NGO – Government Collaboration: An Uneasy Alliance PDF

Preview

Summary

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D. 1 Towson University NGO – Government Collaboration: An Uneasy Alliance? Abstract An important but often overlooked consideration in NGO understanding is why NGOs choose to collaborate with government. Collaboration with NGOs in developing countries has been linked to an increas...

Description

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

1

Towson University

NGO – Government Collaboration: An Uneasy Alliance? Abstract An important but often overlooked consideration in NGO understanding is why NGOs choose to collaborate with government. Collaboration with NGOs in developing countries has been linked to an increase in failed states and the inherent lack of capacity to provide basic social services to citizens. Thus, NGOs are left to fill in the service delivery gap. NGO and state relations has never been an easy one in Africa; each is suspicious of the other, yet their collaboration is essential for the effective redevelopment of a failed state. The distrust and suspicious is attributable to differences in organizational structure, culture, forms, work style, and motivations of each actor. For collaborations to be successful, it must span power perspectives, values, resources, norms and cultures (Brown and Ashman, 1996). Despite the promise and benefits of NGO and government collaboration in developing countries, not much attention has been given to factors that affect NGO state collaboration. This paper attempts to answer the question: what are the factors that affect collaboration between NGOs and the state in developing countries?

Key words: collaboration, NGO, service delivery, failed states

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

2

Towson University

Introduction Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have risen as global partners in meeting pressing needs and challenges around the world such as famine, poverty, natural and manmade disasters, and other human and social development needs (Grant Space, 2013). The rise in NGOs in developing countries and the corresponding rise in fragile and failed states is documented by Salamon and Anheir (1998) who posits that broad range of political, economic and societal patterns constrain a state provision of social services. We see the rapid increase in NGOs in developing countries as a result of wars, lack of accountability and transparency, lack of capacity, and high incidence of corruption. This in turn affects the state’s ability to provide basic social services and functions such as security, governance, or education due to poverty or violence. When states cannot meet the needs of its citizens, NGOs fill in the gap either by providing the service themselves, or by collaboration with recipient government to provide the services. Thus, the focus of this paper is to expand our understanding of the mechanisms that motivate collaboration between NGOs and government in developing countries. This paper addresses the question: what are the factors that affect collaboration between NGOs and the state? Specifically, it addresses what are the factors that affect collaboration between NGOs and the state? Collaborative arrangements are heralded by organizations such as the World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), United Nations, and others such as CARE and OXFAM, for NGOs to provide social services like health care, education,

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

3

Towson University

maternal care, wells, and other employment related usually provided by the government (Whaites, 1998). However, the alliance is often an uneasy one with each party wary of the intentions of the other. Collaboration between states and NGOs especially after a disaster – natural or manmade provides relief to citizens and also a government that is often crippled under the weight of ongoing social, economic and social issues. Forming these collaborative relationships between the state and NGOs allows resources and expertise to be combined; which allows for outcomes to be achieved that would not have been possible individually (Dimaggio and Anheier 1990; Clarke 1998). The question guiding this paper is based on the idea that despite the promise and benefits of NGO and government collaboration in developing countries what motivates NGO collaboration with the state. What are the factors that affect collaboration between NGOs and the state? NGOs provide a wide range of services to communities that the government cannot reach. Through collaborating with the state, they provide education to disenfranchised groups, repatriate refugees’ after conflicts, as well as engage government on issues of transparency and accountability (Salamon and Anheier, 2001). Previous research has indicated that NGOs usually grow out of economic crisis as well as patrimonial traditions (Young 2004, Roitman, 2005), very little is known about what motivates NGOs to collaborate with the state in developing countries. Thinking of NGOs as an extension of a government is not a new idea. In his writings, Tocqueville (1863) describes how non-governmental actors strengthen the state by providing needed social services. Similarly, Putnam et al (1993) noted improved government performance through the actions of civil associations. Prior studies have mostly looked at the collaborative

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

4

Towson University

relationship between NGOs (Foster and Meinhard 2002; Guo and Acar 1995; Sowa 2010) but did not extend the research to investigate collaborative between NGOs and the state, and what factors motivate the collaboration. Though this has broadened our theoretical understanding of NGO – government relationships, it does not fully reveal the complexities of the relationship and its impact. I argue that without a proper understanding of the impact of NGO- government relationships in developing countries, the likelihood of obtaining false results is high. Literature Review Non-governmental Organizations The definition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provided by the literature is varied and ambiguous. Though the exact definition remains contested, it covers a range of organizations not considered part of government or state (Willet, 2001, Anheier, 2012). The World Bank notes that NGOs are “many groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and that have primarily humanitarian or cooperative rather than commercial objectives”. Further, Salamon and Anaheir, (1997) postulate a definition as “NGOs are self-governing non-profit organizations which seek to promote their particular mission such as the advancement of international human rights”. Even with no generally acceptable definition of NGOs, Willett (2001) posits that three characteristics exclude some organizations from being considered as an NGO. The first characteristic he notes is that NGOs cannot be government agencies or political party. This means they are not affiliated directly with the government and should not seek political power through their social services. Even though NGOs consider themselves independent, many of them receive a bulk of their income from government. The second characteristic Willett (2001) note is that NGOs should not seek to generate profit. Finally,

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

5

Towson University

he notes that criminal groups (though they do not belong to government) should be excluded from what it means to be an NGO. NGOs have emerged as important global actors in providing services in most parts of the developing world. They advocate on behalf of the poor, provide clean water, healthcare, education, monitor the government and other human and social development issues. Structurally, NGOs can be small, large, flexible, bureaucratic, formal and informal. They are also externally funded, and some rely on resources mobilized locally (Kirlin and Reid, 2004). Thus, NGOs are considered independent, neutral organizations that promote economic, social, and political change. For example, in developing countries, NGO growth is a result of states inability to meet the basic needs of citizens. Even though the exact definition is contestable, Cleary (1997) notes that NGOs pursue activities to relieve suffering, advocate for the poor, promote community development and capacity building, and provide social and environmental services. NGOs also differ in their size, scope, geographic location as well as their area of focus. For example, NGOs may be private and voluntary organizations in the United States and individuals may make donations to help people in the developing world. In most developing countries however, NGOs are widely viewed as voluntary organizations that help improve socio-economic conditions. Thus, because of the varied definitions of NGO, this paper uses a broad definition of the concept to capture the diversity of the NGO sector in developing countries. Collaboration Collaboration is a term that is widely used with no accepted definition (Rosenber et al, 2010). As Wood and Gray (1991) posits, scholars have put forth several definitions of the term based on outcomes, process, or preconditions of the collaborating relationship. A concise

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

6

Towson University

definition of collaboration is provided by Sink (1998) “process by which organizations with a stake in a problem seek mutually determined solution [pursuing] objectives they could not achieve working alone”. This means that collaborations can be seen as negotiated terms created by those who have a stake in the problem. Therefore, membership is voluntary with each member maintaining their autonomy, decision-making powers, and sharing resources to increase capacity (Wood & Gray, 1991). In the context of NGOs collaborating with the state in developing countries, there needs to be close dependency and mutual cooperation in order for the collaboration effort to work. This is especially important if there is a mandate to collaborate from a donor agency. The relationship between NGOs and the state in developing countries is complex, multifaceted, and beyond the scope of this paper. However, the relationship is based less on structure and political status, and more on how resources and strategies are shared (Coston, 1998; Najam, 2000). In this context, Coston (1998) notes that collaborations are partnerships based on power balance and formal agreements in a pluralistic institutional atmosphere. The assumption Coston (1998) makes in NGO state collaboration is that power will often reside with governments of developing countries making collaboration inauthentic. Thus, NGOs are relegated to lower levels in the partnership relationship. Najam (2000) on the other hand, provides a collaborative model of NGO state partnerships based on the ends and means of both actors. This means that when goals are the same, a cooperative relationship exists. Consequently, when goals are dissimilar, the relationship is confrontational. When looking at collaboration from a comparative perspective, and in

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

7

Towson University

particular in this context, collaboration can almost be viewed as orders from important stakeholders. However, collaboration by these actors should be more than passive acceptance of mandates, because if we are to accept the definition put forth so far, it also requires that collaborating actors retain their autonomy. NGO- State Collaboration The collaborative relationship between NGOs and developing countries is built on a confusing array of typologies aim at capturing the complex way NGOs interact with the state (Teamey, 2010). The variation in typology ranges from competition, collaboration, control, cooperation and coordination (Ullah, 2006). Despite the variations, typologies of NGO state relationships share common variables on how the relationship should be classified. For instance, Brinkerhoff (2003) presents a matrix that represents NGO government partnership evidenced by degrees of mutuality (horizontal vs. hierarchical) based on accountability, equality and coordination in decision-making. The author also notes that the relationship is based on each partner’s ability to maintain organizational identity such as constituencies, assets, mission, culture, values, and skills. Ramanath and Ebrahim (2011) classify NGO state partnership based on the policy and political space made available to NGOs by the state. This means that the state has the power to control and constraint the political space for NGO operation. Similarly, Clark (1991) implies that NGOs can complement, or reform the state based on the current political and social context. Young (2000) uses comparative analysis and identifies the non-profit sector as complementary, supplementary, or adversarial to the activities of government. At the supplementary level, when demands for services are left unfilled by the other sectors (government for example), nonprofits

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

8

Towson University

step in to deliver the service. At the complimentary level, the nonprofit is placed in a power position because government comes to rely on the sector for service delivery. At the adversarial level is when nonprofits force the hand of government to provide services (Young, 2000). These perspectives can also be used to view NGOs state relationship. When government fails because they lack the political will, NGOs will provide the services. In terms of complementarity, the state relies on NGOs to provide the services because they have the capacity and expertise. NGOs will often advocate on behalf of the poor and marginalized by shedding light on their plight thereby forcing the state to act. Another approach in viewing NGO state relationship is put forth by Najam (2000). The author indicates that NGO state relationship is subject to a form of push and pull between the collaborative actors as they strategies in achieving their own ends and means. This means that NGOs are not just responding to the demands of the state but rather act strategically in how they interact with the state. Najam’s (2000) framework offers a different lens through which to view NGO state relationship by stipulating under which conditions the actors may collaborate. For example, Najam (2000) postulates that NGOs and the state will collaborate when they have the same end and means. However he notes that they may be co-opted by the other where they have the same means but divergent goal. Figure 1. The Four-C’s of NGO-Government Relations (Najam, 2000) Ends Means

Similar

Dissimilar

Similar

Cooperation

Co-optation

Dissimilar

Complementarity

Confrontation

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

9

Towson University

Heins (2005) conceptualizes NGO state relationship using game theory concepts. The author notes that variation in NGO state relations exists based on different spatial and temporal domains. He posits that states and NGOs are rational actors, and that NGOs have “mixedmotive” with the state. This means that NGOs values and those of the state are partly in harmony and partly in conflict (Heins, 2005). For example, though many developmental NGOs prefer non- war to war, they rather collaborate with war ravage states to non-war states. Theoretical Framework With NGOs increasing at the rate they are, scholars have begun to pay attention and address why they collaborate. Previous studies have addressed and clarified the results of collaboration in other sectors; however, there is no dominant theory to explain why NGOs collaborate. The lack of a unified theoretical framework underscores the complexities of collaboration (Galaskiewicz and Bielefeld 1998; Guo and Acar 2005; OSowa 2008). For this reason, this research utilizes multiple theories – institutional theory and resource dependency theory - to understand the collaboration between NGOs and the state in developing countries Political Theory Institutional theory deals with social structures (norms, rules) and the process by which the structures become established as principles to guide social behavior (Scott, 1995). Thus, the basic assumption of institutional theory is organizations seek legitimacy through structural adjustment of external institutions, including funders (Bailey and Koney 2000; Gray and Wood 1991; Sowa 2008). For example, Oliver (1990) suggests that institutions put pressure on organizations to explain their activities and outputs (p. 246). Based on these pressures, it is assumed that organizations are motivated to appear to agree with prevailing and existing norms

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

10

Towson University

beliefs and expectations. Thus, NGOs may respond to these institutional pressures by supporting any mandates to collaborate and model their behavior based on their funders’ behavior (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Sowa 2008; Bailey and Koney 2000; Gray and Wood 1991) The literature seems to suggest that funder mandate to collaborate will lead to collaboration in the NGO sector. For example, Sowa (2008) argues that when a funder establishes a mandate that NGOs collaborate, then NGOs will collaborate at the level dictated by the funder. Rapp and Whitfield (1999) concurs that funders emphasis on partnerships will force NGOs to collaborate. Thus, NGOs will collaborate when mandated directly or encouraged to collaborate as indicated by Institutional theory. When NGOs work collaboratively, they increase their legitimacy to funder and by extension secure their funding. Based on the above, the following proposition is derived: Institutional theory states that organizations within the same environment (isomorphic environment) will adopt similar objectives, programs, forms, and structure (Dimaggio and Anheier 1990; Reitan 1998). Further, scholars note that these organizations mimic the behavior of those organizations they depend on for funding (Dimaggio and Anheir 1990, 87). Proscio (2006) implies that interaction among funders in developing countries is often limited. Thus, it is hypothesized that: A starting point for the resource dependency theory is that successful organizations will maximize their resources (Pfeffer 1981). This theory posits that faced with an unstable resource environment, and competition, organizations will collaborate to gain access to resources (Compston 2009; Foster and Meinhard 2003; Guo and Acar 2005; Oliver 1990; Singer and Yankey 1991; Sowa 2008). The driving force behind collaboration is the need to access

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

11

Towson University

resources for survival (Sowa 2008). Organization will attempt to balance the interdependence, which arises out of the need to secure resources, with maintaining their autonomy, which is a challenge of collaboration (Bailey and Koney 2000; Foster and Meinhard 2002; Gray and Wood 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Reitan 1998). Further, the existing literature on resource dependency theory suggests an examination of the financial resources of NGOs and the state since funding is the main resource at stake. In the context of developing countries, most NGOs operate in an unstable and unpredictable resource environment. In this type of environment, the theory suggests that NGOs will collaborate with the state to gain access to resources. For example, NGOs may collaborate with the state on a joint proposal, which may appeal to funders. As Sowa (2008) notes this ensures the NGOs survival.

Aminata Sillah, Ph.D.

12

Towson University

References: Barauh. P (2007) Assessment of public–private–NGO partnerships: Water and sanitation services in slums. Natural Resources Forum 31 (2007) 226–237 Clarke, Gerard (1998) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing World. Political Studies 46(1): 36-52. Coston, J. M. (1998). A model and typology of government-NGO relationships. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 27(3), 358-382. Dimaggio, Paul and Helmut Anheier (1990). The Sociology of Nonprofit Organizations and Sectors. Annual Review of Sociology 16:137-159. Dimaggio, Paul and Walter Powell. (1983). The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. American Sociological Review 48(April)...