Phil139 q1 Intrinsic Value PDF

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Carolyn Mason, Intrinsic Value...

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PHIL139: ETHICS ESSAY ABIGAIL PHUA 73791288

QUESTION – Are some desires intrinsically better than others? Explain and defend your answer. What does your answer imply about the desire satisfaction theory of welfare? In this paper, I will discuss desires being intrinsically better than others. Additionally, it will correlate to the Desire Satisfaction Theory of Welfare. This essay will analyze the reason(s) why the desire satisfaction theory is false, how the response is false, and the reasons why desires are intrinsically better than others.

To begin with, we must define what is meant by intrinsic value. This paper will use the Zimmerman and Bradley (2019) definition. “Intrinsic value has traditionally been thought to lie at the heart of ethics. ...The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that that thing has 'in itself,’ or 'for its own sake,’ or 'as such,’ or 'in its own right.’” The Desire Satisfaction Theory attains the interpretation that the satisfaction of authentic or informed desires is necessary and sufficient for enhancing an individual’s welfare; the desire satisfaction theory of welfare claims that one is made better off by the satisfaction of one’s desire, (Bruckner, 2010). The Desire Satisfaction Theory is an ethical theory that holds the belief of what determines whether an individual is living a satisfied life, in the extent of getting what one desires, and not getting what one does not desire. An extract that illustrates this theory is, “Our deepest desires determine what counts as life’s improvements or failures” (Shafer-Landau, 2018). Desire Satisfaction Theory has three main reasons for accepting this particular theory; Pluralism, Avoiding Problems with Objective Values, and Self-interest.

PHIL139: ETHICS ESSAY ABIGAIL PHUA 73791288

Some desires are intrinsically better than others. Thus, implying that Desire Satisfaction Theory is false. The two primary claims of the desire satisfaction theory mentioned by Shafer-Landau, (2018) are, "If something is intrinsically good for us, then it fulfills our desires; if something is instrumentally good for us, then it helps to fulfill our desires." Secondly, "If something fulfills our desires, then it is intrinsically good for us; if something helps fulfill our desires, then it is instrumentally good for us.” (Shafer-Landau, 2018). The first claim of the desire satisfaction theory is considered the necessity for improving welfare. Consequently, this means that if you discover a situation where an individual(s) wellbeing is increased, but none of their desires are satisfied, this theory of welfare is proven to be false. However, this can be proved flawed. An illustration of this is, X can benefit an individuals' welfare but satisfy their desire(s). In an example, a child typically does not desire the consumption of vegetables, but it is beneficial to a child’s welfare. Therefore, it can be claimed that the first primary claim is flawed. Furthermore, there is an issue with the second primary claim of desire satisfaction theory. Not everything that fulfills our desires is intrinsically good for us. An example to support this argument is, an alcoholic individual would desire an excessive amount of alcohol constantly, consuming the alcohol would satisfy their desire(s) but would not be suitable for their welfare (Heathwood, 2006). Thus, also concluding that this welfare theory claim is false. By disregarding the desire satisfaction theory, it can be stated that some desires are intrinsically better than others.

The Desire Satisfaction Theory of Welfare has a response to statements made and would provide the three main reasons for accepting this theory. The first argument would be

PHIL139: ETHICS ESSAY ABIGAIL PHUA 73791288

Pluralism. An individual who believes in this theory of welfare would argue, that each individual has different desires to one another, so what is good for one individual will be different as to what is considered suitable for another. Desire satisfaction theory would also be defended by avoiding the issues that arise with objective values, “How could something be good for me if I do not want it, and I do not want what it gets me?” Additionally, a desire satisfaction theorist would state, if one is non-motivated to pursue X, it cannot be good for one, so there cannot be any objective values. Lastly, another response would be restating the primary claim, “if something is intrinsically good for you, it will satisfy your desires.” They would conclude this response in stating, If X makes us better off, then we have a reason to obtain it.” Concluding, these three reasons given in itself are flawed as it does not conclude the argumentative point that a desire satisfaction theorist is presenting; instead it circulates without directly addressing the problems raised against the desire satisfaction theory of welfare.

Although a response is given defending the desire satisfaction theory, there are reasons why it is incorrect. Desire satisfaction theory is not necessary for promoting welfare. Pleasant surprises can support this statement. Discussed by Shafer-Landau, (2018), "these are events in which you are getting a benefit that you did not want or hope for… the flattering interest of a charming stranger." Flattery would produce endorphins for an individual, making them feel good as a result of this case, but this intrinsically good did not fulfill any preexisting desires. Furthermore, another reason why desire satisfaction is not sufficient for promoting individuals' welfare is due to disappointment. An individual may desire something, but consequently, after feel regret rather than satisfaction. An example of such an event could be on the topic of 'virginity.' An individual may desire to have intercourse with someone

PHIL139: ETHICS ESSAY ABIGAIL PHUA 73791288

thinking they will feel satisfied after, but instead, they feel disappointed because it was someone, they did not have a relationship with. Considering the arguments, it can be claimed: "desire theorists cannot recognize that any desires are intrinsically better than any others” (Shafer-Landau, 2018) Stating that some desires are intrinsically better than others would be controversial. To deny this, the Objective Theory of Welfare must be accepted.

An Objective Theory of Welfare consists of multiple factors; Hedonism (happiness), Knowledge, Autonomy, Good Relationships, and so on. The Objective theory, of welfare, is what directly contributes to a good life is solely independent of a persons' desires and their opinion on what is considered necessary (Lauinger, 2013). Concerning some desires being intrinsically better than others, the objective theory hedonism correlates to this. The term Hedonism is a theory of welfare with the belief of, what is intrinsically good is pleasure, and what is intrinsically bad is pain. The hedonism theory seeks pleasure while avoiding pain. An extract from, Harman (1967) states, "once one has been specified what has intrinsic value, one can then say that anything has value to the extent that it 'leads to' something having intrinsic value." This implies that some matters can be intrinsically better than others, supporting the main argument.

In conclusion, the Objective Theory of Welfare must be accepted if stating that some desires are intrinsically better than others. This was illustrated in the reasoning as to why Desire satisfaction Theory is false, how a desire satisfaction theory response is flawed, and why some desires are intrinsically better than others. Therefore, this argument implies that Desire Satisfaction Theory is false.

PHIL139: ETHICS ESSAY ABIGAIL PHUA 73791288

References Bruckner, D. W. (2010). Subjective wellbeing and desire satisfaction. Philosophical Papers, 39(1), 1-28. doi:10.1080/05568641003669409

Harman, G. H. (1967). Toward a theory of intrinsic value. The Journal of Philosophy, 64(23), 792-804. doi:10.2307/2024086

Heathwood, C. (2006). Desire Satisfactionism and Hedonism. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 128(3), 539-563. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/stable/4321735

Lauinger, W. (2013). The Strong-Tie Requirement and Objective-List Theories of WellBeing. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice,16(5), 953-968. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.canterbury.ac.nz/stable/24478739

Shafer-Landau, R. (2018). The fundamentals of ethics (4th ed.). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Zimmerman, M. J., & Bradley, B. (2019, January 09). Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Value. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-intrinsic-extrinsic/...