Joint and Solidary Obligations PDF

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SECTION 4. JOINT AND SOLIDARY OBLIGATIONS ARTICLE 1207. THE CONCURRENCE OF TWO OR MORE CREDITORS OR OF TWO OR MORE DEBTORS IN ONE AND THE SAME OBLIGATION DOES NOT IMPLY THAT EACH ONE OF THE FORMER HAS A RIGHT TO DEMAND, OR THAT EACH ONE OF THE LATTER IS BOUND TO RENDER, ENTIRE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRESTATION. THERE IS A SOLIDARY LIABILITY ONLY WHEN THE OBLIGATION EXPRESSLY SO STATES, OR WHEN THE LAW OR THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATION REQUIRES SOLIDARITY. BY: JEIROME DOMINGO (1) Joint Distinguished from Solidary Obligations In a joint obligation “each obligor answers only for a part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs only a part of the correlative rights.” Whereas, in “a solidary or joint and several obligation, the relationship between the active and the passive subjects is so close that each of the former or of the latter may demand the fulfillment of or must comply with the whole obligation.” (8 Manresa 194). Stated otherwise, the following are the maxims to remember: (a) Joint Obligations — “To each his own.’’ (b) Solidary Obligations — “One for all, all for one.” (2) Examples For Joint Obligations: (a) A and B are joint debtors of C to the amount of P1,000,000. C can demand only P500,000 from A, and only P500,000 from B. (b) A and B are joint debtors of C, D, E, and F, who are joint creditors to the amount of P1,000,000. C may demand only P125,000 from A, and P125,000 from B. D, E, and F, have the same rights as C. For Solidary Obligations: (a) A and B are solidary debtors of C to the amount of P1,000,000. C can demand the whole P1,000,000 from A. A in turn, after paying C, can ask reimbursement from B to the amount of P500,000. (b) A and B are solidary debtors of C, D, E, F, solidary creditors, to the amount of P1,000,000. Any creditor, like C, can demand from any debtor, like A, the whole P1,000,000. In turn, C has to give P250,000 each to D, E, and F. B has to reimburse A for P500,000 which is really B’s share of the obligation. (3) General Rule and Exceptions Where there are two or more debtors or two or more creditors, the obligation is: General Rule — Joint Exceptions — (a) when there is a stipulation in the contract that the obligation is solidary (b) when the nature of the obligation requires liability to be solidary (c) when the law declares the obligation to be solidary (4) Some Instances Where the Law Imposes Solidary Liability (a) obligations arising from tort (b) obligations arising from quasi-contracts (c) legal provisions regarding the obligations of devisees and legatees

(d) liability of principals, accomplices, and accessories of a felony (e) bailees in commodatum (5) Query May the obligation be joint on the side of the creditors and solidary on the side of the debtors or vice-versa? ANS.: Yes. “In such cases, the rules applicable to each subject of the obligation should be applied, the character of the creditors or the debtors determining their respective rights and liabilities.” (8 Manresa, pp. 201-202). Examples: (a) A and B are joint debtors of C, D, E, and F, solidary creditors to the amount of P1,000,000. How much can C collect from A? ANS.: C is a solidary creditor, so presumably he can collect the whole debt. But since A is only a joint debtor, C is entitled to collect only P500,000 from A. A and B are solidary debtors of C, D, E, and F, joint credi- tors to the amount of P1,000,000. How much can C recover from A? ANS.: Since C is only a joint creditor, he can only recover his share which is P250,000 from A, a solidary debtor. (NOTE: Had C been solidary creditor, he could have recovered P1,000,000 from A; had A been a joint debtor, and C, also a joint creditor, C could have recovered only P125,000 from A.) (6) Some Decided Cases Uk Pa Leung v. Nigorra 9 Phil. 381 FACTS: The defendants, as partners in the management of a bakery, owed the plaintiff the amount of P43.35. The trial court ordered each of the defendants liable for the whole amount (in solidum). Nigorra appealed this point. ISSUE: In the absence of any fact or law which would make the defendants solidarily liable, are they jointly or solidarily responsible? HELD: The presumption is that they are only jointly liable. Hence, Nigorra should pay only half of the debt. Pimentel v. Gutierrez 14 Phil. 49 FACTS: Three persons signed a contract. No words were used to make each liable for the whole amount. HELD: Each one is liable only for his proportion or aliquot share of the obligation. “If three persons sign a contract under the provisions of the Civil Code, and no words are used to make each liable for the full amount, each is only liable for the proportionate amount of the contract. From a reading of the contract in question, it will be seen that it is una obligacion mancomunada

y no solidaria and that the three debtors are not liable separately for the payment of the whole amount. They are each liable for an aliquot part of the original obligation.” De Leon v. Nepomuceno and De Jesus 37 Phil. 180 FACTS: In an election contest, the protestee and the intervenor were sentenced to pay the costs and expenses of the contest. Issue: Is the obligation joint or solidary? HELD: The obligation is joint. “A final judgment for costs and expenses in an election contest providing that the costs and expenses of the intervenor is a joint and NOT a joint and several judgment for costs and expenses.” “If a judgment does not specify how certain debtors are bound it is presumed that they are bound ‘jointly’ and not ‘solidarily’.’’ (Uk Pa Leung v. Nigorra, 9 Phil. 381; Floriano v. Delgado, 11 Phil. 154; White v. Enriquez, 15 Phil. 113; De Leon v. Nepomuceno and De Jesus, supra). Parot v. Gemora 7 Phil. 94 FACTS: Two people borrowed money and signed a promis- sory note promising to pay “juntos o separadamente.” Are they jointly or solidarily liable? HELD: They are solidarily liable. “We are of the opinion, and so hold that the phrase ‘juntos o separadamente’ used in this promissory note, is an express statement, making each of the persons who signed it individually liable for the payment of the full amount of the obligation contained therein. The phrase juntos o separadamente used in a contract creates the same obligation as the phrase mancomun o insolidum. The words ‘separadamente’ and ‘insolidum’ used in a contract in connection with the nature of the liabilities of the parties are sufficient to create an individual liability.” Calo, Jr. v. Cabanos L-19704, Oct. 19, 1966 If a father is a debtor and he dies, his heirs, up to the value of the inheritance, are liable. Thus, before the heirs share in the inheritance, the debt must first be paid. Thus also, it is not accurate to say that the heirs are solidarily liable for the debt of their father. Oriental Commercial Co., Inc. v. Felix Lafuente (C.A.) 38 O.G. 947 FACTS: To guaranty the obligation incurred by Felix Laf ente, a group of men executed a bond in favor of the Oriental Commercial Co., where they promised to answer “individually and collectively for the total amount.” ISSUE: Are the sureties here jointly or solidarily liable? HELD: They are solidarily liable, and everyone is individually responsible for the full payment of the obligation. Worcester v. Ocampo, et al. 22 Phil. 42 FACTS: A and B were both responsible in causing an in- jury to C through their (A’s and B’s) negligence. C brought an action against both. A maintains that his liability is only joint, not solidary. Issue: Are joint tortfeasors (those liable for a tort) jointly or solidarily liable?

HELD: They are solidarily liable. “If several persons jointly commit a tort, the plaintiff or the person injured has his election to sue all or some of the parties jointly, or one of them separately because the tort is in its nature a separate act of each individual. (1 Chidey, Common Law Pleadings 86). It is not necessary that the cooperation should be a direct, corporeal act. It may be stated as a general rule that joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate, aid or abet the commission of a tort or who approve of it after it is done. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent, and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.” (Cooley on Torts, 133; Moir v. Hopkins, 16 Ill. 313). Abella v. Co Bun Kim, et al. 100 Phil. 1019 ISSUE: What is the liability of a debtor and the receiver of his property (as assignee in insolvency) — joint or solidary? HELD: The rules concerning joint and solidary obligations (obligaciones mancomunadas y obligaciones solidarias) require a plurality of subjects (creditors, debtors, or both), and have no application when there is only one creditor and one debtor, even if payment is to be made by several individuals, representing one and the same interest or debtor. Thus, the liability of a debtor and the receiver of his property in a litigation cannot be said to be joint or solidary because the receiver does not represent an interest completely distinct and separate from the owner of the property, but is merely the custodian of the property, and an extension of the personality of the latter. Tamayo v. Aquino L-12634-12720, May 29, 1959 FACTS: A, registered operator (in the Public Service Com.) of a common carrier, sold the vehicle to B without prior approval of the Commission. B then operated the vehicle. An accident took place one day, injuring a passenger of B. Issue: Are A and B jointly or solidarily liable? HELD: Only A, the registered owner is liable, but he can recover indemnity from B. Since only one is liable, the distinction between joint and solidary liability does not exist. A is liable as a result of the culpa contractual (not culpa aquiliana) because the vehicle was still registered under his name. This is true even if the property had already been sold to another at the time the accident took place. If the rule were otherwise, a registered owner can easily evade responsibility by collusion with others who may possess no property to answer for the damages. (See Erezo v. Jepte, GR L-9605, Sept. 30, 1957). NOTE: In Caners, et al. v. Arias, et al., (Court of Appeals) GR L-24881-R, March 4, 1961, it was held that if the vehicle which figured in an accident was operated under the so-called “kabit system,” the award of exemplary damages, among others, payable jointly and severally by the operator and the grantee of the certificate of public convenience is justified. This pernicious system is not only a violation of law but a fraud upon the trav- elling public, which has a right to expect that the holder of the certificate be the one to actually operate his transportation line, hire the drivers, and other employees and exercise the necessary supervision over them. Jereos v. Court of Appeals L-48747, Sept. 30, 1982 In a civil action due to a quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana), the registered owner, the actual owner, and the driver of the jeep involved are solidarily liable. (See Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103; Tamayo v. Aquino, 105 Phil. 949; and De Peralta v. Mangusang, 120 Phil. 582).

Fe Perez v. Josefina Gutierrez, et al. L-30115, Sept. 28, 1973 FACTS: Gutierrez, holder of a certificate of public convenience and authorized to operate an auto-calesa in the province of Davao, sold the vehicle to Alajar. The sale, at the time of the accident, had not been approved by the Public Service Commission, and was therefore not registered with such Commission. Later, thru the reckless imprudence of its driver, Cordero, the vehicle met an accident resulting in injuries to Perez, one of its passengers. ISSUE: Who should be held liable to Perez? HELD: The registered owner, Gutierrez, should be the one directly liable to Perez (See Erezo v. Jepte) despite the transfer of the vehicle to another. In dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the public has right to presume that the registered owner is the actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the action for damages for injuries caused to them by vehicles being negligently operated, if the public should be required to prove who the actual owner is. The transferee, however, should in turn be responsible to the registered owner for in operating the vehicle without its transfer having been approved by the Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as an agent of the registered owner and should be responsible to him. The driver should also be held liable solidarily with Gutierrez to Fe Perez in accordance with the provisions of Art. 2184 in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. (NOTE: The driver was also held liable on the basis of a quasi-delict, there being no contractual relation between him and the passenger.) Gonzales v. Halili, et al. L-11521, Oct. 31, 1958 The liability of two motor vehicle drivers convicted for in- juries thru reckless imprudence is solidary. Consequently, the employer of each of them is also solidarily liable with respect to his subsidiary liability, as said liability must necessarily be co-extensive with the judgment against his employee. Republic Planters Bank v. CA GR L-93073, Dec. 21, 1992 In the case at bar, the solidary liability of private respondent Fermin Canlas is made clearer and certain, without reason for ambiguity, by the presence of the phrase “joint and several” as describing the unconditional promise to pay to the order of Republic Planters Bank. A joint and several note is one in which the makers bind themselves both jointly and individually to the payee so that all may be sued together for its enforcement, or the creditor may select one or more as the object of the suit. A joint and several obligation in common law corresponds to a civil law solidary obligation, i.e., one of several debtors bound in such wise that each is liable for the entire amount, and not merely for his proportionate share. By making a joint and several promise to pay to the order of Republic Planters Bank, private respondent Canlas assumed the solidary liability of a debtor and the payee may choose to enforce the notes against him alone or jointly with defendant Shozo Yamaguchi and Pinch Manufacturing Corp. as solidary debtors. As to whether the interpolation of the phrase “and (in) his personal capacity” below the signatures of the makers in the notes will affect the liability of the makers, the Court does not find it necessary to resolve and decide, because it is immaterial and will not affect the liability of private respondent Canlas as a joint and several debtor of the notes. With or without the presence of said phrase, private respondent Canlas is primarily liable as a co-maker of each of the notes and his liability is that of a solidary debtor.

ARTICLE 1208. IF FROM THE LAW, OR THE NATURE OR THE WORDING OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO WHICH THE PRECEDING ARTICLE REFERS THE CONTRARY DOES NOT APPEAR, THE CREDIT OR DEBT SHALL BE PRESUMED TO BE DIVIDED INTO AS MANY SHARES AS THERE ARE CREDITORS OR DEBTORS, THE CREDITS OR DEBTS BEING CONSIDERED DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, SUBJECT TO THE RULES OF COURT GOVERNING THE MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS. BY: JAYSON CALVENTAS Kung mula sa batas, o sa katangian o sa pagkakasalita ng mga obligasyon na tinutukoy sa naunang artikulo ay hindi makikita ang kabaligtaran, ang kredito o utang ay dapat ituring na nahahati nang pantay sa sindaming bilang ng mga nagpautang o may utang, at ang mga kredito o mga utang na ito ay ituturing na hiwalay sa isa’t isa; ito man ay napaiilalim din sa Mga Panuntunan ng Hukuman na namamahala sa mga maramihang demanda. JOINT LIABILITY each debtor is liable for his own debt each creditor can collect only that which is due him SOLIDARY LIABILITY each debtor may be held liable for the whole amt. each creditor may collect the whole amt. due all creditors “solidarily liable” “each debtor may be compelled to pay the whole obligation” EXAMPLE 1 2 ARTICLE 1209. IF THE DIVISION IS IMPOSSIBLE, THE RIGHT OF THE CREDITORS MAY BE PREJUDICED ONLY BY THEIR COLLECTIVE ACTS, AND THE DEBT CAN BE ENFORCED ONLY BY PROCEEDING AGAINST ALL THE DEBTORS. IF ONE OF THE LATTER SHOULD BE INSOLVENT, THE OTHERS SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR HIS SHARE. BY: JEIROME DOMINGO COMMENT: (1) Indivisible Joint Obligation This Article speaks of an indivisible joint obligation (in- divisible — referring to the OBJECT; joint — referring to the TIE between the parties, who are merely proportionately liable, unless solidarity has been stipulated by the parties or the law, in which case, it is called a solidary indivisible obligation). (2) Example of a Joint Indivisible Obligation A and B are jointly liable to give C this particular car. (3) Manresa’s Comment “The obligation is in a sense midway between the joint and the solidary, although it preserves the two characteristics of the joint obligation in that: (a) no creditor can do an act prejudicial to the others, and (b) no debtor can be made to answer for the others. The peculiarity of this obligation, however, is that its fulfillment requires the consent of all the debtors, although each for his part. On the side of the creditors, collective action is also required for acts which may be prejudicial.” (8 Manresa 197). (4) Characteristics

(a) The obligation is joint but since the object is indivisible, the creditor must proceed against ALL the joint debtors (Art. 1209), for compliance is possible only if all the joint debtors would act TOGETHER. (b) Demand must, therefore, be made on ALL the joint debt- ors. (c) If any one of the debtors does not comply with his monetary obligation for damages. (Art. 1224, Civil Code; 8 Manresa 237-238). (d) If any of the joint debtors be insolvent, the others shall not be liable for his share. (Art. 1209, Civil Code). (NOTE: The obligation to pay monetary damages is of course no longer indivisible, and therefore, the creditor may go against each debtor individually, subject to the provisions of the Rules of Court.) (e) If there be joint creditors, delivery must be made to all, and not merely to one, unless that one be specifically authorized by the others. (f) Each joint creditor is allowed to renounce his proportionate credit. (5) Example A, B, and C are jointly liable to give a particular car worth P1.2 million in favor of D, E, F, and G. A is insolvent and the debtors, therefore, cannot purchase the car to give to the credi- tors. D and E have renounced their rights. The debtors are not in default. How much can each of the creditors get from each of the debtors? ANS.: Since this is a joint and indivisible obligation and since the car cannot be given, it is converted into an obligation to give indemnity for damages. Since this is a joint obligation, each debtor is proportionately liable and each creditor is only entitled to his proportional credit. P1.2M divided by 3 = P400,000 (the total debt of each debtor) P 400,000 divided by 4 = P100,000 (the credit belonging to each joint creditor, not from each joint debtor). A is insolvent, and his share will not be included in the liability of B and C. Therefore: (a) D and E having renounced their rights, they get (b) F has not renounced his right, so he can get P100,000 from B and P100,000 from Over A, F has the rights of creditor over an insolvent debtor. (c) G has exactly the same rights as F. (6) A Demand by One Joint Creditor Is Not a Demand by the Others In a joint indivisible obligation, if one of the joint creditors makes a demand upon one of the debtors, there is no doubt that the debtor is in default with reference to the demanding creditor’s share. Is she also in default with reference to the others? ANS.: Although it would seem that the answer is YES, because this act benefits, and does not prejudice the others, and is therefore implicitly what the law provides (See 8 Manresa 197), still it should be borne in mind that the credits are still independent of one another (See by analogy from the decision of the Supreme Court of Lousiana, Buard v. Lemes Syndic., 12 Robinson’s Reports, p. 243), and, therefore, the answer should be NO.

ARTICLE 1210. THE INDIVISIBILITY OF AN OBLIGATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY GIVE RISE TO SOLIDARITY. NOR DOES SOLIDARITY OF ITSELF IMPLY INDIVISIBILITY. BY: JOHANNES AQUINO Maaring habulin ng kreditor ang sino man sa mga solidary debtors, ilang sa kanila or kahit lahat sila ng sabay sabay. Ang pagha...