Pluralist and Rational Choice analytical perspectives PDF

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Summary

Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism, and Neo-Pluralism PLURALISM  A theory of liberal democratic states  Who holds power in liberal democracies?o A plurality of people o Hence, pluralists focus on interest groups and their behaviour  Power cannot be taken for granted o The scope of any group’s power is...

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1. Pluralism, Reformed Pluralism, and Neo-Pluralism PLURALISM  

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A theory of liberal democratic states Who holds power in liberal democracies? o A plurality of people o Hence, pluralists focus on interest groups and their behaviour Power cannot be taken for granted o The scope of any group’s power is limited o Therefore, we cannot assume that a particular group will always be powerful o Competition for influence and resources within and across sectors o Dahl (1961) ‘Who governs?’: antithesis of Elite Theory

Three core varieties:   

Classical pluralism o Concerned with the ability of interest groups to influence politics Reformed pluralism o More attention to the exclusion of certain groups Neo-pluralism o The market as privileging certain groups and interests

Classical Pluralism: core assumptions 

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Centrality of groups to the political process o All groups are able to participate, though some groups may develop institutionalised links with government o The state is a neutral arbiter between competing interests Dispersal of power between different centres o Separation of powers; government departments Focus on formal decision-making processes

Classical Pluralism: the ‘Polyarchy’ (Dahl, 1971)      

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Control over governmental decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials Elected officials are chosen and peacefully removed in relatively frequent, fair and free elections Practically all adults have the right to vote o Avoiding efforts in the US to stop certain people voting Most adults enjoy right to run for the public offices Citizens have an effectively enforced right to freedom of expression, particularly political expression o No one has the right to shout fire in a crowded theatre Citizens also have access to alternative sources of information o Informed active citizenry o Diverse information flows Citizens have an effectively enforced right to form and join autonomous associations

o Able to compete for the government Classical Pluralism: normative dimensions 

Influence of liberal political theory

How can we achieve a just and liberal society?   

Through political institutions! Suspicion of state power But paradoxical faith in political institutions to deliver pluralist values

Classical Pluralism: criticisms of its ‘naivety’ Simplistic view of how political decisions are made 

Non-decision-making – who keeps items off the agenda?

Exclusion in principle or in practice   

Unequal representation in interest groups Differential access to political arenas = elite theory The power of capital

What about the role of ideas? Ideology? False Consciousness? Reformed Pluralism: core propositions Associated with analyses of British government: ‘Whitehall Pluralism’ (see Smith, 1990) Attempts to use American political system and use it here Still fragmentation in the political system 

Separation of the state into distinct policy domains

But acceptance of the exclusion of certain groups within these domains 

No longer naïve?

Reformed Pluralism: the fragmented state British pluralists saw the government as characterised by ‘Whitehall pluralism’   

Government as fragmented into different departments and agencies Hence, there is diversity at the heart of government If an interest group is ignored by one department, they will be able to find an audience elsewhere

Now taken up in studies of governance 

This literature is still plagued with questions about the balance of power within the state

Neo Pluralism Charles Lindblom (1982) argued that business is privilege as a group

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Not just because it is well-organised and well-resourced Rather, the power of business is built in to the structure of the political system This is because governments depend on economic growth o In western societies However, still an overall focus on plurality of interests and the fragmentation of government = not Marxism

Structural power of business and finance means capitalist democracies are highly resistant to change Attempts to change political and economic institutions result in automatic punishment    

Market reforms may automatically trigger slow growth or unemployment Efforts to reduce industrial pollution may result in a decline in investment and employment Uniquely automatic punishment of reforms Markets ‘imprison’ policymaking and policy makers

Corbyn; Brexit; responses to the Global Financial Crisis  

Corbyn- 'He'll tank the economy' Brexit- 'It will be massively economically damaging'

The Global Financial Crisis: bank bailouts of 2008 can be viewed as an example of how markets ‘imprison’ policy     

Risky subprime lending and mortgages Bursting of the US housing bubble and resulting fears for bank solvency Big investment banks deemed ‘too big to fail Bailouts: US ($700bn) and UK (£500bn) Quantitative easing NOT ‘Helicopter money’ o Helicopter money- Fly helicopters over over poor parts, chuck cash out of a helictopter

The Global Financial Crisis was a ‘Grand Issue’  

No debate But money no object

Grand versus secondary issues 

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Grand issues o Rarely make it onto the agenda o Certain outcomes predetermined o Policy debate is not really pluralist Secondary issues o Easier to get onto the agenda o More competition over outcomes o Policy debate is more pluralist – but business interests can still dominate

Summary    

Pluralism is rooted in liberal ideas about politics but has had to develop in response to criticism Criticism: a simplistic account of how political decisions are made that overlooks how groups are excluded Reformed pluralism and neo-pluralism: different ways of taking into account the relative power of different interests Strong normative dimension: but often not recognised and/or smuggled in as ‘objective’ political science

 Rational Choice Theory Two basic assumptions: a) rationality, and b) self-interest. (being aware of what your interests are and acting accordingly) As rational beings we have a set of goals and objectives, known as preferences Preferences     

Completeness: All actions can be ranked in an order of preference; allowing for indifference Transitivity: If action a1 is preferred to action a2 and action a2 is preferred to a3, then a1 is preferred to a3 Strict: an individual prefers a1 to a2, but not a2 to a1 Weak: an individual has a preference for at least a1 Indifference: an individual does not prefer a1 to a2 or a2 to a1

Full or perfect information about any choice made Cognitive ability and time to weigh all choices Brexit: A lot of people didn't know what they were voting for General problems with Rational Choice Theory: The dominant assumption that people are rational and intentions can be ‘read off’ from their decisions  

e.g if an actor votes Brexit, they want to leave the EU, because they have understood the implications rather than just 'stick two fingers up' to David Cameron But actions/consequences are inherently uncertain o We don't know what we're getting ourselves into

Some argue that rational choice puts an emphasis on STRUCTURE over AGENCY   

However, a lot of literature focuses on individual agency Stands of rational choice that emphasise both Constraints the strand thinks exist over the agent

Ignores or downplays the existence of ideas Strong normative dimension: but often not recognised and/or smuggled in as ‘objective’ political science

“the reduction of political man and woman to atomistic calculators, and the capture of the research agenda by applied mathematicians and ‘economic imperialists ’.”- Morris P. Fiorina

BEHAVIOURAL FOCUS: ECONOMIC VOTING Grounded in the ideal-type of the voter as Homo Economicus   

Reflexive Rational In possession of sufficient information to make an informed vote choice

Downs (1957), ‘Economic Theory of Democracy’

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Parties ‘formulate policies in order to win elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies’ (Downs, 1957: 28) o Key thing for political actors is to be in office Voters reward parties for their policies, which are analogous with products

Tufte (1978), and Schneider and Frey (1988) on ‘Political business cycles’   

Voters voted instrumentally and the core policy area was economics State of the economy was decisive in determining vote choice Governments endeavoured to synchronise the electoral and business cycle in order to generate booms in election years

Predicated on the ‘paradox of voting’ 

Voting is in itself an irrational with significant opportunity costs and little or no marginal utility (as the likelihood that the individual’s vote will be decisive in the outcome of the election)

Two main links in the causal chain between economic conditions and vote choice   

From the economy to voter perceptions From voter perceptions to the vote How the two links load into the chain as a whole seems to vary from country to country (Lewis Beck and Palham, 2000)

Specific problems with Economic Voting approaches    

Based on notion of ‘responsible government’ Grounded in the US and British literature (two-party majoritarian political systems) In reality the system is less responsive to voters’ preferences Consensual systems with minority or coalition governments blur responsibility for economic conditions

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Doubts about the core

INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS: RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM 

Actors create institutions in order to lower transaction costs of collective action

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But institutions are products of complex political bargaining and contexts and therefore tend to be hybrids with little resemblance to the initial/intended design or purposes Institutions form the expectations one actor has about the (actual and future) behaviour of others and thereby influence his behaviour

Institutions enable political decisions to be taken by ruling out many imaginable decisions (through incentives and constraints)... So institutions matter because they:  

Generate incentives shaping the rational goal-seeking behaviour of politicians, parties and citizen Perform certain functions with predictable consequences if all actors behave rationally

Problems of Rational Choice Institutionalism     

Good at identifying anomalies – not so good at explaining these anomalies if radically depart from interest-motivated action Individuals qua individuals not present here High-level of abstraction – very ‘thin’ conception of ‘rationality’ means a simplistic understanding of human motivation Can appear economically deterministic (with normative assumptions) Explanations are static: assumes fixed preferences – hard to account for change over time

Summary    

Pluralism is the idea that a variety of political actors (or agents) exist and each contributes to politics and policy making Pluralism is often accused of being naïve about the true nature of power relations Rational choice theory involves ‘cost-benefit’ analysis where we match our ‘preferences’ to available options Rational Choice approaches are often elegant but fail to capture nuances and paradoxes of human behaviour (individual and collective)...