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Philosophy Essay, Semester 1, 2020. Describes Inductivist and Popperian accounts of the scientific method. ...

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SCIE1000

Philosophy Essay

Samuel Buckingham

“No amount of experimentation can ever prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.” – Albert Einstein. Q: Explain how an inductivist might respond to this claim regarding falsification and knowledge. Do you agree with this response? Explain and justify your answer. In doing so, consider to what extent inductivists and Popperians have mutually exclusive ideals of what makes science rational, or whether they are, in some way, complementary.

The following paper aims to evaluate the validity of science as a rational endeavor in regard to opinions an inductivist would convey to the hypethetico-deductive interpretation of knowledge acquisition through scientific methods. Although the inductivist perspective is subject to scrutiny and opposition, it would be plausible to conclude inductivism as rational with regards to its necessity within the scientific community. For the purposes of this essay, my argument will be restricted to the inductivist and falsificationist perspectives on scientific methodology. I wish to present the position that, although differing, the falsificationist ideal is subject to induction. It can be assumed that science is a rational endeavor and I will present my argument as such. Before an argument can be made it is essential that I provide a brief recount of the Inductivist and Falsificationist accounts of the scientific method. Firstly, let me discuss induction. The inductivist ideology insists an approach to logic whereby our scientific laws are logically derived from observational recollection by means of an inference known as ‘induction’ (SCIE1000 notes, 2020, pp. 131). It is through this traditional method that scientists are able to uncover the causal and material structure of natural phenomena, void of preconceptions. However, these generalizations as a product of induction are subject to specific parameters to which they must adhere. In order for a law to be established through mere observation, it is imperative that firstly the number of observation statements forming a generalization is large. Secondly, the observations must be repeated under a broad range of conditions. It is in such a case that presuppositions can be made normative as a universal statement. Concerning the aforementioned claim about falsification and knowledge, I believe the inductivist perspective would refute such a claim. Through the inductivist appeal a hypothesis can be cemented as a law so long as no accepted observational statements conflict with the derived universal law. Although induction is widely utilized throughout the scientific fields, the inductivist appeal is not without points of contention, most notably Hume’s problem of induction. Popularized in the mid-eighteenth century by Scottish philosopher David Hume, the problem of induction removes the possibility of reasoning on which an inductive inference is based. Humes’ problem of induction replaces logical reasoning with probability and assumption; as stated by Hume in A Treatise of Human Nature, “probability is founded on the presumption of a resemblance betwixt those objects, of which we have had experience, and those, of which we have had none” (Hume, 1739, pp. 90). Although this problem of induction has been considered unassailable by some, it can be stated that the premise of Humes’ argument is contradicted by the Falsificationist (Popperian) account which limits the scope of inductive skepticism (Henderson, 2018) by arguing that knowledge is created by conjecture and criticism exclaiming that “induction is a myth” (Popper, 1963, pp. 53). I shall now discuss this alternate perspective, furthermore I will highlight how the Popperian position is subject to induction. The hypothetico-deductivist account of science commonly referred to as falsificationism, is the most common opposing theory to inductivism. Established by philosopher of science Karl Popper, this widely accepted account of the scientific method signifies induction as unjustifiable, instead stating that science proceeds through hypotheses and deductive inferences which falsify said hypotheses. This radical theory

SCIE1000

Philosophy Essay

Samuel Buckingham

seeks to enforce the idea that science is purely reliant of deduction, thereby having no need for induction and inductivist theories. Falsificationism follows the general format, “if theory A is correct, then we should observe B, B was not observed, hence theory A is incorrect.” Following this reasoning, Popper was correct in stating that science is reliant purely on deduction. However, when we are looking to falsify a hypothesis, it is not a singular hypothesis being tested, rather a theory with multiple auxiliary theories operating in the background. This poses a dilemma which may create difficulties when attempting to falsify a claim as, when identifying an issue within a particular hypothesis, it is difficult to know whether the problem is related to the theory being refuted or the other auxiliary theories which were assumed correct when creating such a hypothesis (SCIE1000 notes, 2020, pp. 153). Furthermore, another instance of falsificationism being incomplete can be seen in the variety of hypotheses which are yet to be refuted, however may be contradictory of each-other. In accordance with the Popperian framework, since these hypotheses are unrefuted, they must be considered plausible and equal. This detracts from the legitimacy of purely deductive Popperian theory as an adequate account of the scientific methodologies. Additionally, I believe that the Popperian theory isn’t correctly categorical of deductivism alone, whereby it is actually subject to induction in of itself. My reasoning for this claim can be seen in the process of falsification. Popper provides a method for selecting and falsifying hypotheses which may contain content that exceeds that of the original basic statements noted. However demonstrative inference is not able to accomplish this, due to proper deduction being non-ampliative in that the conclusions drawn shouldn’t surpass their premise in content. This issue is circumvented by the use of corroboration; however, I believe this use of non-demonstrative inference to be indicative of the inductivist approach. The Popperian theory seeks to provide forms of justification for a manner of non-demonstrative inference, which I believe to be reminiscent of the Inductivist approach. This in my opinion demonstrates an implicit reliance on inductive processes even if induction isn’t explicitly utilized within falsificationism. Considering the prior discussion, I believe it feasible to state that regardless of the approach, falsificationist or inductivist, induction is imperative when formulating hypotheses and justifying scientific laws and principles. Therefore, I can presume induction as a rational scientific approach. I wish to address a possible objection to my argument. It could be stated that a world void of induction as described by Popper is completely plausible due to induction being derived from probability rather than experimental evidence. However, I believe the conditions of induction which must be met before a generalization can be labeled valid refute such a remark. Similar parameters are seen in modern statistics where the larger a sample size the more often the observations are regarded as accurate. In addition, I believe some form of homogeneity must be warranted in order for natural phenomena to be explained. Without such a factor it would become difficult to create a hypothesis which underpins said phenomenon due to the randomness of the events. In conclusion, the necessity of induction in both the inductivist and Popperian accounts of the scientific method is evident. Therefore, when assuming science itself as rational, induction can be considered rational.

SCIE1000

Philosophy Essay

Samuel Buckingham

Bibliography: Costa, C. (2018) Philosophical Semantics: Reintegrating Theoretical Philosophy. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Retrieved from: https://www.cambridgescholars.com/download/sample/64547 Henderson, L. (2018) The Problem of Induction. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Retrieved from: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/#NeceCondForJust Hume, D. (1739) A Treatise of Human Nature. Henry Frowde, M. A. Retrieved from: http://files.libertyfund.org/files/342/0213_Bk.pdf Katzav, J. (2020) SCIE1000 theory and practice in science: Sixteenth Edition. School of Mathematics and Physics, The University of Queensland Popper, K. (1963) Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. Basic Books, publishers New York London. Retrieved from: http://www.rosenfels.org/Popper.pdf Salmon, W. C., Hitchcock, C. (1967) The Foundations of Scientific Inference. University of Pittsburgh Press. Retrieved from: https://muse-jhu-edu.ezproxy.library.uq.edu.au/book/52596#info_wrap...