Summary Discussion on On Adler and Barnett PDF

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Paul Bodnar

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IR Field Seminar, Week 12 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chs. 2 and 4 Summary In Chapter 2, Adler and Barnett set out the central proposition for this edited volume: that collective identity is a powerful force in defining states’ conceptions of their security. Security communities can form in which a collective definition of “we-feeling” which promotes peaceful resolution of disputes within the group and encourages collective mobilization against external threats. “Security communities may become… somewhat permanent international (and transnational) actors whose boundaries are determined by shared understandings rather than geography.” (58) In Chapter 4, Adler argues that the OSCE played an important role as a “security community-building institution” and assisted the peaceful transition to a post-Cold War political order of (more or less) shared liberal values from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Theoretical lens Reviving Karl Deutsch’s concept of a security development, the authors place their work in the constructivist research program. Their arguments are closely related to those advanced by Wendt (1999) on “cultures of anarchy.” Their theory is non-ideological but fits closely with liberal theories of the democratic peace, e.g. Owen (1994). Definition of security communities States either “reside in formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it.” (30) A loosely coupled security community is a “transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change.” A tightly-coupled security community goes beyond shared expectations / norms) by having formally institutionalized mutual security arrangements, plus some degree of supranational authority over decision-making on threat assessment and response. One way to think about this is that the states in the group redefine the borders of anarchy (what is on the outside of community). Security communities can be comprised on non-contiguous states. “We may conceive the habits and practices of the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and the shared norms on which they are based, as a crude governance structure.” The task of this research program is to “isolate the conditions under which the development of a community produces dependable expectations of peaceful change.” Three tiers of density “The sequenced and causal relationship between these three tiers is responsible for the production of dependable expectation of peaceful change. Tier 1 For whatever reason, states orient themselves to each other and begin to coordinate policies. Triggers for this process could be endogenous or exogenous—could be technological developments, external threat, ideological homogeneity, potential gains from trade, migration/demographic changes. Tier 2 Interacting structure and process conditions. Defining feature: “states and their peoples have become involved in a series of social interactions that have begun to transform the environment in which they are embedded.” Structural conditions: power and knowledge. “Power and knowledge are the structural girders for the development of a security community.” Powerful states form cores of strength around which integrative processes develop. “Power can be alternative understood as the authority to determine

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shared meaning that constitutes the “we-feeling” and practices of states.” Power can be a magnet. “Those powerful states who belong to the core of strength do not create security per se, rather, because of the positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them.” (40) “Power is not simply coercive but also conveys a sense of purpose and, potentially, a vision for the future.” (52) For these reasons, a core state or coalition of states is a likely facilitator and stabilizer of this phase, “for only such a state or group of states can be expected to provide the leadership, protection, material benefits, and sense of purpose that is frequently required.” (53) Knowledge really means a set of political ideas and meanings, e.g. liberalism as a possible necessary condition for security communities Process conditions. Qualitative and quantitative growth of transactions (broadly defined) can reshape collective experience and alter social facts. Institutions and organizations in different issue areas encourage interdependence and trust. Social learning involves the gradual updating and reinterpretation of reality; social learning explains why transactions and institutional actions can encourage the development of mutual trust and collective identity. These conditions interact. “Trust, for instance, may be promoted by institutions that significantly increase the number and quality of transactions, which, in turn, further the diffusion of norms. Tier 3 Here true trust develops and overcomes the conditions of anarchy: “Trust can best be understood as believing despite uncertainty.” (46) “The dynamic and positive relationship among the variables… are the wellsprings of both mutual trust and collective identity, which, in turn, are the proximate necessary conditions for the development of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Trust and identity are reciprocal and reinforcing: the development of trust can strengthen mutual identification, and there is a general tendency to trust on the basis of mutual identification.” (45) But trust comes first. Three phases of development Phase 1: Nascent This phase is characterized by relatively costless coordination steps, gradually increasing density of interactions, and establishment of some institutions. Phase 2: Ascendant Increasingly dense networks, new institutions defining tighter military coordination, cognitive structures that promote “seeing” and acting together. “States and their societies are increasingly embedded in a dense network of relations collectively portrayed as ‘friendly.’” (53) These networks and relationships institutionalize cognitive structures and deepen mutual trust and responsiveness. One indicator: look at narratives—how do societies tell the story of their history, present, and imagined future? “To the extent that actors locate themselves within a shared or congruent storyline they can be said to have a collective identity.” (54) Phase 3: Mature With firmly rooted conception of shared identity, it’s more difficult to think of using violence on the other because it approximates using violence on the self. Indicators include multilateral decision-making architectures that are consensual; unfortified borders; changes in military planning that remove certain contingencies of conflict within the community; common definition of threats. “The right to use force shifts from the units to the collectivity of sovereign states and becomes legitimate only against external threats.” (56)

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Disintegration Is this process teleological a la Kant? No, Adler and Barnett admit: see the Post-Cold War phenomenon of ethnic violence and civil war and other similar spasms after the end of empires. Their only comment: “political communities can be disrupted from within and without.” (58) The OSCE as security community-building institution (Chapter 4) Here Adler argues that “collective identities, the “stuff” of which security communities are made, do not always evolve spontaneously; rather, as in the case of the expansion eastward of the EuroAtlantic pluralistic security community, they are socially constructed by institutions.” (119) This is the explicit function of the OSCE: it is “geared to shape new transnational identities based on liberal values.” “Through political dialogue, the establishment of a liberal normative structure for the entire OSCE region, and constant pressure to implement normative commitment, the OSCE imprinted the development of political community.” (121) It increased transactions between east and west through seminar diplomacy and technical exchanges, strengthened civil society in Eastern Europe, and molded a sense of “we-feeling” from Vancouver to Vladivostok. Institutions like OSCE have a “direct impact on the way diplomatic, military, and economic communities perceive and understand reality—for example, their security, welfare, rights, and duties.” (122) Thus the institutional performance of the OSCE and other seemingly toothless security institutions cannot be gauged by looking at their formal products, but also by the extent to which they have shaped state preferences and interests by infusing them with collective identity. The OSCE was a “breeding ground” for new norms and a “conveyor belt” for their diffusion. These norms and practices have become embedded in other European multilateral institutions such as NATO, the WEU, EU, and CoE. Adler’s conclusion is that the OSCE case raises “serious doubts about mainstream realist arguments and their dismissal of international institutions and their community-building functions.” (149) Unlike neoliberal institutionalists, he sees the primary function of institutions like the OSCE not as lowering transaction costs or providing information to the parties, but “Rather, by helping to change the way security is understood in Europe, [the OSCE] led to a transformation of the cognitive, institutional, and material context within which post-Cold War domestic and international politics takes place.” (150) Comments 1. I think the most interesting question raised here relates to trust. Under what conditions can and do states trust one another? To what extent can trust overcome the dynamics of anarchy? What are the bases of trust? 2. Adler and Barnett admit that security communities can disintegrate. They do not offer any analysis of this phenomenon or what can trigger it. Indeed, they state that “the same forces that build up security communities can also tear them down.” This does not leave us with a very useful theory for predicting state behavior.

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