Noel Carroll \'Hume\'s Standard of Taste\' Summary PDF

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Summary of Carroll's paper on Hume's aesthetics...

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Noel Carroll on Hume’s Standard of Taste Hume identifies a paradox: aesthetic taste seems subjective, yet some artworks seem to be objectively better than others… Sentiments are incorrigible (true by being believed): none represent what is in the object, so our responses are ‘right’ in that we do respond as we do. However, there nevertheless seems to be an objective standard. a) Rules of art, discovered via observation: as a matter of contingent fact, works are crafted in accordance will prude pleasure. b) Proper conditions for the operation of rules of art are rarely satisfied when most people appraise artworks – so diversity explained by the fact that in most cases, personal/circumstantial features interfere in the operation of the work in producing sentiment. c) So, need to turn to experts in adjusting to the correct circumstances. Causation and Understanding What is the causal trigger for sentiment? Sympathy/utility? Peter Jones: Hume aware too of intentional nature of perceptual objects – e.g. good sense situates artworks within genre framework of expectations. So understanding and reasoning as a precondition for proper operation of good taste – Contra e.g. Burke, who takes aesthetic appreciation to preclude reasoning. For Hume, a lot is going on intellectually: must identify category and purpose of a work – must imaginatively postulate alternate structures. But this suggests aesthetic response is not an unmediated perceptual, causal response. So part of the pleasure is intellectual/cognitive? Pleasure in the interpretation – searching for meaning, understanding structural principles… Can also self-consciously enjoy art – so not necessarily passive spectators. Would have no need to revisit artworks in hope of more full experience, if simple causal model applied. So, need to add account of aesthetic response as active pleasures, derived in part by exercise of cognitive powers. Liking and Assessing

Conflation: ‘liking’ vs crticially ‘assessing’… More rational, not necessarily a matter of preference. Critics when they evaluate artworks aren’t just stating personal preferences, but offering reasons why an artwork is good. Hume’s critics don’t just evaluate in terms of ‘liking’, but engage in reasoning… ‘ We have already observed, that no objects are, in themselves, desirable or odious, valuable or despicable; but that objects acquire these qualities from the

particular character and constitution of the mind, which surveys them. To diminish therefore, or augment any person's value for an object, to excite or moderate his passions, there are no direct arguments or reasons, which can be employed with any force or influence. The catching of flies, like DOMITIAN, if it give more pleasure, is preferable to the hunting of wild beasts, like WILLIAM RUFUS, or conquering of kingdoms, like ALEXANDER.*74 I.XVIII.35

But though the value of every object can be determined only by the sentiment or passion of every individual, we may observe, that the passion, in pronouncing its verdict, considers not the object simply, as it is in itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances, which attend it. A man transported with joy, on account of his possessing a diamond, confines not his view to the glistering stone before him: He also considers its rarity, and thence chiefly arises his pleasure and exultation. Here therefore a philosopher may step in, and suggest particular views, and considerations, and circumstances, which otherwise would have escaped us; and, by that means, he may either moderate or excite any particular passion.’

So ideal critics taste seems different because not just expressing their preference – seems very different to an affectionate response. Is it even necessary to like an artwork to judge it as e.g. a good example of its genre? Carroll’s example of Stephen King a ‘bad writer’ who he very much enjoys. Thus, seems to be no necessary connection between liking an artwork, and judging it to be good… the central paradox of Hume stems from this confusion. Carroll doesn't abstract his argument from these examples, I think the argument would go like this: certain properties of aesthetic objects are "good-making" properties (such as symbolic den- sity, structure, etc.). The existence of these proper- ties in an object can be noted without their provoking any kind of affective response in the observer. Since an object which has good-making properties is an aesthetically good object, aesthetic evaluations can be made by pointing out the relevant goodmaking features. In giving reasons, the critic cites these good-making features. The major problem wit Objection: Violates putative principle that aesthetic judgements must be based on experience. But a critic without emotion can experience an artwork – so objection depends on specific reading of ‘experience’ where it requires emotion, sensation, etc as separate from intellect. Circularity    

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X disagrees with Y over whether an artwork is good. To resolve a dispute, we could find a good critic/a group of them Problem: to find a good critic, one must already know what good artworks are. To discover whether an artwork is good, ask a good critic. To find a good critic, find someone with the qualities; to decide if he has these properties, check if he approves of good artworks. Kivy’s solution: some of the identifying features of critics do send us in circles. Practice, and use of comparison, for example… what are they practicing with, and making comparisons

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between? But, he denies delicacy of taste is problematic, as delicacy of taste, argued Hume, tends of be accompanied by delicacy of passion, so could independently ascertain. But, questionable psychological hypothesis. Still, good sense and prejudice can be identified independently. Kivy’s regress problem: Smith and Jones disagree about whether the critic has good sense. So the value judgement is pushed back. Carroll’s response: Kivy is saying that the two might disagree over the definition of good sense… but unproblematic for Hume, as he specifies the criteria: ability to relate parts to whole, determine purposes, etc. It’s a matter of fact whether someone has these properties. Can drop ‘good’… this is just to have sense. If the problem is ‘what’s so good about sense’, then again, no problem with Hume, as the burden of proof then lies with Smith to explain why he thinks Hume is wrong. Kivy shifts focus of disagreement from debate about circle, to debate about Hume’s theory!

Redundancy Problem    

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Anyone could have the attributes of a good critic. Hume wants something apart from an individual response, to ground the standard of taste in matters of fact. The idea that everyone is a critic seems antithetical for Hume. His theory assumes an entity view of objectivity: X is subjective means X is in some subject; objective means existing independently of the subject’s experience. So, the standard cannot be located within individual’s appreciate response. What if we instead accept an intersubjective view of objectivity? If we reject Hume’s theory, then the fact that in principle everyone could be a critic means that in principle, consultations with critics are not needed....