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AL-AMEEN COLLEGE OF LAWINTERPRETATION OF STATUTES(IX sem 5years B.,LL & V sem 3years LL.)Model Answer Paper 2018ANSWER Q. 9 AND ANY 5 OF THE FOLLOWING:1. WHAT IS LITERAL INTERPRETATION? EXPLAIN.The literal rule is the primary rule which takes precedence over the others. Under this rule the j...

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AL-AMEEN COLLEGE OF LAW INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (IX sem 5years B.A.,LL.B & V sem 3years LL.B.) Model Answer Paper 2018 ANSWER Q. 9 AND ANY 5 OF THE FOLLOWING: 1. WHAT IS LITERAL INTERPRETATION? EXPLAIN. The literal rule is the primary rule which takes precedence over the others. Under this rule the judge is asked to consider what the legislature actually says rather than considering what it might mean. Words and phrases should be construed by the courts in their ordinary sense and the ordinary rules of grammar and punctuation should be applied. In order to achieve this it is up to the judge to give words in legislation their literal meaning even if, the effect of this is to produce what might be considered as an unjust outcome, ie., effect should be given irrespective of its consequences. Example- fisher v. bell, the shopkeeper had a flick knife on his shop window with a ticket bearing words “ejector knife”. Under the restriction of offensive weapons act 1959 sec 1(1), “it was illegal to manufacture, sell, hire, or offer for sale or hire or lend to any other person any knife……” . the claimant alleged that the defendant shopkeeper had contravened sec 1(1) by offering the flick knife for sale. It was held by the court that displaying the knife was merely on invitation to treat, not an offer for sale and thus no liability arose. The lack of the words “exposing for sale” in the restriction of offensive weapons act 1959 suggested that only a true offer would be prohibited by the act. This rule can be explained under the following head: a) Natural and grammatical meaning: the words of a statute should first be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are to be construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or object of the statute suggests the contrary. It there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, the court should give effect to it and not try to amend it.

Ramavtar v. assistant sales tax officer, the act of sale of vegetable does not attract sales tax. Therefore, when an assistant sales tax officer wanted to tax the sale of betel leaf, a vendor objected on the ground that betel leaf was a vegetable. He claimed exemption. To advance his argument, he relied on the dictionary meaning of vegetable in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and text books on botany. The SC did not accept the scientific or dictionary meaning of the word vegetable and observed that it must be construed not in any technical sense nor from a botanical point of view, but as understood in common parlance. It held: It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. It is to be understood as understood in common language. In this view, betel leaf was not a vegetable but a condiment. Not being a vegetable, it could not enjoy exemption from sales tax. The judgment lays down the basic principle that a vegetable is one that in market parlance is known as such. This is the definition of vegetable for fiscal laws, but not so for students of botany who would regard betel leaf as a vegetable. So the definition depends upon who asks the question. For a botany student, betel leaf is a vegetable, but not so for a tax collector. Therefore the sale of betel leaves was liable to sales tax. b) Exact meaning preferred to loose meaning: it is presumed that words used in the statute are used correctly and exactly and not loosely and inexactly. Example- the exact meaning of the word contiguous is touching and whereas its loose meaning is neighboring. Every word has a secondary meaning too. Thus court should be careful not to mix up secondary meaning with the loose meaning. If secondary meaning points to that meaning which statute meant then preference should be given to it only. c) Technical words in technical sense(i) special meaning in trade, business etc- according to this words are to be understood in their subject matter. Thus in case of legislation relating to a particular trade, business, profession or science words having a special meaning in that context are understood in that sense only. Example- the term “waist” are well known terms applied to a ship and

nobody would think of their meaning to the waist of a person when used in a an act which deals with ships. (ii) legal sense of words-when words acquire a technical meaning because of their constant use by the legislature in a particular sense or because of their authoritative construction by superior courts, they are understood in that sense only when used in a similar context in subsequent legislation.

2. WHAT

IS

A

STATUTE?

EXPLAIN

THE

EXTERNAL

AIDS

TO

INTERPRETATION. A statute is the will of the legislature. It is derived from the Latin word “statutere” meaning “to be made to sit up”. It is a formal expression in writing of the will of the legislature. It is usually called an act of the legislature. A statute unless it is expressed to have a duration that is temporary, never dies, though it may be amended or repealed. There are aids for interpretation which are not part of the statute and these are known as external aids. These external aids are relevant only when the language used in the statute is not clear and two meaning are possible. 1) Dictionaries: usually a word would be defined under the definition clause of the statute and the said word will have the same meaning for that word whenever it occurs again in the act. But when a word is not defined in the act itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find out the common parlance in which that word is used. But again dictionary will have various meaning for that one word and in selecting one out of the various meaning, regard must be given to the context in which it s used in the act, because the expression must take colour from the context in which they appear. If plain reading of the provision brings out what was intended and there is no ambiguity then dictionary meaning of a word is not considered.

Ramavtar v.

assistant sales tax officer, the act of sale of vegetable does not attract sales tax. Therefore, when an assistant sales tax officer wanted to tax the sale of betel leaf, a

vendor objected on the ground that betel leaf was a vegetable. He claimed exemption. To advance his argument, he relied on the dictionary meaning of vegetable in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary and text books on botany. The SC did not accept the scientific or dictionary meaning of the word vegetable and observed that it must be construed not in any technical sense nor from a botanical point of view, but as understood in common parlance. It held: It has not been defined in the Act and being a word of everyday use it must be construed in its popular sense, meaning that sense which people conversant with the subject matter with which the statute is dealing would attribute to it. It is to be understood as understood in common language. In this view, betel leaf was not a vegetable but a condiment. Not being a vegetable, it could not enjoy exemption from sales tax. 2) Foreign decisions: in pre-constitutional period, reference to English decisions was a common practice despite warning by the Privy Council. This practice is continued even now to an extent. There is one qualification attached to the assistance of foreign decisions that prime importance is always to be given to the language of the relevant Indian statute, the circumstances and the setting in which it is enacted and the Indian conditions where it is to be applied and there is always an element of risk in taking ready and hasty assistance from foreign decisions. 3) Parliamentary history: the SC does use the aid of parliamentary history in resolving questions of construction but its used within its circumspect limits only in resolving ambiguities. i.

Bill- debates on a bill in parliament are not admissible for construction of the act which is ultimately enacted. The speech only shows the subjective intent of the speaker but it cannot reflect the inarticulate mental process lying behind the majority vote which carried the bill. Nor it is reasonable to assume that the minds of the legislatures were one in accord. But in Indra Sawhney vs UOI, SC referred to Dr. Ambedkar speech in the constituent assembly for interpreting the expression backward classes of citizens which is not defined in the constitution.

ii.

Statement of objects and reasons- it can be referred only for understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the state of affairs and the evil which the statute was sought to remedy.

It cannot be utilized for the purpose of restricting and controlling the plain meaning of the language employed by the legislature in drafting a statute and excluding from its operation such transactions which it plainly covers. iii.

Commissions/inquiry committees- reports of commissions or inquiry committees preceding the introduction of a bill have also been referred to as evidence of historical facts or of the surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil intended to be remedied and at time for interpreting the act. In Sodra Devi’s Case in which income tax enquiry report was referred and in Express Newspaper’s case, the press commissions report was referred.

iv.

Parliamentary debates- this can be used as an external aid in interpretation but its use is limited.

v.

Letters- letter written by the law minister cannot be used as an aid. It cannot override the statutory provision.

4) Historical facts and surrounding circumstances- the court is at liberty to look into the history of the law, the circumstances which existed and which lead to the passing of the law, the evil which is intended to remedy. Where it is important to ascertain ancient facts of public nature recourse to historical works, documents and treaties may be taken. 5) Text books- text book can be used to ascertain the true meaning of an enactment. But it’s the discretion of the courts to accept or reject the views given in the text book. Kesavanand Bharati vs State of Karnataka is one such case where a large number of text books were quoted in arriving the decision. 6) Subsequent social, political and economic developments and scientific inventions: this can be discussed under the following headingi.

General act- a statute may be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute. When a change in social condition produces a novel situation which was in contemplation at the time when a statute is first enacted, there can be no prior assumptions that the enactment does not apply to the new circumstances.

Development in science and technology must be taken into consideration while interpreting an ongoing statute. Example- It has been held that telephone is ‘telegraph’ within the meaning of that word in t he telegraph act 1863 and 1869 although telephone was not invented in 1869. ii.

Constitutional acts- a constitution is intended as an enduring instrument, not only designed to meet the needs of the day when it is enacted but also needs of the altering condition of the future. Thus the language of the constitution is given a liberal construction so as to include which in its ambit the future developments in various fields of human activity and not just restricting the language of the existing things at the time of passing the constitution. Constitutional provisions are required to be understood and interpreted with an object oriented approach. It should not be interpreted in a narrow and pedantic sense. Every provision should be read harmoniously and purposively and should not render another provision redundant. The best example can be taken of article 21 of the constitution which provides, no person shall be deprived of his life/personal liberty except according to procedure established by the law. Now to this article 21 a whole lot of human rights were deduced from art 21 like right to means of livelihood, privacy, education and speedy trial etc.

3. STATE THE EFFECT OF REPEAL OF PERPETUAL AND TEMPORARY STATUTES OF INTERPRETATION. Effect of expire of temporary statutes: When the duration of a statute is for a specified time it is temporary statute. After a temporary statute expires it cannot be made effective by merely amending the same. Revival of the expired statute can be done only by re-enacting it on similar terms or expressly saying that the expired act is herewith revived. The effect of expiry of temporary statute can be discussed under the following sub headings1) Legal proceedings under expired statute- after the expiry of an act can the legal proceedings under that act be initiated or continued? If that act has a saving clause

its effect would be similar to Sec 6 of the General clause act which says repeal of the statute shall not affect the legal proceeding. But if such saving clause is not present than the proceedings started under the temporary statute would terminate as soon as the statute expires. Thus in the absence of a saving clause no person can be prosecuted/ convicted under the expired act and the on-going proceedings will be terminated at once with the expiry of the temporary act. Rayala corporation vs director of enforcement. 2) Notifications, orders, rules etc made under temporary statute- with the expiry of temporary act, any notification, ordered or rules issued under it will also come to an end and cannot be revived even if the provisions of expired act is re-enacted. 3) Expiry does not make statute dead for all purpose- even without the saving clause the expiry does not make the statute dead for all purpose. The nature of rights and obligations under the act has to be considered in determining whether such rights and obligations are continuing after the expiry of the act or no. State of Orissa vs Bhupendra Kumar, it was held that a person who has been prosecuted and sentenced during the continuance of a temporary act for violating its provisions cannot be released before he serves out his sentence, even if the temporary act expires before the expiry of full period of the sentence. 4) Repeal by temporary statute- if a temporary statute repeals an existing statute, the question which arises is if the repealing temporary statute expires will the repealed statute revive? This will depend on the construction of the repealing statute.

Mode of Repeal Express Repeal and Repeal by implication Repeal of a statute may be express or by necessary implication. There is no reason to restrict the meaning of the word ‘repeal’ merely to an express repeal and to exclude the implied one. Express repeal of a statute is usually made by stating that the earlier statute or a particular provision therein is thereby repealed. Usually enactments repealed are mentioned in a schedule attached to the repealing statute. Such express repeal needs no construction of the later statute. The use of any particular form of words is not necessary to bring about an express repeal. All that is necessary is that the words used show an intention to abrogate the Act or

provision in question. The usual form is to use the words 'is or are hereby repealed' and to mention the Acts sought to be repealed in the repealing section or to catalogue them in a Schedule. The use of words 'shall cease to have effect', is also not uncommon. When the object is to repeal only a portion of an Act words 'shall be omitted' are normally used. The legislative practice in India shows that 'omission' of a provision is treated as amendment which signifies deletion of that pro-vision and is not different from repeal. It has been held that there is no real distinction between repeal and an amendment. It has also been held that where a provision of an Act is omitted by an Act and the said Act simultaneously re-enacts a new provision which substantially covers the field occupied by the repealed provision with certain modification, in that event such re-enactment is regarded having force continuously and the modification or changes are treated as amendment coming into force with effect from the date of enforcement of re-enacted provision. When a Central Act has been adopted under Article 252 by a State by a resolution passed by the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State, the amendment or repeal of the Central Act by Parliament does not affect its continuance as a State Act unless the Central amending or repealing Act is also adopted under Article 252 by the State by a resolution of the House or Houses of the Legislature. Substitution of a provision results in repeal of the earlier provision and its replacement by the new provision. Substitution thus combines repeal and fresh enactment. Sometimes the expression used in the later statute runs: a) all provisions inconsistent with the Act are repealed, or b) all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, or'all laws and parts of laws in conflict herewith are expressly repealed”. Provisions of this character leave the question open as to what laws are inconsistent and are intended to be so repealed. One view therefore is that here is a case not of express repeal but by implication and therefore all rules of law which apply to implied repeals generally will be applicable to repeals brought about in the aforesaid manner. The question naturally arises in such cases as to the extent or scope of the repeal. Thus where a repealing clause expressly refers to a portion of the prior Act, the remainder of such Act will not usually be repealed, as presumptions raised that no further repeal is necessary, unless there is irreconcilable inconsistency between them. In like manner, if the repealing clause is by its terms confined to a particular Act, quoted by title it will not be extended to an Act upon a different subject. And a general Act repealing all Acts inconsistent therewith, will usually apply to general Acts and not to special or local laws. The reason behind this rule, according to Crawford finds its foundation in two premises: the special Act is not repealed because it is not named, or because there is no absolute inconsistency between the general Act and the special Act. Consequently, if the repealing Act named the special Act or if the two were irreconcilably inconsistent, the special Act would also be terminated. Where there is direct reference in the

repealing clause to a particular Act, it is a case of express repeal. But where there is no direct reference, the matter will have to be determined by taking into account the exact meaning and scope of the words contained in the repealing clause and the principles of law which govern the interpretation of the same. Principles governing the cases of implied repeal can in such a case be called in aid to determine whether there is effective repeal of the earlier statute. Court has to suppose that the Government have a consistent design and policy and intend nothing that is inconsistent or incongruous. Prior statutes are held to be repealed by implication by subsequent statutes if the prior enactment is special and the subsequent one is general. This rule must not be pressed too far. If a special enactment and a subsequent general enactment are absolutely repugnant and inconsistent with one another, the Courts have no alternative but to declare the prior special enactment as repealed by the subsequent general Act. In all such cases the legislative intention, rather than grammar or letter of the enactment, is the determining factor. If the intention is found to be to sweep away all previous orders and to establish one rule for all belonging to a class of persons that will be sufficient to get rid of any previous special provision. There is no doubt that repeal by implication is just as ...