Legal and Judicial Ethics Case Digest PDF

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Case Digest DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW LIST OF CASES Legal and Judicial Ethics LEGAL ETHICS I. Sources of Ethical Standards A. Primary Sources 1. Constitution 2. Code of Professional Responsibility 3. Rules o...

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Legal and Judicial Ethics Case Digest

DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW LIST OF CASES Legal and Judicial Ethics LEGAL ETHICS I. Sources of Ethical Standards A. Primary Sources 1. Constitution 2. Code of Professional Responsibility 3. Rules of Court 4. New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary 5. Rules of Court 6. MCLE 7. SC Decisions, Resolutions, Circulars 8. IBP Issuances B. Other Legal Sources 1. Civil Code provisions 2. Revised Penal Code provisions 3. Special Laws II. Practice of Law (Rule 138) A. Concept 1. Definition of the practice of law 2. Practice of law is a privilege, not a right 3. Law as a profession, not a business or trade 4. Essential Criteria B. Qualification for Admission to the Bar Bar Matter No. 1153, amending Section 5 and 6 of Rule 138 C. Continuing requirements for membership in the Bar 1. Good moral character 2. Citizenship Reacquisition of the privilege to practice law in the Philippines under R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 3. Good and regular standing (Rule 138) 4. Membership in the IBP 5. Payment of professional tax 6. Compliance with MCLE

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D. Appearance of Non-Lawyers 1) Law student practice rule (Rule 138-A) 2) Non-lawyers in courts 3) Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals 4) Proceedings where lawyer are prohibited from appearing as counsels E. Sanctions for practice or appearance without authority 1) Lawyers without authority 2) Persons who are not lawyers F. Public officials and the practice of law 1) Prohibition or disqualification of former government attorneys 2) Public official who cannot practice law or can practice law with restrictions G. Lawyer's Oath

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Jurisprudence 1.

Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. 100113, September 3, 1991. Paras, J.

Practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. Taking into consideration the modern definition of practice of law and the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments. Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination. Cayetano opposed and challenged the nomination and the subsequent confirmation of the Commission because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. ISSUE: Whether or not Monsod possesses the required qualification for the position of Chairman of COMELEC. (YES) HELD: The case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava stated that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with the grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. After passing the Bar, he worked in his father’s law office. Monsod also 4

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worked as an operations officer for World Bank Group (1963-1970). Upon his return to the Philippines, he worked as Chief Executive officer of Meralco Group, and subsequently rendered service to various company either as legal and economic consultant or as chief executive officer. He also served as former Secretary General (1986), and National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987), as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987) and Davide Commission (1990), and as Chairman of Committee on Accountability of Public Officers. Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyerlegislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. 2. Re: Atty. Edillon A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978. Castro, C.J.

Requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession. FACTS: Atty. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. In 1975, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" notwithstanding due notice pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP. In his pleadings, conceded to the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, but questions the all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to pay membership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right in the sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewise questions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body. ISSUES: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar may be compelled to pay the required membership fee in IBP.

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RULING: An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar xxx. The Court sees nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. Such compulsion is justified as a valid exercise of the police power of the State over an important profession. 3.

Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 792, January 25, 2006. Per Curiam

"Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances." The circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault. The Court also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. FACTS: Atty. Dizon was driving his car along Abanao Street in Baguio when a taxi driver, Soriano, overtook the car driven by Dizon who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, Dizon tailed the taxi, pulled it over, and berated Soriano and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, Soriano forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. Soriano got out of his car to help him get up. But Dizon, now enraged, stood up immediately and boxed Soriano on the chest. Dizon fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box Soriano, but the latter caught his fist

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and turned his arm around. Soriano held on to Dizon until he could be pacified and then released him. Dizon went back to his car and got his revolver. As Soriano was handing the eyeglasses of Dizon which fell on the ground, Dizon fired and shot him on the neck. Soriano was brought to the hospital and would have surely died had he not received timely medical assistance. Dizon was eventually convince of frustrated homicide, but was granted probation, conditioned of payment of civil liabilities. However, according to Soriano, Dixon still has yet to fulfill his obligation to pay such liability. Soriano then filed a complaint for disbarment against Dixon before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to which the Commission recommended Dizon’s disbarment for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude. (In this case, YES) RULING: Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." In International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, the Court explained that it had the discretion to determine whether a crime involves moral turpitude. As further explained, "Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances." Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character. In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. As the IBP correctly found in the present case, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law. Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer's assault. The Court also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.

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4. Re: Telesforo Diao v. Martinez, A.C. No. 244, March 29, 1963. Bengzon, J. As provided by the Rules, the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath that previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.” Further, passing the Bar examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it and passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. FACTS In 1953, Telesforo Diao was admitted to the Bar. About 2 years later, Severino Martinez charged him having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The Solicitor General investigated and later recommended Diao’s name to be erased from the roll of attorneys because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, Diao had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially in the following particulars: (a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and (b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal education". Diao admits the first charge, but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of U. S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school. As to the second charge, he asserted he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records. ISSUE Whether or not Diao should continue practicing law despite not completing the prelaw requirements. (NO)

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RULING Diao’s explanation is not acceptable since the “error” or “confusion” was of his own making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948- 1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree, and then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests because the Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education.” Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it and passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examination is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential. 5. Re: Atty. Jose Principe, Bar Matter No. 543, September 20, 1990. 6. PAFLU v. Binalbagan, G.R. L-23959, November 29, 1971. Reyes, J.B.L. Section 24, Rule 138, Rules of Court imports the existence of attorney-client relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney’s fee. Such relationship cannot exist unless the representative is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. FACTS In Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo titled, "PAFLU, et al, vs. Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al.,” the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final and executory. Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's hen equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and Tenazas filed a manifestation indicating their nonobjection. Then, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer. The records of case show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by Muning. The Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwaters as compensation where10% of such was awarded to Muning who is not a lawyer. In this petition, the

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10% award given to Muning was sought to be voided. ISSUE Whether or not a non-lawyer may recover attorney’s fee for legal services rendered. (NO) RULING In Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., it was stated that an agreement providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case. The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 provides that, "In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel . . ." is no justification for a ruling that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that, "it ...