Homeland Security week 9 PDF

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Functions of a Red Team/Penetration Teams Conducting red team exercises is one of the most successful ways of making security plans. The military created these exercises as a game theory to test preparations, improve knowledge of the enemy’s skills, equipment, and techniques; and develop ways to combat them. They are now also used to evaluate security strategies, protocols, and procedures. Experienced role-players are used to stimulate the danger, so they are knowledgeable, fully grasp the threat’s methodologies, and use them to challenge the customer’s protection. The aim is to confirm suspected flaws or deficiencies in a facility’s overall security; to assess staff readiness by evaluating their security awareness; and to test security operations and practices, techniques, and facilities. Red team exercises have long been used by DHS and other federal departments and agencies to assess not just the human factor, but also the technology used to identify threats. A successful red team exercise necessitates the use of specially trained and seasoned personnel. “Red teams have been used for years in the corporate world to evaluate information technology security, plans, policies, and procedures” (Lee, 2021). DNDO provides a one-of-a-kind red team capability for objectively assessing the success of proposed and deployed capabilities, such as technology, processes, and protocols. The red team tests deployed technologies and processes as well as their related strategies, methods, and practices, in a practical context. They measure operators’ ability to identify radiation sources during regular operations by simulating enemy techniques against Federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal radiological and nuclear detection, and interdiction operations. “The Red Team conducts both overt and covert tests. Overt tests occur when operating personnel are made aware in advance” (DHS, 2018). Covert tests are conducted without prior warning while workers suspect an imminent hazard incident is about to occur.

Security Disaster Our current homeland security does not have the required structure for dealing with the problems raised by 21st-century catastrophic threats. Soon after Katrina made landfall, state and local officials realized the damage was serious, but they lacked the capacity to connect with one another and organize a response due to the loss of facilities and response capability. Federal agencies failed to carry out duties often carried out by the state and local authorities, such as rescuing people trapped by rising floodwaters, providing law enforcement, and evacuating New Orleans’ remaining population, and without the aid of advance planning or a working state/local incident command system to direct their efforts. The Federal response to Hurricane Katrina raised a variety of concerns about the utilization of military capabilities during domestic events. For example, due to restrictions imposed by federal legislation and DOD policy, the active-duty military was forced to rely on demands for assistance. Since there are these restrictions, the application of DOD services during the initial response was slowed. Furthermore, active-duty members and National Guard activities remained uncoordinated, representing two separate supervisors, the President, and the Governor. In collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security, the DOJ can review Federal responsibility for assisting State and local law enforcement and criminal justice systems during emergencies, and also develop operating arrangements, strategies, and regulations to ensure an efficient Federal law enforcement response. “The Department of Homeland Security, working collaboratively with the private sector, should revise the National Response Plan and finalize the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan to be able to rapidly assess the impact of a disaster on critical infrastructure” (National Archives and Records Administration, N.d.). Not having a secured security plan and preparedness with good communication led to the huge disaster of Hurricane Katrina.

Oslo, Norway Attacks A commission examining Norway’s reaction to last year’s terror attacks concluded that the perpetrator should have been apprehended up to half an hour earlier, potentially saving several lives, and that a fatal car-bomb blast in central Oslo could have been avoided with improved security. According to the report, which looked at how officials handled the July 22 attacks last year, police were too late to react to the shooting spree on Utoya island, and confessed murderer Anders Behring Breivik might have been apprehended faster if police response has been properly coordinated. The panel has recommended a full ban on semiautomatic weapons, as well as stricter restrictions over weapons and chemicals. “It took more than three hours after the bomb in Oslo went off before Mr. Breivik was arrested” (Hovland, K). Their biggest security issue was the lack of coordination and response time to the attack. If they were better prepared and coordinated, they could have apprehended the shooter after the bomb before many more were killed.

References Hovland, K. M. (2012, August 13). Norway Police Faulted Over Attacks. The Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444772404577586852952807194. National Archives and Records Administration. (n.d.). National Archives and Records Administration. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessonslearned/chapter5.html. Assessments Directorate. Department of Homeland Security. (2018, September 21). https://www.dhs.gov/assessments-directorate. Lee, E. (2021). Homeland Security And Private Sector Business: corporations' role in critical infrastructure... protection, second edition. CRC PRESS....