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G.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983
DOLORES VILLAR v DEPUTY MINISTER INCIONG

Facts:

Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, and the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo Manufacturing (hereinafter referred to as Com...

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G.R. No. L-50283-84 April 20, 1983 DOLORES VILLAR v DEPUTY MINISTER INCIONG Facts: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, and the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo Manufacturing (hereinafter referred to as Company). The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations, which agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last 60 days of the CBA, events transpired giving rise to the present dispute. On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company, including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (referred to as FUR) filed a petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter. The petition was opposed by PAFLU. Thereafter, employees who signed with PAFLU signed a resolution stating their withdrawal from PAFLU and authorizing FUR to be their sole bargaining agent. Invoking the security clause in the CBA, PAFLU demanded the dismissal of the members of fur, which the company granted. Issue: WON the right to self-organization has been impaired. Held: No. It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But this Court has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non- union membership. Petitioners became non-union.

Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely be raised. Under the peculiar facts of the case, we find petitioners' insistence untenable. A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. Where in a closed-shop agreement it is stipulated that union members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately be dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively cognizable by the CIR.

Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering 10, were among the 96 who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" whereas there are 234 union members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the union to remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the majority must, therefore, prevail over that of the minority members.

G.R. No. L-22228 February 27, 1969 PAFLU, SOCIAL SECURITY SECRETARY OF LABOR

SYSTEM

EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION-PAFLU v

Facts: The Registration of Labor Organizations — hereinafter referred to as the Registrar — issued a notice of hearing of the matter of cancellation of the registration of the SSSEA, because of failure to furnish the BLR with copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly verified by affidavits, in violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875. After hearing, the certification was cancelled. Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents, the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association — hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA — which is affiliated to the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions — hereinafter referred to as PAFLU — as well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of RA 875. Issue: WON section 23 violates freedom of assembly and association. Held: No. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section is not a limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with or without said registration. The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations". The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses, fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly

accredited agents of the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore, the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts of money due to them or to the organization.

Sec. 23 does not impinge upon the right of organization guaranteed in the Declaration of Human Rights, or run counter to Art. 2, 4, 7, which provide that "workers and employers shall have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing, without previous authorization"; that "workers and employers organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by administrative authority"; that "the acquisition of legal personality by workers' and employers' organizations, shall not be made subject to conditions of such a character as to restrict the application of the provisions" above mentioned; and that "the guarantees provided for in" said Convention shall not be impaired by the law of the land.

G.R. Nos. L-18778 and L-18779

August 31, 1967

UNITED SEAMEN v DAVAO SHIPOWNER Facts: On August 4, 1959, USUP presented a set of demand to DSA, representing the respondent shipping companies, for union recognition, union security, standardization of wages and other benefits. In response, the ship owners brought to the attention of the USUP the existence of a CBA with the Davao Marine Association (DMA), where all of the crewmen of their launches belonged. They suggested to the USUP that they first take the necessary steps for certification as the collective bargaining agent, as the ship owners were bound by the CBA until 1959. However, even before receiving the ship owner’s response to its demands, the USUP had filed a Notice of Strike against the individual ship owners at the Department of Labor Davao Office. The Chief of the Labor Operations Section of the Davao Office requested for a conference to solve the conflict. On August 20, 1959, both parties reached a covenant stating the withdrawal of the Notice of Strike, as well as the observance of the status quo regarding the jobs incident to the businesses of the DSA and the withdrawal of the civil case of the DMA against the USUP. It was also stipulated in the contract that the USUP will respect the existing CBA between DSA and DMA, but USUP will file a petition for certification election for determination of union representation. As stipulated, the USUP filed with the CIR a petition for certification election. Subsequent to the covenant, the shipping companies separately served notices of termination upon 64 employees, effecting December 31, 1959, due to different reasons (from stoppage of operations to the death of one of the partners of the shipping companies due to business losses). As a result, USUP reported the terminations to the Department of Labor, which called for a conference. Nevertheless, on December 29, 1959, the USUP notified the Philippine Constabulary, City Mayor, Bureau of Customs and the general public of a strike on January 1, 1960.

On February 11, 1960, the shipping companies filed a petition for writ of injunction, as a necessity due to irreparable damage to properties due to “coercion, violence and illegal picketing”. On the other hand, on February 24, 1960, the USUP filed a ULP case against the ship owners and DSA, alleging that the ship owners interfered, and continued to interfere with their right to selforganization by discrimination against employees. CIR however sided with the DSA, dismissing the USUP’s ULP case while declaring the strike as illegal. Issue:

WON the strike was legal.

Held: No. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court’s findings that the USUP’s Notice of Strike was but a direct offshoot of the “losing effort” to compel the DSA and the ship owners to recognize USUP as the sole collective bargaining agent of the employees, to the exclusion of the DMA as the existing collective bargaining agent of the DSA. First, the Court noted that the USUP filed its Notice of Strike even before its receipt of the ship owner’s answers to its set of demands, thereby showing that the USUP was already set on continuing the strike with or without the answer of the ship owners. This, according to the Court was a clear showing that USUP was aware of the existence of DMA as a valid collective bargaining agent, operating as a legal bar to entertaining USUP’s demands. Second, the Court stated that USUP completely disturbed the status quo – the return to normal and original operating practices through the strike that was done by USUP. By striking, USUP impaired existing CBA between the shipowners and the DMA which recognized "the right of the Employer to hire, promote and transfer and for legal cause suspend, lay-off or discharge employees subject to the right of the union (referring to the DMA) to notification and to ask reconsideration of any action of the Employer in the premises." It could not also be said that the DSA violated the covenant of August 20, 1959, as it was stated that the DSA was not a party thereto. Even assuming that the shipping companies were bound by the covenant, the termination of the

employees was not considered to be a violation of the covenant, as the dismissals were predicated on legitimate reasons. Third, the existence of the CBA should have deterred USUP from acts tending to force its recognition as a union. The employees concerned were bound by the CBA between DMA and the ship owners, but instead of going through the procedure as stated in their CBA for grievance machinery. Fourth, it was stated by the Court that, even granting that the purpose of the strike was valid, the fact still remained that the means employed by the employees on strike were far from legitimate, as shown by the fact that the USUP used acts of violence and coercion.

G.R. Nos. 64821-23

January 29, 1993

UNIVERSITY OF PANGASINAN FACULTY UNION v NLRC Petitioner filed various complaints against UPang in NLRC Dagupan, mostly for non-payment of allowances. The complaints were dismissed. Petitioner's contention that the cases filed by Consuelo Abad as its president should affect, not only herself, but all the other union members similarly situated as she was, is well taken. The uncontroverted allegation of the petitioner is that it is the holder of Registration Certificate No. 9865-C, having been registered with the then Ministry of Labor and Employment on February 16, 1978. As such, petitioner possessed the legal personality to sue and be sued under its registered name. Corollarily, its president, Consuelo Abad, correctly filed the complaints even if some of them involved rights and interest purely or exclusively appertaining to individual employees, it appearing that she signed the complaints "for and in behalf of the University of Pangasinan Faculty Union." The University's contention that petitioner had no legal personality to institute and prosecute money claims must, therefore, fail. What should be borne in mind is that the interest of the individual worker can be better protected on the whole by a strong union aware of its moral and legal obligations to represent the rank and file faithfully and secure for them the best wages and working terms and conditions. . . . Although this was stated within the context of collective bargaining, it applies equally well to cases, such as the present wherein the union, through its president, presented its individual members' grievances through proper proceedings. While the complaints might not have disclosed the identities of the individual employees claiming monetary benefits, such technical defect should not be taken against the claimants, especially because the University appears to have failed to demand a bill of particulars during the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter. On the merits of the petition, the NLRC did not abuse its discretion in resolving the appeal from the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Tumang except for the

disallowance of the emergency cost of living allowance to members of the petitioner.

GR No. L-30241 June 30,1972 MACTAN WORKERS UNION VS ABOITIZ 47 SCRA 517 FACTS: Defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. in Lapulapu City is employing laborers and employees belonging to two rival labor unions. Namely plaintiff, Mactan Workers Union(MWU) and intervenor appellant Associated Labor Union (ALU). On November 28, 1964, the defendant Cebu Shipyard & Engineering Works, Inc. and the Associated Labor Union entered into a ‘Collective Bargaining Agreement which mandate a profit sharing bonus of 10% of its net income derived from the direct operation of its shipyard and shop in LapuLapu City for its labourers and workers. The profit sharing bonus shall be paid by the company to ALU of which ALU will deliver it to the employees. Unclaimed bonuses shall be returned to the management. The delivery should be in 2 instalments, 1st payable in March and the 2nd payable in June every year. In 1965, the 2nd instalment given in June were not received by members of the rival Mactan Workers Union (MWU) because they did not went to the ALU office to receive their shares. After the 60 day period has lapse, ALU returned the funds to the management with an advice to management to refrain from delivering the amount to the members of MWU without a court order otherwise ALU will take steps to protect the interests of its members. Because of the warning from ALU, the company deposited the amount of P4,035.82 with the Labor Administrator. The MWU filed a case with the lower court to recover the amount. The lower court ordered the company to deliver the sum of money to ALU and for ALU to pay the members of MWU their corresponding shares. Hence, the appeal of intervenor ALU. ISSUE: WON Intervenor ALU only represent its members and not the entire workforce of Defendant company HELD: Petition dismissed.

The Labor Union that gets the majority vote as the exclusive bargaining representative does not act for its members alone. It represents all the employees in such a bargaining unit. It is not to be forgotten that what is entitled to constitutional protection is labor, more specifically the workers, not labor organizations. That is the Raison D’etere of labor unions. Nevertheless, it is not to be forgotten that what is entitled to constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically the working men and women, not labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities through which their welfare may be promoted and fostered. That is the raison d’etre of labor unions. The utmost care should be taken then, lest in displaying an unyielding, intransigent attitude on behalf of their members, injustice be committed against opposing labor organizations. In the final analysis, they alone are not the sole victims, but the labor movement itself, which may well be the recipient of a crippling blow. Moreover, while it is equally understandable that their counsel would take advantage of every legal doctrine deemed applicable or conjure up any defense that could serve their cause, still, as officers of the court, there should be an awareness that resort to such a technique does result in clogged dockets, without the least justification especially so if there be insistence on flimsy and insubstantial contentions just to give some semblance of plausibility to their pleadings. Certainly, technical virtuosity, or what passes for it, is no substitute for an earnest and sincere desire to assure that there be justice according to law. That is a creed to which all members of the legal profession, labor lawyers not excluded, should do their best to live by.

G.R. No. 96189

July 14, 1992

UP v HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA

The Organization of Non-Academic Personnel of UP (ONAPUP) filed a petition for certification election with Bureau of Legal Relations (BLR). It claimed to represent 33% of all the non-academic personnel of UP-Diliman, Los Baños, Manila, and Visayas. The University made no objections thererto, but the All UP Workers’ Union opposed the same and asked that the appropriate organizational unistructure be first defined. It alleged that its membership composed of both academic and non-academic rank-and-file (RnF) employees (EEs) of UP. The University then made a comment on such that there should indeed be 2 distinct unions, one for academic EEs and the other for the non-academic EEs, considering their dichotomy of interests. Director Calleja however declared that the appropriate bargaining unit should comprise of both groups, stating that the intent of EO 180 was to not fragmentalize the employer (ER) unit. The University also sought to exclude from the bargaining unit EEs holding supervisory positions, alleging that there still existed that held supervisory powers over her other EEs. Director Calleja upheld her earlier ruling, interposing that the policy-making powers contemplated in the case merely pertained to academic matters and not as under the Labor Code. UP’s Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, hence this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON academic and non-academic EEs of UP should comprise a single collective bargaining unit.

HELD: No. Although the country’s labor laws fail to provide a criterion for determining the proper bargaining unit, even EO No. 180 only stated that the appropriate organizational unit. A “bargaining unit” has been defined as a group of employees, consistent with equity to the ER, cases have shown the 4 criterion to consider;(1) will of the employees; (2) affinity and unit of employees' interest,

such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) employment status, such as temporary, seasonal probationary employees. Out of the four, it is the “community/mutuality of interests” test that stands out the most. Applying the same, it's clear that the acad and non-academic personnel’s respective interests contradict with each other, and in effect, failed to satisfy the “community/mutuality of interest test.” Contrarily, the 2 obviously share a dichotomy of interest or dissimilarity in the work. Thus, the 2 separate and distinct bargaining units, one unit is for academics and the other for nonacademic unit personnel, is essential to assure it to all the EEsthe exercise of their collective bargaining rights. A "bargaining unit" is a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective intere...