other person by making themselves look ‘big’ and sends the message of ‘i won’t back down’ -> tries to intimidate the other person to back down. Not about beating them, but trying to get them to back down first ● Nuclear weapons -> the fact a country has nuclear weapons (even if they have never used it) is enough to get other countries to back down or stay away (e.g. north korea & US relations) ■ Third wave - statistical and case-study methods to empirically test deterrence theory, mainly against cases of conventional deterrence. Questioned rationality. ● Don’t always assume that states are rational actors ■ Fourth wave? Response to 9/11? ○ Deterrence theory and realism ■ Realism emphaizes power politics in a state of anarchy. Deterrence may serve to maintain an equilibrium such as ‘balance of power’, e.g. West vs East ● Deterrence becomes valuable ● Realism talks about three ‘S’ ○ statism (states are most important actors) -> usually goes back to Hobbesian idea that state is able to transform human nature from anarchy to hierarchy. Anarchy only exists in the international system ○ Survival: since states have overcome anarchy, second most important priority is to ensure survival. Because once the leviathan dies, from Hobbes’ experience, the state goes back/degenerates back into state of nature. ○ Self-help: no one to help the state so it has to help itself. ○ This all goes back to cost-benefit analysis. Everyone tries to maximise and reduce losses

○ What deterrence brings to realism is that: rather than fighting all the time, what you do is get everyone to be aware of what are the consequences they would have to face if they do get into a fight with you. To get people to think twice before getting into a fight with you. ■ Gain maximization and pain minimization: states (and individuals) are self-interested rational actors thus they make decisions based on cost-benefit analyses ○ Popularity of the theory ■ Deterrence n...