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DEPOSIT Deposit in General and its Different Kinds Article 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the ...

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DEPOSIT Deposit in General and its Different Kinds Article 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. (1758a) • • If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no deposit but some other contract. • • Derived from the word “depositum” of the Roman Law. NOTE: it is essential that the depository is not the owner of the thing deposited. Parties to a Deposit: 1. Depositary – to whom the thing is deposited. 2. Depositor – the one who deposits the thing. Characteristics: 1. Real contract – because it can only be perfected by the delivery of the object of the contract. However, an agreement to constitute a future deposit is a consensual contract and is therefore binding. NOTE: There is no consensual contract of deposit; there is only a consensual promise to deliver which is binding if such is accepted. 2. Unilateral (gratutitous deposit) - only the depositary has an obligation. Unless there is: a. Contrary agreement; or b. The depositary is engaged in the business of storing goods, like a warehouseman. 3. Bilateral (onerous deposit) - gives rise to obligations on the part of both the depositary and depositor. Notes: - The principal purpose is safekeeping, so that if it is only accessory or secondary obligation, deposit isn’t constituted - Deposit may be entered into orally or in writing. (Art. 1969) - If person having capacity accepts a deposit made by one who is incapacitated, the former shall be subject to all the obligations of a depositary & may be compelled to return the thing by the guardian or the person himself if he acquired capacity. (Art. 1970) - If deposit made by capacitated person to someone who is not, depositor shall only have action to recover the thing while still in latter’s possession or compel latter to pay him the amount w/c he may be enriched

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• However, if a 3rd person who acquired the thing acted in bad faith, the depositor may bring an action against him for its recovery (Art. 1971)

- The depositary isn’t liable in cases of loss by force majeure or by gov’t order. HOWEVER, he has the duty to deliver to the depositor money or another thing he receives in place of the thing. (Art. 1990) Article 1963. An agreement to constitute a deposit is binding, but the deposit itself is not perfected until the delivery of the thing. (n) Binding effect of agreement to deposit. A deposit is a real contract and is, therefore, perfected only upon delivery of the object of the contract. Where there has been no delivery, there is merely an agreement to deposit which, however, is binding and enforceable upon the parties. Hence, a contract of future deposit is consensual. (see Art.1934.) Article 1964. A deposit may be constituted judicially or extrajudicially. (1759) Kinds of Deposit (Art. 1964) 1. Judicial – takes place when an attachment or seizure or property in litigation is ordered (Arts. 2005-2008) 2. Extra-judicial (Art. 1967) a. Voluntary – delivery is made by the will of the depositor or by 2 or more persons each of whom believes himself entitled to the thing deposited (Art. 1968) b. Necessary – made in compliance w/ a legal obligation, or on the occasion of any calamity, or by travelers in hotels & inns (Arts. 1996-2004) or by travelers w/ common carriers (Arts. 1734-1735) Article 1965. A deposit is a gratuitous contract, except when there is an agreement to the contrary, or unless the depositary is engaged in the business of storing goods. (1760a) - Contract of deposit is generally gratuitous (Art. 1965) • • There is a contrary stipulation • • Depositary is in the business of storing goods • • Property saved from destruction during calamity w/o owner’s knowledge; just compensation should be given the depository (Art. 1996[2] & 1997[2]) Article 1966. Only movable things may be the object of a deposit. (1761) Subject matter of deposit. (1) Only movable or personal property may be the object of extrajudicial deposit, whether voluntary (Art. 1968.) or necessary. (Art. 1995.) Article 1966 proceeds from the object of a deposit which is safekeeping of a thing. The possibility that the thing may disappear or may be lost or stolen is not present in real property. Thus, the delivery of the keys of a house cannot be considered as a deposit of the same, and entrusting its care and custody is, juridically, an agency. (11 Manresa 671.)

(2) Judicial deposit (Arts. 2005-2006.), however, may cover movable as well as immovable property its purpose being to protect the rights of parties to a suit. Only corporeal things contemplated. Article 1966 does not embrace incorporeal or intangible property, such as rights and actions, for it follows the person of the owner, wherever he goes, and is not, by reason of its incorporeality, susceptible of custody in the tangible sense that deposit is juridically understood. True it is that the deeds or documents in which those rights are contained can be the object of deposit, but in such a case, they are only the materialized and representative expression of the rights. (11 Manresa 671.) Article 1967. An extrajudicial deposit is either voluntary or necessary. (1762) Kinds of extrajudicial deposit. Deposit is generally voluntary. It becomes necessary in the three cases mentioned in Articles 1996 and 1998, i.e., when made in compliance with a legal obligation, on the occasion of any calamity, or by travellers in hotels and inns. The deposit of goods made by travellers or passengers with common carriers may also be regarded as necessary. (supra.) Cases: BPI vs. IAC, 164 SCRA 630. Facts: Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account and a peso current account. An application for a dollar drat was accomplished by Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon. In the PPLICtion, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dolar savings account of the Zshornacks. There wasa no indication of the name of the purchaser of the dollar draft. Comtrust issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explainaiton from the bank. In its answer, Comtrust claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8450 issued by the manila banking corporation payable to Ernesto. Issue: Whether the contract between petitioner and respondent bank is a deposit? Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the US$3,000.00 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornack at a later time. Thus, Zshornack demanded the return of the money on May 10, 1976, or over five months later. The above arrangement is that contract defined under Article 1962, New Civil Code, which reads: Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is NO DEPOSIT but some other contract. Chan vs. Maceda, 402 SCRA 352 Facts: On July 28, 1976, Bonifacio S. Maceda, Jr., herein respondent, obtained a P7.3 million loan from the Development Bank of the Philippines for the construction of his New Gran Hotel Project in Tacloban City. Thereafter, on September 29, 1976, respondent entered into a building construction contract with Moreman

Builders Co., Inc. They agreed that the construction would be finished not later than December 22, 1977. Respondent purchased various construction materials and equipment in Manila. Moreman, in turn, deposited them in the warehouse of Wilson and Lily Chan, herein petitioners. The deposit was free of charge. Unfortunately, Moreman failed to finish the construction of the hotel at the stipulated time. Hence, on February 1, 1978, respondent filed with the then CFI an action for rescission and damages against Moreman. On November 28, 1978, the CFI rendered its Decision rescinding the contract between Moreman and respondent and awarding to the latter P445,000.00 as actual, moral and liquidated damages; P20,000.00 representing the increase in the construction materials; and P35,000.00 as attorney‘s fees. Moreman interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals but the same was dismissed on March 7, 1989 for being dilatory. He elevated the case to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari. In a Decision dated February 21, 1990, the Court denied the petition. On April 23, 1990 an Entry of Judgment was issued. Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, respondent ordered petitioners to return to him the construction materials and equipment which Moreman deposited in their warehouse. Petitioners, however, told them that Moreman withdrew those construction materials in 1977. Hence, on December 11, 1985, respondent filed with the RTC an action for damages with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment against petitioners. Issue: Whether or not respondent have the right to demand the release of the said materials and equipment or claim for damages. Ruling: At the outset, the case should have been dismissed outright by the trial court because of patent procedural infirmities. Even without such serious procedural flaw, the case should also be dismissed for utter lack of merit. Under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts are binding upon the parties (and their assigns and heirs) who execute them. When there is no privity of contract, there is likewise no obligation or liability to speak about and thus no cause of action arises. Specifically, in an action against the depositary, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the bailment or deposit and the performance of conditions precedent to the right of action. A depositary is obliged to return the thing to the depositor, or to his heirs or successors, or to the person who may have been designated in the contract. In the present case, the record is bereft of any contract of deposit, oral or written, between petitioners and respondent. If at all, it was only between petitioners and Moreman. And granting arguendo that there was indeed a contract of deposit between petitioners and Moreman, it is still incumbent upon respondent to prove its existence and that it was executed in his favor. However, respondent miserably failed to do so. The only pieces of evidence respondent presented to prove the contract of deposit were the delivery receipts. Significantly, they are unsigned and not duly received or authenticated by either Moreman, petitioners or respondent or any of their authorized representatives. Hence, those delivery receipts have no probative value at all. While our laws grant a person the remedial right to prosecute or institute a civil action against another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, every cause of action ex-contractu must be founded upon a contract, oral or written, express or implied. Moreover, respondent also failed to prove that there were construction materials and equipment in petitioners‘ warehouse at the time he made a demand for their return. Considering that respondent failed to prove (1) the existence of any contract of deposit between him and petitioners, nor between the latter and Moreman in his favor, and (2) that there were construction materials in petitioners‘ warehouse at

the time of respondent‘s demand to return the same, we hold that petitioners have no corresponding obligation or liability to respondent with respect to those construction materials. Triple –V Food Services, Inc. v

Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc., GR 160544, February 21, 2005 Facts: On March 2, 1997, at around 2:15PM, a certain MAry Jo-Anne De Asis (De Asis) dined at petittioner’s Kamayan Restaurant at 15 West Avenue, Quezon City. De Asis was using a Mitsubishi Galant Super Saloon Model 1995 assigned to her by her employer Crispa Textile Inc. (Crispa). On said date, De Asis availed of the velvet parking service of petitioner and entrusted her car key to petitioner’s valet counter. A corresponding parking ticket was issued a receipt for the car. The car was then parked by petitioner’s valet attendant, a certain Madridano, at the designated parking area. Few minutes later, Madridano noticed that the car was not in its parking slot and its key no longer in the box where valet attendants usually keep the keeps of cars entrusted to them. The car was never recovered. Thereafter, Crispa filed a claim against its insurer, herein respondent Filipino Merchants Insurance Company, Inc. (FMICI).Having indemnified Crispa in the amount of P669.500 for the loss of the subject vehicle, FMICI, as subrogee to Crispa’s rights, filed with the RTC at Makati City an action for damages against petitioner Triple- V Food Services, Inc. In its answer, petitioner argued that the complaint failed to aver facts to support the allegations of recklessness and negligence committed in the safekeeping and custody of the subject vehicle, claiming that it and its employees waster no time in ascertaining the loss of the car and in informing De Asis of the discovery of the loss. Petitioner further argued that in accepting the complimentary valet parking service, De Asis received a parking ticket whereunder it is so provided that “Management and staff will not be responsible for any loss of or damage incurred on the vehicle nor of valuables contained therein”, a provision which, to petitioner’s mind, is an explicit waiver of any right to claim indemnity for the loss of the car; and that De Asis knowingly assumed the risk of loss when she allowed petitioner to park her vehicle, adding that its valet parking service did not include extending a contract of insurance or warranty for the loss of the vehicle. During trial, petitioner challenged FMICI’s subrogation to Crispa’s right to file a claim for the loss of the car, arguing that theft is not a risk insured against under FMICI’s Insurance Policy No. PC-5975 for the subject vehicle. In a decision dated June 22, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment for respondent FMICI. Obviously displeased, petitioner appealed to the CA reiterating its argument that it was not a depositary of the subject car and that it exercised due diligence and prudence in the safe keeping of the vehicle, in handling the carnapping incident and in the supervision of its employees. It further argued that there was no valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent FMICI. In a decision dated October 21, 2003, the CA dismissed petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court. In so dismissing the appeal and affirming the appealed decision, the appellate court agreed with the findings and conclusions of the trial court that: (a) petitioner was a depositary of the subject vehicle; (b) petitioner was negligent in its duties as a depositary thereof and as an employer of the valet attendant; and (c) there was a valid subrogation of rights between Crispa and respondent FMICI. Issue: Are all contracts for parking, contracts of deposit? Or are there critical factors in the case of Triple-V Food Services that, if not present in another situation, would lead to different conclusion? Ruling: When De Asis entrusted the car in question to petitioners valet attendant whileeating at petitioner’s Kamayan Restaurant, the former expected the car’s safe return at the end of her meal. Thus,

petitioner was constituted as a depositary of the same car. Petitioner cannot evade liability by arguing that neither a contract of deposit nor that of insurance, guaranty or surety for the loss of the car was constituted when De Asis availed of its free valet parking service.

In a contract of deposit, a person received an object received an object belonging to another with the obligation of safely keeping it and returning the same. A deposit may be constituted even without any consideration. It is not necessary that the depositary received a fee before it becomes obligated to keep the item entrusted for safekeeping and to return it later to the depositor. Specious is petitioner’s insistence that the valet parking claim stub it issued to De Asis contains a clear exclusion of its liability and operates as an explicit waiver by the customer of any right to claim indemnity for any loss of or damage to the vehicle. The parking claim stub embodying the terms and conditions of the parking, including that of relieving petitioner from any loss or damage to the car, is essentially a contract of adhesion, drafted and prepared as it is by the petitioner alone with no participation whatsoever on the part of the customers, like De Asis, who merely adheres to the printed stipulations therein appearing. While contracts of adhesion are not void in themselves, yet this Court will not hesitate to rule out blind adherence thereto if they prove to be one sided under the attendant facts and circumstances. Hence, and as aptly pointed out by the CA, petitioner must not be allowed to use its parking claim stub’s exclusionary stipulation as a shield from any responsibility for any loss or damage to vehicles or to the valuables contained therein. Here, it is evident that De Asis deposited the car in question with the petitioner as part of the latter’s enticement for customers by providing them a safe parking space within the vicinity of its restaurant. In a very real sense, a safe parking space is an added attraction to petitioner’s restaurant business because customers are thereby somehow assured that their vehicle are safely kept, rather than parking them elsewhere at their own risk. Having entrusted the subject car to petitioner’s valet attendant, customer De Asis, like all of petitioner’s customers, fully expects the security of her car while petitioner’s premises/designated parking areas and its safe return at the end of her visit at petitioner’s restaurant. Anent the trial court’s findings of negligence on the part of the petitioner, which findings were affirmed by the appellate court, we have consistently ruled that findings of facts of trial courts, more so when affirmed, as here, by the CA, are conclusive on this Court unless the trial court itself ignored, overlooked or misconstrued facts and circumstances which, if considered, warrant a reversal of the outcome of the case. This is not so in the case at bar. For, we have ourselves reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the trial court’s findings. VOLUNTARY DEPOSIT SECTION 1. — General Provisions Article 1968. A voluntary deposit is that wherein the delivery is made by the will of the depositor. A deposit may also be made by two or more persons each of whom believes himself entitled to the thing deposited with a third person, who shall deliver it in a proper case to the one to whom it belongs. (1763) VOLUNTARY VS NECESSARY • The chief difference between a voluntary deposit and a necessary deposit is that in voluntary, the depositor has complete freedom in choosing the depositary, whereas in necessary, there is a lack of free choice in the depositor. Voluntary deposit Concept – It is a contract or juridical relation where a thing is delivered at the will of a person (depositor) to another (depositary) for the purpose of safekeeping by the latter coupled with the obligation of returning it upon demand. There is freedom of action. The depositor is free to choose the depositary. Depositor need not be the owner of the thing – GR: Depositor be the owner of the thing deposited. XPN:

1. Article 1968, second sentence: “A deposit may also be made by two or more persons each of whom believes himself entitled to the thing deposited with a third person, who shall deliver it in a proper case to the one to whom it belongs.” 2. Article 1984, first paragraph: “The depositary cannot demand that the depositor prove...