Lecture 2-1 Defensive Developmentalism Online Lecture PDF

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Lecture 2-2 Defensive Developmentalism

Slide 2 In the air 1800s+ images 1-3

Last time, I explored the meaning and practice of the Eastern Question largely in the Arab-speaking regions of the Middle East with you. Today we continue that conversation by examining how radical ideas and institutions were translated by or imposed on the sultans of the Ottoman Empire and on the Qajar dynasty of Iran in the same period. It is important to bear in mind that societal reforms are almost always engendered as a series of conversations between ruler and ruler, negotiations resulting from both peaceful and violent means. The French and American Revolutions of 1789 and 1776 respectively are the most common markers for most historians of the beginning of the modern age, when freedom from slavery and constitutionalism drive the overthrow of autocratic governments the world over. Image 1-2 The audacious invasion of Egypt in 1798 by Napoleon Bonaparte is similarly advanced as the arrival of the modern world into the Middle East, bringing with it whiffs of freedom, republicanism, new forms of brotherhood and equality of citizenship. Image 3The revolts against the late Ottoman government arose from many sources: deprivation, military losses, excessive taxation, oppressive governors, but many of them as time went by, and the Great Powers intervened more regularly and forcibly on the behalf of the non-Muslim populations, were stimulated and justified by the calls for self-determination, equality and constitutionalism.

Slide 3 Modernity & Modernization slide 4-6 just illustrative of cities of the era

We use such terms as modernity, nationalism, constitutionalism and citizenship often without reflecting on their meaning. What did it mean to be “modern”? in 1800? In 1850, in

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1900 –even now? Do we ask the question anymore? What did populations in the Balkans, in North Africa, and Eurasia imagine constitutionalism might mean? And what pressures, domestic and external, were brought to bear on an autocratic system like the Ottoman Empire, itself caught up in a series of absolutely essential reforms to military and economic institutions simply as a matter of survival. It is this cauldron of change, reform and resistance that you will be exploring for the next little while.

Slide 4: collapse or survive

We have seen how the global economic forces played out in the imperialism of the Eastern Question, but what of the responses of these societies by the rulers whose right to retain power was under threat of dissolution? Gelvin uses the term Defensive Developmentalism, by which he means how Ottoman sultans and Persians shahs (the Qajars) found themselves at a deep disadvantage against the modernized armies of Europe, and embarked on campaigns to modernize societies with radical, defensive, top-down measures. Military reform was the first priority, but in order to support that, bureaucratic reforms, i.e. the creation of new ministries and administrations; economic reform, including equal and fair taxation systems, and societal reforms, such as access to universal education, were equally imperative.

Slide 5Qajar Great Game

Qajar Iran (formerly Persia) stood on its own on the margins of our Eurasian map – image 7 – never having been incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. Defensive developmentalism Iran took a different path than in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire to which we return shortly. The Qajars arose in the eighteenth century out of the dissolution of the Shiite

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Safavid Empire – rivals of the Ottomans – in roughly the territory we understand as Iran today. Historians are puzzled by the Qajar dynasty – image 8 which apparently never actually ruled except as the main power broker in territories otherwise autonomous, tribal and remote. Here, the Eastern Question played out as the “Great Game,” as the Qajars found themselves between two Great Powers, Russia and the British, and basically unable to prevent their rivalries over Persian resources.

Slide 6 defensive developmentalism – Iran

Not that they did not try: nationalism and constitutionalism had its part to play here as well: a new model army, the Cossack Brigade – image 9 and the creation of a military academy Dar la-Funun meant that new elites were encouraged and educated, but the Qajars were forced to agree to concessions of natural resources to raise revenues – in 1872, the Reuter Concession, was given a private contract to an investor to build all of Qajar’s infrastructure in Isfahan and Tehran. Public objections – from the religious class (ulema) and merchants alike – forced the cancellation, but it continued. Again, in 1890, a European investor persuaded Persian officials to sell of the entire Tobacco industry for a period of 55 years – again rescinded at public protest. In 1901, William Knox d’Arcy secured the rights from the Qajars for petroleum exploration and production, which the British government then turned into the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which had earned the British government some 40 million pounds by 1923. Image 10 The Qajars, deeply indebted, had little choice. But the important point is that the Great Game clearly set the template for the future.

Slide 7: The Egyptian version Mehmet Ali

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The Ottoman sultan(s) Mahmud II (1807-39) and Abdulhamit II (1876-1908), were equally engaged with remaking their societies in fundamental, disruptive and often divisive ways, a rocky road to then current ideas of a modern state, or a “modern” society. So too in Egypt, where an independent governor, image 11 Mehmet Ali (Muhammad Ali), an Albanian Ottoman soldier, assumed power, and almost succeeded in bringing down the Ottoman government in Istanbul, except for the intervention of the Great Powers to prop up the “Sick Man of Europe” in the 1840s. Mehmet Ali, often heralded as the founder of modern Egypt, succeeded in negotiating an agreement with Istanbul and the Great Powers that his heirs would govern the territory of Egypt, which they did until 1952, even when occupied by Britain in 1882.

In order to compete or withstand not just the foreign incursions of troops and financiers, but his Ottoman overlord in Istanbul, Mehmet Ali reorganized his army, rebuilt his financial institutions, introduced uniform legal practices, and new educational systems, all of which enabled the rise of local elites who had access to the benefits of the reforms. Reforms in Egypt began with the military. Building the new army along Napoleonic and Prussian models proved expensive and very difficult to impose on peasant populations. It has been estimated that Mehmet Ali eventually had ten to twelve percent of his peasant population under arms by the 1840s, some 250,000 strong. Image 12 The impact on a largely agricultural system is obvious. Armies required leadership – the building of a class of officers, administrators and bureaucrats was another major aspect of the reforms, officers thus educated in ways that fostered an independent-minded class, as we will see challenged the Qajar dynasty in 1905 and Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamit II in 1908.

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Slide 8: Egypt: Further reforms

Reforms required revenue. Mehmet Ali tackled the abusive tax farming systems which siphoned off much need revenue long before it reached the government, and created cash crops, leading to the foreign indebtedness we saw last time – in effect, short-term gain for long-term pain. Egypt became a plantation economy. Middle East leadership understood that local manufacturing was one of the necessary reforms, and there were attempts at establishing local industries – but foreign investors discouraged it, both in Cairo and Istanbul, unless they were directly involved in the financing – as exports in the manufactured goods of Europe was an essential part of the new global trading system, and the Middle East proved a ready market. Other notable reforms of the Mehmet Ali period in Egypt included sending students to Europe 1813; introducing non-religious (secular) education in 1834; creating a School of Languages in 1835, and rebuilding his navy. Image 13

The impact on the larger population, the unsustainable military challenge in Syria and the stress and economic demands of the reforms led to massive revolts, bankruptcy and further takeover intervention and takeover by foreign powers and investors as we described last time. Image 14

Slide 9 Defensive develpmentalism – the Ottoman version.

For the Ottoman sultans in Istanbul, similarly, it was a matter of survival. Neglected, the whole edifice was on the verge of collapsing. As with Egypt and Persia, domestic issues and European encroachment and interference in Ottoman territories were two of the major reasons why the Ottomans undertook programs of major reform. Survival, however, hinged on the need

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to reform virtually all aspects of the administration of the empire, including the military, bureaucracy, and socio-religious structures of the state. Image 15-16 The European Powers, particularly Britain, encouraged the reformist impulses of the Ottoman administration, because they believed that it would strengthen the Ottoman Empire and ensure the balance of power in Europe as the best bulwark against Russian ambitions.

The Ottomans believed that reform could help to court and at times avert foreign intervention in the Empire; they also believed that the only way to save the empire was through European-style reforms. Hence, as with Mehmet Ali in Egypt, the Ottoman sultans relied heavily on European models in almost all aspects of their reform – military manuals and techniques were adopted from France and Germany; models of modern bureaucracies, taxation and property reforms, law reforms, constitutionalism, and citizenship came from France, England, latterly Germany and Italy.

Slide 10: Ottoman Military reforms

Three phases of reform were carried roughly in Ottoman territories in the long nineteenth century. Two will be discussed here – the third we will return to in the next unit on WWI.

The first wave of reforms that can be described as top-down defensive developmentalism was image 17 Sultan Selim III’s New Order (Nizam-i Cedid) 1789-1807. Selim sought to strengthen the central administration through bureaucratic reform and to overhaul the military. He particularly tried to eliminate the Janissaries, image 18, the elite fighting force whose effectiveness had dwindled since the 18th century and collapsed utterly in the menu Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-74 mentioned last time. Selim II rebuilt his navy and

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supply systems, concentrating on reorganizing arms production and the grain supply system. He was the first sultan to send Ottoman representatives to European courts after 1793, radicalizing Ottoman approaches to diplomacy. Major reforms to tax generation were also on the agenda, but proved very difficult to implement. In other words, a major overhaul of the ways in which the Ottomans conducted business was attempted, but public resistance, and insufficient administrative structures meant that the sultans were only nibbling at the edges of the significant problems facing the empire.

Selim III did introduce new, European style disciplined troops, but only at the margins of the main military organization. It was a beginning, if unsuccessful. Brought down by a revolt of the Janissaries in 1807, Selim III was murdered in the violence that followed and his new army was dismantled. His successor image 19 Sultan Mahmud II, however, waited patiently, and assumed the mantle of reform more successfully, finally eliminating menu the Janissary Corps on the streets of Istanbul in 1826.

Mahmud II then embarked on a radical reorganization, including a completely new military organization 1827– Asakir-i Mansure, later the Nizamiye, image 20which was based on the first empire-conscription of the Muslim population; 1834 – Provincial Reserve Army; 1838 – Military council; new schools & administration; schools for Military: Surgeons, Engineering; as with Mehmet Ali, sultan Mahmud sent students abroad for education.

Mahmud II major problem was the decentralization and semi-autonomous nature of provincial territories, where local tax farmers had become state bureaucrats and prevented the proper flow of revenues to the capital. The sultan, whose ferocity won him the title “the infidel sultan” set out to recentralization the provinces, and build a modern, wage-based bureaucracy in 7

the capitol. His innovations include the first census of the population, the first official newspaper (1831); a new translation bureau in 1833, even new dress – obvious in the images here of the new uniforms, but also on the streets of Istanbul where the Fez, worn first by soldiers, became the ubiquitous headgear of the population.

Slide 11 Anglo-Ottoman Trade Treaty of 1838 – Gelvin 166 image 21 leave document in place for this paragraph

But the long struggle with Mehmet Ali over control over Egypt, which included the invasion of Syria by Mehmet Ali and his son Ibrahim from 1820-1840, forced Mahmud II to accede to intervention by the foreign powers – first turning to Russia, and then signing with Britain the Anglo-Ottoman Trade Treaty of 1838 – essentially a favored nation treaty – to secure military aid in the defense of Istanbul against Mehmet Ali, which gave the British rights to domestic production and semi-colonial status to the Ottomans.

Slide 12: The Great Transformation: Tanzimat 1839-76 – Gelvin 167-69

The second phase was known as the Tanzimat (Re-ordering), the period between 1839 and 1876 and progressed over the course of the reigns of two Ottoman sultans, Abdülmecid I and Abdülaziz I. The major aims of the Tanzimat were to create, in theory, an Ottoman citizenship with equal rights for all subjects, notwithstanding religious confession. The first package of reforms, known as the Hatt-i Şerif of Gülhane, was issued in 1839. It promised the establishment of new institutions that would guarantee all Ottoman subjects security of honor, property and taxation, a new system for military conscription, and the abolition of tax-farming. In issuing the decree, Abdülmecid was signaling his support for a more modern system of

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governance in order to compete with the European Powers. The second major reform decree under the umbrella of the Tanzimat reforms was the Islahat Fermanı, or Ottoman Reform Edict of 1856. Through this decree, Abdulmecid I reaffirmed the stipulations of the Gulhane edict.

In effect, it reaffirmed the sultan’s wish to treat all subjects equally, and introduced new rights for non-Muslim subjects of the sultan, including greater authority for religious leaders of the separate confessional communities. The decree, which was included in the text of the Treaty of Paris of 1856, and brought an end to the Crimean War (1853-56), demonstrates the influence of Britain and France on the Ottomans in reissuing the sultan’s previous promises, and is a direct consequence of Eastern Question politics, to which we will return shortly next time.

Slide 13 Ottoman Constitutionalism 1876-1908

The third reformist movement, 1876-1908 was the short lived constitutional period of Sultan Abdülhamid II, image 23 who came to power after the deposition of his brother Murad V. Murad had been overthrown by the Young Ottomans, a group of constitutionalists, who insisted that the new sultan enact a constitution and hold parliamentary elections. The sultan kept his promise and elections for the image 24 Ottoman parliament were held, and the parliament was formally opened in March 1877. With the outbreak of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78, and the Russians practically at the gates of Istanbul in February 1878, Abdülhamid I formally prorogued the parliament. He went on to rule as an autocrat for over thirty years until his removal by coup d’etat in 1909. We will return to the next phase of the Eastern Question beginning in the 1870s,

but efore that, we need a look at the new national movements that

engaged populations in discussions about the role of their governments and their rights in these societies in transition. 9...