Outline OF Aristotle’S Nicomachean Ethics PDF

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OUTLINE OF ARISTOTLE’S NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald translation) by Robert Greene BOOK I Note that the chapter headings are supplied by the translator. They are not in the original text. In a couple of places I have revised the headings slightly. Also, in Book II, I have added to Aristotle’s list of ethical virtues and vices with a modern list of my own. Chapter 1: The good as the aim of action Note the mention of “ends” or “aims” or “goals.” The Greek for “end,” “aim,” or “goal” is télos, and Aristotle’s philosophy is often called “teleology,” or the science of ends, aims, and goals. “Since there are many activities, arts, and sciences, the number of ends is correspondingly large...” (p. 3) Chapter 2: Politics as the master science of the good Politics is the science that rules and manages the other sciences. Its good encompasses theirs and thus is the good for mankind. Chapter 3: The limitations of ethics and politics We mustn’t expect ethics and politics to be as precise as the mathematical sciences, but seek the degree of precision each subject admits. It would be just as silly to accept merely probable arguments from a mathematician as it would be to demand mathematical proofs from a politician! (p. 5) Chapter 4: Happiness is the good, but many views are held about it Most people, both the masses and educated people, agree that the good for humans is happiness. (p.6) But even to pursue it properly, one needs a decent upbringing to begin with. (p. 7) Chapter 5: Various views on the highest good He identifies (p. 8) three basic kinds or ways of life: the life of pleasure, the “political” life, and the speculative or contemplative life. The term politikós, from which we get the word “political,” needs to be explained. Here it means ‘having to do with citizens, civic.’ So “the political life” is a little misleading. It means the life of a citizen, the life of a man of affairs, someone who plays a significant role in the life of the community. Later on, in chapter 13 (p.29, bottom of the page),

Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

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he uses the same expression. “Thus, the student of politics (politikós) must study the soul, but he must do so with his own aim in view, and only to the extent that the objects of his inquiry demand...” Here politikós could be rendered as ‘the good citizen’ or ‘the person wishing to be a good citizen.’ This raises the question of who was Aristotle’s audience for the lectures that comprise these texts: young men of the upper or upper middle class who were among the relatively few to receive a high-class education in Athenian society. Note how undemocratic he sounds on p. 8: “The common run of people (hoi polloi, the many or the masses)...betray their utter slavishness in their preference for a life suitable to cattle...” Chapter 6: Plato’s view of the Good This chapter is a critique of Plato’s theory of forms, in particular the concept of the Good that we read about in The Republic. Plato thinks there is one single form of the Good of which all good things partake. Aristotle thinks his teacher, Plato, is wrong about this: “The good...is not some element common to all these things as derived from one Form.” (p. 13, pgh 1) We call different things “good” by analogy (p. 13, pgh 2) He leads up to this with several arguments against Plato’s view that there is one single form of Good. He also distinguishes (p. 12) between that which is good as a means and that which is good in itself, or good as an end in itself. It is not easy to decide whether Plato or Aristotle is right in this controversy, but at least we can get some idea of their different views. Chapter 7: The good is final and self-sufficient; happiness is defined “[W]e always choose happiness as an end in itself and never for the sake of something else.” (p. 15, pgh 1) p. 16, pgh 2: How can it be that a carpenter and a shoemaker has a proper function, but that a human being as such doesn’t have one? Or how can the eye, the hand, the foot, etc. each have their proper functions, but the individual as a whole does not? p. 17, pgh 2: a thing and a good thing are generically the same. In other words, when something most fully attains its natural function, that’s what we mean by calling it a good thing. Chapter 8: Popular views about happiness confirm our position The virtuous man is happiest, but we also need external goods. Chapter 9: How happiness is acquired Humans can be happy, but not animals. Even children can’t truly be happy. Aristotle seems a bit grumpy here. Surely children may have a measure of happiness, but not to the same extent as when they reach their full human nature. Still, we notice him starting to circumscribe happiness here, and this continues in the next chapter.

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Chapter 10: Can a man be called “happy” during his lifetime? We can’t be completely sure someone has been happy until he reaches the end of his life because a great enough misfortune can wreck his life. Still (p. 25), “activities in conformity with virtue constitute happiness,” so that the virtuous person can withstand misfortune and find a measure of happiness. Chapter 11: Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead? Not very much. Chapter 12: The praise accorded to happiness We honor happiness rather than praise it. Chapter 13: The psychological foundations of the virtues In this chapter he gives a simplified explanation of the nature of the psyché or “soul,” contrasting its rational and irrational parts. The latter is divided into two parts (p. 31, pgh 2), the vegetative and the part containing appetite and desire. The former also has two parts, the one possessing reason within itself, the other listening to reason. At the end of this chapter (p. 32) he makes an important distinction between ethical or moral virtue, which has to do with a person’s character and behavior, and intellectual virtue, which consists of wisdom (sophia), intelligence (synesis), and practical wisdom (phronesis). “Practical wisdom” means common sense, good sense, prudence. To be intelligent is to be smart or quickwitted, the sort of thing IQ tests attempt to measure. Wisdom is something deeper and more than just quickwittedness; it is insight, imagination, creativity. Books II-V deal with ethical virtue, and Book VI with intellectual virtue. Book VII discusses moral weakness and pleasure. Books VIII and IX provide a detailed analysis of “friendship,” i.e. social relationships of nearly all kinds. Book X concludes with a detailed comparison of pleasure and happiness and the bíos theoretikós, the speculative or contemplative life, the one Aristotle regards as the highest and most like the divine.

BOOK II Chapter 1: Moral virtue as the result of habits Intellectual virtue comes chiefly from teaching. Moral virtue, ethiké areté, is formed by habit, as the name shows, being derived from ethos, habit. We become just by practicing just actions, etc. By acting bravely in the face of danger we become brave. Chapter 2: Method in the practical sciences

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We are not conducting this inquiry in order to know what virtue is, but to become good—why else do this? Thus, we must examine actions and how they should be performed, for it is actions that develop habits. However, this is only an outline, as we said earlier (I, 3). In every situation, the agent must consider the particulars. Moral qualities are destroyed by defect and excess. First statement of the mean. Individual virtuous actions lead to the development of virtue. Chapter 3: Pleasure and pain as the test of virtue Moral virtue is concerned with pleasure and pain: pleasure makes us do base actions and pain prevents us from doing noble actions. The pleasure and pain we feel in doing or not doing virtuous actions are a gauge of whether or not we are virtuous. Pleasure and pain accompany every emotion and every action. A good man will feel pleasure and pain at the right time, to the right extent, in the right way. The actions that produce virtue also will develop it, together with the corresponding pleasures and pains. Chapter 4: Virtuous action and virtue The agent must know what he is doing, must choose to act as he does, and for its own sake, and the act must spring from a firm and unchangeable character. Meeting all these qualifications requires action and repeated action, not merely knowledge. Chapter 5: Virtue defined: the genus In the soul there are a) emotions, sense-perceptions and memories (pathé) b) powers or faculties (dynameis), c) dispositions to think or act in certain ways, in other words, traits, characteristics, or simply habits (hexeis). An ethical virtue is a disposition or characteristic or habit. In other words, ethical virtues are good habits and vices are bad ones. Chapter 6: Virtue defined: the differentia Ethical virtue or excellence is a mental disposition that inclines one to choose the mean between two vices relative to us, a mean defined by a logos or rational principle, such as a reasonable person would define or determine it. Chapter 7: Examples of the mean in particular virtues Virtues mentioned: courage, self-control, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, “gentleness,” honesty, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, righteous indignation. Chapter 8: The relation between the mean and its extremes the extremes are more opposed to each other than each is to the mean

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

In some cases it is the deficiency and in others the excess that is more opposed to the mean. Chapter 9: How to attain the mean It is hard to behave as we should to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right reason, and in the right way. First of all, avoid the extreme that is more opposed to the mean; that is, take the lesser evil. Then we must watch for the errors we as individuals are more prone to. We come to recognize our inclinations by observing the pleasure and pain produced in us by the different extremes. Then we steer in the opposite direction and try to overcompensate for our inclinations. Even observing all these counsels, it still is hard to hit the mean and even harder when all we know is the definition. But still, that’s a start. ARISTOTLE’S LIST OF ETHICAL VIRTUES AND VICES The virtues and vices immediately below are the ones listed and described in the Nicomachean Ethics. Following are a set of additional virtues and vices that reflect contemporary Western culture. Some of them might have been considered as such by Aristotle, and some might not. Moreover, as Aristotle observes, some of the virtues and vices do not have specific names, and we have to supply a name or description. Excess

(Vice)

The Mean (Virtue)

Deficiency (Vice)

recklessness

courage

cowardice

self-indulgence, wantonness

moderation, temperance

asceticism

extravagance

generosity, liberality

stinginess

vulgarity, ostentatiousness

magnificence, suitable expenditure

cheapness, meanness

vanity, conceit

magnanimity, high-mindedness, greatness of soul

pettiness, small-mindedness

excessive ambition

the mean in the pursuit of honors

lack of ambition

bad temper

gentleness, good temper

apathy, passivity

obsequiousness

friendliness, pleasantness, ability to get along honesty, frankness, candor

surliness,grouchiness

boastfulness

excessive modesty

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

silliness, tactlessness, boorishness

tastefulness, tact, wittiness

lack of a sense of humor

shamelessness

modesty, proper sense of shame

bashfulness, shyness

doing injustice

justice, acting justly

suffering injustice

VIRTUES AND VICES TO SUPPLEMENT ARISTOTLE’S LIST As Aristotle notes, some of the virtues and vices don’t have specific names, and you have to use a descriptive phrase to name them. Also, in some cases there may be difficulty in deciding which vice is the excess and which the deficiency. It depends on how you define the virtue. Here are some additional virtues and vices (good and bad habits) that we might add to fill out Aristotle’s list. Excess

Virtue

Deficiency

smugness

confidence

lack of confidence

overpunctuality

punctuality

lack of punctuality

fussiness

orderliness, neatness

sloppiness

obsessive-compulsiveness

self-discipline

laxness

excessive orderliness

being well-organized

disorganization

severity or harshness

discipline

laxness

overconscientiousness, being a workaholic

diligence

laziness

being a gossip

interest in others

indifference to others

officiousness, being a busybody

helpfulness

unconcern

hastiness or: being too slow to act

promptness in action promptness in action

procrastination lack of deliberateness

excessive tolerance

fairness

prejudice

greed, avarice

proper attitude to money

unconcern with money

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

excessive politeness, effeteness

politeness

rudeness, brusqueness

unctuousness, effeteness

pleasantness

coarseness

overbearingness, being a bully

manliness

effeteness

masochism, sado-masochism assertiveness

endurance, stamina modesty

softness, weakness shyness

pomposity, ceremoniousness

decorum, dignity

excessive informality

hypercleanliness hypochondria

good personal hygiene concern for one’s health

sloppiness neglect of one’s health

overly strict parenting, abusive parenting

good parenting

neglect of one’s children

greed

proper attitude to money

insufficient interest in money

being materialistic

proper attitude toward possessions

carelessness about possessions

nervousness, hyperactivity

alertness, alacrity

phlegmaticness, stodginess

excessive haste

sense of pace or rhythm

lethargy

inflexibility, stubbornness

perseverance, assiduousness

flightiness

being guilt-ridden, excessive self-criticism

proper sense of guilt, self-criticism

being un-self-critical

excessive sense of shame

proper sense of shame

shamelessness

egotism

proper “self-love”

self-hatred

cynicism

sophistication

naïveté

paranoia

prudence or caution in dealing with others

being too trusting of others

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

overconscientiousness, compulsiveness

conscientiousness

irresponsibility

BOOK III In the first five chapters of Book III, Aristotle makes a complicated set of distinctions between a) voluntary and involuntary acts in general and b) actions done due to (or because of) ignorance and actions done in ignorance. He also speaks of actions that are “non-voluntary” (as the translator Ostwald calls them) or more literally, “not voluntary.” This is all less complicated than it seems if one takes the trouble to look at the distinctions carefully. Actions done under constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary. In an act done under constraint, the source of motion comes from without and the person compelled contributes nothing. Mixed actions: partly under constraint, but essentially voluntary, like jettisoning a cargo in a storm. All acts due to ignorance are not voluntary, but they are involuntary only when they are followed by sorrow and regret (ch. 1, p. 55). In other words, if you knew, you wouldn’t have done them. Acting due to (through or because of) ignorance (di’ agnoian) is different from acting in ignorance (agnooûnta – not knowing, being ignorant). Acting due to intoxication or anger is acting in ignorance, that is of the particular circumstances in which one acts or refrains from acting. While this kind of ignorance can make an act involuntary, ignorance of principles like that of not stealing is not involuntary—it is wicked. Every wicked man is ignorant of what he should and should not do. The terms “voluntary” and “involuntary” are to be used with reference to the moment of action. Actions belong among particulars, and particular acts such as the one above are performed voluntarily unless one is physically constrained to do them (or from doing them). In other words, we have “free will” because we have the power to initiate action, that is, to move our own bodies freely and to think, to reflect about what we are going to do. In chapter 5, one of the most important chapters in the book, Aristotle explains the ultimate motive of our actions: we pursue the good as it appears to us (to phainómenon agathon). Hence, it is crucial for human beings that our vision of the good approximate as much as possible to what is truly good. If it does, we can truly be said to be well endowed by nature. In placing so much importance on our vision of the good, Aristotle clearly shows the influence of Plato on his thought.

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Outline of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

In the remaining chapters of Book III, Aristotle gives a fuller discussion than in Book II of the two most important moral virtues, courage and self-control (that is, temperance, moderation in the pursuit of sensual desires). THE SYLLOGISM AND THE PRACTICAL SYLLOGISM In discussing various issues and problems, we make use of different kinds of reasoning. In inductive reasoning, we form generalizations from individual examples. In deductive reasoning, we derive a conclusion from premises. Usually an issue can be summed up in a controlling syllogism, associated with which will be subordinate arguments. Often there is broad agreement about the major premise, a generalization, although defining the terms may be a problem. Then most of the discussion focuses on establishing the minor premise, usually a statement of fact. In the practical syllogism, which we use in deliberating about an action that we are contemplating, the conclusion is equivalent to the act, or we might simply say, the conclusion is the act.1 Between stating an argument in ordinary language and restating it in the symbols of formal logic, the transition sometimes is tricky. The examples below illustrate how it may occur. All [Middle term] is/are [Predicate term].

MAJOR PREMISE

This [Subject term]

MINOR PREMISE

is

[Middle term].

Therefore, [Subject term] is [Predicate term].

CONCLUSION

The bracketed terms can be represented simply by letters: All B is C. This A is B.2 Therefore, this A is C. In the practical syllogism, as Aristotle says (Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 3, p. 183 in the Ostwald translation), “When two premises are combined into one…the soul is thereupon bound to affirm the conclusion, and if the premises involve action, the soul is bound to perform this act at once.” Aristotle then gives an example of a practical syllogism: Everything sweet ou...