Personal Jurisdiction and Long-Arm Statutes PDF

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Class 13 – Personal Jurisdiction and Long-Arm Statutes Personal Jurisdiction I.

Burnham v. Superior Court a. Facts: Dennis Burnham (plaintiff) and Francie Burnham were married from 1976 until July 1987, at which point they decided to separate. At that time, they were living in New Jersey with their two children. They agreed to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences and that Francie would move to California, where she would have custody of both children. She moved to California, and in October 1987, Dennis filed for divorce in the state of New Jersey on the grounds of desertion, but never attempted to serve her. In January 1988, while in California for business and to visit his children, Dennis was served with a California court summons and Francie’s divorce petition. Subsequently, he returned to New Jersey. Later that year, Dennis filed a motion to quash on the basis that it was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for California to assert jurisdiction over him, because he lacked the minimum contacts necessary for personal jurisdiction. The superior court denied the motion, and the California Court of Appeal denied mandamus relief, holding that it was enough that Dennis was present in the forum and personally served with process. Dennis appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. b. Procedural Posture: i. California Superior Court: Petitioner made a special appearance, moving to quash the service of process on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him b/c his only contacts w/ CA were a few short visits to the State for the purposes of conducting business and visiting his children. The court denied the motion. ii. California Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief, rejecting petitioner’s contention that the Due Process Clause prohibited CA courts from asserting jurisdiction over him because he lacked “minimum contacts” w/ the State. It is a valid jurisdictional predicate for in Personam jurisdiction that D was present in the forum state and personally served w/ process. c. Issue: Whether the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment denies California courts jurisdiction over a nonresident, who was personally served w/ process while temporarily in that State, in a suit unrelated to his activities in a state. d. Petitioner’s Argument: In reliance on the International Shoe standard, that in the absence of “continuous and systematic” contacts w/ the forum, a nonresident defendant can be subjected to judgement only as to matters that arise out of or relate to his contacts w/ the forum. i. Court’s Response: This argument rests on a misunderstanding of our cases. e. Precedent: i. International Shoe Co: A state court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. ii. Shaffer v. Heitner: We concluded the normal rules developed under International Shoe for jurisdiction over suits against absent defendants should apply. Delaware could not hear suit b/c D’s sole contact w/ the State (ownership of property there) was unrelated to the lawsuit. f. Defining Terms: i. Specific Jurisdiction: Litigation arises from defendant’s activities in or toward the forum state. ii. General Jurisdiction: Defendant has a continuous & systematic presence in the forum state.

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iii. Transient Jurisdiction: Defendant is personally served w/ process while physically present in the forum state, regardless of contacts. g. Holding (Scalia): Nothing in International Shoe offers support for the very different proposition petitioner seeks to establish today: that a defendant’s presence in the forum is not only unnecessary to validate novel, nontraditional assertion of jurisdiction, but is itself no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Because Dennis was physically present in CA when he was served with process, the state properly asserted personal jurisdiction over him, and the holding is affirmed. h. Concurrence (White): The rule that a non-resident party may be served if he physically enters the forum state is not so well accepted that it would be impossible to strike it down. It is, however, a useful rule to prevent flooding the courts w/ fact specific inquiries relating to personal jurisdiction. i. Concurrence (Brennan): A long history of enforcement of personal jurisdiction when a non-resident party is present in a state, while informative and persuasive, is not necessarily dispositive. It does mean, however, that defendants have notice that they might be served if they enter a different forum state. By entering the state, the defendant avails himself of the benefits made available by the state, such as police protection and use of the roads. Furthermore, the burden on the non-resident defendant is small; modern travel is not a great inconvenience for an individual who wishes to defend himself in a foreign state. j. Rule of Law: A non-resident is properly served if he is physically present in the forum state, and the forum state may exercise personal jurisdiction over him w/o violating due process. Understanding Burnham and “Transient Presence” Jurisdiction a. Scalia and 3 other justices concluded that the Shaffer opinion really meant to say that assertions of in Personam, quasi in rem, and in rem jurisdiction had to meet the International Shoe standard, not that International Shoe applied to other bases for personal jurisdiction, like transient presence. i. Transient personal jurisdiction was well established historically, so the use of that form of jurisdiction was clearly consistent w/ “traditional” notions of fair play and substantial justice. b. Courts have consistently held that a plaintiff cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a corporation by serving an officer of that company who happens to be in the forum state. i. Jurisdiction over a corporation of 1 state can not be acquired in another state/district in which it has no place of business & is not found, merely by serving process upon an executive officer ii. Because a partnership does not have a status independent from the partners themselves, it is constitutionally permissible for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a partnership if one of the partners is served w/in the forum state. Consent and Waiver *Common alternative to the usual methods of establishing personal jurisdiction. A party cannot consent to or waive a court’s subject matter jurisdiction*

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Consent a. A defendant can affirmatively decide not to raise the issue. i. Courts typically do not address personal jurisdiction on their own, so if D wants to litigate in a court that lacks personal jurisdiction, D can simply appear in court and not raise the issue. b. Parties can consent to personal jurisdiction before a lawsuit occurs.

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i. “Forum selection clauses” in contracts. Courts typically enforce these clauses if they were the result of an arm’s length bargain, even when personal jurisdiction would not otherwise have existed over the defendant in the specified forum. c. Some statutes provide that, by engaging in certain forum-related conduct, a party implicitly designates someone in the state to accept service of process on the party’s behalf for particular types of claims. Waiver a. Typically results from a party’s failure to raise an issue w/in a specified time or in a proper manner. b. Rules 12(g)-(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describe the procedures that a defendant must follow to avoid waiving a personal jurisdiction defense. Some states have adopted a similar approach, and other states require a defendant to make a “special appearance,” where the defendant appears in the court at the outset of the case for the sole purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction. c. Deemed to waived personal jurisdiction if the party fails to comply w/ court orders.

Other Constitutional Bases for Personal Jurisdiction: Summary of Basic Principles a. Several alternatives to specific jurisdiction, including general, in rem/quasi in rem, “transient presence,” consent, & waiver. b. General jurisdiction allows P to sue D “generally” for any claims that P might have, no matter where they arose, but only if D is “at home” in the forum state. i. A company is typically “at home” in states where it has its principal place of business or place of incorporation. It may also be “at home” in other jurisdictions under limited circumstances. ii. An individual is typically subject to general jurisdiction in the state where they are domiciled. c. In rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction are now analyzed using the minimum contacts formula of International Shoe. d. An individual is usually subject to personal jurisdiction in any state where she is served personally while physically present in that forum, assuming she is in the forum voluntarily. e. A party can waive personal jurisdiction or consent to it, such as by failing to raise the issue in a timely manner, deciding not to raise the issue, or accepting a contract w/ a forum selection clause. Long Arm Statutes

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Introduction a. A court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction in every instance where it would be constitutional to do so. The Due Process Clause places a limit on a court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction, but the Due Process Clause does not give a court the authority to exercise that power. b. A court’s authority to exercise P.J. is usually granted in long arm statutes. Without this statute, a court cannot typically exercise P.J. Distinguishing the 14th & 5th Amendments’ Due Process Clauses a. The 14th Amendment applies to the states, not the federal government. b. A federal court’s power is usually limited by the 5th Amendment. The 5th amendment has been interpreted to permit the federal court to exercise much more personal jurisdiction authority than the state courts are permitted under the 14 th Amendment.

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Summary a. A court can usually exercise PJ only if (1) a long arm provision authorizes it and (2) PJ is constitutional. One possible exception is “tag” jurisdiction, which appears to exist as part of a court’s common law authority. b. Many state long arm provisions do not confer the full constitutional authority to exercise PJ, so courts often have to interpret the scope of applicable long arm provisions. These provisions commonly appear in enumerated act statutes that confer PJ in a wide range of cases, or in narrower statutes such as in business registration statutes. c. Some states authorize their courts to exercise PJ to the full extent the Constitution allows, making an analysis of the long arm provision unnecessary. d. If a court concludes that a long arm provision authorizes PJ in a case, but the exercise of PJ would be unconstitutional, a court will refuse to exercise PJ in that case. The court will not strike down the statute as unconstitutional. e. Federal courts have more expansive personal jurisdiction authority under the 5th Amendment than state courts have under the 14th Amendment. Rule 4(k)(1)(A) provides that, in most cases, a federal court may only exercise PJ if a state court in the state where the federal court sits could do so. f. Congress has passed some rules and statutes that authorize federal courts to exercise nationwide jurisdiction. Under those statutes, federal courts can probably exercise PJ as long as a D has a relevant contact somewhere in the US....